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Sustainability on the semi-periphery: an 
impossible topic in a non-existent place?
Mladen Domazet / Dinka Marinović Jerolimov 
As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in 
early 2014, global climate change has over the preceding decades impacted 
on natural and human systems all over the world. It is ‘virtually certain’1 
that human influence, the consequence of practices that uphold contem-
porary complex civilisation, has been the dominant cause behind the per-
ceived impacts. Climate change is probably the most complex and threat-
ening environmental issue that human societies have ever faced. Whilst 
evidence is strongest for impacts on natural systems, scientists can also 
detect evidence of direct and indirect impacts on human societies. Wa-
ter resources, essential for human survival and stability of ecosystems on 
which humans depend, have changed in quantity and quality. Plant and 
animal species have shifted geographical ranges, annual behaviour patterns 
and species interactions on which the very definition of familiar ecosys-
tems depends have changed. Crop yields have largely decreased. 
The vulnerability of people who are socially, economically and politically 
marginalized is further exacerbated by these changes in the environment. 
Climate-related extreme weather further compounds the existing social 
stressors diminishing livelihoods, especially of people already living in 
poverty. The resultant violent conflicts only further harm resources and 
infrastructure that could facilitate adaptation to change of climatic and 
bio-physical conditions. Whilst it spells immediate trouble for the most 
vulnerable, the ‘fire’ does not stop there and eventually affects everyone 
everywhere. A structural transformation to low carbon, and eventually 
post-carbon, society and economy is inevitable. A democratic structural 
transformation requires broad social mobilisation and institutional plan-
01 “Virtually certain” is the term IPCC uses in the summaries for policymakers 
to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result, which carries 
99–100% probability. 
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ning to contain vulnerabilities, in the ‘core’ and in the ‘periphery’ societies 
globally. A transformation to sustainability is a dynamic process of adapta-
tion, learning and action, for which the relations between economy, soci-
ety and the natural environment must be brought to light and examined. 
Awareness of the need for strategic transformation has been growing in 
scientific circles across disciplines since at least 1970s, but it has not en-
gendered sufficiently pervasive broad public awareness required for com-
munal action. 
This volume presents a collection of theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions from 14 authors within a framework that explores the relationships 
between environmental, social and economic systems, and political and 
cultural institutions and norms. In elucidating these relationships they 
reflect the specific views of the ‘European semi-periphery’2, in theoretical 
explorations, positioning in reference to global development and impact 
indices, and analyses of public opinion survey data. The volume includes 
theoretical considerations of the understanding and significance of sustain-
ability as the developmental outcome, from global and regional perspec-
tives; as well as studies of attitudes among selected European populations 
and selected peripheral country case-study reports and recommendations 
for sustainability oriented policies. They all accept the theoretical inevi-
tability of transformation, but address the specific obstacles to necessary 
social mobilization from a variety of perspectives. 
The basic premise is that the European semi-periphery, especially its 
post-socialist countries, through experiences of specific modernising de-
velopment harbour valuable lessons useful in the face of intense develop-
ment crisis that combines environmental and social facets. These are the 
countries with high level of development, widespread educational and 
healthcare attainments, close to European cultural sphere and compara-
tively lower cumulative historical emissions of climate-change contrib-
uting industrial by-products. Interdisciplinary readings of global trends 
from semi-peripheral perspectives provide a renewed voice allowing those 
lessons to be heard in a global struggle to redefine different societies and 
02 ‘Semi-periphery’, to be introduced in greater detail below, marks the 
countries positioned between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ countries according 
to world-systems theory. Their societies are organized partly as those in 
core countries and partly as those in periphery countries. They are often 
geographically located between core and peripheral regions as well as be-
tween two or more competing core regions, and have transformative po-
tential in terms of technology, reforms in social and organizational struc-
ture, and dominance over peripheral nations. Semi-periphery is more than 
a description; it is a position within the world hierarchy in which social and 
economic transformation can be interpreted.
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economies under common bio-physical and ethical constraints. In the semi-
peripheral European societies, such as the post-socialist countries of South-
East Europe are, the overall average material development is among the 
highest in the world, although this fact is generally unrecognized among 
the national populations. The benefits of development and economic activ-
ity over the last 20 years have by and large not been equitably distributed 
in those countries, making inequality a serious concern for sustainable 
development path of peripheral European societies. 
This introductory chapter provides a background for the subsequent 
chapters through its combination of historical and geophysical ‘collapse’ 
warnings, outlining ethical constraints in the present global state of injus-
tice counterbalancing those warnings, and attempts at interdisciplinary sci-
entific description. It reviews the development and environmental impact 
indices across Europe, to help position the specific findings of subsequent 
chapters. 
Special times for a special perspective 
We live in special times. Though we laud the complexity of contemporary 
advanced global civilization from a longue durée historical perspective, we 
are also increasingly aware of the multiple instances of historic civiliza-
tional collapse. There are examples in history where increasing complex-
ity of civilisation based on mobilisation of ever-increasing quantities of 
resources, increasingly capable technologies and growth of population has 
been suddenly disrupted by a long-lasting collapse. A collapse is character-
ised by dwindling of population and deconstruction of complexity to the 
state of basic social and political organization and economic specialization 
(Diamond 2005a; Turchin and Nefedov 2009; Morris 2011; Montgom-
ery 2012). Western Roman and Mayan civilisations’ examples are readily 
recognizable precursors, but these were local and regional phenomena. In 
today’s interconnected and highly technological global society, the threat 
of collapse of civilisation is global in extent, both in terms of consequences 
and in terms of causes (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2012). 
The globalized nature of contemporary society is itself a historically spe-
cial situation (Burke III 2009), any shake-ups of which would have global 
consequences (Goldin 2013). But there is more to our predicament today 
than the mere domino effect of high economic and cultural interconnect-
edness. The globalized world is exposed to several structural weakness-
es, the most significant among them being the global irreversible climate 
change and the inequalities of development. Both are a necessary conse-
quence of the dominant development model based on output growth as 
the only remedy for relative poverty reduction, combined with fossil fuels 
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as the dominant energy source. The dominant development model is in 
turn rooted in the assumption that the primary source of our wellbeing as 
a species lies in the ability to increase the global output of goods and ser-
vices by at least 5% per year, despite the clear sign of destructive outcome 
of continuing along such path. 
Paul Crutzen coined the name “Anthropocene”3 for the new geological 
era that humans have brought about in the life of the planet (cf. Zalasie-
wicz, Crutzen and Steffen 2012 for an overview). In geological terms it 
is a very recent transition from the much longer geological age that pro-
vided the climate hospitable to human civilisation as has been historically 
recorded. The name “Anthropocene” suggests that we are living in a special 
time in which our species, our societies and cultures, act with the power of 
a geophysical force, changing the material constitution of the atmosphere, 
cryosphere, marisphere and arid topsoils (Archer 2010; Sager 2011); primar-
ily thanks to the profligate use of fossil fuels as source of energy. Geophysi-
cal forces usually involve physical processes through which tectonic plates 
are shifted; major volcanic eruptions change the concentration of different 
compounds in air, sea and soil; or a large extra-terrestrial object (an aster-
oid) strikes the surface of the planet. 
Yet, there is no doubt that the availability of abundant cheap energy 
in th eform of fossil fuels has freed modern humans from massive forced 
physical labour in the sustenance of civilisation. So, globally, humanity 
finds itself in a bind: what materially enabled a large part of our individual 
liberation and an engine for growth in population and material consump-
tion, is also predicted with high likelihood to be bringing about the collapse 
of socio-political-economic complexity we call civilisation (Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich 2013). The lethal mix is provided by the coupling of fossil fuels 
with expansionist logic of capitalism, which once established necessitates 
an ever increasing consumption of fuels and resources to maintain its pe-
culiar innovation and wellbeing expansion engine. 
Climate change and its socio-economic consequences today engender 
narratives of lament, fear, hubris and justice combining empirical obser-
vation of the trends in bio-physical environment and historical strategies 
of modern societies (Hulme 2010). Strong invocations of “time to ‘believe 
and change the way you live’, [… time] for human rebirth” (Levene 2010, 78) 
are typical of cultural transformation invoked as a mitigating response to 
threat of collapse. Meanwhile, meta-assessments (such as the IPCC work-
ing group reports) warn that over 4 degrees of warming, which is where 
03 A number of other different names have been suggested for the new age 
that humans have ushered in: including the Catastrophozoic era, Homog-
enocene, Myxocene (from the Greek word for “slime“). 
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the current development model is taking us, lie irreversible severe material 
changes for which we have no adaptation capacity. In other words, without 
mitigation of material causes and their social drivers, global civilisation 
will probably not be able to adapt to the biophysical changes (cf. the ‘con-
straints’ section below). 
Given the scientific and cultural development over the last few mil-
lennia we are in a position to say that the way the world is today leads to 
there being no ‘world’ in some near future. This is not to say that there 
will be no humans, but the civilisation that humans have been construct-
ing over the past few millennia is threatened with a long-lasting collapse. 
The global society is heavily dependent on fossil fuels for everything from 
food production, heating, construction, and material production to the pro-
duction of energy for most of the contemporary global knowledge banks. 
These resources are not inexhaustible, and as yet are not fully replaceable 
with renewable sources of energy. Only their widespread replacement can 
guarantee the global civilisation’s existing energy consumption without 
bringing on a widespread collapse under drastic, sudden and irreversible 
climate change. 
This special time calls for a combined perspective of projecting physical 
trends with as high confidence as possible into the relevant near future, but 
also sensitivity to processes in political, social and cultural spheres through 
which the projected material changes are made meaningful (Skrimshire 
2010). Not least because it is in those spheres also that we encounter signs 
of, at the very least, a “peculiar historical juncture” (Graeber 2011, 381). 
At this juncture, the dominant unsustainable paradigm for reducing ever 
evident inequalities between members of human societies is the national 
debt and credit money, a promise of continual future improvement made 
by ‘government’ to ‘the people’. Widespread debt default and economic 
collapse without inequality reduction, again in a globalised world, is the 
other driver of the precipitous termination of civilisation. 
It is not that difficult to grasp the impossibility of maintaining the cur-
rent engine of perpetual growth forever on a finite planet, given the aware-
ness that technological breakthroughs can provide very limited immediate 
improvements constrained by other limiting factors of their own. What 
is much more difficult is to untangle the intricate connections between 
environment, society and economy. By untangling them we would better 
elucidate what aspects of contemporary environment-resources-society-
economy complex we wish to preserve as much as possible whilst abandon-
ing others to necessary change under present-day constraints. This volume 
has an ambition to take a step towards untangling, to present and critique 
sustainability strategies through combined perspectives of economics, 
sociology (both theoretical and empirical) and development philosophy, 
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all rooted in the peculiar positions of its authors: researchers living and 
working in the region of the European semi-periphery.
The volume opens with examinations of philosophical, sociological and 
economic a priori considerations of sustainability (Part I) as conceived by 
experienced authors, and young researchers with novel interdisciplinary 
training and activists from post-socialist countries of Southeast Europe. 
They critique traditional growth theories and contemporary life-style prac-
tices, as well as controversial bio-pharmaceutical solutions or neoliberal 
market mechanisms as ways out of the collapse predicament. In that, they 
each step out of their professional disciplinary silos to initiate a broader 
conversation in this volume. Yet, they and the analysts in empirical com-
parative and country-case studies sections that follow, are professionally 
rooted primarily at one segment of Europe’s semi-periphery, a region that 
plays a major role in mediating economic, political, and social activities that 
link ‘old’ Europe and aspirational peripheral areas. 
Like many concepts employed in ‘straddling’ of established academic dis-
ciplines, semi-periphery is much maligned and ambiguous. However, on face 
value it serves well as description of the ‘new’ and aspiring European states, 
both by their geographical and historical position. In the 21st century Europe 
it covers industrialized and industrializing capitalist countries positioned 
between periphery and core countries. They mix both core and peripheral 
forms of organization despite recent accession to European Union, trans-
mit flows between core and peripheral regions, and exhibit cultural and 
social institutional features intermediate in form between adjacent core 
and peripheral areas (Wallerstein 1979; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). It is 
most significant for our purposes, though, to delineate the semi-peripheral 
European region by its potential for transformation of world-systems. 
Researchers in natural and social sciences are, generally, increasingly 
aware of the epistemological straddling of processes of otherwise vastly 
different scales: the dynamics of an inanimate Earth system, history of 
life and human evolution, the history of globalised industrial civilisation, 
and the collective intellectual creativity of individual humans freed from 
muscular toil (McNeill and McNeill 2003). In that they strive for a holis-
tic understanding of the physical, biological, economic and cultural sus-
tenance of contemporary civilisation by providing knowledge that itself 
straddles, or non-linearly combines, the finely profiled specialisations of 
the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. Researchers writing 
about the combined projections of the dynamics of an inanimate Earth 
system and the intellectual creativity required to transform the structures 
of social organisation and energy conversion have to themselves straddle 
discourses, disciplines and incomparable scales of processes they study 
within a single narrative. 
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This leads to texts, viewpoints, analyses and explanations with one foot 
in one set of ontological categories and the other in another, unwilling to 
cement a single unchangeable interpretation of how life and other peo-
ple should be. Given the combined effect of processes of vastly different 
scales peaking in the threat of collapse, the viewpoints resulting from the 
straddling of disciplines are not less real for being subject to alternative re-
constructions. However, the very awareness of the straddling of processes 
of vastly different scales within a single narrative of culture-civilisation-
nature interaction, like the once revolutionary paradigm of Earth mov-
ing along a heliocentric orbit around the stationary Sun, does not in and 
of itself enable humanity to implement collective strategies that would 
alter the course of the four perilously combined processes. What the said 
awareness does enable, though, is an understanding of constraining prin-
ciples under which future collective actions should unfold so as to avoid 
the dreaded collapse. 
The loose overall framework within which to develop strategies to avoid 
the collapse trades under the name of “sustainability”. Though an often mis-
used concept (cf. Mebratu 1998), sustainable development and sustainabil-
ity have a ready-made interpretation in the so-called ‘reduced Brundtland’4 
formulation as development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs 
(WCED 1987). Such ambiguity-ridden definition of strategy goals is in accord 
with the constraining principles outlined below by focusing on ‘needs’, ‘pre-
sent’, ‘future’, ‘ability’ and ‘development’. Both old Europe and new, Far East 
and far flung islands have needs, historically conditioned abilities, variable 
presents, but the least common denominator of their futures is avoiding 
catastrophic termination of the beneficial aspects of global civilisation. 
In providing the explanatory framework for sustainability, scientific ex-
planation and prediction of both natural and social phenomena play a crucial 
role. The traditional mechanistically based rationalisation through separate 
disciplines resulting from the normal conduct of science (Funtowitcz and 
Strand 2007) – reducing complexity and eliminating uncertainty – fails to 
elucidate the so-called ‘wicked’ problems associated with sustainability 
(O’Connor 2006, 291). Based on the premise that the ‘wicked’ problems defy 
classical mechanistic problem-solving methods and explanatory conceptu-
alisations, a choice of categories of representation of the present state and 
future development needs to be drawn from across a range of the problem 
domains (physical, geophysical, biological, social, economic, psychological, 
emotive). Reductive mechanistic paradigm of identifying a single obstacle 
04 The authors are indebted to Tomislav Tomašević for introducing them to 
nuances of Brundtland definitions. 
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to the problem solution is not limited to natural sciences only (Elster 2007). 
However, at this historical juncture of straddling of processes of vastly dif-
ferent scales one process’ obstacle (CO2) is another process’ solution (abun-
dant ‘cheap’ energy). A straddling perspective requires a consideration of 
the ‘wicked’ concept within a unified operative explanatory framework. 
When a problem seems ‘wicked’ or its constituent elements defy easy 
reductive categorisation sciences turn to obvious and unshakeable con-
straining principles to provide broadly generalizable explanations. As no 
intellectual discipline offers a direct mechanistic reduction of processes 
across scales of biological evolution and contemporary individuals’ moti-
vation and wellbeing, a standard mechanistic constructive explanation re-
mains elusive. It would require an identification of basic natural and social 
categories that allowed us to meaningfully combine the vastly different 
geological and cultural process that a sustainability-oriented explanation 
has to straddle. A principle-based approach, on the other hand, identifies 
the most general statements about a whole range of phenomena with-
out speculating about the universal characteristics of the fundamental 
elements of those phenomena. Whilst there are no conceptual categories 
unifying the analyses of European armed conflicts through history and an 
individual’s motivating factors in choice of breakfast, both are constrained 
by the principle that ‘humans have to eat’. 
Principles are easily understandable constraints within which broadly 
explanatory and strategic conceptualisations can be developed. Pressed for 
time and conceptual apparatus, but enjoined to engender a wide-enough 
understanding of their narratives, principle-based explanations rest on 
general but easily understandable observations without newly invented 
conceptual apparatus. Given the self-evident or easily understandable na-
ture of the constraining principles, they clarify what the world must be like 
so that those observations always hold as a general rule. The elements that 
form their basis and conceptual starting point are not the hypothetically 
constructed interacting elemental categories of disparate scale phenom-
ena, but easily established general characteristics of processes under con-
sideration (Domazet 2012a). This introductory chapter maps the possible 
constraining principles framing the more specific theoretical and empirical 
contributions below. It is the possible globally constraining principles span-
ning geophysical ecosystem conservation, cooperative behaviour motiva-
tion and ethics that we turn to next.
 
Common global constraints 
The straddling of disciplines and processes outlined above calls for a meth-
odological unification through constraining principles applicable across 
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a range of scales and structures very different in detail. When empirical 
sciences in material domains seek an integral constraining principle that 
is at work across a range of systems different in detail, they often turn to 
classical physical theory of thermodynamics as the paradigmatic princi-
ples theory (Kleidon and Lorenz 2005; Klein 1967). Behind the formal 
structure of principles (‘laws’) in thermodynamics, there lies a guiding 
concept with the seed of much of the meaning and idiosyncrasies of the 
formal explanatory apparatus. Equilibrium, a balance, is a notion that can 
be applied to many aspects of human experience beyond thermodynam-
ics, including the resource/nutrient cycling of the global population and 
the planet as a whole. In it lies concealed the behavioural principle, the 
‘minus first’ law of thermodynamics that isolated systems in an arbitrary 
initial state within some fixed volume of space will spontaneously attain 
a unique state of equilibrium (Brown and Uffink 2001). It is the founda-
tional postulate of this framing that left to themselves all things, the epis-
temological ‘black boxes’ as far as we are concerned, tend to equilibrium 
with their surroundings. 
Thus, biological population with time equilibrates/balances its resource 
uptake and release with its environment (Catling 2005), social groups 
over time equilibrate in material and cultural exchange with surrounding 
societies etc. Essential components of ecosystems: predator and prey spe-
cies, parasites, diseases and periodic physical and geological events create 
an equilibrium that keeps the ecosystem vibrant, verdant and resilient – a 
green equilibrium (Wills 2013). One lesson for us is that the ‘green equilib-
ria’ result from a wide variety of environmental pressures, again from dif-
ferent fields of study and process scales. They too are characterised by wick-
edness as the strength and overall direction of external selective pressures 
varies with the structural changes within the ecosystems they act upon. 
The other lesson, from equilibria in general, is that there is a unique direc-
tion of time from when the equilibrium condition is suddenly removed/
disturbed to when it is restored again. The overall macroscopic system will 
always tend to restore equilibrium regardless of the necessary rearrange-
ment of relative frequencies of its component elements. 
An important physical characteristic of the equilibrium state at a mac-
roscopic scale is stability, an endurance of the overall state in time. Be-
yond biology, within history of civilisation stability is also a shared aspect 
with the ‘human security’ concept and its accompanying wider discourse 
(Gasper 2005). The thermodynamics root of equilibrium concept is an 
important analogy, as a macroscopic equilibrium can contain a myriad 
of microscopic inequalities. Of course, equilibrium in terms of what, and 
whose equilibrium are issues that deserve further exploration, but are an 
issue of an extension of choice of conceptual apparatus we introduce in 
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the contributions below. Suffice to say, from a continuation of wellbeing 
through civilisation perspective not all possible final equilibrium states 
are equally desirable. 
Human population growth, material wealth increase through pre-set 
utilisations of technology, and urbanization drive the use of natural re-
sources and environmental services dramatically upward worldwide 
(Speth 2008). Most humans want a piece of that goodness at a great cost 
to other humans and future generations. Such practices are deeply rooted 
in the economic structures and cultural patterns that motivate individual 
and group behaviour. Unlike 500 years ago that is no longer insignificant 
to the planetary biosphere as a whole. They lead to a sudden environmen-
tal change in geological and evolutionary terms. This is resisted by incre-
mental readjustment of the environmental conditions in turn leading to 
societal conflicts and challenges at local, national and international levels. 
Accompanying unfair distribution of the costs and benefits of environmen-
tal change prompts serious concern for equity and fairness at all levels of 
governance. The following are then the constraining principles that sum-
marise the limiting factors of the possible sustainability orientation strate-
gies that our societies will have to develop in the near future if they are to 
avoid a collapse. Delineating micro-strategies within these constraints is 
illustrated in some contributions to this volume. 
Principle 1: The current sustenance processes (energy, food, 
and commodities production) constructive of the dominant 
development model practiced by the global human popula-
tion drive a geo-physically sudden imbalance of the material 
conditions on the planet. This leads to change in parameters 
(e.g. average global surface temperature, acidity of the oceans, 
sea level etc.) over a 40 year period unrecorded in hundreds of 
thousands (in case of some parameters several million) years. 
From the perspective of history of human societies and geo-
logical processes a relatively sudden significant disturbance of 
equilibrium (or structurally insignificant oscillations about it) 
conditions is introduced.
In absence of images and graphs it suffices to say that current levels of CO2 
in the atmosphere are exceeding 400ppm whilst only 150 years ago and 
for a very long time preceding that they were only about 280ppm. The 
associated changes show records and predictions of change over a 40-100 
year period not registered for millions (or in some cases tens of millions) of 
years. If the change over those millions is seen as the steady flux towards 
or minute oscillation around the equilibrium state, then the rapid change 
recorded and predicted now is nothing but a sudden equilibrium removal. 
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Meanwhile, so far all efforts to curb CO2 emissions through regulation and 
international agreements have not worked. In other words, the equilibrium 
on the planet is disturbed by the current practices of use of resources and 
environmental services by the global human population. 
Given the concept of equilibrium, and its ‘minus first law’, sciences warn 
of the predicted tendency of the global humans + non-human environment 
system to return to a state of balance of physical parameters and their biotic 
components. Looking at the global situation (which often may be hard to do 
from local semi-peripheral perspectives) and talking coarsely: a state of sud-
den imbalance has occurred and the overall global system will tend to find 
a new state of balance. The principle itself does not proscribe what ought 
to be done in terms of governance, it does not even state what shape the 
return to balance will or ought to generally take. That is a matter for more 
specific climatological, environmentalist, geographic, social, economic 
and most-importantly interdisciplinary discourses, a matter for debates 
between the strict scientific monitoring of the environmental conditions 
and the social and economic activities of human societies exemplified in 
contributions below (Part III). But the thermodynamic analogy teaches 
us that the role of civilisation in the new geological equilibrium may be 
altered beyond recognition. 
Acceptance of the general overall state of imbalance and the understand-
ing of the natural tendency towards equilibrium is the sufficient first step 
in motivating the popular sense of global common interest to support a 
transformation of the current modes of production. This will eventually 
probably have to include different governance structures, different energy 
production, different economic models, different cultural practices, dif-
ferent self-perception by individuals and societies etc. However, in terms 
of framing a lot is achieved when this initial point is universally accepted 
and translated into various subject-specific discourses. This is part of what 
contributors to this volume include in sustainability-orientation attitudes 
of European populations (Part II). 
The remaining two principles (fairness and guaranteed minimum) fo-
cus on the constraints to possible modifications of the societal status quo. 
Moreover they are more plainly expressed following closely the founda-
tional ethical principles of global fairness, a concept preceding mutual 
respect and dignity. They too, however, have a close connection with the 
equilibrium tendency and can as such prove to be a good guidance to the 
popular concerns. Shue (1997) claims that his principles, two of which will 
be adapted for our purposes here, do not depend on controversial philo-
sophical theories of justice and are thus widely applicable and easy to un-
derstand. Behind them lies an awareness of the danger of further desta-
bilizing the environmental conditions that all societies share should the 
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current path to development and economic prosperity be pursued; similar 
to the sharp equilibrium removal suggested above. 
Shue also points out that despite unequal inter-relations in the past, all 
societies are now aware, especially those on the profiting end of inequality, 
that ‘business-as-usual’ when applied to all leads to “everyone [continuing 
to suffer] the effects of environmental destruction” (Shue 1997, 531). He 
thus envisages that under such circumstances all societies might be willing 
to act cooperatively on equitable terms and in a manner that gives weight to 
the universal notions of fairness of burden distribution. Assuming that the 
current dominant development model has contributed to or solely created 
the sudden imbalance, a sharp deviation from equilibrium, the following 
constraining principles aim to prevent additional unfair disadvantages to 
collaborators from whom cooperation is expected. If the global humans + 
non-human environment system is to press for return to equilibrium of its 
own accord, its human subsystem should try to align with that tendency, 
rather than work against it and consequently invoke an even sharper re-
sponse from the remaining segment. 
Principle 2: It is unfair (and works against restoration of bal-
ance within the societies) when some groups have less than 
enough for a decent human life whilst others have far more 
than enough, and the total resources available are so great that 
everyone could have at least enough. (Following Shue 1997, 541) 
In simplistic terms, the hungry participants have to be fed before the joint 
work on a common task can commence. But away from such extremes, this 
principle constrains the definition of a guaranteed minimum of decent life. 
Quantitatively setting up such a minimum will determine to a great extent 
the potential for acceptable equilibrium restoration. This principle also 
recognises the crucial explanatory role of recognition of ‘radical inequal-
ity’ prevalent among and within societies today: where the aggregate total 
of resources available today is sufficient for all parties to have more than 
enough, whilst some have much more than enough and other less than 
enough. Of course, one might ask what of the different cultural heritages’ 
influence on the definition of the minimum. What if the definitions are 
so widely different that the two parties will never be able to agree? From 
the position of commons governance this issue is easily informed by the 
above principle: whatever one party sets as enough must not exert a pres-
sure on the common resource that limits the access to minimum for oth-
ers and leads to unsustainable management (denying this minimum in 
the future). No agreement would be fair, and would thus only bring about 
further imbalance, if it forced someone to make sacrifices that would leave 
them without necessities. 
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History of civilisation shows the willingness of societies and transna-
tional governance institutions to engage in notional attempts to restore 
different power and freedom balance within non-cooperative sovereign 
states, so opening up a debate about others’ self-defined minimum should 
not be a moral or a political first. Simply, those that say they need much 
more, knowing that by doing so they bring damage to everyone, whilst 
others have much less, must think hard about how to convince others of 
the fairness of their position. Without fairness there will hardly be lasting 
cooperation, or in Shue’s terms: “if the wealthy have no general obligation 
to help the poor, the poor certainly have no general obligation to help the 
wealthy” (Shue 1997, 543). 
Principle 3: It is fair (and is in line with overall equilibrium 
within societies) that among the number of groups contrib-
uting to a common endeavour those who have the most re-
sources relevant to the endeavour should normally contribute 
most to the endeavour. (Following Shue 1997, 537) 
Or, in terms of individuals, when a number of parties contribute to a com-
mon endeavour then those individuals with the most resources should 
contribute the most. Of course, attribution of different resources may vary 
between those individuals, some may have most time, others most money, 
and others still most physical power, but according to the principle of sim-
ple fairness those with most of anything should give most of the amount of 
it required for the endeavour to succeed. The strongest should pull hardest, 
those with most time should keep watch most and those with most money 
pay the highest bills. No resource commitment should impoverish anyone, 
or bring them below the minimum unless it does so for all. 
In terms of unified constraints framework offered here it seems hardest 
to reconcile fair and unequal distribution of burdens with the equilibrium 
tendency of blind physical systems. Except that again in tendency towards 
a future equilibrium state, those substructures with most energy will give 
up most to the establishment of the overall equilibrium. Most of the equi-
librium heat capacity of the combined bathtub and cup of water will come 
from the bathtub, whilst relatively most ‘heat’ will be given up by the hot-
ter of the two, whichever it is. In physics, though this should not be a blind 
guide to social governance but merely a possible conceptual inspiration, 
quantification of heat is only meaningful in relative terms, as heat avail-
able in difference from equilibrium (when no heat can be exchanged any 
more). In terms of societies, those with more invest more till balance is 
re-established. The one with more of a resource for the endeavour at the 
start will invest more for its successful outcome. 
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Cynical attitudes to human self-interest aside, it is clear that the threat 
of collapse opens up a necessity of discussion about the extent and concep-
tualisation of sacrifice, whether populations find it appealing at face value 
or not. Also, looking for marketable alternatives will not help, as Meyer 
and Maniates (2010) have elaborated. Finally, we do have both empathic and 
sacrificial practices and values already included in our biology and culture, 
and comparative surveys of societal attitudes can bring them to light as 
contributions to the ongoing discussion. A democratic shift to acceptance 
of invocation of constraints within which to navigate collapse-avoidance is 
based on recognition of crisis conditions. These include a sustained global 
economic recession in part brought about by the fossil fuel limitations, ob-
vious evidence of changing climate in the core countries, a popular sense 
that there is a global common interest in preventing a catastrophe, discur-
sive weakening of the power of ‘carbon interests’, widespread commit-
ment of vast sums of money, organizational, technological and political 
innovations (Urry 2011, 158-9). In at least some of those the semi-peripheral 
societies may lead the way in exemplifying the required transformations. 
Given that we are living a “disastrous mismatch between today’s human 
societies and the world of living natures on which human life depends” 
(Greer 2009, 3) we need to radically reinterpret our ideas of development. 
The dominant global capitalist economic growth depends on expanding to 
ever new markets. Current strong growth of countries such as China or India 
relies on incorporating new land and labour into the production process, 
while concurrently the West is experiencing a deep crisis of its growth model 
since no significant resources remain that can be introduced into market 
exchange. Europe is obsessively focusing on the threat of losing the status 
of the most competitive region in the world, but displays an inability to re-
define the ideas of development towards a more humane and sustainable 
model. Combining perspectives from ‘old’ Europe and the newly expanded 
peripheral regions paves the way for renegotiating what the European way 
of life stands for and what steps are required to orient us to that goal. Con-
sidering that the role-model of development for most world countries is 
a vague European ideal, by redefining the idea of the good society Europe 
stands a fair chance of influencing a global developmental trajectory towards 
a sustainable global community. Theoretical expositions in Part I illustrate 
how academics from European semi-periphery present these limitations. 
Some of the options for sustainability oriented economies and policies 
explored in the contributions below include measurement of development 
and productivity beyond the categories included in GDP (Coote, Franklin 
and Simms 2010), the introduction of universal basic income and a reduction 
of working time (Orsi 2009). Besides planetary geoengineering, sweeping 
biotech engineering of popular consent would infringe on ethical norms 
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now taken as a civilizational bedrock (Persson and Savulescu 2012). To gain 
through technological improvement rather than mere historical regression 
to less energy-intensive modes of production we have to change intellectual 
property rights to achieve better balance between individual and societal 
welfare (cf. Pagano and Rossi 2009). But, as other contributions show, these 
can only be initial steps in a wholesale transformation of the economy as 
required by respect for natural constraints, rather than a smokescreen to 
buy more time for those least affected by the impeding collapse. 
Though itself a dead academic letter on paper, this volume aspires to 
instil in its readers a sense of empirically founded hope that there are his-
torically rooted alternatives to fear in the face of present state of things 
actually ending (Graeber 2011, 383; žižek 2008). Whilst the recent decades 
of attempted change and upheavals concurrent with the Limits to Growth 
(Meadows, Meadows and Randers 1972) announcement were character-
ised by suppression, the experiences of peripheral existence can shed new 
light on our cultural priorities and orientation of collective aspirations. And 
when we are all at the beginning of the turn of a major historical cycle, all 
our voices count in determining how it’s going to turn out. Analyses and 
conceptual connections exhibited in this volume are one such voice in a 
global conversation of how we could live more by, to paraphrase Graeber 
ever so slightly, destroying less (Graeber 2011, 390). In transition oriented to-
wards sustainability that is understood as a dynamic process of adaptation, 
learning and action, theoretical contributions to this volume aim to clarify 
the relations between economy, society and the natural environment. Em-
pirical contributions look for evidence of potential for those clarifications 
among general populations; and within economic and educational policies. 
Development and its impacts across Europe 
Viewed from the global perspective, sustainable or unsustainable practices 
are a matter of humanity’s choice. For too many people on Earth, though, 
the problem is not unsustainable choices but a lack of choice in the first 
place. Real choice is only possible when basic human rights and needs, hu-
man security and communities’ resilience in the face of adversity have been 
assured. Whilst contributions in this volume illustrate how inequalities 
reduce the spread of choices throughout societies and between states, all 
European societies surveyed in our comparative texts are highly developed 
and competent to take responsibility for the sustainability-orientation of 
their policies and practices. This is easily affirmed in the case of the so-called 
‘core’ European wealthy nations, but from a globally comparative perspec-
tive it is also applicable to the states on semi-periphery included in this 
volume. And whilst the global semi-periphery covers most of the world’s 
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states, or sometimes excludes the post-communist countries through nar-
row definition based on trade (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000), it 
is clear that the new EU-member states from the European east and south 
play a cultural, political, economic and environmental role positioned be-
tween Europe’s less developed eastern and southern periphery and the 
highly developed European core. 
There are differences in governance architecture, global outreach, popu-
lations’ experiences and aspirations and historical development practices 
between core, semi- and peripheral European societies which this volume 
accentuates as a contribution to the global coordinated action. This is re-
flected in the population’s attitudes reported in the surveys as well as the 
theoretical strategy formulations by authors embedded in the academia 
and strategy groups in the semi-peripheral societies. The comparative chap-
ters (Part II) in this volume construct measures to examine differences in 
prevalence of sustainability-oriented attitudes between core and semi-pe-
ripheral states beyond the initial expectation that greater individual wealth 
opens up the conceptual space to ponder sustainability of civilisation. The 
contributions in this part show that inequalities and risk of deprivation are 
barriers to sustainability-acclamations expressed at the level of wealthier 
and more egalitarian European societies, but do not prevent concern for 
the environment and strife for structural social interventions that raise the 
populations’ wellbeing without the environmentally detrimental impact 
of the economic growth imperative. 
Of course, this does not mean that the European semi-periphery, how-
ever extensively delineated, can make substantial contributions to planet-
wide material sustainability alone, without a profound global reorienta-
tion. The UN Secretary General’s Panel clearly stated in the run up to the 
Rio+20 conference that achieving sustainability requires the transforma-
tion of the global economy (UN SG HP GS 2012), which is a task too momen-
tous for the European semi-periphery to achieve. Moreover, economic 
structures in the semi-peripheral region we focus on are characterised as 
liberal dependent capitalism (King 2007), which is by definition incapable 
of initiating the required transformation of the overall global economy. 
However, under the aforementioned constraining principles, present day 
societies have to find the way of abating the basic population-consumption 
drivers of environmental deterioration. In the most developed countries 
this involves abating the cultural addiction to continued economic growth, 
and evolving the satisfaction of needs of many through a steady state or 
decreasing economic activity (Jackson 2009b). In the time-span set by pace 
of climate change and our historic miniscule and localised decoupling of 
economic growth from material, resource and energy consumption this is 
imperative in high-development states of the world. 
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What the semi-periphery can contribute is experience, resources and 
practices to a coordinated global effort, and testimonies of the popula-
tions enjoying high level of material development with a lower environ-
mental impact. As the case study of Croatia has shown before (Domazet, 
Dolenec and Ančić 2012) and case-study analyses in this volume (Part III) 
extend to Bulgaria and Slovenia, there are specific and inherent obstacles 
to sustainability-orientation in this region too. These are structural faults 
built into the societies reconfiguring their aims and ontology, combining 
intense historical socialist industrialization and more recent changes in the 
role of citizens and the environment in the generation of economic activ-
ity. The case-study chapters use a variety of methods (quantitative survey 
data-sets, interviews, policy and educational content analyses) to present 
hands-on empirical insights into the sustainability-issues as lived on the 
European semi-periphery. 
In the last few decades an awareness of the need for a strategic shift 
is growing in the scientific circles, but the intensity of the crisis, and the 
strong association between its environmental and social facets, raises ques-
tions about the type and level of broad public awareness needed for consen-
sual action. In the semi-peripheral European societies the material develop-
ment is among the highest in the world, but this fact is almost invisible to 
the national populations. The benefits of development and economic ac-
tivity over the last few decades have been inequitably distributed, making 
inequality the primary popular concern standing in the way of sustainable 
development path of semi-peripheral European societies. 
Current disparities in development are not only detrimental to the bio-
physical manifold of civilisation, but are important because societies need 
to develop relations of cooperation to lessen the sacrifices that individuals 
and populations as a whole will have to make to meet the material con-
straints, most notably avoiding irreversible catastrophic climate change. 
Coordinated global action, and coordinated national or European action 
as well, cannot emerge in sufficiently developed societies enjoying civi-
lizational freedoms of modernity when material conditions of life and re-
sulting life chances are so disparate as to separate citizens into different 
socio-material realities. As Wright argues, without a basic sense of shared 
humanity we cannot engage in a democratic debate on the features of a just 
and sustainable society (2011). 
Most comparative texts in this volume use the data for 18 countries (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, United Kingdom) participating in the ISSP module Envi-
ronment, and fielded during 2009, 2010 and 2011. These countries represent 
both the old or ‘core’ nations of the European Union (including also Norway 
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and Switzerland that are not members of the EU but have close ties to the 
EU economically, culturally and materially), as well as the new member 
states from the European semi-periphery, which includes Central Eastern 
and Southeast European post-socialist countries (Hobsbawm 1995). More 
nuanced historical analyses point out the varieties of socialist economies, 
as well as their social and environmental consequences, experienced by the 
populations of states such as contemporary Croatia and Slovenia, Czech and 
Slovak Republics, or Latvia and Lithuania. Some of these are illustrated in 
the empirical comparisons below and in the contributions in Part II. 
Whilst the GDP5 of the range of European countries surveyed in this 
volume has suffered setbacks through the global economic crisis, severe 
and prolonged in many of the countries on the semi-periphery, a longer-
term perspective provided by the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) 
paints a somewhat different picture. The HDI is a composite measure of 
life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living in countries 
worldwide. It is part of the spectrum of indices that provide a background 
of distinctions between development trends and benefits in the core and 
semi-peripheral European societies. Although the exact methodology of 
the index calculation has changed somewhat over the years, the dominant 
trend places European countries in the top group of very high development 
(HD1 2012 value of 0.75-1). 
Figure 1 shows that countries with HDI value above 0.7 fall into the 
segment where increases in GNI bring comparatively smaller societal de-
velopment benefits. From a global perspective, whilst the relationship 
between HDI and GNI per capita is positive and strong, growth of HDI weak-
ens above the 0.7 HDI score, which the score that all European countries 
attain. The lesson to be drawn from this comparison is the fact that even 
our semi-peripheral European societies should not be postponing sustain-
able development policies for some more prosperous future, but should 
own up to their global development position in line with Shue’s egalitarian 
constraints presented above. 
However, when we zoom in on the GNI-HDI relationship within core 
and semi-peripheral European societies, a finer differentiation between 
their wealth and development attainment appears (Figure 2). Now some 
of the decidedly semi-peripheral societies sit on the sloping part of the 
curve. Sustainability-orientation in that case must first address the ques-
tion whether all European societies require equal attention. Some of the 
05 Whilst GDP per capita is most readily used measure of state’s economic 
performance, GNI is used in the figures below as the data readily available 
from UNDP and used in their calculation of individual state’s HDI. GNI is by 
definition GDP adjusted for incomes contributed to domestic economy by 
foreign residents and earned in the domestic economy by non-residents. 
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contributions in Part II and Part III will address this question and compare 
it to the attitudes expressed by the respective populations, as well as struc-
tural obstacles to sustainability-oriented governance. 
Figure 1
GNI per capita – HDI (2012 data); Lichtenstein and Qatar values off chart; closer 
presentation of European countries in the box in this figure is given in Figure 2
source: https://data.undp.org/ (Accessed March 2014) 
Figure 2
GNI per capita – HDI (2012 data) spread for European countries; Lichtenstein values 
off chart; 18 countries participating in ISSP marked in grey colour
source: https://data.undp.org/  (Accessed March 2014)
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From the perspective of environmental constraints of the economic 
growth promise, we can compare the ‘objective’ environmental cost of 
the development attainment of European societies included in the ISSP 
survey. Ecological footprint (EF) is conceptualised as a measure of the land 
and water required to sustain the material standard of living of a given 
population, given the reliance on contemporaneously dominant technol-
ogy (Chambers, Simmons and Wackernagel 2000). It is a measure of the 
human demand for extraction from Earth’s ecosystems, that is of the hu-
man utilisation of the natural capital contrasted with the planet’s ecologi-
cal capacity to regenerate. 
EF is expressed in figurative amount of biologically productive land and 
sea area (global average hectares, or gha) necessary to renewably supply 
the resources that the human population consumes, and to assimilate the 
resultant waste. Globally, the situation is not bright as the average global 
citizen (again hiding great disparities) has an eco-footprint of about 2.7gha, 
whilst the top sustainable limit is 1.8gha. In other words, the global popula-
tion has (without including the threat of irreversible catastrophic climate 
change) overshot the global biocapacity by 50% and now lives unsustaina-
bly be depleting the previously accumulated stocks of natural capital (Rees 
2010). The EF of the EU (including ‘old’ and ‘new’ members in 2005) has 
risen by almost 70% since 1961, from a situation where it was matched by 
the available biocapacity of the European ecosphere to requiring more than 
twice as much as that biocapacity can provide today (WWF 2005). The great-
est increase has been recorded in the decade around the turn of the century. 
With only 7% of the world population, Europe now requires 20% of the 
planet biosphere’s regenerative capacity. Whilst not all of the surveyed 
countries in the contributions below have a footprint that exceeds the 
biocapacity of their own territory (which is dependent on natural endow-
ments), all of them have overshot the global average biocapacity and are 
extracting benefits for their populations to the detriment of the less de-
veloped countries and future generations (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 
2012). 
As Šimleša (2010) summarises, the key suggestion provided by EF is that 
lifestyle improvements (including wellbeing), human population size and/
or technology, must end up in greater burden for the environment, or natu-
ral resources more specifically. We would thus expect an overall trend of 
greater EF to correspond to a greater HDI score for all European societies, 
as per capita values do not make a great difference between European coun-
tries based on population size other than those resulting from population 
density’s impact on the environment. In other words, increases in indi-
vidual wellbeing and technological underpinning across countries should 
show a linear increase in the selected European countries’ HDI scores. 
Sustainability on the semi-periphery 39
Figure 3
EF (2008 data) – HDI (2012 data) spread for 18 European countries
source: EF: Global Footprint Network, 2012. National Footprint Accounts, 2011 Edi-
tion. Available online at http://www.footprintnetwork.org; HDI: https://data.undp.
org/  (Accessed March 2014) 
As Figure 3 shows there is a clear trend amongst the selected European 
countries to increase the EF by 50% (whilst even the smallest is already 
100% above the globally sustainable average level of 1.8 gha) with a 20% 
increase in the level of development (data source: Global Footprint Net-
work 2012). But more importantly, it shows two possible, but divergent 
trends facing the societies of the semi-periphery, if we assume that de-
velopment attainment’s correlation with environmental impact is path-
dependent. This is not an unrealistic assumption given the current trends 
in the spread of the dominant social paradigm on the one hand, and almost 
negligent resource-development decoupling on the other (Hoffman 2011). 
One group of the selected European countries shows that there is a poten-
tial doubling or trebling of ecological footprint with a stagnation of the 
development benefits (HDI). Another group paves the way for a compara-
tively lower increase of footprint with more significant gains in develop-
ment benefits.
But in avoiding overall collapse of civilisation under common global con-
straints through a strategic reduction of EF, of all the European countries 
the semi-peripheral states’ populations stand in an exemplary trade-off of 
ecological cost and development attainment. Their footprints are on aver-
age 20% lower, with a 10% lower development score and a 50% lower GNI 
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per capita. From a longer historical perspective of CO2 contributions, the 
semi-periphery drops down even further whilst some of the ‘core’ nations 
centred around the European average today rise to the top of global rank-
ing (Matthews et al. 2014). 
When this material transformation is reflected in social and cultural 
processes the present day attitudes among populations and academic ex-
planations of social, political and economic specificities present a starting 
point. Although most individuals in European populations are probably 
unaware of their national footprints, and more readily perceive the benefits 
of development and wealth, it is worth bearing this connection between 
development and footprints in mind when assessing attitudes with sus-
tainability transformation potential of selected European populations. 
Whilst awareness of the national EF value does not have a direct effect on 
the populations’ environmental attitudes, attitudes in countries with high 
and those with low EF do not carry the same gravity from a global transfor-
mation perspective (Prescott-Allen 2001). 
In this setting societies of the European semi-periphery are poorer and 
less developed with lower environmental impact (Figures 1, 2, 3). We might 
expect that this makes these societies less likely to act upon their potentials 
for a sustainability switch, regardless of objective potentials to benefit from 
good balance of globally comparatively high development and low environ-
mental cost (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012). However, despite lower 
commitment to individual material sacrifice, many of our semi-peripheral 
societies populations’ concerns on behalf of the environment and global 
empathy is higher than might be expected from simple relationship be-
tween wealth and liberty to care; as the contributions in Part II illustrate.
This is the importance of the semi-periphery’s sustainability potential 
for the global dramatic cultural change required to avert collapse of civilisa-
tion (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013). Societies from European semi-periphery 
have a specific combination of material development, environmental im-
pact and cultural heritage throughout modernisation. As the sociological 
analyses show (Giddens 1984; Baudrillard 1998; Carruthers and Babb 
2000) our development patterns and environmentally destructive practices 
are not a case of individuals’ malevolence, but a feedback loop between ex-
isting cultural trends and norms and individual adaptive reactions (Zabel 
2005). On the one hand these interact with what can be termed universal 
human biological predispositions for sociability and survival through com-
petition for resources, and on the other with historical entrenchment of 
societal and technological structures, cultural norms and values (Trivers 
1971; Axelrod 1984; Wilson 2012). 
Whilst the human biological predispositions can be deemed universal 
across the European space, the societal and technological structures have 
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undergone a wave of recent rapid transitions in the semi-peripheral socie-
ties (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2005; Hobsbawm 1995). This volume presents 
theoretical and empirical rethinking of cultural and historical develop-
ment patterns in semi-peripheral European societies. These are important 
because in a culture with a prevailing self-interest orientation, individu-
al’s concerns and attitudes reflect this orientation although they preserve 
patterns of philanthropy and altruism towards what they will deem their 
closer fellows (Zabel 2005). The latter patterns are a foundation to build 
on within collective creativity processes under the common global con-
straints. 
The exposition above justifies the choice of topics and research perspec-
tives adopted across the range of contributions below. It situates the contri-
butions below geographically, within the world-system framing suggested 
by the title, as well as within dimensions of human experience, scales of 
historical processes and across academic problem-solving domains. In the 
remainder of this chapter we provide an overview of the ISSP Environment 
module’s fielding in 2010 and its survey instruments, and the particular 
content of individual chapters below. 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – a global survey of en-
vironmental attitudes 
The ISSP is an on-going programme of cross-national research that covers a 
range of topics important within the social sciences. Its members are sur-
vey organizations from around the world, many of whom are affiliated with 
academic institutions, each representing one nation. The ISSP implements 
rigorous standards of survey research in order to address the difficulties 
inherent in multinational survey research. Since its modest beginning in 
1984 ISSP has grown to include 48 members, each of whom are responsible 
for the ISSP surveys being implemented in their country each year.
The annual topics for ISSP surveys are developed over several years, led 
by an elected sub-committee and pre-tested in various member countries. 
The annual plenary meeting then discusses and finalize the questionnaire 
which is fielded in all countries. The ISSP research concentrates especially 
on developing questions that are: 1) meaningful and relevant to all coun-
tries, and 2) can be expressed in an equivalent manner in all relevant lan-
guages. The ISSP data archive prepares a combined dataset that is freely 
available. Many topics are repeated at regular intervals, allowing research-
ers to examine cross-national variations and changes over time.
ISSP marks several new departures in the area of cross-national research. 
First, the collaboration between organizations is not topic-specific nor in-
termittent, but routine and continual. Second, the on-going collaboration 
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of the same institutions makes cross-national research a basic part of the 
national research agenda of each participating country. Third, ISSP prin-
ciples require that all member institutions be involved in various phases 
of planning and designing survey modules, and each member has a say in 
decision making. Fourth, by combining a cross-time methodology with a 
cross-national perspective, two powerful research designs are being used 
to study societal processes.
The data presented in six chapters of this volume (partially or exclu-
sively) deal with the 2010 third fielding of the ISSP module Environment. 
The first module was run in 1993, when 22 countries took part, the second 
in 2000, when it was fielded by 25 countries, while in the 2010 module 36 
countries took part.
This research module focuses on environmental attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour. Previous studies from 1993 and 2000 have been widely used by 
researches in many countries.6 They commonly use the data to examine 
how levels of environmental concern and behaviour vary between different 
groups and different countries, and to help understand different patterns of 
attitudes and how these relate to behaviour. Researchers very often relate 
country-level variables such as GDP and GDP growth to survey data, show-
ing a great deal of diversity. 
Attitudes and beliefs covers: environmental concern, the salience of the 
environmental issues, environmental knowledge, attitudes towards sci-
ence, nature and environment, environmental efficacy, scepticism about 
the environmental threat, dangers of specific environmental problems, 
role of different nations in tackling environmental problems and environ-
mental policy.
The question about environmental concern aims to explore the salience 
of environmental issues in more detail, allowing us to identify those who 
are the most and least environmentally concerned. Correlation of results 
with the behaviour items expectedly shows that the most environmentally 
concerned respondents are the most likely to behave in an environmentally 
friendly way. Attitudes about the salience of environmental issues explore 
which particular environmental problems respondents see to be of most 
concern both to the country as a whole, and to the respondent and his or 
her family. This refers to the well-known thesis of environmentalism which 
explains the global environmental concern, divided between rich (North-
ern) and poor (Southern) societies either as a manifestation of typical post-
06 The description of the module relies on Environment Drafting group re-
port discussed at the ISSP annual meeting in Vienna in 2009. Drafting 
group consisted of five member countries: Canada, Chile, Germany, United 
Kingdom, South Korea and Spain.
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material modern values in wealthy countries (Inglehart 1995; Dunlap and 
Mertig 1997) or suggests that citizens’ real experiences of environmental 
hazards in poor countries motivate them to protect the environment (In-
glehart 1995; Brechin 1999, 2003). Another way to explore the salience of 
environmental issues is assessing the importance of the environment to 
the respondent compared to other societal issues.
The environmental self-assessed knowledge question refers to causes of 
environmental problems and the solutions to these problems. Pilot results 
showed that those concerned about the environment report higher knowl-
edge and that self-assessed knowledge increases with education. The part of 
the research aimed to explore attitudes to science and nature particularly 
how these relate to environmental concern (for instance whether we can 
expect science to solve environmental problems).
Attitudes about environmental efficacy (the extent to which people 
think their attitudes and behaviour are important and actually make a 
difference) are crucial to our understanding of how people live in practice. 
It is worth noting that although individual’s impact is usually small, over-
all impact of people’s behaviour is considerable. Evidence from the pilot 
showed a positive association between efficacy and environmental behav-
iour; people who said that they “do what is right for the environment even 
if it costs more or takes more time” were also more likely to report always/
often engaging in green behaviour.
Another important possible predictor of people’s behaviour is the scepti-
cism about the environmental threat i.e. assessment of the extent to which 
they feel environmental threats have been exaggerated. Attitudes about 
dangers of specific environmental problems (air and water pollution, us-
age of GMO crops, usage of pesticides and chemicals in agriculture, global 
warming) showed the variation in recognising different areas as more or 
less dangerous for the environment. These questions have been used in 
analysis to explain environmental consciousness, and according Haanpää 
(2007) form a clear dimension that is distinct from environmental knowl-
edge and behaviour.
The role of different nations in tackling environmental problems as-
sesses the respondent’s own perception of how well his or her country is 
doing. On the other hand the questions concerning the role of government 
in environmental policy refer to respondents’ attitudes about the extent 
to which government should intervene to protect the environment, in re-
spect to both individuals and businesses. Also respondents need to choose 
between the positive government policy approaches (such as tax incentives 
or education) and negative ones (such as fines or higher taxation). Pilot 
results showed a clear tendency for people to adopt more punitive poli-
cies when it comes to business than they do in relation to people and their 
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families (for example, policies such as more education or changes to the 
tax system are more popular than fines or stronger laws). In the context of 
climate change attitudes about energy sources as part of the environmental 
policy was found of particular importance.
Items concerning behaviour include: hypothetical behaviour, actual be-
haviour, membership of environmental groups and involvement in other 
environmental actions.
The hypothetical questions refer to willingness of respondents to make 
sacrifices for the sake of the environment. They explicitly highlighted the 
link between support for environmental protection and the associated 
costs involved in order to elicit more honest views. The actual behaviour 
covers important aspects of current policy debates: recycling, car use, use 
of pesticides and chemicals, fuel use and water consumption. It was impor-
tant that the question wording makes clear that environmentally friendly 
behaviour is environmentally motivated (not for example religiously or by 
simply obeying the law).
Membership of environmental groups and involvement in other envi-
ronmental actions are another environmentally relevant behaviour. Few 
people are members of an environmental group (under 10%), but a sig-
nificant minority of people in many countries had been involved in one 
or more environmental activity. Increasingly common way of expressing 
environmental concern is boycotting or ‘buycotting’ (the term used to 
describe choosing to buy products from a particular source for environ-
mental reasons).
There are several explanatory items used in the module: left-right ori-
entation, materialism / postmaterialism, social trust and political trust. 
The left/right dimension remains important in helping explain different 
attitudes and beliefs about the environment (NeuMayer2004; Curry et 
al. 2007) as well as materialism/postmaterialist dimension despite a con-
siderable debate about the extent to which post-materialism is linked to 
environmental attitudes (for example Ignatow 2006; Franzen 2003). The 
key measure behind the social capital construct (Putnam 1995) social trust 
is expected to have considerable relevance to environmental attitudes and 
behaviour – if people are going to make sacrifices of various sorts for the 
environment, they are more likely to do so if they believe they can trust 
other people to act the same way. Social trust is also likely to relate to the 
perceived efficacy of environmental action and to participation in environ-
mental action. In addition some authors suggest that political trust is an 
important factor in shaping people’s views about the environment as well 
(Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2007). 
Almost all of the issues covered by the 2010 Environmental module can 
be found in the chapters presented in this volume, either theoretical or 
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empirical. Six chapters deal with ISSP national or comparative quantitative 
empirical data, and one presents the national qualitative study tackling 
the Croatian climate policy issues. All chapters are original contributions 
of scholars from different research institutions in Croatia, Switzerland 
and Bulgaria who are engaged in environmental research, some of them 
for decades. 
Overview of the chapters 
The volume Sustainability Perspectives from the European Semi-Periphery is 
divided in three parts.
Part I examines philosophical, sociological, and economic theoretical 
considerations of sustainability, giving a critique of traditional growth 
theories and contemporary environmental practices, of controversial bio-
pharmaceutical moral enhancement solution and of the existing global 
(neoliberal) understanding of the market mechanisms which produce the 
crisis whilst offering those same markets as the way out of it at the same 
time. Different alternative approaches that re-examine the foundations of 
global economy are discussed, including the concept of de-growth. 
In the opening article “Limits to growth and the growth of limits. Are we 
ready for a sustainable society?” Ivan Cifrić paints a broad canvass of the his-
torical position of sustainability throughout the modern period, and iden-
tifies the contemporary practices seen as obstacles to a wholesale social 
switch to more sustainable socio-metabolic practices. In most general and 
global terms he also identifies the values and social norms assumed as the 
sociological and philosophical preconditions for such a switch. Presented 
in a creative way this chapter offers a needed critique of the traditional 
growth theories. 
Tvrtko Jolić, in the chapter “Climate change and human moral enhance-
ment”, provides a detailed and cogent philosophical argument against the 
shocking suggestion of ‘geo’-engineering for technologically challenged 
societies of the semi-periphery, a bio-pharmaceutical enhancement of hu-
man moral faculties so as to socially engineer adherence to the politics of 
sacrifice for the sake of the avoidance of catastrophic global climate change. 
In absence of such drastic solutions what remains is the faith in a historic 
pattern of overcoming collective challenges and in potential for coordi-
nated action and sacrifice engendered by education and understanding of 
the common constrictions. 
In the chapter “Global Environmental Crisis and Limits to Growth: A Marx-
ian Perspective”, Mislav Žitko provides a theoretical justification for the 
relevance of Marxian analysis of the contemporary globally dominant eco-
nomic institutions for the considerations of environmental limits of eco-
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nomic growth, and vice versa. Using the contemporary data from world-
wide sources the article argues that moving beyond capitalist relations of 
production, whatever form they are cloaked in for the new century is a 
matter not of utopian theoretical projection, but of political urgency. 
Dražen Šimleša, in the chapter entitled “What kind of economy does a 
sustainable development need?”, captures many aspects of sustainability 
and questions the global state of the art in progressive economic thought. 
He reviews the critiques of the existing global economic situation, the 
modes of management of economic crisis, and alternative approaches to 
the issues that each in its own right re-examine the very foundations of the 
global economy. Those alternatives aim to suggest how we might restruc-
ture the values and modes of organization of contemporary societies so 
as to mitigate the devastating consequences for environment and human 
wellbeing. He elucidates with concrete policies and examples from Croatia 
what would be required in order to build economies which are slower and 
lighter by design, rather than by disaster. 
The chapters in Part II are based on ISSP 2010 quantitative survey data. 
They bring comparative empirical insights into European differences in the 
sustainability potential concerning environmental policies and practices, 
levels of social inequality, income of populations, personal willingness to 
activate and sacrifice for environment preservation as well as differences 
in sustainability potential of knowledge based societies / economies.
Mladen Domazet, Branko Ančić and Marija Brajdić Vuković, in the 
chapter “Prosperity and environmental sacrifice in Europe: importance of in-
come for sustainability-orientation” analyse the comparative findings in 18 
European countries. They construct indices to reveal the prevalence of 
the potential within different national societies to support policies and 
practices conducive to a sustainability switch. Going beyond general claims 
about prosperity and post-materialism, the authors offer a more nuanced 
view identifying the aspects of popular attitudes strongly correlated with 
the incomes of the said countries’ populations. These are mainly related 
to individual personal concern, activation and willingness to commit to 
materially sacrificial practices. However, when asked about the broader 
developmental practices those populations’ attitudes no longer depend on 
current income trends. With this, the authors pave the way for the remain-
ing comparative chapters to investigate what other than current incomes 
might be driving the sustainability-potential differences across Europe. 
In the chapter “Why power is not a peripheral concern: Exploring the rela-
tionship between inequality and sustainability” Danijela Dolenec, Mladen 
Domazet and Branko Ančić investigate the correlations between levels of 
inequality within the said European countries and personal concern, activa-
tion and sacrifice commitments within their populations. They expand the 
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models and instruments from the previous article with measures of social 
inequality and international indicators of material deprivation. Whilst ac-
knowledging the strong influence of income in support for environmental 
conservation among general population, this chapter exposes the fallacy 
behind the expectation that only affluent European societies hold value 
orientations important for the switch to sustainability. 
In the final comparative quantitative study, “The sustainability potential 
of the knowledge society: Empirical study”, Marija Brajdić Vuković explores 
further the factors behind differences in concern, awareness and economy-
environment trade-off in a range of European countries. She focuses on 
two concepts that are widely used in political debates, ‘knowledge soci-
ety’ and ‘sustainable development’. The study is especially concerned with 
the belief implied by politicians that the development of the knowledge 
economy and, more broadly, of knowledge societies will result in sustain-
able development. It shows that that the sustainability potential of a given 
knowledge society varies with its contextualisation within the normative 
framework of neoliberal capitalism in different European countries. 
In Part III five country case studies are presented highlighting some 
specific aspects of sustainbiliy obstacles and potentials in Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Slovenia. While in the Bulgarian study authors pay particular atten-
tion to relevance of social trust and other social factors for environmental 
attitudes and behaviour, several authors analyse the situation in Croatia 
concerning the structure, background and potential of environmentalist 
attitudes and values, industrial policy and climate change policies. The fi-
nal chapter compares the sustainability education content and framing in 
Croatia and Slovenia. 
Franziska Bieri and Rumiana Stoilova in the chapter “Environmental 
Concern in Bulgaria: The Role of Social Trust”, explore different social factors 
(particularly social trust) that shape European and Bulgarian individuals’ 
environmental concern as the key components of sustainability-oriented 
attitudes. Based on the ISSP dataset the analysis sheds light on the deter-
minants of environmental concern in semi-peripheral contexts, an area 
which has received only marginal attention. They find that in Bulgaria, in-
come or post materialistic values do not significantly affect environmental 
concern, whilst educational attainment, gender and people’s social trust 
appear as consistent and strong predictors for people’s environmental con-
cerns. These are particularly interesting findings in the light of the special 
position of Bulgaria within the comparative datasets presented in Part II. 
In the chapter “Structure and action potential of environmental attitudes 
and knowledge of environmental problems in Croatia” Krešimir Kufrin analy-
ses the history and findings of pro-environmentalist attitudes as precondi-
tions for sustainability switch support throughout more than 20 years in 
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Croatia and compares them to the most recent data from the ISSP Environ-
ment survey of 2010. He finds that environmental protection falls behind 
pressing economic issues among majority of Croatian population leaving 
a lot of room for improvement of pro-environmental behaviour, despite 
high and widespread concern for global environmental limits. Yet there 
is also room for improvement, the author finds, in the level of awareness 
of environmental issues and their effects on individuals’ everyday lives.
Igor Matutinović, in the chapter “Industrial policy for sustainability” 
takes the case-study of Croatia to illustrate in real-policy examples what 
interventions are required in the economic sphere today so as to better 
position a small semi-peripheral European country for long-term material 
sustainability without radically disturbing the current social order. From 
the perspective of ecological economics, clearly aware of the dangers posed 
for small peripheral societies by global climate change, he also argues for 
urgent and pointed interventions in sectors critical for sustainability such 
as food and energy production. 
Contributing to empirical research on a relatively new topic Jelena 
Puđak, in the case-study “Are we ready for a climate policy? – Status of cli-
mate change politics in Croatia”, presents a qualitative analysis of climate 
change policies in Croatia from the perspectives of different actors: state, 
academic, CSO and business sectors, and finds them wanting from many 
standpoints. It concludes that Croatia does not have a comprehensive or 
efficient policy for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet the 
problem identified seems to rest on a deeper structural fault, that of good 
governance and policy coordination and implementation in the countries 
like Croatia, and is not solely hampered by lack of individuals’ will, vision 
or awareness of the importance of the issue. 
In the closing chapter, “Environmental sustainability and education: the 
case of Croatia and Slovenia”, Mladen Domazet and Branko Ančić take a 
qualitative look at calls for change in educational content in line with the 
calls for social change in sustainability-oriented practices. The authors 
present an overview of studies of educational content related to environ-
mental component of sustainability education in Croatia and Slovenia’s 
compulsory education. They consider this component as a reflection on 
the development, prosperity and educational attainment of the two neigh-
bouring countries’ populations. The relevance of educational content in the 
context of this volume rests on the premise that education is an expression 
of a society’s dominant choices; that a politics of nature and development 
is inscribed in the educational projects notionally geared towards sustain-
ability.
Studying sustainability is a hopeful narrative for the future state of 
the human species in the face of the upcoming serious perturbation in 
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the Earth system. Whilst the connections between the subtleties of hope 
for elimination of subsistence inequalities between societies, progress in 
equality within the same societies, mitigation of ecosystem destruction 
and climate change are often hard to reductively model in language, the 
effects are often all too obvious. The global academic community does not 
have all the answers, but an informed public with basic knowledge of gov-
erning principles and political will to make a difference can start reducing 
the risks and contributing solutions to difficult questions that confront us 
all. The contributors to this volume dedicate their efforts to beginning to 
deal with these difficult questions. 
The role of powerful actors in the global governance as the central in-
stance that coordinates policies for 7 billion people is not in question, but 
this volume suggests that there is a need to strengthen democratic impuls-
es for voice, collective action and self-governance in often overlooked pop-
ulations on the semi-periphery. The states of the European semi-periphery 
are currently in a comparatively good position to change from the develop-
mentalist project bent on excessive burden to environmental sustenance 
capacity and deepening of social inequalities to a sustainable development 
model that respects citizens’ aspirations, ecosystems limits’, common re-
sources and future generations before it is too late for all. 
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considerations

Limits to growth and the growth of 
limits: Are we ready for a sustainable 
society?
Ivan Cifrić
1
Introduction
The motto above is the hope of critics of the contemporary industrial so-
ciety. What remains to be seen how the transformation that they predict 
will unfold and what its result will be. The history of social thought has 
dealt with this issue from a range of perspectives, from the reformist to the 
radical. Considering that the reformist practice of industrial capitalism has 
been dominant so far, but did not help resolve the contemporary crisis, it 
could be an indication that a more radical approach is needed. 
Starting from these considerations, the paper discusses growth as a con-
temporary socio-ecological problem and development as a “civilizational 
issue”. The analysis starts with the thesis that socio-ecological crisis, de-
fined as the crisis of the relationship between nature and society, exposes 
the existing limits of growth of the capitalist economy and western under-
standing of progress. However, despite the critiques of growth, the “limits 
of growth” are systematically widening (growth of limits), due to modern 
developments in science and technology, which remain firmly set on the 
path of liberal capitalism. As a result, the distance between the developed 
“center” and the poor “periphery” is also widening. The solution to this 
crisis is possible only if transformation occurs within the “centre”, which 
parasatizes the resources of the “periphery”. In other words, only with the 
“The earth is full. In fact our human society and economy is 
now so large we have passed the limits of our planet’s capac-
ity […] Our current model of economic growth is driving this 
system, the one we rely upon for our present and future pros-
perity, over the cliff. […] We will change […] completely trans-
forming our economy, including our energy and transport in-
dustries, in just a few short decades.” (Gilding 2011, 1-2).
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transformation of the “centre” can we expect more significant changes 
worldwide. 
As an argument in favor of this thesis, the author examines the relation-
ship between man and nature, the need for change of the relationship be-
tween economic and environmental systems, the crisis of modern society 
and its developmental dilemmas, as well as the possibility of a social turning 
point. There is an obvious paradox here: the “limits of growth” are being 
overcome by the new “growth of limits”, in connection with the domina-
tion of developed countries, as capitalism is globally spread and sustained. 
Theoretically, the author expresses the need for a more permanent solution 
to socio-ecological crisis, by examining the social metabolism of liberal cap-
italist society, as well as the ideas of the Green New Deal and green economy, 
new international cooperation, and the role of the environmental move-
ment. The crisis should serve as an incentive for a critical examination of 
the existing condition and direction of modern industrial society, as well 
as developmental perspectives of humankind. Environmental criticism 
can, therefore, be seen as the basis for social criticism, which can lead to 
the questioning of industrial capitalist model. 
Humanity needs a new developmental paradigm, which will be based on 
a sustainable relationship between economy and nature (environment), as 
well as on a decrease in the alienation of the system on both global and na-
tional levels. Solutions based on the same way of thinking that led modern 
society and the entire world into this crisis are no longer suitable. We need 
almost a utopian paradigm which will limit the quantitative growth and 
the domination of economic and technical subsystems, establishing a new 
“unity of nature and society”. It should be guided by a threefold principle: 
a liberated human in a librated society and a liberated nature. 
Society and the environment – Need for ecological change
Ecological crisis warnings list key issues like population growth, food pro-
duction, industrial production, exploitation of natural resources, and pol-
lution, all of which contribute to the overall problem of increasing pollu-
tion and degradation of nature and the environment. All these processes 
have social causes. Nonetheless, fifty years ago some experts understood 
them not as being part of a longer process and complex problem, but chose 
to speak of them separately as “ecological crisis,” “energy crisis,” “natural 
resources crisis,” “nuclear plant crisis” (Eckert 1978, 8).
In the meantime, different ecological and social issues were shown to 
make up a complex of mutually related issues as an overall social-ecological 
problem. Ecological issues have become global, including climate change, 
biodiversity loss, etc. Social issues include international cooperation, global 
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security and personal safety, mass unemployment, uneven distribution of 
produced goods, debt bondage of individuals and countries, over-exploi-
tation of natural resources etc.The most significant among these is the 
population growth and its demands for increasing welfare. 
The environment does not become an issue of its own accord. The issue 
is created in the mind, in the social reception of reality as a theoretical 
(economic, political, ethical, esthetic, legal, etc.) construct on the basis of 
observed problems (Bemmann 2012). It does not objectively exist in nature 
without human influence, nor subjectively without being socially con-
structed as a social problem. 
Cultural evolution shows that the main goal of humans in the history 
of societies was survival, which required food and shelter, as it does today. 
The human being as a dual creature – creative and destructive (Kattmann 
1997) – has altered (destroyed and created) its environment to match its 
individual and collective needs. The anthropological determinant of hu-
mans is not only creating new cultural environments (which would fit 
their needs), but destroying pre-existing ones. In the process of creation and 
destruction, they accumulated historical experience by creating cultures 
and civilisations.1 If this dual activity were to end, their development as 
humans would cease. Human beings cannot be separated from nature, re-
gardless of the level of creation and the modes of mediation established: 
that is another anthropological determinant of humans. Humans have 
thus systematically colonised nature by colonising what had already been 
colonised (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 1997). The question is: where are the 
limits of such linear colonisation, driven by the Western idea of progress? 
“External,” i.e. spatial, colonisation of nature is almost completed; what 
follows is the “internal” colonisation of nature and its elements (humans 
and other creatures). Given the tendencies of contemporary science (e.g. 
genetic engineering), technical and biological colonisation of the human 
body will replace the colonisation of nature (the environment). This is an 
issue that brings up anthropological questions and causes ethical contro-
versy.
The economy of premodern societies was formed within natural condi-
tions, natural resources. The ecosystem came first, and the economic sys-
tem came second. Industrial society is characterised by a “Copernican revo-
lution” between the ecosystem and the economic system. The economic 
system has become the foundation of political, cultural, and moral systems. 
01 “Culture consists of the set of relations that the human beings of a given 
civilization maintain with the world; society consists more particularly of 
the relations that these same human beings maintain with one another.” 
(Lévi-Strauss 2013, 74)
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Nature was placed within economy, and not the other way round, which 
resulted in turning nature into an economic construct. Three paradigms 
of conceptualising nature emerged: nature as “continuous” (organic), as 
“resource” (capitalised), and as “constructed” (the product of science and 
technology) (Hecht 1998, 248). The faulty logic of economic dominance 
over the environment was pointed out by the Chicago School in the “hu-
man ecological pyramid” (Park 1952; Hamm 1982, 173), which conceptualised 
the economic system as limited by the ecological system. The caveat was 
embraced by contemporary ecological economics (Hampicke 1992; Daly 1994; 
Common and Stagl 2006).
One should distinguish between “ecological economics” and “environ-
mental economics.” Environmental economics is related to issues of econo-
mising environmental resources in the context of the existing liberal capi-
talist economy. It does not vary with different political systems, because 
its goal remains the exploitation of resources. “Industrialist economics” is 
another possible name for it, while some even call it “cowboy economics.” 
Ecological economics foregrounds the ecological aspects of economy, i.e. 
a mode of economising that incorporates reducing exploitation of natural 
resources and use of agrochemicals, the reduction and further use of waste 
and energy in production, the application of new energy sources (solar, 
wind power) and technologies – in general, the economical use of materials 
in production and consumption of commodities.
In terms of the “ecumene,” one can speak of the biotic and cultural ec-
umene. Acting in and upon nature, changes the human environment. Hu-
man encroachment upon nature and the environment has increased in 
the course of history. The space where culture (the cultural ecumene) and 
nature (the biotic ecumene) interact is called the anthropobiotic ecumene 
(Cifrić 2007), and has expanded to cover a large portion of the Earth. Pres-
ervation of nature (the wilderness issue; species becoming extinct...) is but 
one aspect of protecting nature and the environment: it is the protection 
of humans themselves. It becomes necessary to protect the anthropobiotic 
ecumene in in its entirety, i.e. the cultivated space that continues to be 
polluted as well as endangered, and which is subject to increasing entropy 
(Altvater 1992, 42-43). Preserving nature and the environment has become 
an issue of development, and not of protection.
Crisis of modern society (economy) – Need for social change
In order for the state of things to change, an event must occur in its real-
ity, which therby undergoes ta certain cathartic transformation where 
existing structures and relations are altered or eliminated, and new ones 
are formed – as expected or unexpected they may be. That process can be 
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described as a minor or major crisis. Every step of development in human 
history is the consequence of a crisis of the then existing order, a resolu-
tion between old and new relations (states). This means that crisis is not 
just a negative state (process) ending in a minor or major disaster, but also 
a positive state which produces a new potential choice, something new and 
progressive. It will be deemed progressive if existing social expectations 
see novelty as desirable.
There are different kinds of social crises, such as financial crises, mar-
ket crises, crises of values and morals, political crises... but also ecological 
– social-ecological crises, which result from ill-suited human activity in 
nature (the environment). The crisis is not one of nature, but of culture, 
and its consequences are observable in nature as well as in society. New 
epochs are brought about by transformations of social order relations, 
such as “the great transformation” used by Karl Polanyi to explain the 
emergence of the first industrial revolution or of industrial society (Po-
lanyi 1999), or by some authors to explain the emergence of “the era of 
ecology” (Radkau 2011).
Different authors speak of different roots (causes) of crises in modern 
society. There is mention of Biblical causes of the ecological crisis (White 
1967), or of a threefold crisis of values, of world cooperation, and of respon-
sibility (Taylor 1970, 352-354). Another prominent thesis is that of human 
self-understanding (as “exceptional” in their qualities but “excluded” from 
nature and the rest of the world) and the understanding of nature (as the 
object of human needs and greed), both of which are seen as separating 
human beings from nature (Faber and Manstetten 1992).
Gilding (2011) optimistically describes three stages of crisis response. 
The first is a call for action; the second is the clash between the ecosystem 
and the economic system; and the third is the great expectation. Gilding 
warns that the Earth is “full” and that the world population and world 
economy have exceeded limits of provision, meaning that the current 
model of economic growth is pushing the ecosystem towards a disaster 
(Gilding 2011, 2). Today’s world finds itself between the second and third 
stage, although opinions remain different and the “great expectation” 
undefined. Some expect to see a general improvement which is supposed 
to occur on its own; others expect to see the concept of sustainable devel-
opment put into action; finally, there are expectations of a radical trans-
formation of the capitalist system, which we agree with. In the long run, 
we do not share Gilding’s (as well as some others’) optimism that the way 
out is for humankind to take a new leap, prompted by the social-ecological 
crisis (entropy). That would lead to the next level, i.e. a deeper crisis. On 
the contrary, what is needed is a radical transformation of the contempo-
rary industrial capitalist society, which would entail a transformation of 
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economy’s relation to nature.2 If the historically obsolete paradigm of 
contemporary capitalism was not evidently dangerous before, the danger 
is clear and present now.
It would appear that the key to the current crisis of modern society – a 
sliding crisis – lies in its state of transition into a different kind of society 
– a postmodern society3, and in the fear of curbing growth and of possible 
economic entropy or social disaster. The goal of today’s industrial society 
is not to “fill” it up with more economy to reach a “full world state” (Daly 
1994). The issue is how to keep it in balance.
The system and global regimes. In terms of temporality, the basis of mod-
ern society is linear development, whereas premodern (agrarian) societies 
organise their time in line with nature (cyclically) and are not familiar 
with the category of development in the sense that we know it. Neverthe-
less, they also experience cyclical (social) crises. So far, liberal capitalism 
has manifested an extraordinary power of progress and is the main force 
behind today’s level of civilisation. Its progress depends on its systematic 
expansion into, and colonisation of, the premodern world (cultures). The 
economy and logic of liberal capitalism has probably already “filled” (ex-
panded into) this “empty world” to a great extent, which means that the 
conditions of its progress have expanded to include the whole world and 
to spread the logic of capitalist ideology of unlimited growth and profit 
increase. One historical cycle of its progress is therefore in crisis and prob-
ably facing its end, which poses the question of what the next cycle is going 
to be (under the assumed condition that global nuclear or environmental 
disaster is avoided). However, the system is strongly resisting more radical 
changes and supporting only those that meet the needs of the global system 
established by the highest developed countries.
On the global and national level, it is possible to track and analyse the 
influence on the crisis of modern (industrial) society which reflects on pre-
modern (preindustrial) societies, i.e. societies in transformation. Namely, 
the modern system is characterised by the following:
(a) formation of different regimes and institutions (e.g. economic, finan-
cial) – economic protectionism and financial imperialism have become 
effective regimes of domination by developed countries. Financial im-
02 According to Supek, “there can be no possible solution for the contem-
porary ‘ecological crisis’ unless there is radical reform of human society, 
because the ‘ecological crisis’ itself is merely a reflection of the deeper 
social crisis of humankind, its mode of production, its relation toward its 
own life conditions” (Supek 1989, 36).
03 Relevant literature uses different terms to describe what we most com-
monly refer to as “modern society” (Pongs 1999).
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perialism is the reflection of the crisis of contemporary capitalism and 
main threat to the prospects of undeveloped countries;
(b) networking regimes into an integrated global system that resembles 
an octopus; and
(c) estranging the system from society to an extent where it becomes an 
alienated system.4 The paradox of humankind is that this creates the 
feeling of increased liberty, and not of slavery. Although the USA is a 
key to its emergence and existence, the global alienated system did 
not originate from a single national centre, but from several developed 
countries simultaneously. It was constituted as a global octopus.
The main purpose of this alienated system is its internal rationality, used 
to maintain itself and the modern industrial capitalism, instead of a func-
tional rationality oriented towards society and humankind. It promises 
citizens prosperity and security, and in return, citizens are willing to give up 
part of their freedom. Thus the “security” catchphrase becomes a formula 
towards total control of citizens and increasing alienation of human be-
ings from their community. It acquires magical powers.5 Another modern 
paradox of humankind is the feeling of increased liberty, instead of slavery. 
J. W. Goethe was right in saying that no one is more of a slave than he who 
thinks himself free without being so. The system ought to be serving so-
ciety and increasing human welfare (including being humane and ethical) 
04 There is a distinction between the terms “system” and “alienated system.” 
Every alienated system is a system per se, but not every system is alien-
ated. An alienated system is a system estranged, characterised by sepa-
ration and alienation from individuals and an imposed way of living. It is 
its own purpose and rationale. It is a network of regimes, characterised by 
institutional relations – regime interaction, formalised and legislated or-
ganisations, based on interest and power. Society comprises a network of 
interactions of individuals for the purpose of regulating life. It is founded 
on a consensus of values and norms, on tradition and personal communi-
cation.
05 A (new) paradox is noticeable in developed democracies in this respect. 
On the one hand, humans are becoming more and more tame, adaptable 
to the conditions of the alienated system (is this the historical route of 
ultimate domestication of humans into a state of “obedience” in a “stable” 
society?). On the other hand, humans as citizens protest through non-
governmental organisations to seek their rights as humans and citizens. 
The question is: why do humans easily give up their autonomy and free-
dom? A likely answer is the fear of losing what they have achieved (assets), 
or the loss of faith in the possibility of playing an active role in the creation 
of a fundamentally different community, i.e. society. In addition to the 
social and ecological crisis, this is probably also a time of existential crisis 
as a crisis of human spirituality and identity.
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instead of serving itself. This kind of rationality, upheld by today’s level of 
liberal capitalism, has a negative impact on the environment and society 
on a global scale. The influence it exerts – imposing its rules on less devel-
oped countries – expands this impact to national levels and the colonised 
world, exhausting useful natural and social capital. Some authors believe 
that this course of events paves the way towards a potential new totalitari-
anism (Hardt and Negri 2000; Hamm and Smandych 2005) and global man-
agement – “managerism” – in the area of economy and the environment.
The alienated system has created a setting that is ripe for a crisis of de-
mocracy, since democracy has obviously proven insufficient in resolving 
economic and environmental, but also social problems, and is at the same 
time susceptible to being dominated by the alienated system. Global and 
national centres of power make decisions in the name of an already small 
“30-percent democracy” that legitimises elected governments.
A long-term consequence of the financial and economic crisis is debt 
bondage (vulture funds)6 and debt bondage of society in nature (ecological 
footprint). The solution to the latter lies in limiting the exploitation of 
nature; the solution to the first issue is not to refinance debt, but write it 
off. Refinancing leads to further debt and higher debt bondage levels for 
entire groups of countries which in turn leads to global conflict or extend-
ing existing local war conflict.
Growth – limits to growth and the growth of limits
The “limits to growth” thesis originated in the late 1960s (on the develop-
ment level at the time), when the potential for new growth limits emerged 
with the application of better technology – Factor 4 (Weizsäcker and 
Lovins 1997) or even Factor 10 (Weizsäcker 1999, 41). Factor 4, for instance, 
means that it is possible to simultaneously double welfare and use half the 
amount of natural resources, because technology can increase its efficiency. 
Limits to growth were therefore shifted, which can be described as “the 
growth of limits,” including some contemporary optimistic claims as well. 
Since natural resources are limited, it remains to be seen how far limits 
can shift. Humanity needs optimism as an outlook, but it also needs facts 
as arguments. Unfortunately, facts seem to corroborate criticism of the 
current situation and direction of development more than they can opti-
mistically support them. Despite the growth of limits (scientific-technical 
possibilities), a new model of the economy-nature relation will require 
growth to be limited. So far, sustainable growth has mostly been adopted 
06 Vulture funds; hedge funds buy off debt in order to create more debt. Paul 
Singer founded the first such fund.
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in principle (UNCED 1992),7 the concept of which proclaims three mutually 
harmonised goals: protection of the ecosphere; stable economic growth; 
and equitable distribution of life chances. It presupposes different practical 
technology measures in environmental protection, including reduced use 
of natural resources and limited consumption in general. Overall, a change 
is needed in the modern way of life, but also of society itself and the basis 
of its economy.
One cannot consider “limits to growth” and “the growth of limits” with-
out considering development, which is, in a broader sense, connected with 
nature and the cultural evolution as a historical process, as well as with 
linear time, as paradigms of the historical construction of development. 
The issue we are addressing is essentially how society relates to the envi-
ronment, and since development has depended on growth, how culture 
relates to nature. 
These phrases – “limits to growth” and “the growth of limits” – are a 
theoretical as much as a practical problem. They refer to the totality of 
society’s flow and changes, with two major indicators: the consumption of 
natural resources (ecological footprint) and excessive pollution of the envi-
ronment (ecological rucksack). They indicate the need for limits to growth 
and overshoot. The practical aspect refers to limiting the depletion of finite 
natural resources, while the theoretical aspect refers to the social paradigm 
as the constructed frame within which to think of development.
The advance of science and technology has boosted the growth of in-
dustrial society economy, while at the same time stimulating quantitative 
economic growth, including a definite growth in social welfare. This is how 
the liberal capitalist economic order and modern society have to this day 
developed as a form of “paneconomic idealism” (Panikkar 1995, 133).
(a) The phrase limits to growth refers to the projections of (resource and 
commodities) consumption limits onto some key resource sectors in 
the short or long term. The idea of limiting growth (Meadows et al. 
1973) was influenced by new findings on factors that had supported 
growth and led to crises, such as: science and technology; rise of con-
sumption aspirations in the population (society); lifestyle; the military 
sector; egotism of national economies; general belief in continuous 
quantitative growth and progress, all of which have contributed to the 
emergence of social crises, including the one we are facing today. Crisis, 
primarily that of the environment, has indicated the need for limiting 
growth. The problem with cogency of limits to growth is that they can-
07 UNCED – The United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, also known as the Rio Summit, Rio Conference, and Earth Summit 
held in Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992.
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not be precisely predicted. Supek insisted that limits to growth must 
be acknowledged willy-nilly. “The only thing left to see is whether the 
current exploitation of unrenewable resources (...) will be exhausted 
in fifty, a hundred, or two hundred years. A mere speck in all of Earth’s 
history. In terms of contemporary economy, however, economising 
these resources would primarily mean discontinuing ‘mass consump-
tion of mass production,’ i.e. any luxury, and serving humans according 
to their actual needs” (Supek 1989, 8).
Limits to growth are an indicator of how society (the alienated system) re-
lates to nature (the environment). In the course of history, every society 
“defined” its limits according to the relation that was perceived between 
the needs of society (the collective) and the opportunities that nature of-
fered on an inhabited territory. Some did not adhere to this principle, and 
failed (Diamond 2005b). Today, limits to growth point out the devastating 
long-term impact of exploiting natural resources at the current level as a 
“natural necessity.” Limits to growth of contemporary industrial society 
do not refer to small-scale, isolated communities (societies) but to “world 
society” i.e. all of humanity. Curbing growth limits does not mean ending 
evolution (of technological progress and the internal differentiation of so-
cieties), but bringing the current volume of current humanity to a halt at 
a certain cut-off point, which cannot be achieved overnight” (Supek 1989, 
280). This is why the top question today is which areas must be further de-
veloped, and which curbed (Seidl and Zahrnt 2010). 
(b) In parallel with the discourse on limits to growth, the growth of limits 
continued, i.e. the increase of scientific findings and technological 
applications, meaning the capacity increase of the economic system 
potential. The phrase “growth of limits” signifies the internal relation 
of a society (system) to itself, i.e. to what extent it might be able to 
transform internally – increase the possibilities of intervening in the 
ecosystem by developing human potential, as well as use the current 
(limited) natural resources more effectively and efficiently.
Being a product of human creativity, scientific findings and the applica-
tion of new technologies are virtually unstoppable. They open up new 
opportunities of social welfare in every way. Limits of growth (of science 
and technology, and consequently economy) are constantly expanding in 
the practice of industrial capitalist societies, which prolongs the lifecycle 
of liberal capitalism. The alienated system and growth have thus been op-
erating in a symbiotic relation.
However, the complex of science and technology as a whole, the con-
sequence of which is a way of thinking where technical rationality and 
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its dominance in society hold central place, forms a technosystem (apart 
from the ecosystem and sociosystem). This technosystem, not just in the 
sense of application of technique – from production to everyday life, has 
its problematic aspects. It is the capacity of corporations to control biodi-
versity (e.g. monoculture) as an aspect of cultural diversity, i.e. the capac-
ity to control human life (movement in space; personal data banks, etc.). 
Technique thus increasingly acts as a means of human alienation, i.e. as a 
separate alienated self-standing holistic system. The influence of the tech-
nosystem in society is not a practical issue (for instance, ethical) within 
the role of technology, but a theoretical issue (Mittelstrass 1991, 106). It 
requires a systematic consideration of the influence of new technologies 
on human life.
Growth, especially economic growth, affects the state of the contempo-
rary world. Poverty, hunger, and illness are on the rise in the undeveloped 
world, whereas on the other hand the developed world is increasing its 
wealth. Two worlds are clearly discernible here: the minority developed 
world and the majority undeveloped world, with an 80:20 ratio in favour of 
the rich (developed countries). The solution clearly lies in reversing this 2:1 
ratio which favours the developed (Radermacher 2002). At the same time, 
(developed and undeveloped) societies are experiencing an increasing gap 
between the stratum of the rich few and the poor many. 
If we look at today’s world in terms of “centre” and “periphery,” the 
noticeable pattern is that of continuous growth of the “centre,” and the 
“peripheries’ ” efforts to follow suit. Prosperity of the “centre” ought to be 
followed by prosperity of the “periphery,” however that is not happening. 
Peripheries are lagging behind. History is strewn with “centres” (of econ-
omy, power, culture) and their peripheries. The basic question is: will the 
world remain divided in this way? Although this is an altogether separate 
issue, we can say that one should not have illusions about the existence of 
an equal world where these differences would be completely eliminated, 
but that one should believe in the possibility of a world that is more equita-
ble, and a different world order with more solidarity towards poor societies 
and nature. 8This cannot happen without transforming – in fact, abolish-
ing – today’s global world order, which is responsible for producing and 
distributing social and natural entropy. We are therefore facing a “natural 
limit” to growth (limited resources), but also the growth of limits as a global 
social issue, i.e. the social limits of growth. This force society to face its own 
value system as well.
08 A study carried out in 2010 has shown world peace, religious peace, and 
consensus on values to be significant preconditions of a new world order 
(Cifrić 2011, 186).
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The social-ecological system 
Throughout history, every form of society had its own social-ecological 
metabolism (German: Stoffwechsel), depending on how it understood and 
enacted its relation towards nature (Fischer-Kowalski 2000). The quali-
ties of these societies provide a historical overview of the level of “unity 
between nature and society.” Agrarian societies had a social-ecological me-
tabolism similar to that of nature (ecological metabolism), where both the 
inputs and the outputs were organic. There was no production of waste that 
nature could not recognise and decompose. Industrial society created its 
own social-ecological metabolism: it uses organic and inorganic materials 
as input and disposes of the unused (unprocessed) inorganic materials in 
nature, polluting ecosystems and damaging the overal natural ecosystem 
in the long run. Industrial capitalist society has created a “metabolic rift” 
between nature and society (Foster 2000b).
We believe that this model of increasingly polluting economy is unsus-
tainable, and that the key issue is that of the relation between economy 
and nature, between environment and society (inspite of the level of de-
velopment of science and technology). That is, the lack of a developed and 
applicable model of a social-ecological metabolism that would in effect 
be similar to that of agrarian societies, i.e. the social-ecological system as a 
complex consisting of a biophysical unit and its associated social agents and 
institutions (Glaser et al. 2012; Becker 2012).
As Jared Diamond has said (2011), societies have collapsed in the past 
(Easter Island) for refusing to recognise a problem and take it seriously, thus 
failing to anticipate it and take adequate action. This could be a lesson that 
today’s societies could learn from premodern (undeveloped) ones, especially 
if they have vast communication options at their disposal. Far from regress-
ing to a lower level of social metabolism, this would entail the creation of 
a new kind of relation between economy and the environment (nature).
Modern developed societies of today, as well as civilisation on the 
whole, cannot go back to a previous state, but their future is uncertain 
at this rate of change (development). Apart from the pace of social changes 
(Reheis 2006), the condition of modern society and civilisation in gen-
eral are also influenced by climate changes (e.g. Flannery 2007; Urry 
2011). Lévi-Strauss describes a “third way.”9 Contemporary society ought 
09 “The ideal would likely be a third path, one that would lead to making ever 
more order in culture without having to pay for it through an increase in 
entropy in society.” He finds instructive Saint-Simon’s thesis that a move 
is in order “from the governance of men to the administration of things” 
(Lévi-Strauss 2013, 75). That requires will power, because the system is set 
up to govern things, and through them, govern people as well.
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to learn from earlier civilisations in order to find its own solutions. “If 
Western civilisation does not seem to find in its foundations that with 
which it might renew itself and rise again, perhaps it might learn some-
thing about humans in general, and about itself in particular, from these 
demeaned and long despised societies, which up until recently avoided 
its influence?” (Lévi-Strauss 2013, 13) It will likely be forced to radically 
change its linear mode of progress, perhaps even replace it with the cycli-
cal (in the sense of internal restructuring), and establish a new balance 
between society and nature for which the social-ecological metabolism 
is a key precondition. It regulates a dual social exchange: (a) the exchange 
of materials between society and nature, and (b) the exchange (distribu-
tion) of resources among people. The importance of distribution here 
surpasses production.
Social turning point 
We speak of a turning point in terms of the theoretical and methodical 
construction of key points in environmental history (Uekoetter 2010; 
Radkau 2011), that is to say its historical reconstruction, and at the same 
time the construction of an incipient turning point. At this point in history, 
we might describe it as a simultaneous social and ecological turning point, 
a “social natural relation” as a new unity between nature and society. It is 
not a short-term change marked by a single key point, but several points 
that come together to create a complex “turning point,” that is, a long-
term activity process of the social-ecological metabolism. If global agents 
of modern society (that is, Western civilisation) decide to introduce the 
practice of sustainability and the concept of sustainable development (sys-
tematically correcting it on the basis of historical experience), that would 
be a good sign that a social-ecological turning point is taking place (even if 
it is merely a change in consciousness to begin with) and that a new era of 
human cultural evolution has begun – an “era of ecology” (Radkau 2011), 
“century of the environment” (Weizsäcker 1999, 21) or of “ecological en-
lightenment” (Kösters 1993), etc.
The need for a turning point could be supported with the following 
arguments:
(a) The problematic expansion of the ecological footprint (Wackernagel 
and Rees 1996). By this we mean the increasing “flows of energy and 
matter to and from the economy, converted into the corresponding 
land required to support these flows” (Simonis 1998, 6). Society, espe-
cially the highest developed societies, consume more and more natural 
resources and produced goods, which humanity will increasingly find 
in short supply.
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(b) The boiling-frog-syndrome tendency of the social-ecological crisis, in 
which the ecological crisis can lead to social disaster, i.e. radical social 
change (Clausen 1991), unless society takes systematic action to reach 
timely long-term solutions. By now, the crisis has gained momentum, 
especially when it comes to global climate changes where acknowledg-
ment of difference and of the level of social-ecological systems is called 
for. Adaptation has its archetypal barriers as well (Eisenack 2012). The 
“cries” voiced today by certain scientists and world politicians might 
be efficient “social quick fixes,” but are unlikely long-term indicators 
of radical change in the direction and formation of a new society.
(c) Debt bondage in nature (Cifrić 2012, 75), which refers to human borrow-
ing and excessive consumption of natural resources, beyond natural 
limits. At this moment, a year of human consumption tends to expend 
a year and several months’ worth of natural production, thus using 
both current and future natural resources. This means that we live on 
natural credit. Borrowing more and more from nature, humankind 
increases its debt bondage. The illusion of progress that humans will 
master nature turns into bondage in nature and the illusion of libera-
tion from bondage. The former “glory” of human “exceptionality” and 
“exclusion” as masters in nature has faded in reality, although not in 
human consciousness.
(d) The generally disrupted relation between nature and society, caused by 
the emergence of industrial society. Industrial society is merely a stage 
in the history of humanity, not its eternity. This indicates that we are 
living in a new “social natural state” (Görg 1999), that is, in the “An-
thropocene” era for the past 200 years (Crutzen 2002), which Bill Rud-
diman considers to have begun 8000 years ago, i.e. with the Neolithic, 
not the industrial period. Ruddiman seems to relativise the influence 
of industrialism by extending the Anthropocene era to include the to-
tality of human activity in the course of cultural history. Humans did 
alter their environment – more than they altered themselves, indeed 
– but never to the extent seen in the past two centuries. Industrialisa-
tion has caused a “metabolic rift” (Parsons 1977; Foster 2000b) and 
made it transparent: it is now an observable contemporary indicator 
that a turning point is necessary.
If the need for an ecological turn10 is an object of public discourse and inter-
national efforts today, the need for a social turn (such as social deceleration, 
10 “Ecological turn” (German: ökologische Wende) comprises three key themes 
in public discourse: stepping out of nuclear energy; transferring to clean en-
ergies of carbon and gas; entering renewable energies (Simonis 2012).
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slowing down the pace of contemporary civilisation; Reheis 2006), which is 
seldom mentioned, should be addressed as well. Contemporary civilisation 
systematically produces more order, but also more entropy than “primi-
tive,” egalitarian, stationary societies. We can therefore describe liberal 
capitalism as an entropy society, in which the system leads society into a 
greater state of entropy.
Another current issue, apart from the ecological turning point, is the ques-
tion of a social turning point. The fact that it is discussed in scientific and 
expert discourse is an argument towards voluntary radical transformations 
of the current state of the anthropobiotic ecumene (Cifrić 2007) and the 
paradigms of capitalist progress. They have been the subject of books and 
discussions. Crises, homogenisation of cultures, international cooperation, 
debt bondage etc. – all of these are general social turning point issues.
Development dilemma of modern society: Is it possible to do away       
with growth? 
There is much criticism of the current state and development tendencies 
of modern society, especially economic liberalism and its impact on society 
and the environment, within the broad framework of civilisation as critical 
of the belief in infinite progress (for instance, Fromm 1984), which unites 
two ideas: progress of society and “progress of science and technique” (Ei-
genfeld 2002). According to Adorno (1977, 635) progress both “is and is not” 
– it simultaneously exists and does not exist. Some contemporary authors 
describe different kinds of progress: Christian progress; the increase of rule 
over nature; economic progress; autonomy and liberty of the individual; a 
greater degree of democracy (Fetscher 1989): it would therefore be more 
logical to speak of “different forms of progress” (Wehrspaun and Wehr-
spaun 2002).
Earlier caveats of limitations (quantitative limits and pace) that human-
ity is faced with, specifically today’s state of crises in modern (industrial) 
societies and societies that dwell on their peripheries, indicate two things: 
(a) that warnings of certain growth limits on the global scale were not taken 
seriously, and (b) that the few highest developed countries have created a 
“civilisation development centre,” which furthers the existing develop-
ment tendency to polarise the world into developed and undeveloped coun-
tries. Instead of helping to alleviate the hardship of undeveloped peripher-
ies, which would in turn benefit the centre as well, the gap is widened, and 
limitations and “walls” put up: instead of being torn down (like the Berlin 
Wall), they are fortified (Cifrić 2009).
They continue to drift further apart instead, along with the rising debt 
of the undeveloped; it becomes difficult to find a development measure of 
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growth and equity between the developed and undeveloped world by the 
end of the century (Radermacher 2002, 37). Radermacher uses the term 
“eco-social market economy,” which will avoid a “cannibalising growth.”
Without a doubt, society cannot “come to a halt” (save for total catastro-
phe, such as environmental disaster or nuclear war, after which some form 
of growth and development would most likely ensue again) and will keep 
developing. The question is, how far and in what way will it grow? Con-
temporary economic (monopolies and pressures), financial (debt bondage), 
social (unemployment, poverty), political (lack of adequate international 
communication) and ever-increasing criticism (theoretical and conceptual 
– sustainable development) has opened up a contemporary development 
dilemma of modern society, as well as of perspectives of liberal capitalist 
ideology. Undeveloped (primitive, agrarian, premodern) societies did not 
encounter development dilemmas because they had no concept of “devel-
opment” as such.11 
For the first time in human history, there is awareness of a development 
dilemma concerning industrial society. It is a very simple one: can today’s 
modern (industrial) society give up growth increase, i.e. limit growth, or 
must the growth continue? If growth is limited, society will in the long 
run have to face economic collapse; if, on the other hand, the current growth 
tendency is retained, society will face possible ecological collapse (Jackson 
2009a, 167). Although it might pull through an economic collapse, it would 
be extremely difficult to recover from an ecological collapse. Moreover, 
they are not separate issues, but long-term connected phenomena of so-
ciety and the environment: the threat is that of a sliding social-ecological 
collapse.
The contemporary development dilemma does not resolve the issue of 
stability, i.e. the question of the basic cause and driver of instability (of prof-
it) and social crises of contemporary society, that is, world society which 
is becoming increasingly less stable and requires more and more interven-
tion. It is the development dilemma of industrial capitalist society indeed, 
but it is false in that it presupposes a basic confrontation between humans 
and nature, between the natural and the social system, retaining the po-
sitions of industrial capitalism which caused the “metabolic rift” (Marx 
1949). The premise that society and nature are pitted against one another 
is justified with possible reforms of the relation, including sustainable 
development. On the one hand, critics who see this view as a political or 
11 The term development, developed areas and the like emerge after U.S. 
President Harry Truman gave his speech on 20 January 1949. It has since 
spread into theoretical discourse and virtually every other area of life.
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ideological concept are right. On the practical side, they are wrong because 
it does represent a step forward. The dilemma can be resolved by continuing 
to consume resources until they are completely depleted, or by changing 
the very model of society.
Finally, the question remains whether sustainable society is a stable 
society, and whether sustainable development is stable development? To-
day, a stable society can only be a world society, society on all levels of 
development, humanity in its totality. Despite claims of world stability, 
there can be no global stability without stability of humankind: instead of 
a small closed community, humanity as a large community comprised of 
smaller sustainable communities. Within such a community, science can-
not remain “metabolic” either, in the sense of “hard” sciences (e.g. natural 
sciences) and those that are usually belittled in our region, and which ex-
plain the connection between humans (society) and nature – human and 
social sciences.
Searching – Social turning points
When denoting a change, i.e. a turning point, which consists of several mi-
nor changes but is essentially a more complex and different entity on the 
whole, some authors use the term transformation, thereby including social 
and economic changes that mark a major epoch as a new era. Polanyi (1999), 
for instance, describes “the great transformation” and the emergence of in-
dustrial society. Historians, on the other hand, categorise periods of global 
history or of national histories.
There are common categorisations of human history in terms of succes-
sive social epochs, whether the criterion is social relations (tribal societies; 
slaveholding; feudal; capitalist (Marx 1952), or the historical (temporal) 
level of development (savagery; barbarism; civilisation (Morgan 1981).
There are similar categorisations of environmental history in the con-
text of cultural evolution and its historical periods – from hunters and 
gatherers to the post-industrial era (Worster 1994; Delort and Walter 
2002; Simmons 2010; Hughes 2011), etc.
The dilemma between continuing and limiting growth has so far been 
dealt with directly through technology (with no practical dilemma to speak 
of, in fact). Since the development of technology served the economy (of 
growth), no long-term solution was found: instead, the problem is even 
more severe today. To carry on with this practice would mean (a) facing dis-
aster in the long run, or (b) enabling the technosystem more independence 
in setting foundations towards a totalitarian society (alienated system), 
alienated from humankind.
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The advance of science, technique and technology makes it possible 
to put into practice virtually any human idea (Mack 1991).12 Successes of 
technology can be argumented with the following: (a) the objective fact 
of fast development of scientific research and its application in economy 
and other sectors of life, and (b) the mode of human thinking. Practical 
domination of the technosystem indicates that science and technique set 
their own limits, through which progress is made, its own limits growing 
with the advance of science and technique. Human thinking today takes 
place within the technical paradigm, in the mode of technical rationality. 
Education serves as preparation for it. Human ideas move within those 
lines. Ethicists are therefore calling for an ethical assessment of the im-
pact on human individuals, on society, and on the environment (nature). 
Technical measures are not necessarily ethical at the same time. Ethical 
measures stem from ethics, and ethics is always an ethics of the citizen 
(German: Bürgerethik), “the accomplishment and virtue of all citizens” 
(Mittelstrass 1991, 104).
This justifies the question: is humankind in a situation of an incipient 
turning point today? As opposed to a possible theoretical reconstruction 
of environmental history – ecological turning points13 (Uekoetter 2010; 
Radkau 2011), we find ourselves in a situation of a potential theoretical 
construction of social turning points, and such a construction means con-
sciously building the future. 
A Global Green New Deal might be such a turning point. This kind of con-
struction would have several requirements. The first requirement would 
12 There are two kinds of human ideas – achievable utopias: (1) achievable 
utopias with expected consequences, based on the motto “Whatever hu-
mankind can conceive, technology can achieve;” and (2) “There is no need 
to worry about the consequences of today or tomorrow, because experi-
ence has shown that science and technique will find a solution” (a ver-
sion of the first kind, examining in ethical discourse what science does and 
what it ought to do) (Mack 1992, 34).
13 The term can be used (a) in the singular, meaning that irreversible change 
has occurred and that a transformation of the existing situation will fol-
low, or has already happened, or (b) in the plural, when describing differ-
ent stages of a turning point in a specific sector. There is, for instance, the 
global scale of humankind in the biosphere (McNeill 2000), different time 
periods in forestry (Grewe 2010) or in urban history (Tarr 2001).
 In the socio-cultural sense, turning points are important in the periodisa-
tion of human history as “cultural thresholds”: moving from a gathering 
existence to a sedentary mode of living; the emergence of monotheistic 
religions and the idea of an invisible god; the emergence of industrial cul-
ture (Gehlen 1994, 5).
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be to determine the most important current social-ecological issues that 
present a burden for the development perspectives of modern society and 
humanity in general. They are reflected in practice on the following levels: 
the level of development of individual countries or groups of countries, the 
global level of humanity, as in theoretical reflection or environmentalist 
practice. The second requirement would be to determine the priorities of 
resolving issues (questions) which will (according to current knowledge) 
have a major influence on the “new social natural state.” And thirdly, it 
would be necessary to indicate a possible direction for this new movement.
The construction of a social turning point should be preceded by theo-
retical discussions about the global direction of our civilisation, not just 
practical aspects within the existing neoliberal capitalist economy which 
offers no (radical) alternative of its own. Let us describe just a few areas 
and aspects: economy, ethics, international politics, and ecological move-
ments.
(a) Global Green New Deal. The goal of the “Green New Deal” concept (Ger-
man: die Neuverteilung der grünen Karten) is to achieve structural eco-
logical changes which will influence the reduction of climate changes 
on the global scale. This concept is part of overall efforts to reduce 
global ecological (climate) effects, specifically activities related to “de-
carbonising” (reduction of harmful emissions) and “dematerialising” 
(absolute reduction of resource use) (Simonis 2011).
The concept echoes the “New Deal” measures introduced during the great 
economic and social crisis in the USA when unemployment soared between 
1930 (3.2 million) and 1933 (13.2 million). “Therapy” was designed by the 
government (Franklin D. Roosevelt), and included controlling unsound 
banking and the stock market, as well as other measures: shorter working 
hours and higher wages; setting minimum wages in industry, minimum 
prices for agricultural products; accepting union tariff levels; lower taxes 
for the poor and higher taxes for the rich, etc. The phrase “New Deal” is used 
in the sense of card games as well as business: as a new round and distribu-
tion of cards, and “sealing a new deal.”
The term “Green New Deal” was first introduced by the economist 
Thomas L. Friedman in a New York Times article on January 10, 2007. It was 
embraced by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), whereas the econo-
mist Edward B. Barbier (2010) formulated the concept (policy, investment, 
and incentive mechanisms), which originates from previous discourse on 
the relation between economy and ecology, with three goals: (a) revival of 
world politics, job creation and protection of disadvantaged groups; (b) re-
duction of coal dependency, reduction of environmental degradation and 
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water shortage; (c) promotion of the UN Milennium Development Goals14 
and ending extreme poverty.
The Green New Deal is a current strategy of transformation as potential 
response to the three-fold crisis: ecological, financial and social, which is, 
as yet, missing its revolutionary subject (Bütikofer 2011, 29). This concept 
presupposes a radical change of the industrial metabolism, which is why it 
could be described as a social “turning point,” i.e. “green turning point” 
that would usher in an “era of ecology” (Radkau 2011) in the periodisation 
of environmental history (Uekoetter 2010).
Green economics, that is, ecological economics (Daly 1994), is the oppo-
site of classical economics in theory and practice. It refers immediately to 
production, and indirectly to consumption as well. It takes into account 
the limits of the natural system, the principle of ecological irreversibil-
ity, and sustainability within the limits of the environment’s absorption 
capacity. It incorporates ethical aspects of relation towards nature and 
produced goods. It emerged from the critique of exponential growth and 
the increase of entropy, and the profit of capitalist economy (Daly 1973; 
Hampicke 1992; Common and Stagl 2006), but was well known to agrar-
ian society.
It is still not sufficiently represented in industrial or agricultural prac-
tice. Studies of economics and agriculture will therefore be required to 
incorporate more green economics-related content into their curricula. In 
the current context of Croatia, it is probably better known to farmers and 
environmental organisations than to many students and some professors.
(b) World ethos and ecological orientations. When discussing the issue of 
limits to growth and international cooperation in establishing world 
peace and a new world order, it is important to mention the concept 
of world ethos (German: Weltethos). It was introduced by the famous 
theologist Hans Küng (1992).15 The aim of the concept is to encourage 
world religions and other beliefs to get involved in building a world 
ethos which would be an “ethos of humankind.” It assumes that, de-
spite differences between religions, there is a cluster of common values 
towards a “minimal ethical consensus” that could open up dialogue on 
social values. There has been virtually no empirical research on world 
14 This refers to the 55/2 „United Nations Millennium Declaration”, Resolu-
tion adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 8, 2000.
15 For more on the world ethos, please see Küng (1992, 1996, 1997). To men-
tion only a few other writings: Režan 2008; Radić 2009; Cifrić 1997b; Cifrić 
2000; 2004a.
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ethos.16 Unfortunately, global economic and financial issues as well as 
war conflicts have overshadowed this type of ethical discourse; at the 
same time, theologians do not seem to be exhibiting much “theologi-
cal will” for ethical discourse or for empirical research.
Several studies of ecological orientations have been carried out in Croatia: 
their authors (Cifrić 2004b; čulig 2004; Kufrin 2004) presented their re-
sults in the journal Socijalna ekologija. These studies have shown that there 
are three major social-ecological orientations: anthropocentrism; ecocen-
trism; and technocentrism (Cifrić 2008a). Everyday situations do not require 
that people consciously subscribe to any of them: their actions depend on 
the situation. Although it is impossible for humans not to act anthropo-
centrically, they do not have to go against their own natural bases of life. 
However, our civilisational paradigmatic and practical inclination is essen-
tially anthropocentric, and impervious to criticism of anthropocentrism.
(c) International politics. Cooperative competition, which has marked the 
last fifty years, does not seem to be crossing over into competitive co-
operation. Up until now, (international) economy was based on com-
petition that affirmed itself in the marketplace. However, since the 
marketplace was not a level playing field, competition occurred in 
inequitable conditions. Despite efforts to establish international coop-
eration within these conditions, inequity led to limited cooperation. In 
international politics, we are talking about cooperative competition. 
International economy (community) today ought to be based on coop-
eration, whereas (market) competition should be viewed in the sense 
of competing for more efficient and effective cooperation. The term 
is competitive cooperation, i.e. competing in the area of cooperation 
(who can achieve a greater level of cooperation). Units of cooperation 
are independent countries acting on the international scene. “Here, 
competition is not based on output, but on the process that estab-
lishes a cooperative order… the conditions of competitive cooperation 
require that competition be understood as a process of joint searching 
and learning” (Messner 2001, 31). In terms of international law, this 
type of cooperation presupposes relinquishing part of national sover-
eignty to the international community (Biermann 1996, 245).
16 One such study was carried out in Croatia (2010), so the results cannot be 
compared with other studies. The study found that between 35.7% and 
56.9% of participants considered that the stated values were “not respect-
ed.” “Partnership between man and woman” was an exception, estimated 
as respected in society by 38.5% of participants. Opinions on values were 
compared with three established factors of socio-cultural identity: terri-
torial-regional; professional; and religious-national (Cifrić, 2011). 
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(d) The role of the global environmental movement (NGOs). Globalisation of 
environmental and social problems leads to a rise in cultural and bio-
logical entropy, which endangers cultural and biological diversity. At the 
same time, there are indications of two global movements forming: 
one to protect cultural diversity, and the other to protect biodiversity: 
“Preservation of biodiversity and cultural diversity are the two major 
social movements of the twenty-first century. These two forces are 
closely connected” (Rifkin 2005, 322). In both of them, we encounter 
optimism and pessimism, vision and catastrophe as warning of the 
necessity of a bioethical approach.
A comparative view of environmental and social issues (separately or as a 
complex social-ecological problem) over the past few decades, including 
the present, and taking country development level(s) as criterion, clearly 
shows that these problems have influenced the structure and dynamic of 
environmental movements. Movements in developed and undeveloped 
countries differ in terms of priority content, as well as the level of envi-
ronmental awareness, which affects their quality. There is therefore a dif-
ference between “first world” and “third world” environmentalism (Lange 
2011). 
Environmental issues, just like developmental ones, are becoming more 
global, while movements are mostly defined in terms of territories – apart 
from the few that operate on a global scale. Since “fragmented” environ-
mental movements cannot be as effective in responding to global envi-
ronmental challenges, it makes sense to consider integrating them on an 
international level (organisation) (Messner and Nuscheler 1996). If it is 
possible for certain organisations to exist within the UN, there is also the 
possibility and need for this type of organisation with cross-border activ-
ity (Weizsäcker 1999, 101), just like cross-border organised international 
capital. This would secure them a decision-making position in global gov-
ernance (Brühl and Simonis 2001).
Certainly, some ascribe a major role to NGOs and have high hopes for 
them, seeing them as a turning point; others, on the other hand, doubt 
their effectiveness as they adapt to the prevailing reality principle, which 
is reflected in their professionalisation and embrace of “managerism.”17 It 
should be mentioned that NGOs and environmentalists operate globally in 
17 The concept of a “managerial revolution” (Burnham 1941) separated the 
greedy interests of owners from the interests of managers. However, it 
did not occur because managers became interested in increasing their 
personal share in the profit (ownership) and ended up pursuing their own 
interests.
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two areas: raising global awareness, especially during the 1970s, and acting 
as a social mechanism for ecological repair since they are “professionalised.” 
They have increasingly become part of major entrepreneurship and man-
agement in environmental protection, with individual careerists among 
their ranks (Köster 2012). They ought to get back on course if they want to 
retain their credibility. 
Even Greenpeace has become a large organisation that resembles entre-
preneurship, with a hierarchical structure and careerists among its ranks. 
Members of environmental organisations thus become a sort of repair 
mechanism, whose reaction to pollution and destruction of nature limits 
the protest potential to overcome the social causes of the problem (Köster 
2012). They lose their authenticity by simply joining the logic of the social 
system, because, to paraphrase Albert Einstein, we cannot solve problems 
by using the same thinking we used when we created them.
However, we should bear in mind that environmental movements 
should not be the only agents to play a key practical role here. There are 
other agents (powers) in society, such as public media (television; radio; 
print media), the Internet; religious organisations/institutions; and of 
course, scientific and educational institutions. Yet we should not expect 
to find the utopian initiative within the alienated system, which brought 
about the current alienated relation between society and nature in the first 
place, but in the utopian potential of environmental movements on the one 
hand, and in the historical mutability of the system and its own logic on the 
other hand: their guiding principle will be a qualitatively different society 
– sustainable society where the principle of violation of nature aggravating 
the violation of man will not hold true (Marcuse 1973, 72). The final goal 
is a three-fold liberty: liberated man in liberated society and liberated nature 
(Marcuse 1968, 18; 1973, 60 and 89).
Conclusion 
The question of development today faces a (global) social dilemma con-
cerning growth, i.e. a dilemma on the possibility of impending social and 
environmental disaster.18 Limiting growth will in the long run bring about 
economic collapse, whereas retaining the current growth tendency might 
lead industrial society into ecological collapse, the kind of which have al-
ready occurred in history (Diamond 2005). Systematic scientific research 
18 (Social) disaster occurs if there is uncertain safety, uncertain danger that 
was not expected as a budget value (especially in the long term), and 
which occurs as a surprise. Following Clausen (1991), Simonis describes six 
degrees of diagnosis and prevention (Simonis 1996, 32).
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is therefore necessary to establish the causes of potential social-ecological 
collapse.
Development is connected to the energy needs of a society, as well as 
with climate changes (Jahrbuch Ökologie 2011). These are also limiting 
circumstances in terms of growth. Discussions on “climate geoengineer-
ing” today include Solar Radiation Management (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide 
Removal (CDR).
Liberal capitalist economy must continue growing for its own sake; the 
opposite will lead industrial society, i.e. capitalist economy itself, into cri-
sis, perhaps even collapse (catastrophe) in the long run. Capitalism cannot 
survive without growth. This brings to the foreground criticism of today’s 
capitalism as an ideology of “cannibalising growth,” whereas humans have 
at times been described as parasites in nature.
Today’s environmental and social problems originated in the centres 
of globalisation – developed industrial countries, and are reflected onto 
their social (cultural) and environmental “peripheries.” This is where the 
“centre” gets its development power today. The question is: how long will 
the “peripheries” be able to take the centre’s current pace of development? 
This limit will probably be the growth limit of contemporary industrial 
capitalism, especially its aspect of financial imperialism. Indeed, the “pe-
ripheries” also use crises of the “centre” in order to increase the intake of 
capital and technology. Until the majority of natural and social resources of 
the peripheries has been depleted, liberal capitalism and the global alien-
ated system will carry along its well-trodden path. This path will reach an 
end to itself, of its own accord, unless there is radical change. 
This article aims to remind that there are significant indicators of a pos-
sible social turning point, and relevant literature singles out two: resource 
consumption (ecological footprint) and environmental impact (ecological 
rucksack). This is why resource decoupling and impact decoupling are re-
quired. We have exceeded limits in some aspects, but there is still hope 
(Meadows et al. 1992; 2004). The question of today’s social turning point is 
connected with limits to growth.
Ideas towards creating a new social-ecological system, green (ecological) 
economics, that is, a global new deal, value system, international coopera-
tion, and the role of environmental movements, are some of the points 
discussed in this article as possible social turning points in the Anthropo-
cene era.
Exhausting natural resources and global pollution gradually leads to 
global crisis as a sliding social-ecological crisis, and even a possible disaster in 
the long term. We do not seem to be aware of this sufficiently to take radi-
cal action. Is it possible to avoid without radical change of society itself? 
No civilisation, no society is timeless: they have their temporality, and so 
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does liberal capitalism. Only if society changes in a way that engages human 
potential is there hope for a better life.
Although theoretical discourse questions the existing paradigm of lib-
eral capitalism, beside the concept of sustainable development (which 
already is a lot) – which is otherwise met with strong resistance, a new 
paradigm is required of the relation between humans and nature – a social-
ecological humanist paradigm, different from the Newtonian mechanistic 
view and the idea of Promethean progress. More than a global paradigm 
of modern society, this is about paradigms on different levels that refer 
to different social-ecological systems. This new paradigm will not stop 
the development of humankind, especially not scientific research; it will 
encourage new limits of development, but with ethical considerations of 
their application. Some contributions towards a turning point have already 
been identified: far from regression, it would entail the use of knowledge 
and historical experience of humankind to define criteria for sustainable 
survival of all of humanity and a humane relation between people, nations, 
and religions. Sustainability has not yet become a new reality of human 
development or a new symbol of progress – as humans do require symbols, 
but remains more of a threat and an alibi for developed countries, and is 
likely to become a mitigating circumstance for the undeveloped world. 
However, there are positive initiatives on the micro level. “One thing is 
certain: there can be no possible solution for the contemporary ‘ecological 
crisis’ unless there is radical reform of human society, because the ‘ecologi-
cal crisis’ itself is merely a reflection of the deeper social crisis of human-
kind, its mode of production, its relation toward its own life conditions” 
(Supek 1989, 36).
It is not possible to build a new relation toward nature or a more equi-
table social order without criticism of the society of alienation, alienation 
in society and the social origins of alienation. For “....the goal is not control 
over nature but control over technique and over irrational social forces and 
institutions that threaten the survival of Western society, if not of the hu-
man race” (Fromm 1984, 185). Furthermore, Albert Einstein warned that 
problems cannot be solved using the same thinking that was used when 
they were created. If researching the condition and consequences of growth 
is enough for science, it is not enough for humanity without asking ques-
tions about the meaning of growth and limits to growth.
In conclusion, it can be said that both growth and the ideology of growth 
are closely connected to the model of liberal capitalism. Within that same 
model the critique of growth and demands for its limitation are also formed. 
Growth is increasing due to the application of new knowledge and technol-
ogies that enable a more efficient use of resources and living labour (and its 
GDP) – which leads to the widening, growth of limits. 
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The thesis about the limits of growth relies, on the one hand, on the 
idea of an increasing exploitation and depletion of resources and, on the 
other hand, on the fact that continual growth did not result in the increase 
of justice or living standards for the majority of the world population (in 
developing countries). Therefore, the temporality of the linear economic 
model of capitalism is prolonged, and it must be closely followed by an-
thropological and humanistic critique of modern industrial society and 
its developmental dilemmas. The existing model of economic growth and 
capitalist development has lost sight of the human dimension. 
Climate change 
and human moral enhancement
Tvrtko Jolić
2
Introduction: Education for change 
Contemporary science is providing more and more evidence that climate 
is indeed changing and that at least part of the cause lies in factors related 
to human activity. Strong emphasis is placed on raising public awareness 
about the need to conserve the environment in order to remove, or at least 
alleviate, the worst consequences of climate change. However, research has 
shown that only a small share of, for example Croatian, population con-
siders environmental concerns to be the most important social issue (cf. 
Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 31). Also, very few people are willing to 
change their behaviour in aid of environmental protection and sustainable 
development if it means sacrificing their own economic interests (Dom-
azet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 43). There are many reasons why people are 
not willing to modify their behaviour. I will name just a few.
Firstly, not everyone is convinced that climate change is indeed hap-
pening under human influence. A possible reason for this is that, upon 
considering different scientific theories, they might think that the argu-
ments in support of the thesis that climate change is the result of human 
activity are just not strong enough. A second possible reason is that the 
scientific theories which explain processes that lead to climate change are 
too complex to understand, even when presented in simplified form.1 Fail-
ing to understand a certain theory is often accompanied with reluctance 
to accept the theory.
01 Environmental psychologists claim that for most people it is difficult to 
understand even some basic concepts associated with climate change, 
e.g. difference between a deterministic weather prediction and a statisti-
cal climate projection. “[T]he explanation is complex to the journalist, the 
policy maker, and the general public, despite every effort to use simple 
language” (Newell and Pitman 2010, 1004).
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In addition, even those who believe that climate change is the result of 
human activity, and who have the knowledge of how they should alter their 
behaviour, often lack the motivation to do so. Some of them know that a 
significant part of their actions will only have a long-term impact, affecting 
generations that will come after them. Others are not motivated to change 
because their actions affect population in remote parts of the world. In both 
cases, spatial or temporal distance leads to weaker interest and concern 
among individuals for those who are affected by the negative repercussions 
of their actions. In addition to the individual level, this problem is encoun-
tered on the group level as well, especially in the activity of businesses and 
countries that refuse to change and choose the politics of waiting instead.
How can individuals be moved to change their behaviour towards environ-
mental protection and sustainable development? Having analysed relevant 
data, the authors of the study We Need to Change conclude that “citizens with 
higher level of educational attainment more often perceive environmental 
issues as important, they less frequently see economic growth as damaging 
for the environment and they are more willing to accept a reduction in liv-
ing standards for the benefit of the environment” (Domazet, Dolenec and 
Ančić 2012, 47). Why is it that education, especially higher levels of educa-
tion, lead to greater degrees of sensibility towards issues of environmental 
protection and sustainable development? Answers to this question seem 
to lie in the very structure of education processes and their intended goals. 
According to the understanding prevalent in contemporary Western liberal 
democracies, education comprises at least two significant components. The 
most prominent component, which is often considered to be the funda-
mental goal of education, is the transfer of knowledge and development of 
different skills and competences. This knowledge and these skills can have 
a wide variety of possible applications, such as reading and writing, or they 
could be limited to more narrow areas, like knitting lessons or constructing 
bridges (Bailey 1984, 14). The second, equally important, component of the 
standard Western process of education is related to upbringing, socialisation 
and internalisation of civic virtues. In terms of environmental protection 
and sustainable development, education can offer individuals information 
about the challenges that we face due to climate change, to provide them 
with the knowledge and capabilities to cope with these challenges, and to 
acquaint them with the principles and values which they must uphold in 
their actions. Without these three constituents of education, humanity is 
highly unlikely to sustain itself and progress.2
02 There is no room here to enter into elaboration of general strengths of 
education for sustainability, which can be found elsewhere in this volume 
(Domazet and Ančić, THIS VOLUME). 
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To what extent is it possible to achieve these educational goals through 
traditional modes of education? As can be expected, education would be 
the best way to fulfil the goal of informing people about climate change, 
about harming the environment and harming-related hazards. We can ap-
proach this goal by placing emphasis on making tertiary education more 
accessible, as, according to statistics, people with tertiary education attain-
ment express the greatest concern for environmental issues (Domazet, 
Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 32). The capabilities of the current education 
model to transfer the knowledge and abilities necessary to tackle climate 
change-induced issues depend on the capabilities of science to generate this 
knowledge. Given the complexity of processes that affect climate change, 
many doubt that science is capable of achieving this to the degree necessary 
to deter impending environmental disaster (cf. Huesemann 2000; 2006). 
However, even those who are more optimistic believe that science can only 
help resolve these issues if it is accompanied by a shift in awareness and 
values that guide our actions. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that 
the education system will be able to carry out a quick and radical enough 
change in our understanding of what we are morally obliged to do in order 
to prevent climate change that could have a disastrous impact on human 
survival. This primarily involves our tendency to put our short-term inter-
ests before long-term ones, and to ignore the negative repercussions that 
our actions have on other people who are most often removed from us in 
terms of space and/or time.
Although research has shown that people are willing to modify their 
behaviour in order to contribute to the protection of their living environ-
ment, their readiness for change drops if they are expected to sacrifice their 
lifestyle (Kempton, Boster and Hartley 1995; Domazet, Dolenec and 
Ančić 2012, 46). Educational and other institutional measures (taxation, 
incentives, and the like) can to a certain extent encourage people to alter 
their behaviour. However, as some authors state, traditional measures of 
moral education were able to achieve only “modest success” during the 
last few millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 9). The limiting factor in 
the internalisation of principles and values crucial to the preservation of 
humankind in the light of global climate change (as well as tremendous dis-
tributive inequalities, threats of terrorism and possible nuclear war) is our 
moral psychology, which has not altered significantly since the emergence 
of humankind (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 1). Namely, our moral psychol-
ogy is better suited for living in small communities that operate with sim-
ple technologies than for today’s way of living in multi-million population 
countries that use advanced technologies. The shortcomings of our moral 
psychology are evident in the lack of altruism towards people with whom 
we do not interact closely, a consequence of which is our reluctance to alter 
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our actions that cause climate change. Actions that we take today will only 
reach their full effect in several decades, impacting generations that will 
come after us. Also, the present consequences of our actions are seriously 
affecting the population of remote countries and parts of the world. The 
limitations of our moral psychology, which motivates us to have concern 
for those who are near and dear to us, prevent us from changing harmful 
patterns in our behaviour.
In order to avoid the worst consequences of climate change caused by 
human activity, it will be necessary to reach a sustainable level of consump-
tion of natural resources on the global scale. According to some estimates, 
however, a sustainable level of consumption presupposes that the mate-
rial welfare level enjoyed by citizens of Western democracies would have 
to decrease significantly (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 76). Namely, even 
the current level of consumption necessary to sustain the lifestyle of one 
billion population of the rich West is considered to require an overall unsus-
tainable level of consumption. Things get even more complicated when we 
take into account the aspirations of the rest of humanity to reach a higher 
level of welfare. In addition, moderate projections by United Nations ex-
perts estimate that the population growth might exceed ten billion peo-
ple by the end of the twenty-first century (UN 2013, 2). These data support 
the thesis that human behaviour and approach to the environment must 
change as soon as possible.
Biomedical moral enhancement 
Apart from the technologies we use to exploit natural resources, there 
are other contemporary technologies (specifically, nuclear and biological 
weapons) that enable humankind to inflict immense damage upon human-
ity itself as well as the world it lives in. Given this greatly increased possi-
bility of humans causing damage or even complete destruction, Savulescu 
and Persson believe that humans should be morally enhanced so that they 
could apply these technologies responsibly. Starting with the assumption 
that our moral behaviour is based in biology and is a product of the process 
of evolution, Persson and Savulescu’s solution proposes the research and, 
if possible, application of biomedical modes of moral enhancement (Pers-
son and Savulescu 2012, 106; 2013, 124). These authors consider it to be one 
of the ways we must test in order to reduce the risks we face from reckless 
and malevolent use of power enabled by contemporary technology.
According to one of the originators of the idea of moral enhancement by 
biomedical means, “a person morally enhances herself if she alters herself 
in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in her having morally 
better future motives, taken in sum, than she would otherwise have had” 
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(Douglas 2008, 229). What could therefore be done to improve people’s 
motives for action, thereby changing their behaviour and starting to make 
sustainability-oriented decisions? Whereas traditional methods of educa-
tion did this indirectly, informing people about available options and the 
effects of particular choices, the idea of biomedical enhancement considers 
the option of directly influencing the biological and psychological basis of 
human motivation. There are three basic ways to do this – with the help 
of drugs, genetic engineering, and using technical devices connected to 
the brain. All these methods are in very early stages of testing and are very 
far from being applied on human beings (Douglas 2008, 233). Those who 
are optimistic about biomedical moral enhancement of humans rest their 
hopes on two research projects that are exhibiting somewhat promising 
signs of progress in this area.
The first project is tied to the research into the activity of the hormone 
and neurotransmitter oxytocin. It was found to enhance certain morally 
relevant characteristics and was popularly dubbed “the cuddle hormone.” 
Apart from the oxytocin released by the posterior lobe of the pituitary 
gland, the hormone can also be introduced into the body via pills or nasal 
spray. Research has shown that persons who are administered with a dose 
of oxytocin exhibit a higher level of trust and readiness to cooperate than 
those left untreated (Kosfeld et al. 2005; Zak, Kurzban and Matzner 
2005). Also, oxytocin was found to be helpful in fostering fidelity in mo-
nogamous couples (Scheele et al. 2012). However, other studies have found 
that the application of oxytocin does not really corroborate the arguments 
of those in favour of biomedical moral enhancement. Namely, quite contra-
ry to the idea that oxytocin might help extend altruism, trust and coopera-
tion to include persons beyond our immediate social group, these studies 
have shown that oxytocin primarily enhances prosocial behaviour within 
the group, and can even encourage sacrificing outsiders if it could benefit 
members of the group (de Dreu 2010; 2011; 2012).
The other method that is often seen as a potential way of influencing our 
moral behaviour is the application of selective serotonin reuptake inhibi-
tors (SSRIs), which are used to treat depression, anxiety and personality dis-
order. Similar to oxytocin, SSRIs stimulate cooperation, but they also seem 
to affect our sense of fairness. Experiments have shown that SSRI-treated 
individuals are more willing to offer fairer conditions of cooperation than 
the control group which was left untreated (Tse and Bond 2002; Wood 
2006). As with oxytocin, the current state of research has at best provided 
a mere hint that the application of SSRIs might have a positive effect on 
human behaviour. Further research in this area indicates that technologi-
cal advancement might lead to these methods becoming more precise and 
having a stronger effect on human behaviour.
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These and other lines of research into ways of biomedical enhancement 
of human morality are seen by some authors as a promising solution for 
shortcomings of the human nature that lead to the resources depletion, 
climate change, and global inequality. The main argument behind this view 
is the following: if drugs and medical treatments could be used to me make 
people care for the wellbeing of other human beings that are temporally 
and spatially distant, these bioenhanced people will be more willing to 
adopt sustainable ways of behaviour.
Persson and Savulescu believe that “[i]f safe moral enhancements are 
ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use should be 
obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should 
take them are least likely to be inclined to use them. That is, safe, effective 
moral enhancement would be compulsory” (Persson and Savulescu 2008, 
174). However, even if biomedical methods are sufficiently improved to be 
used safely and effectively on humans, the question remains of how justi-
fied it would be to try and influence human moral behaviour in this way.
Arguments against the biomedical moral enhancement project 
According to an influential school of ethical thought, the only way to mor-
ally improve humans is connected to the enhancement of our cognitive 
abilities. The more we know, the less we err. Those sceptical of biomedical 
intervention in the basis of human moral motivation refer to the philo-
sophical understanding that goes back to Socrates, according to which the 
root of immorality is false belief, which is best eliminated by cognitive im-
provement and education. For instance, John Harris thus claims that “[t]he 
most obvious countermeasure to false beliefs and prejudices is a combina-
tion of rationality and education, possibly assisted by various other forms 
of cognitive enhancement, in addition to courses or sources of education 
and logic” (Harris 2011, 105).
The most prominent representative of this branch of ethics is most 
definitely Immanuel Kant, for whom morality is based in rationality. He, 
as well as his subsequent proponents, would find the very idea of affect-
ing morality by altering our emotional psychological inclinations such 
as altruism completely misguided. Namely, moral actions are those that 
result from duty which is based in rational thinking, not in inclination 
(Kant 2011, 24). Acting upon our inclinations, whether natural or acquired, 
cannot be free according to Kant. When we act upon our inclinations, we 
are slaves to our own emotions or customs. The only free actions are those 
which result from our ability to think rationally. Therefore, in order to 
achieve moral improvement, we must improve our rationality, not the 
emotional aspect of our character. Attempts at improvement that are 
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carried out through direct enhancement of emotions, such as suggested 
by Douglas, Persson and Savulescu, cannot therefore be moral improve-
ments (Harris 2013).
Also, opponents of biomedical moral enhancement might object that 
mandatory subjection to moral enhancement would narrow the subjects’ 
freedom, namely in two respects. Firstly, no one asked them whether they 
wanted to undergo moral enhancement. From a liberal standpoint, this is 
a serious encroachment upon human freedom in a particularly sensitive 
area like private moral beliefs. One of the basic tenets of liberal political phi-
losophy, built into the foundations of more or less all Western democracies, 
is the principle of state neutrality, according to which the state must not 
favour any one moral belief or understanding of human good (cf. Dworkin 
1978, 127; Rawls 1993, 179). For instance, communitarians might therefore 
object that state-imposed “moral enhancement,” which would motivate 
us towards greater concern for the needs of outsiders, is detrimental to the 
interests of our own community, which is, according to the communitarian 
moral outlook, a fundamental moral value. Without assessing the rectitude 
of this moral view, it is evident that the idea of mandatory subjection to 
biomedical procedures of moral enhancement is at least prima facie, for lack 
of better justification, contrary to the tenets of liberal political philosophy.
The second objection is not so much concerned with political restrictions 
of freedom as with our understanding of what it is that makes a certain 
action morally good. With posthumans, which is the common name for 
humans who have undergone some sort of biomedical enhancement, their 
improved nature causes them to have different motivation in certain situa-
tions than they would have had without the moral enhancement. Neither 
the motivation that they would have had without the moral enhancement, 
nor the motivation caused by moral enhancement is the result of these 
individuals’ independent choice; in that respect, posthumans are no less 
free than common people.
However, sceptics might argue that moral enhancement deprives post-
humans of the ability to demonstrate strength of character in certain situa-
tions, resisting the supposedly poorer motivation that they would have had 
without the moral enhancement. They are thwarted from demonstrating 
their moral excellence, which derives its specific moral value from overcom-
ing their biological predispositions. Certainly, there will be differences in 
moral excellence among posthumans as well, since even morally enhanced 
individuals will exhibit different degrees of being able to turn the good 
motivation laid down by biomedical engineering into morally good action. 
However, the excellence of an individual who has had their psychological 
process biomedically altered is not ascribed solely to their moral character, 
but also, at least in part, to the biomedical treatment to which they were 
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subjected. The virtue of marital fidelity displayed so beautifully by Penelope 
as she waited for Odysseus to return from his voyages will no longer be 
ascribable solely to the character of the spouse, but a well-administered 
cocktail of medication and genetic intervention as well.3
This line of thinking led John Harris to state the following: “Without 
the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; and freedom disappears and 
along with it virtue. There is no virtue in doing what you must” (Harris 
2011, 104). Changes that are brought about by enhancing psychological char-
acteristics of humans are changes in behaviour alone, and not in the human 
understanding of morality. If biomedical enhancement can someday make 
people choose to act in such a way that is more responsible to the interests 
and needs of temporally and spatially remote strangers, to the natural en-
vironment and threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, this will on 
the one hand be morally good, useful, and commendable.
However, the problem from the standpoint of morality is that these 
actions will not have been deliberate choices of moral actors, thereby hav-
ing no intrinsic moral value. Biomedical enhancement of our emotional 
psychological characteristics is thus revealed not only as being no moral 
enhancement at all, but sacrificing a major aspect of the moral character 
of humans as well.
Biomedical enhancement and liberal democracy
What are the potential counterarguments that advocates of biomedical en-
hancement could provide in response to the abovementioned objections? 
In response to the objection that mandatory moral enhancement curtails 
human freedom, it could be said that freedom is not the only value humans 
care about. Although exceptionally important, freedom can be restricted in 
certain circumstances, especially in situations of threats to human safety 
or the very survival of humankind. 
There are many who believe that humanity will face such a challenge, 
if not today, then in the near future. Climate change, environmental 
devastation and threats of terrorism, combined with the possible use 
of weapons of mass destruction, will seriously endanger the chances of 
human survival. A possible way to deter this threat is the moral enhance-
ment of humans. 
03 As regards proposals to stimulate marital fidelity through biomedical en-
hancement, please see Wudarczyk et al. 2013. Earp, Sandberg, and Savules-
cu 2012 believe that this form of enhancement should be mandatory for 
couples who are parents. 
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However, it seems that this enhancement would have to be applied on 
a wider scale if it is to be effective. 
This would require something that could be described as a “biological 
contract,” which would oblige all people to undergo biomedical enhance-
ment procedures in order to secure the survival of humankind and make 
Earth a safer place to live. In other words, people would relinquish part 
of their sovereignty over their biological characteristics to the state. In 
this respect the “biologically contract” is similar to the social contract 
in which people relinquish part of their sovereignty over their freedom 
to state, which then take it upon itself to secure peace and safety for its 
citizens.
Is this justification of mandatory moral enhancement plausible? It could 
be, if certain conditions are met. Just like in the natural state in social con-
tract theory, what needs to be shown is that humans are in a situation, or 
that their way of life will necessarily lead to it, where normal functioning 
of society is threatened. That humanity is indeed in such a situation is what 
Persson and Savulescu are claiming. They believe “that the development 
of science and technology turned for the worse, all things considered, at 
the point at which it put in the hands of humankind the powers of doing 
ultimate harm” (Persson and Savulescu 2011, 441). According to them, 
“something could be ultimately harmful by forever extinguishing sentient 
life, or by damaging its conditions so drastically that, in general, life will 
not henceforth be worth living” (ibid.).
A major difference between the biological contract and the social con-
tract is that the social contract stems from the fact that the war of all 
against all, which occurs in the natural state, is unbearable. According to 
Hobbes’ famed description of the disadvantages of the natural state, human 
life in it is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1998, 84). But 
is not human life, at least that of most citizens of Western democracies, 
everything but that?
Savulescu and Persson acknowledge that most people are not aware 
of the risk we are faced with, and they partially ascribe this to our innate 
cognitive bias to objects and events that we find familiar and available: “we 
are fixated on the possible occurrence of events of which we have readily 
available images, largely as a result of recently having experienced events 
of these kinds. Our emotions are geared to how vividly we imagine pos-
sible events rather than simply to how we abstractly estimate their value 
and probability” (Persson and Savulescu 2011, 442). But is humanity truly 
headed for destruction? And could biomedical enhancement save us from 
it? These questions are, as admitted by Savulescu and Persson as well, “so 
complex that it is difficult to be confident of not going astray somewhere” 
(Persson and Savulescu 2011, 444).They become especially difficult to an-
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swer when it is not possible to attribute an exact, or at least approximate, 
degree of probability to different outcomes.4
Some reckon that even in these circumstances it is possible to apply 
the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, which requires regular 
citizens, as well as the government, to take extra precautions when assess-
ing potentially catastrophic situations (Sunstein 2007, 122). But even if we 
agree that climate change and other threats that accompany the develop-
ment of contemporary technologies represent a potentially catastrophic 
danger, which requires precautionary measures that involve various forms 
of action to deter this danger, it obviously does not mean that any and all 
precautions are justified.
For instance, although I am in danger of contracting a virus in contact 
with other people, it does not mean I have to accept avoiding all direct so-
cial contact as precaution. I can just get inoculated against the most danger-
ous diseases for which there is reasonable probability of getting infected. It 
is therefore not only in our interests to identify challenges in connection to 
the threat we are facing, but also the challenges that accompany potential 
solutions. Apart from the potential dangers of climate change and weapons 
of mass destruction, we should assess the dangers that come with biomedi-
cal enhancement as one possible solution to these issues.
Earlier in this text, I claimed that biomedical intervention aimed to-
wards improving human behaviour that is considered moral improve-
ment by its advocates is, in fact, no moral improvement at all, and that it 
also restricts moral and political freedom. If this reasoning is correct, the 
project of biomedical improvement could be justified solely if it was the 
only way to save humanity from destruction.
However, not even advocates of biomedical enhancement believe that; 
they see this method as an accompanying measure that could contribute 
to resolving the problem (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 121). They con-
sider it necessary because they are convinced that liberal democracy as 
the political order of the developed West is not capable of making changes 
that would deter the threat of catastrophic predicament and secure sus-
tainable development. The democratic process makes change impossible 
as long as the majority of citizens put their short-term interests before 
long-term interests. Politicians likewise avoid proposing and carrying 
04 Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provide rough 
estimates of the probability of climate change impact on human life. The 
reports confirm, with a high degree of reliability, that economic losses due 
to weather- and climate-related setbacks are on the rise and that develop-
ing countries are particularly affected. However, the reports are highly re-
served when it comes to estimates of the magnitude of losses and damages 
that climate change will cause in the future (IPCC 2012, 234 and IPCC 2013).
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out unpopular measures whose impact would only be felt in the distant 
future, for fear of losing elections. Another solution would be to accept a 
form of benevolent authoritarian government which would be successful 
in putting unpopular decisions into action. But the authoritarian form of 
government cannot be a serious solution because it has so far invariably 
failed in the area of freedom and human rights.5
Were Persson and Savulescu perhaps too quick to write off liberal de-
mocracy? Although their analysis of liberal democracy reveals that it is 
faced with serious problems, the practice of liberal democracy per se has 
in the course of history displayed an amazing capability of self-correction. 
The development of Western democracy in the past two hundred years has 
shown that democracy was able to find it in itself to respond to some of its 
own shortcomings, such as the tyranny of the majority and the abuse of 
power. Since democracy is never a finished project, these responses must 
always be examined and improved anew. The development of democracy 
primarily depends on developing awareness among its citizens of the need 
for its continuous improvement. For instance, the development of civic 
awareness of gender equality led to enfranchisement of women. Raising 
awareness of the gross injustice of subjugating religious, racial and ethnic 
minorities led to effective legislation which guaranteed equal rights for all 
citizens. In these cases, the enfranchised ruling majority was able to put 
aside its own short-term interests and support a politics that would benefit 
the long-term interests of society on the whole.
05 Not all threats of potential catastrophic damage originate from the short-
comings of liberal democracy. Among the potential dangers that ought 
to incite our moral improvement is the misuse of nuclear weapons. How-
ever, history has come to show that, after the sobering effect of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never used again. Perhaps we owe 
the fact that a nuclear event did not occur during the Cold War to the 
so-called “balance of power,” but almost a quarter of a century after its 
end, no country seems to be ready to use nuclear weapons either. Persson 
and Savulescu are more concerned with the level of technological devel-
opment, which they consider to have made available the knowledge and 
necessary materials to produce a nuclear bomb to smaller groups or even 
individuals; they are also apprehensive that terrorists might acquire nucle-
ar weapons through stealing (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 47). Without a 
doubt, there are terrorist organisations that would gladly get their hands 
on nuclear weapons, either by producing or by stealing them. But neither 
option is that simple. Despite the fact that knowledge on producing nu-
clear weapons is fairly easily available, we bear witness to the fact that 
not even those countries that possess far greater resources than terrorist 
organisations are capable of it. Still, the threat of nuclear weapons theft 
is far smaller today than in the 1990s, when the nuclear weapons storage 
facilities of the former Soviet Union were virtually unguarded.
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Although problems related to climate change, excessive use of natural 
resources, and the misuse of weapons of mass destruction open up a great 
number of queries, uncertainties and fears from today’s perspective, the 
hope remains that humans are capable of seeing the steps that need to be 
taken in order to deter at least the worst repercussions of these threats. 
Past experience has shown that humans were able to overcome their mis-
conceptions and limitations without biomedical enhancement to establish 
a more equitable and long-term sustainable society. To be able to do this 
in the future, additional efforts are required to develop awareness of the 
problems we are facing. The research data we provided at the beginning of 
this article indicate that a higher level of problem awareness and higher 
level of educational attainment lead to a greater willingness to sacrifice 
one’s own interests and embrace necessary changes. Year after year, science 
gains more knowledge about human impact on climate change; this new 
knowledge strengthens public conviction that it is necessary to change 
how we relate to the world we live in. There is also growing awareness 
that economic growth and protection of the living environment are not 
mutually exclusive. Countries are becoming more serious about focusing 
on sustainable forms of development and ecological sources of energy. It 
might not be enough, but it still leaves hope that the road to change can be 
reached without biomedical enhancement that would require us to sacri-
fice part of our freedom.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed a recent proposal according to which hu-
man beings are in need of moral enhancement by novel biomedical means 
in order to reduce the risk of catastrophes that could threaten the very 
possibility of continued human existence on this planet. According to the 
proponents of this position, our moral psychology – evolved for a life in 
small societies with primitive technology – is no longer able to cope with 
the challenges of modern technologically developed and globalized world. 
Since these authors believe that the traditional means of moral enhance-
ment such as education had only a modest effect in the effort to adjust our 
moral behaviour to the challenges of modern world, they propose that it is 
necessary to examine and (if proven safe and effective) adopt alternative 
ways of moral enhancement by biomedical means. Their hope is that once 
human beings become morally enhanced by traditional and biomedical 
means, they will be able to overcome the affectionate limitations of our 
psychology. These limitations are most obvious in our inclination to take 
care primarily only of those that are near and dear to us, whereas this “near” 
should be understood in its spatial and temporal meaning. One of the main 
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tasks of moral enhancement is to strengthen our altruistic feelings toward 
strangers. Once we are morally and psychologically equipped to take care 
of the needs and interest of those with whom we do not share spatial and 
temporal proximity, we will be more willing to change our behaviour in 
accordance to the more sustainable modes of development. 
In my discussion I raised two objections to this proposal. The first ob-
jection claims that the idea that human beings could be morally enhanced 
by altering our emotional psychological inclinations, such as altruism, is 
misguided. In the line with Kantian understanding of morality I argue 
that our morality is based on rationality and not on inclinations. If we take 
this view of morality it becomes clear that the proposed enhancement by 
biomedical means cannot be moral enhancement. What is enhanced is 
emotional aspect of our character, not our morality. People enhanced in 
this way would not act on the basis of their deliberate choices but on basis 
of preprogramed psychological inclination. This would in turn undermine 
our basic moral concept of freedom and, thereby, of moral responsibility. 
The second objection to the proposal show how the idea that moral en-
hancement by biomedical means should be mandatory violates political 
freedom of citizens. Faced with the objection that moral enhancement by 
biomedical means could be necessary in order to prevent catastrophic de-
struction of environment, in the final part of this chapter I try to point to 
education and liberal democracy as the alternative and morally acceptable 
ways of changing our behaviour. 

Global environmental crisis and limits to 
growth: A Marxian perspective
Mislav Žitko
3
“Accumulate, accumulate! This is Moses and the Prophets!” wrote Marx in 
the first volume of Capital recognizing the internal drive of the capitalist 
mode of production towards perpetual accumulation and growth. The point 
of often present religious overtone in Marx’s analysis of the relationship be-
tween relations of production and accumulation is to capture the enduring 
irrationality of capitalist growth imperative. Capitalism must develop, and 
it must grow because it is structured in such manner that without constant 
displacement of natural and social boundaries it cannot survive as a mode 
of production. Again, this point was forcefully made in class terms by Marx 
and Engels in the Communist Manifesto: 
“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolution-
ising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations 
of production, and with them the whole relations of society. 
Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered 
form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence 
for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social condi-
tions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen 
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices 
and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into 
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to 
face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his rela-
tions with his kind.” (Marx and Engels 2004, 19)
It is, therefore, rather curious that the intellectual tradition within which 
capitalism’s distinctive growth imperative received so much theoretical 
attention has had only a minor role in recent mainstream debates about 
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environment, growth and sustainability. At first glance, it is as if the dreade-
ness of the Soviet model convinced radical ecologists and the commons 
movement that, to use Lenin’s phrase, “the Soviet government plus elec-
trification1” is the only legacy of Marx and Marxian theory. However, such 
a claim, which undoubtedly still plays a prominent role in public discourse 
is fallacious and inappropriate as it fails to distinguish between two sepa-
rate enterprises: the Marxian analysis of capitalist mode of production 
underpinned by labour theory of value and a historical investigation of the 
varieties of socialism (ranging from Yugoslav self-management and Hun-
garian market socialism to the Soviet model). It then becomes possible to 
show that the first enterprise has a real significance for the debate about 
environmental crisis. Indeed, Marxian political economists have provided, 
building on the works of Marx and Engels, tangible insights into the causes 
of the environmental crisis by linking diverse forms of nature’s degrada-
tion with the dynamics of capitalist accumulation, and stressing the pivotal 
role of social class for the understanding of the social order saturated with 
inequality in wealth and income. By taking into account these insights one 
can move forward and explore how contemporary dominance of finance 
capital and the process of financialization creates new enclosures and gen-
erates barriers for transition to a sustainable economy. 
Needless to say, the critique of capitalism cannot by itself provide a 
blueprint for an egalitarian, democratic and ecologically sustainable (i.e. 
socialist) society. Nevertheless, an informed alternative depends not only 
on our ability to expand the reach of democratic decision-making process, 
but also on our aptitude to confront the contradictions of the capitalist 
system at their core. The latter point is of particular importance inasmuch 
as the influence of neoclassical economics is increasingly present in the 
domain of ecological economics, rendering it more and more useless as a 
discourse that can clarify the scope and depth of the environmental crisis. 
Notwithstanding the avowed critical stance towards neoclassical theory 
and its narrow-minded disregard for natural limits to growth, it appears 
that the neoclassical apparatus is still very much present in the minds of 
many ecological economists. The consequences of this learned ignorance 
are quite devastating, since thinking in neoclassical terms of marginal util-
ity and market valuation leaves the entire economic domain free of any real 
scrutiny and, hence, undercuts a possibility for the assessment of intercon-
nections between economy, society and the natural environment which 
are rightly considered to be decisive (Domazet et al. 2012, 10). Instead of 
confronting the difficult task of, for example, relating the greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions to the regime of accumulation and patterns of consump-
01 “Коммунизм есть советская власть плюс электрификация всей страны“ 
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tion in the advanced capitalist economies and peripheral countries alike, 
the orthodox economic discourse leaves us with an elusive puzzle of finding 
the right price for carbon and spurious cap-and-trade arrangements. From 
the dominant point of view, the problem revolves around the search for 
missing markets and mitigation of externalities, while the solutions can al-
legedly be found in further privatisation and extension of market influence. 
The paradoxical nature of neoclassical solutions is well noted by Mirowski 
et al. (2013): “If environmental degradation is encountered in orthodox 
economics as a ‘market failure’ and attributed to ‘externalities’, then this 
amounts to arguing that climate change has not yet been priced into invest-
ment decisions because private property rights to the atmosphere cannot 
yet be assigned in financial contracts. In conventional economics, pollution 
isn’t wrong because it disrupts and debilitates the natural manifold, but 
rather because it somehow derails the market. The general prescription is to 
concede a role for government to restore the market to its pristine natural 
state, rather than to actually do something to repair nature or to stop doing 
the things that mess it up”. (Mirowski et al. 2013)
Neoclassical economics: Growth without prosperity
If business as usual is not an option, than thinking as usual cannot be one 
either. This lesson has been understood quite well by authors focused on 
the complex issue of relation between prosperity and growth. Tim Jackson, 
in his attempt to reconstruct economics for a finite planet, argues that 
neoclassical economics is able to avoid dealing with the ambiguous associa-
tion of prosperity, utility and growth by assuming that the value of various 
commodities is equivalent to their price, while at the same time price is 
just a monetary expression of utility in the context of market exchange 
(Jackson 2009a). Thus, people participate in the market in order to satisfy 
their utility preferences and market exchange brings together producers 
and consumers allowing them to increase their utility and, in that respect, 
their welfare. In a few short steps the square is circled and the individual 
utility maximization is equated with the overall increase in social welfare, 
whereas the increase in social welfare depends on the market exchange. 
Moreover, gross domestic product (GDP) is designed in order to capture all 
market exchanges in a single number within a single economy. On the back-
ground of the fictitious causality between utility, market exchange, social 
welfare and prosperity it should not come as a surprise that since the end 
of the World War II and the establishment of national accounting system, 
governments have set their strategies in accordance with the imperative 
of attaining positive rates of growth (Victor 2008). The point here is not to 
add to the growing literature on the inappropriateness of GDP as a measure 
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of human development, but to highlight the fact that the primary problem 
is market valuation of nature and economic growth itself. Deficiency in the 
measurement of growth is but a symptom of the unsustainable capitalist 
dynamics. Changes in measurement procedures are, of course, important 
and represent a sign of rising social concerns about climate change and dete-
rioration of the biosphere, but they do not begin to address the core issues. 
In fact, many mainstream analysts and commentators have pointed to the 
need to re-think the value of GDP as an aggregate economic indicator, just 
as one can observe a formation of a new discourse with the aim of develop-
ing a framework for a hybrid economic order in which sustainable (green) 
development can co-exist with capitalist markets without contradictions 
or conflicts. The notion of “climate capitalism” put forward by Newell and 
Paterson (2010) can be seen as a refined effort to bring about decarbonisa-
tion of the global economy with the growth imperative still locked in place. 
From a Marxian standpoint, changing of the orthodox mind-set has pro-
duced ambiguous results which can hardly be named politically progres-
sive. Nowhere is the opaqueness and ambivalent nature of “sustainable” or 
“climate capitalism” discourse more present than in the reports, protocols 
and other documents which emerged out of the many summits and con-
ferences dedicated to set the groundwork for new policies in the face of 
on-going climate crisis and devastation of nature. From the Earth summit 
held in 1992, through the lapses and blunders of Kyoto and Copenhagen, 
to the disappointing outcomes of Rio+20, instead of taking into account a 
fundamental fact that we are approaching a tipping point “beyond which 
global warming begins to feed on itself and becomes essentially irreversible 
and uncontrollable, with large-scale adverse consequences” (Storm 2009, 
1012), we have seen the institutionalization of the neoclassical apparatus 
and „neoliberal approaches to sustainable development“ (Böhm et al. 2012, 
2). “The liberal norm-complex” as Böhm et al. have argued “has been based 
upon two fundamental assumptions, 1) that free trade regimes and high 
economic growth rates are not only compatible with, but are important 
preconditions for, environmental sustainability, and, 2) that market-based 
tools are the most appropriate instruments to apply in effort to achieve 
that goal.” (ibid., 2). To be sure, one can find numerous reasons for what 
can now be described only as a complete failure of global climate policy, 
from the influence of lobbies that profit from fossil-fuel use, through weak 
international legal regimes to inertia and corruption of political parties in 
core capitalist countries, but Marxian analysis reminds us that the explana-
tion of this failure must be found in the ability of the neoliberal political 
forces to present market solutions for market problems model as if there 
is no alternative (Lohmann 2010, 133). In that regard Lohmann has rightly 
argued that the future international agreements on climate are “unlikely 
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to bring about better results unless it is recognized that instead of aid-
ing a transition away from fossil fuel mining and use, which must be the 
overriding goal of any coherent climate policy, the market instruments 
at the centre of today’s international climate regime are designed in way 
that actually entrench fossil fuel use and delay the changes that need to 
be initiated immediately.” (ibid., 134). In a similar vein, others on the Left 
have stressed how “primarily economic and flexible instruments, such as 
emission trading (ET), the clean development mechanism (CDM), and joint 
implementation (JI)” are set to “counteract the trend towards an increasing 
greenhouse effect” as if that is the only way of dealing with the ecological 
crisis and the only possible way of regulating the relation between natural 
resources and social needs. (Brunnengräber 2009, 213-14). From the Left 
perspective carbon markets in particular can be seen as “a part of a broader 
set of green economy discourses and practices which are currently facilitat-
ing the expansion of capitalist accumulation through the capture, pricing 
and monetization of ecosystem services and other environmental goods”. 
(Böhm et al. 2012, 3). 
It is understandable that the international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank or the IMF have made every effort to incorporate market-
based solutions to their policy response. The Stern Review and the IEA 
reports, having exhibited quite a lenient stance towards the possible GHG 
stabilization target (at 550 and 500 ppm , respectively), also gave explicit 
support for the carbon trading schemes which in the world designed to fit 
the assumptions of orthodox economics “can deliver least cost emissions 
reduction by allowing reductions to occur wherever they are cheapest” 
(Stern 2007, 326, as quoted in Storm 2009). On the other hand, it is par-
ticularly unsettling to observe, coming back to the issue of the neoclassical 
apparatus at work within the domain of ecological economics, the support 
that the emission trading schemes received from the prominent ecological 
economists like Herman Daly. The role of a Marxist approach to ecologi-
cal conflicts and crisis can be seen, first of all, in bringing a much needed 
epistemological vigilance to a discipline that has often fallen prey to “solu-
tions” that do not work, give business sector incentive to delay structural 
changes, and entrust the financial markets to act as the avant-garde that 
will override the status quo and design a radical climate policy on a new 
ground. Furthermore, theory of capitalist accumulation first developed by 
Marx and later on improved by numerous contributors to Marxian political 
economy can be of use for understanding the rise of finance as the hallmark 
of recent economic history. Commodification of natural resources is, in 
the present regime of accumulation, closely linked to the process of finan-
cialization. To understand the current state of play, i.e., to see what is the 
role of natural resources in contemporary capitalism we will give a brief 
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account of the financialization of commodities market and then examine 
the link between the concentration of power in the sphere of finance and 
the formation of carbon markets. Against the background of the analysis 
of financialization of commodity markets and the construction of carbon 
markets it is possible to get a better insight about the Marxian contribution 
to the environmental crisis literature.
The Entropy law and Marxian Theory
One can readily agree with Paul Burkett’s (2006, 292) appraisal according to 
which “the ecological potential of the Marxian perspective stems from the 
fact that it does not artificially separate a material realm of production from 
a social realm of exchange and distribution. Rather, it sees class relations as 
material social relations, and therefore as specific forms of economy-envi-
ronment interaction” (Burkett 2006, 292). As is well known, the duality of 
labour, or the fact that the capitalist class is able to exploit the difference 
between the labour time necessary for the reproduction of the labour force 
and the surplus labour time (which can, it turn, be realized as profit) is the 
kernel of Marxian theory of exploitation.
For the discussion about the ecological potential of Marxian theory it is 
important to notice that the process of accumulation of capital, built upon 
the alienation of workers from the product of their labour and from the 
conditions of production, generates the metabolic rift between society and 
natural conditions (Foster 2000a). In a production system primarily driven 
by profit maximization the tension between use-value or wealth, which 
includes “natural wealth and the individual or collective capabilities of 
workers and communities”, and monetary exchange value inevitably leads 
(all other being equal) to degradation of labour and nature (Burkett 2006, 
139). The process of degradation of labour and nature cannot be reversed 
because of the in-built growth imperative, i.e., an insatiable need to surpass 
the previous limits of accumulation which depends upon an unimpeded 
access to labour-power and material use-values.
These tendencies Marx discussed in chapters on large scale machinery 
and land rent in the first and third volume of Capital, respectively. Burkett 
has conveniently translated the main argument of Marx and Engels into 
today’s language of ecological economics: “Capitalism’s uncoupling of pro-
duction from the solar budget constraint, and it’s tremendous acceleration 
of matter-energy throughput, had led to entropic degradation of natural 
conditions – a metabolic rift between human reproduction and the condi-
tions needed for this reproduction to be healthy and sustainable.” (ibid., 
204). Once appropriated by capitalist class, human and natural resources or 
use values must be given a commodity form and sold on the market. Hence, 
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capitalist valuation depends equally on the process of exploitation at the 
level of production, and on the market mechanism at the level of exchange. 
The relevant connection with the on-going debate about the status of 
market mechanism in ecological economics should be obvious. As pointed 
out by Burkett (2006), Noonan (2010) and Smith (2010a, 2010b) ecological 
economics critically evaluates some of the basic features of orthodox eco-
nomics discourse (such as the Pareto principle or the neoclassical growth 
theory), but at the same time remains chained to the simple allocation/
scale and private/social dichotomies. For example, Daly explains that the 
market “solves the allocation problem by providing the necessary informa-
tion (prices) and incentives (money). It does this one thing very well” (Daly 
1996, 50). So, the market can coordinate and balance individual maximiz-
ing efforts and by doing so it can determine the set of relative prices that 
measure opportunity cost in the sphere of private decision making, not-
withstanding the scale (macro-allocation) problem for which market offers 
no solution and should be therefore viewed in terms of social or collective 
decision making (Constanza and Daly 1992, 41). Thus, we find ourselves 
faced again with “externalities-missing markets view of environmental 
problems“, only this time at the macro-level as the capitalist economic 
order tends to „overuse low-entropy matter-energy and overproduce high-
entropy matter-energy.” (Burkett 2006, 50). 
A Marxian analysis of ecological crisis recognizes that the production 
of surplus value depends on the separation of producers form their condi-
tions of production which includes land and other natural resources. In 
their seminal work Capitalism with Derivatives, Bryan and Rafferty identify 
three degrees of separation of capital ownership. The first degree involves 
the process in which the worker is separated from the means of production, 
while the second degree refers to the formation of the joint stock company, 
i.e., the separation of company ownership from the process of production 
(Bryan and Rafferty 2006, 71-74). The third degree is related to the current 
historical period in which the proliferation of new financial products is ac-
companied by politics of financial liberalization. The third degree of sepa-
ration implies a change in the nature of class relations. Disconnection of 
laborer and land is a key aspect of the first degree of separation which Marx 
used as a basis for his inquiry into the secret of primitive accumulation, as 
he traces the process through which peasants were removed by force off 
their land and the commons were enclosed. Furthermore, the discussion so 
far pointed to the link between the first and the third degree of separation, 
as the labor force encounters its natural environment, albeit in commodity 
form in the sphere of consumption. 
On the production side, nature also appears in commodity form, but 
this time as a stock of productive assets. This is an important point because 
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once nature appears as a stock of productive assets, neoclassical economic 
theory was able to use the metaphor of capital and to treat nature as natu-
ral capital (Burkett 2006). Hence, a chain of equivalences can be created, 
and the theory suggests that it is possible to use different forms of capital 
(manufactured productive capital i.e. means of production, natural capital, 
human capital) without paying much attention to the specificities of each 
form. One can therefore imagine that all one needs is to find an appropri-
ate combination of non-renewable forms of natural capital and renewable 
forms of manufactured capital. The problem of confronting the limits to 
growth can be postponed indefinitely, as long as technological progress and 
rise in productivity enables the substitution of different forms of capital. 
Now, before the Club of Rome introduced the limits-to-growth notion 
into economic analysis in 1972, neoclassical theory did not devote much 
attention to natural resources. The natural capital metaphor came about 
as the answer to the limits-to-growth challenge. Burkett (2006) writes that 
neoclassical resource optimism was based on the belief that the market 
would automatically bring resource substitution and technological ad-
vance. The background assumption was that natural capital is more than 
just a convenient metaphor and, furthermore, that there is a possibility of 
perfect substitution between natural and manufactured capital, so that 
at any point in time it is possible to replace renewable for non-renewable 
resources. The natural capital metaphor is consistent with the overall neo-
classical framework in which market valuation and pricing of production 
factors determine allocation and scale of production. Ecological economists 
were quick to indicate great difficulties in the attempt to put a market price 
on nature and warn about potential harm that can befall as a result of the 
myopic market valuation of the ecosystem. Writing from an eco-socialist 
perspective O’Connor and Martinez-Alier remind us that “the prominence 
in academic writing of the term natural capital coincides with the real so-
cial and political process of capitalization of nature. This refers to a pattern 
of response of business, within the logic of capitalist economic relations, 
to the supply problem of depletion of natural resources and degradation of 
environmental services required for support of commodity production” 
(O’Connor and Martinez-Alier 1998, 37). 
A Marxian approach to the problems of valuation of nature and environ-
mental crisis relies on the insight advanced by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 
that highlights the importance of the entropy law for economic dynamics. 
For Burkett (2006, 143), entropy is an anthropomorphic category and “it 
needs to be developed in terms of the class relations that shape the pro-
ductive use of nature”. Georgescu-Roegen’s influential study The Entropy 
Law and the Economic Process (1971) was out just one year before the Club 
of Rome published Limits to Growth (1972). Georgescu-Roegen started his 
3. Global Environmental Crisis and Limits to Growth 101
career as a mathematical economist and has used his natural science back-
ground to introduce physical concepts of energy and entropy into economic 
analysis. The motivation for this can be found in his open dissatisfaction 
with neoclassical economics which he thought to be a direct contradic-
tion of the second law of thermodynamics, a more fundamental universal 
world-view. The main idea which he elaborates is the concept of entropic 
degradation as a pervasive constraint placed upon the process of produc-
tion, in contrast to the neoclassical theory of unadulterated growth. For 
Georgescu-Roegen, the entropy law can be readily applied in economic 
analysis since there is a biological aspect of human economy as it requires 
available energy in usable form. The implications for ecological economics 
should be clear and are spelled out by Gowdy and Mesner : “Entropy meas-
ures a system’s unavailable energy, and humankind has the distinction of 
currently being the most significant contributor to entropic degradation by 
increasing rates of extraction of natural resources and discharge of wastes 
into environment” (1998, 147). In correspondence with the laws of thermo-
dynamics, Georgescu-Roegen observes that “the economic process neither 
produces nor consumes matter-energy, it only absorbs it and throws it out 
continuously” and therefore “matter-energy enters the economic process 
in a state of low entropy and comes out in a state of high entropy” (as quoted 
in Burkett 2006, 144). The problem is that in an isolated system, by defini-
tion, there are neither matter nor energy transfers between the system and 
its environment, whereas in the closed system energy can be exchanged, 
but the work cannot be performed indefinitely at a constant rate. From 
that Georgescu-Roegen concludes that the limited supply of low-entropy 
matter-energy places the absolute constraint on production, or in Herman 
Daly’s formulation, the entropy law is “the ultimate supply limit, the source 
of absolute scarcity” (Daly 1992, 25). For our present analysis Ayers (1999) 
offers a brief recapitulation of the Georgescu-Roegen six main propositions: 
(1) human welfare is a function of economic output (2) production is inher-
ently material-intensive (3) material processing requires available energy as 
it converts low-entropy material such as fossil fuels or metal ores into high 
entropy materials (4) the quantity of low-entropy materials is finite on our 
planet (5) recycling materials or fuels requires an exogenous inflow of low 
entropy energy (6) complete recycling is impossible due to entropic losses. 
From a Marxian standpoint the entropy law has a definite function in 
the critique of capitalist mode of production. By introducing the entropy 
law into analysis of capitalist accumulation it is possible to see the inter-
connection between the alienation of labor and the devastation of nature, 
inasmuch as they appear, from the capitalist view, as factors of production. 
Marx understood that only a monetary theory of production can prop-
erly grasp capitalist dynamics, so the role of money was highlighted in his 
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account of how capitalism works. In contrast to neoclassical economics 
where money is reduced to a function of a veil around the so-called real 
transactions, in Marx’s account money is the universal equivalent that 
grounds the commensuration of different commodities in exchange. It is 
no wonder then that for Marx capitalist accumulation can be understood 
only in monetary terms. In regard to entropic contradictions of capital-
ist valuation, Burkett (2006) argues that it would be indeed very difficult 
to capture the qualitative variety, irreversibility and quantitative limits 
of low-entropy matter-energy with a homogeneous, divisible and mobile 
device like money or monetary claims on wealth. In Marxian theory then 
the surplus product cannot but have a monetary expression and the money 
value at the end of each investment cycle must be augmented as a condition 
of a ʻnormalʼ capitalist reproduction. Marx’s formula M – C – M' (money 
– commodity – money) captures the capitalist cycle in which commodity 
production is embedded in monetary accumulation. Nature and natural 
resources either have no place in this valuation chain or can enter in a form 
of commodity which, in turn, strips them of all the properties except for 
those that can influence the process of capitalist accumulation. In other 
words, “while recognizing the reality of the entropy law” Marxian theory 
also “reveals the crucial divergence between capitalism's entropic require-
ments and the entropic requirements of sustainable human production 
and development” (Burkett 2006, 173). The social implications of different 
degrees of separation between producers and conditions of production, 
and the incapacity of capitalist market to incorporate the requirements of 
sustainable development in light of the limits to growth, suggest that one 
needs to differentiate between two types of environmental crisis. 
In the first type “capital accumulation is threatened by environmental 
constraints on supplies of its requisite material use-values”, while the sec-
ond type “involves capitalism’s degradation of the conditions of human 
development” (ibid., 294). In the period of financialized capitalism the 
first type of crisis can be induced artificially, through the mechanisms of 
contemporary finance that regulate the behaviour of financial and non-
financial market actors alike. The dangers of market-based solutions to en-
vironmental crisis lies in the fact that they cannot escape the institutional 
setting tailored to the needs of fictitious accumulation and limitless growth.
Financialization of food and energy
The process of financialization has over the last decades led to the pro-
found changes in the pattern of capital accumulation. In the new regime 
of accumulation the relations between price, investment and production 
are under influence of the process of financialization, and that fact must 
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be taken into account if one is to understand the way nature and natural 
resources appear in the capitalist calculation. The term financialization 
refers to the rise of financial markets, institutions and motives, not only in 
size, but also in structural importance. For Palley the principal impacts of 
financialization are (1) elevation of the significance of the financial sector 
relative to the manufacturing sector, (2) transfer of income to activities 
based on finance and (3) increase in income inequality and contribution to 
wage stagnation. Moreover, financialization may in the period of decline 
put the economy at risk of debt deflation and prolonged recession (Palley 
2007). On the level of non-financial firm financialization is related to “a pat-
tern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production.” (Kripp-
ner 2005, 175). Capitalist valuation of nature has always been saturated 
with ambiguities, which is not surprising given that nature is not a manu-
factured commodity and it therefore requires an elaborate social effort in 
order to appear in a commodity form. The link between financialization 
and capitalist valuation of nature can be most easily observed in the case 
of financialization of primary commodities (i.e. raw natural resources like 
oil, copper, iron, maize, corn, cocoa etc.). The focus on the financialized 
commodity markets does not imply that the traditional capitalist plunder-
ing of nature is gone out of fashion. On the contrary, in the new regime of 
accumulation old fashioned destruction and waste creation stand side by 
side with the new techniques of commodification. In synergy they bring 
the contradictory nature of capitalism to new heights with serious con-
sequences for the ecosystem and the quality of human life. With massive 
capital inflows and rise in investment in these markets, movement toward 
a sustainable economy in which the fossil fuels would be kept in the ground 
and the protection of natural resources placed high on the political agenda, 
appears increasingly out of reach. Recent price boom in primary commod-
ity markets that took place in the pre-crisis period, between 2002 and 2008 
with the food prices reaching all-time high in early 2011 after temporary 
decline, clearly shows the adverse social impact that the financialization 
of food and energy may have on society (see figures 1A and 1B).
On the macroeconomic level, many of the developing countries that 
depend on imports have seen deterioration in their terms of trade as they 
are forced to spend a large proportion of their foreign exchange earnings 
on primary commodity imports (UNCTAD 2011). The price volatility can also 
have a negative impact on primary commodity exporters as the capital 
inflows give rise to currency appreciation which, in turn, undermines the 
position of domestic firms in their struggle to compete with foreign com-
panies. In terms of social class, i.e. at the microeconomic level, excessive 
price volatility means that most vulnerable households, usually located at 
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the bottom half of income distribution, will not be able to afford basic food 
and energy commodities. In fact, according to FAO report more than fifty 
countries had to confront a food crisis as the prices of commodities rose in 
the late 2000s (FAO 2008).
Figure 1A
Evolution of grain prices 2000-2013 (USD per ton); 
 
source: FAO database
Figure 1B
FAO Food price index (nominal), 1995-2013; 
source: FAO database
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Figure 1B: FAO food price indeks  
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The poor in these countries have been hit not only through the price 
channel that forced them to switch to less nutritious food items, but also 
through the worsening of the fiscal position of the state since the public 
funds used to tackle the food crisis could not be used to improve health, 
education and other public systems (UNCTAD 2011). Global finance, armed 
with the opaque financial instruments and the ability of rapid movement 
of capital across national boundaries, can only fortify the existing com-
petition between states and affirm the growth imperative in-built in the 
capitalist mode of production.
It is important to notice that the process of financialization uncovered 
forces that were always present in the capitalist mode of production. There-
fore, the proliferation of new financial institutions and products should not 
be seen as a temporary deviation from the more moderate or less volatile 
capitalist development that one had a chance to observe during the Keynes-
ian years. On the contrary, it is the class compromise, and the welfare state 
as its institutional expression that represents a deviation from the usual 
state of affairs in the history of capitalism. This point should be taken into 
account if one wishes to understand the predicaments of the contemporary 
environmental policy.
To cut the long story short, to be successful a radical environmental 
policy must influence the contemporary capitalist configurations in such 
a way that they deviate from the trajectory they would follow as a matter 
of course. In plain English, the institutional setting in which the motives 
and interests of developed and developing states are embedded revolves 
around the notion that economic growth has a paramount importance for 
social welfare on one hand, and accumulation of economic and political 
power on the other. The process of financialization is in the strict sense 
inherent to the growth imperative. Although we cannot go to great detail 
here, the reason for this can be traced back to the dual nature of credit as 
described in third volume of Capital. There Marx pointed out that credit ac-
celerates the material development of the productive forces and the world 
market, but at the same time, inasmuch as it appears as the principal lever 
of overproduction and excessive speculation in the sphere of commerce, 
it also accelerates financial crisis that in the end can undermine the value 
created in the commodity production process. (For further discussion see 
Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999; Toporowski 1999).
Indeed, relatively high growth rates that the advanced capitalist coun-
tries have had in the decades after the Volcker shock2 in comparison to 
02 The decision of Paul Volcker, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve to raise 
interest rates in order to rid the US economy of inflation and strengthen 
the fast-falling dollar. 
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developing economies, can be to a large extent attributed to their ability 
to adjust their economic development to the new regime of accumulation 
and use the power of finance as a comparative advantage (Varoufakis 2011; 
Pantich and Gindin, 2012) To make the relationship between capitalism 
and nature more transparent let us return to the issue of financialization of 
food and energy in the global commodity markets. The point is to develop a 
more complete understanding of the internal mechanics of financialization 
and to see again, from a different angle, the shortcomings of the allocation/ 
scale demarcation. 
Recent research in critical political economy suggests that the finan-
cialization of commodity markets represents the latest stage in the de-
velopment of financialized capitalism. Wray argues that “commodities 
represent the latest asset class identified by money manager capitalism 
as ripe for financialization” (Wray 2008, 9). The usual economic textbook 
story would tell us that the price volatility in commodity markets must 
be the result of supply and demand, and that any divergence from price 
fundamentals must be a consequence of an illegitimate intrusion into 
market mechanism. 
However, the supply and demand explanation makes sense in the case of 
commodities as much as it makes sense in the case of the dot.com bubble or 
the housing price inflation that led to a global economic crisis after 2007. 
To understand why, one has to take into account that financial investors 
have been present in the commodity markets for a very long time. First 
commodity derivatives had the function to protect producers and buyers 
in commodity markets from the uncertainty inherent in the market game. 
Typical introductory story involves a wheat farmer and a flour miller. For 
both of them the price of wheat is of the upmost importance, and it is in 
their best interest to use commodity derivatives in order to circumvent the 
factors of uncertainty that can influence the price in the period between 
sowing time and harvest. A forward contract can help them to deal with 
the effects of uncertainty as they set out the terms for a future sale and 
delivery in advance of actual exchange of wheat (Bryan and Rafferty 
2006). By the same account, a futures contract allows investors “to buy 
or sell some standardised quantity and quality of a commodity, financial 
asset or index at some future date and place at a fixed price” (Bryan and 
Rafferty 2006, 41).
However, in really existing capitalism the relationship between com-
modity derivatives and commodities cannot be assessed without taking 
into account the institutional and political changes that accelerate or im-
pede market development.
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Figure 2
Notional amount of outstanding OTC commodity derivatives (billions of USD) 
source: BIS Review, Statistical appendix
Political pressures to deregulate, i.e. to regulate the market in the interest of 
major financial players surely represent a key feature of the recent econom-
ic history. De-regulation the commodity market finally paid off after the 
resignation in 1999 of Brooksley Born as the head of Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the enacting of new legislation, starting 
with the Commodities Futures Modernization Act which allowed that the 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives remain exempt from CFTC oversight. 
This opened the door, as Ghosh explains, for a variety of institutional inves-
tors to trade commodity futures contracts without any position limits, dis-
closure requirements, or regulatory oversight (Ghosh 2011, 53). Once it was 
understood that commodity prices do not exhibit correlation with returns 
of financial assets such as bonds or equities, it became rational for investors 
to hold commodities in their portfolio for the purpose of diversification and 
reduction of volatility (Wray 2008). Of course, it is much more convenient 
to hold paper claims to commodities, rather than commodities themselves, 
and commodities futures were seen as a financial instrument that can pro-
vide all the benefits of investment in a commodity, without the trouble 
of dealing with the real thing (Wray 2008, 22). Besides the new legislation 
which was designed to support deregulation of commodity markets, finan-
cial innovation also acted as facilitating factor through the setup of tracking 
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commodity indexes such as Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commod-
ity Index (S&P GSCI) (UNCTAD 2011). According to Masters and White, the 
commodities futures markets are a particular form of marketplace where 
two types of participants with quite different intentions and aims can be 
found side by side. On the one hand, hedgers are trying to access the market 
in order “to reduce the price risk of their underlying physical commodity 
business, while speculators trade in the markets to make maximum profits” 
(Masters and White 2011, 11). Moreover, a new type of speculator emerged 
in the 2000s, after the Commodities Futures Modernization Act under 
the Clinton administration had been put in place. Index speculators such 
as hedge funds, pension funds, university endowments and other institu-
tional investors use commodity futures in order, as was indicated above, to 
diversify their portfolio, and not because they would be interested in the 
underlying commodity (Wray 2008, 6). Hence, they would simply buy one of 
the commodity futures index such as S&P GSCI or the Dow Jones AIGCI. As 
Wray makes clear, index speculators only take long positions, i.e. they buy 
commodity futures index in the anticipation of rising prices, and “because 
commodity futures contracts do not pay any yield, the only possible source 
of return is an increase in the price of contracts” which makes the purchase 
of commodity futures index “a fundamentally speculative activity” (Wray 
2008, 23). As these new financial players entered into the commodity ex-
changes, the corresponding proliferation of complex financial derivatives 
facilitated the transformation of natural resources into a type of asset. As 
a result, the value of unregulated OTC derivative market rose sharply. The 
Bank for International Settlements estimated that the value of outstand-
ing OTC commodity-linked derivatives increased from around 5 trillion U.S. 
dollars in June 2006 to over 13 trillion U.S. dollars in June 2008 (BIS 2009). 
This brief overview of recent developments in the financial markets re-
veals the inadequacy of the standard explanation, and the weaknesses sur-
rounding the arbitrary division between allocation and scale. First, the insti-
tutional and political structures have a decisive impact, not only as factors 
that externally influence market outcomes, but, prima facie, as the determi-
nants of the market game itself. Second, financialization, as the combined 
product of the proliferation of new financial institutions and instruments, 
and political efforts to deregulate the economy, should not be understood 
as some marginal supplement to the capitalist production process. It is, in 
fact, the core element of contemporary capitalism with often devastating 
consequences for the farmers and consumers in the developing countries 
where most of the basic commodities such as wheat, coffee or oil come from. 
Third, it is important to notice that the problem with the notion of market 
as a mechanism for efficient allocation goes beyond the simple lesson that “in 
capitalist societies employers seek to organize labour process in the most 
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profitable way, which does not need to be the most efficient” (Bowels et al. 
2005, 314). The point is that with the financialization of commodity markets 
the allocation of resources becomes dependent on price signals from the 
financial markets in contradiction to the standard theory in which funda-
mentals determine the spot prices, i.e., the supply and demand factors are 
presented as the causes of the price movement. As hedge fund manager Mi-
chael Masters succinctly put it in his testimony to the US Senate Committee: 
“In the present system, price changes for key agricultural and energy com-
modities originate in the futures markets and then are transmitted directly 
to the spot markets” (Masters as quoted in Wray 2008, 31). Therefore, all the 
instability and volatility that is associated with financialization is instantly 
transmitted to the spot market3, with the adverse effects for the small scale 
producers in developing countries, and clear distributional bias in terms of 
a new financial burden on the least well-off part of society.
The discussion so far has indicated the extent to which the process of 
financialization changed the relationship between economy and nature. 
The commodification of food and energy on the background of rising power 
of finance capital has brought severe insecurity and volatility that leaves 
little room, as we have argued, for artificial division on allocative and scale 
aspects of the capitalist economic structure. Moreover, given the current 
state of play, it is almost impossible to produce a plausible political frame-
work for the treatment of economic growth since the price system both 
on the level of allocation and scale acts as an obstacle to key questions of 
de-growth. Namely, if the latter is not meant to ossify the existing unequal 
relations between developed and developing countries, or between the 
rich and poor parts of society in a single country, use of natural resources, 
investment and production of food and energy must be set according to 
egalitarian principles. Global finance, armed with the opaque financial 
instruments and the ability of rapid movement of capital across national 
boundaries, prevents one from even starting to think about those issues 
in a coherent way, since the human needs and social justice do not appear 
at the level of allocation, nor the level of scale. Both allocation and scale 
are in the present regime of accumulation interrelated in such a way that 
brings about malnutrition in developing countries, obesity in developed 
countries, and fortifies the existing competition between states through 
the affirmation of the built-in growth imperative with little real concern 
for climate change and unsustainable waste production.
03 “The spot market or cash market is a public financial market, in which fi-
nancial instruments or commodities are traded for immediate delivery. It 
contrasts with a futures market in which delivery is due at a later date.” 
(Wikipedia definition http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spot_market; accessed 
on 9th November, 2013) 
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Carbon markets: Targeting Carbon-Dioxide vs. Targeting Profits
To learn about uselessness of cap-and-trade and its connection to the world 
of finance one does not have to subscribe to Marxian theory nor read Capi-
tal. Perfectly good explanation can be found in the work of James Hansen, 
the leading scientist on climate issues. As he rightly points out, a nominal 
cap that corresponds to a limited number of certificates is nothing more 
than a tax. The “trade” factor simply means that a holder of the certificate 
doesn’t have to use, but may sell it, instead. At that point, as Hansen ex-
plains, financialized capitalism kicks in: “There will be markets for these 
certificates on Wall Street and such places. And markets for derivatives. The 
biggest player is expected to be Goldman Sachs. Thousands of people will 
be employed in this trading business – the big boys, not the guy working 
for five dollars an hour. Are you wondering who will provide their income? 
Three guesses and the first two don’t count. Yes, it’s you – sorry about that. 
Their profits are also added to the fuel price” (Hansen 2009, 213).
Figure 3
Simplified Cap and Trade Model
Still, it is true that from a Marxian perspective the development of carbon 
markets is closely related to the financialization of commodities. In fact, 
as Hansen said in passing, the commodification of nature is their common 
denominator. It is the task of Marxian theory to explain why the reduction 
of natural resources to the stock of productive assets is important for the 
dominant relations of production. By now it should be clear that “the scale 
of capitalist matter-energy throughput cannot be analytically divorced 
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from the system’s allocation mechanism, that is, from market valuation” 
(Burkett 2006, 169) – i.e. allocation and scale are interdependent. Similari-
ties between carbon markets and markets for financial derivatives are not 
difficult to find. In a recent paper Lohmann listed the most important ones, 
namely, the close state – business relationship with the extreme depend-
ence of regulators on the opinions of business figures, abstraction and sub-
sumption of qualitative to quantitative relations, and radical disembedding 
(Lohmann 2011, 87-90). Because of the revolving door between public and 
private sector, a system of legalized corruption has emerged in the carbon 
and financial derivatives markets alike, with the state “highly dependent 
on private sector judgements about how products should be regulated, 
and highly vulnerable to private sector lobbying regarding the commodity 
design” (ibid., 87). In addition to that, Lohmann makes a very important 
point with regard to the high presence of the financial sector in the carbon 
business. Notwithstanding the fact that financial players that were intro-
duced in the discussion about commodity futures, such as Goldman Sachs 
or Barclays Capital, are also present in the carbon market, neither carbon 
markets nor financial derivatives markets function like a casino (ibid., 89). 
The casino metaphor is quite misleading since the business model in these 
markets cannot be related with the games of chance and the key process 
of radical disembedding, i.e., “disembedding the climate issue from the 
historical question of how to organize for structural, long-term change 
capable of keeping remaining fossil fuels in the ground” (ibid., 90), remains 
sealed under the weight of moralizing criticism. 
Historically, the framework for carbon markets was first established 
through the Kyoto protocol in 1997, and it is still regarded as the key 
achievement of the international climate negotiations inasmuch as it set 
legally binding emissions targets for advanced capitalist countries (Böhm 
et al. 2012, 4). Carbon trading or ‘cap and trade’ is a market-based solution 
which is designed with the purpose to function as a relief mechanism for 
the private sector, so that the implementation of climate policy can be 
based on cost-effective criteria. In other words, “the underlying assump-
tion of this system is that emissions reduction can be achieved at the low-
est possible cost by, first, quantifying the emissions that are caused by 
industrial activities; second, setting a cap on all GHG emissions; and, third, 
incentivizing companies and the entire industries on how to meet their 
caps in the cheapest possible way” (ibid., 4).
Now, the main problem with the carbon trading is that it doesn’t work. 
Since the proposed aim is to achieve cost-effective GHG reductions there 
are no obligations to implement policies that will actually contribute to 
long-term environmental sustainability. In the centre of carbon trading is 
the one-size-fits-all assumption that makes cap-and-trade schemes blind 
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to the fundamental question about how reductions are made (Lohmann 
2010, 138). Inasmuch as carbon trading does not pay attention to what kind 
of industries are involved in buying and selling of carbon credits it can act 
as a vehicle for the prolongation of status quo as major polluters can keep 
their fossil fuel addiction by simply buying pollution permits. Indeed, a 
closer look at EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), the world’s largest 
cap-and-trade system, reveals that no reductions in emissions have been 
achieved. Neither the Kyoto Protocol, nor EU-ETS have managed to reduce 
GHG emissions, on the contrary, “[in the last ten years] the increase in 
atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentrations has accelerated to the fast-
est rate ever recorded and the global climate conditions have gone from 
bad to worse, as the worst-case IPCC projections (or even worse still) are 
being realized” (Storm 2009, 1013). These are, of course, only some of the 
contradictions associated with carbon trading, and we haven’t exhausted 
them all. Other, equally important, schemes such as the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM), which is also part of the Kyoto Protocol frame-
work, suffer from similar deficiencies. The CDM is a carbon offset market, 
designed to enable companies from advanced capitalist countries to buy 
carbon credits from the so-called clean development projects in the capi-
talist periphery (Böhm et al. 2012, 5). On paper, the CDM would allow the 
advanced countries to meet the carbon emission caps with more flexibility 
and less difficulties, while stimulating “green and clean” projects in the 
less developed countries of the Global South. However, numerous authors 
on the Left have pointed to the contradictory nature of the CDM and ar-
gued that it provides shelter for corporate pollution, and does not make a 
contribution to the creation of a sustainable economy in the South in any 
meaningful sense. Cabello suggests that the CDM, as a keystone of the 
carbon market, pushes for the expansion of the capitalist agenda in two 
fundamental ways. The CDM, she argues, “allows the creation of the new 
financial markets, securing the conditions for accumulation and capitalist 
reproduction while allowing polluters to avoid making any real structural 
change”, and it, furthermore, serves as an ideological legitimization of the 
on-going commodification of nature (Cabello 2009, 192). Gilberson (2009), 
in her Thailand case study, reports that the majority of CDM projects are 
run by highly capitalized firms or agencies since only they have sufficient 
financial means “to hire expensive carbon consultants and accountants, 
liaise with officials and pay the fees needed for the UN registration. The 
result is the system that subsidizes some of the most polluting companies 
in the world” (Gilberson 2009, 57). Along the same lines, the technology 
transfer that was enthusiastically projected to be an important side prod-
uct of the CDM proved to be an illusion. Technology transfer, Lohmann 
writes, “[c]ontinues to carry the connotation, as it always has, of moving 
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Northern technology into a ʻtechnology deprivedʼ area in the South. In 
practice, this typically plays out in the degradation, skewing or destruc-
tion of one set of technologies in favour of another” (Lohmann 2009, 1070). 
Admittedly, a lot more could be said about the corrupt and anti-ecological 
development of the CDM. The same goes for the voluntary offset market 
that has developed alongside CDM in order to enable companies and or-
ganization outside the formal Kyoto framework to buy carbon credits. 
However, to understand the contradictory nature of the CDM and the 
overall carbon offsetting business, it is necessary to historically situate 
the commodification of carbon within the relations of production in the 
period of financialized capitalism. 
Böhm and Dabhi documented the expansion of the carbon offsetting 
business. In 2009 there were 1815 registered CDM projects producing more 
than 315,000,000 CERs4 per annum, and it was projected that “it is to 
became a multi-billion dollar industry over the next few years, already at-
tracting large market entrants, such as JP Morgan Chase, which recently 
bought the offset provider Climate Care” (Böhm and Dabhi 2009, 14). Un-
fortunately for the players involved, this marked-based solution for reduc-
ing the emissions of GHGs has another important feature, alongside the 
already mentioned flaws – it is fundamentally related to capitalism’s boom 
and bust cycle. Not surprisingly, as the global economic crisis moved from 
the U.S. to Europe, bringing the Eurozone to the brink of disintegration, 
the repercussions were also felt in the global system of carbon trading. By 
2012 the business press reported that the system of carbon trading had es-
sentially collapsed (Harvey 2012). Senior analyst at Thomson Reuters Point 
Carbon explained that “in Europe, prices plunged as it became clear that the 
EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is over-allocated all the way to 2020, 
mainly due to the impact of Europe’s economic troubles on emissions” (as 
quoted in Murray 2013). The Thomson Reuters report also confirmed that 
there are similar problems in CDM offset market, “where the value of the 
market crashed from 17.8 billion Euros in 2011 to just 6.1 billion Euros in 
2012 despite an increase in traded volumes from 2,012 to 2,408Mt.”(ibid.) 
The fears noted in the World Bank report prepared for the 2011 G20 sum-
mit, namely that “the carbon offset markets – and carbon market as a whole 
– now face major challenges as the value of transactions in the primary 
CDM market declined sharply in 2009 and further in 2010, amid chronic 
uncertainties about future mitigation targets and market mechanisms af-
ter 2012” (World Bank 2011, 24), came true. From the Marxian perspective, 
the present crisis of the carbon market is just a temporary obstacle in the 
process of commodification of carbon, as the new market solutions will 
04 Certified emissions reductions
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inevitably arise. More generally, financialized capitalism demands, through 
“abstraction and commensuration”, the transformation of nature into new 
asset class, i.e., a new form of capital. In that sense, financialization can be 
understood as a process that offers new possibilities for the accumulation 
of capital inasmuch as the growth imperative can now be served by en-
closing natural resources through commodity form. Having said that, one 
must bear in mind that “the carbon prices flashing on electronic screens 
in trading rooms on Wall Street or in the City of London reflect a complex 
political movement to reorganize and redistribute knowledge and power” 
(Lohmann 2009, 34). In other words, there is nothing natural or inevitable 
in the fact that carbon today comes in the commodity form. It is only a way 
of confronting the environmental crisis within a particular social order, the 
one in which knowledge claims put forward by market practitioners and 
supporters are given epistemic privilege on the assumption that market so-
lutions are superior by definition. Thus, in this three-step waltz, first we are 
led to believe that neoclassical economic theory provides guiding principles 
in the realm of policy formation. In the second step, the blessings of real-
world economics and politics are bestowed upon us. As Mirowski shrewdly 
indicated, “once the framework of permit trading is put into place, the 
full force of lobbying and financial innovation comes into play to flood the 
fledging market with excess permits, offsets, and other instruments, so 
that the nominal capon carbon emissions never actually stunts the growth 
of actual emissions.” (Mirowski 2013, 339). In the final step, as we have 
identified the corrupt forces which had obstructed the market game, it is 
time to come back to the drawing board and devise a new market solution.
What is to be done?
In clear contrast to the never-ending story of market refinement, Marxian 
understanding of the present environmental crisis makes no illegitimate 
concessions for market solutions and takes limits to growth argument seri-
ously. It does so because it is clear that nature, just like labor force, is not an 
infinite resource. In a nutshell, the final constraint of the exploitation of 
labor is set by human biology of each individual worker and, likewise, the 
limit for the exploitation of nature is set by the available quantity of low-
entropy matter-energy. In that sense, the problem of growth is relevant 
inasmuch as the poverty and insecurity of the developing countries and ma-
terial deprivation of those at the bottom of wealth and income distribution 
cannot be resolved without additional investment. However, the values of 
solidarity, sustainability and egalitarianism upon which the Left discourse 
has been built do not depend on perpetual growth. On the contrary, the 
critique of exploitation of labor and nature implies a commitment to de-
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growth, as well as to change in the type and quality of produced output. 
There are two principal issues here: first, a need to end the plundering of 
natural resources, and second, to remove natural use values from market, 
i.e. exclude them from monetary valuation. Low growth rates are therefore 
the specific problem of the capitalist mode of production, and de-growth 
cannot even be considered as a possibility in a society in which firms are 
set to maximize their profits, consumers are set to maximize utility on the 
basis of their income, and governments win elections if national statistics 
show high growth rates. However, once it is understood that prosperity is 
not equal to growth and that the quality of life and the strength of demo-
cratic principles do not depend on perpetual growth, it becomes possible 
to think about economic structure based on democracy, sustainability and 
rational governance of common property. De-growth does not necessar-
ily imply any decline of the quality of life. Contemporary capitalism, as 
we have seen, grows on the basis of extensive commodification of nature 
and its valuation in financial markets that has a lot to do with the process 
of financialized capital accumulation, and, hence, very little to do with 
improvement of quality of life. Throughout the history of capitalism the 
price of growth has been increasing misery of large parts of the population. 
That fact has often been overlooked because of the tendency to interpret 
the contradictions of capitalism in a biased and uncritical manner. Capi-
talism is a peculiar economic order in which the most devastating form 
of material and social deprivation appear in the midst of the most aston-
ishing abundance created by the most developed productive forces. It is a 
type of economy in which human development and growth are inherently 
related to economic and environmental crisis. This ambivalence of growth 
was accentuated by Wilkinson and Pickett in their outstanding study, in 
which they demonstrate that material success comes with a price in terms 
of deterioration mental and physical health, and the proliferation of social 
dysfunctionalities. Their lesson that “greater equality is the material foun-
dation on which better social relations are built (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010, 272) corresponds well with the Marxian narrative that points to the 
need to resist the growth imperative and monetary valuation of nature 
mediated by the complex derivative products in financial markets. At this 
critical juncture, moving beyond capitalist relations of production is not a 
matter of utopian projection, but of most immediate political urgency. The 
warning issued by the scientific community about potentially devastating 
environmental, social and economic effects of climate change cannot be 
overstated. As Robert Watson, a former chair of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change explains in detail: “Emissions at or above current 
rates could increase global mean surface temperatures by over 3, inducing 
changes in all components in the climate system, some of which would 
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be unprecedented in hundreds to thousands of years and many of which 
would persist for centuries. Changes would occur in all regions and would 
include land and ocean temperatures, the water cycle, the cryosphere, sea 
level, some extreme events and ocean acidification. This would reduce 
agricultural productivity, water quantity and quality in many parts of the 
world, undermine efforts to reduce poverty, displace large numbers of peo-
ple, cause significant loses of biodiversity and degrade critical ecosystem 
services.” (Watson 2013, 42). Against this background, it is clear that the 
requirements for environmental sustainability overlap with requirements 
for solidarity and social justice. It is the task of the contemporary Left to 
bring them together in a coherent manner, and provide a blueprint for a 
sustainable and egalitarian alternative to capitalism. 
What kind of economy does sustainable 
development require?
Dražen Šimleša
4
Introduction 
The main goal of this text is to provide a survey of global literature concern-
ing the growth imperative in economics, illustrating its connections to the 
situation and current practices in Croatia. 
From the onset of the financial crisis at the end of the summer of 2007, 
discussions concerning the causes, consequences, and especially solutions 
to the crisis have been divided, moving in at least three directions. The first 
has been widely accepted by the majority of countries. On this view, sav-
ings and expenditures constrained by revenues, as well as deficit reduction 
at the end of each year are presented as an unquestioned mechanism for 
exiting the crisis, regardless of their consequences for society. The second 
approach anticipated using the crisis as an agent of change, as a crossroads 
from which we would ensure economic growth, but with the condition that 
we would reduce poverty, improve quality of life, and provide long-term 
protection, maintaining the planet’s bio-capacity. This approach is best 
known as the concept of a “Green New Deal” and is promoted by so-called 
green circles, regardless of whether we are speaking about politics, civil 
society organisations, international organisations like the UN, interested 
business circles, the wider public, or media favouring the green cause. The 
third approach is the least represented and the least well-known, but it runs 
deepest and widest in its demands for change, for a new paradigm. 
The reason why the third approach is less visible is that, regardless of the 
various authors and theoretical underpinnings from which they conduct 
their research and analyses, they all view economic growth as the ultimate 
value and goal of a society. Until recently it was primarily recognised by ad-
vocacy for and the promotion of localisation, from resource use to alterna-
tive currencies, and in recent years, although it is an unattractive name for 
a world that depends on growth, it is known as the concept of postgrowth 
I Theoretical considerations118
or even more precisely degrowth, which is defined as a socially sustainable 
and equitable reduction (and stabilisation) in society’s throughput, where 
throughput denotes the materials and energy a society extracts, processes, 
transports and distributes to consume and return back to the environment 
as waste (Charonis 2012).
In this text we engage in a critique of the existing situation, including of 
the methods used to manage the crisis, as well as of other approaches, each 
of which in its own way re-examines the very foundations of economics and 
whose goal is the reordering of values and the manner in which society is 
organised. The first part of the work will present a critique of the existing 
system and economy using Robinson’s concept (2004) of inherent crisis. Fol-
lowing this, the relationship between the economy and wealth, or prosper-
ity in society and the influence of the dependency of the economy on two 
main unsustainable features – growth and debt – will be presented. At the 
end we try to provide an answer to the title question of this article: What 
kind of economy would really have as a purpose and goal the practical ap-
plication of sustainable development? There is also a separate analysis of a 
Croatian position regarding all those questions and concepts.
We will try to present, regardless of whether we are speaking about 
the economic, social or ecological aspects of sustainable development, a 
holistic approach that seeks to construct a comprehensive picture before 
casting our glance in a specific direction. Peter M. Vitousek emphasizes 
how “humans are forcing qualitative and historical changes on the world 
that will alter the structure and function of Earth as a system. Hence, it is 
of utmost importance for the social sciences to take up these issues.” We 
have written this article as a contribution to the idea of “the science of 
sustainability” or “systematic science,” crucial to the understanding and 
analysis of a new vision and conceptualization of sustainability for the 21st 
century. (IUCN 2006b, 6).
Permanent crises
Although at the start it was announced as a win-win solution and one that 
could ensure minimum agreement for consensus regarding future trends 
in our society, sustainable development today is increasingly mentioned 
as a complicated model far removed from reality in which all social groups 
can express their commitment to it, even if they are not applying it at all. 
Today it is clear that a fundamental problem with sustainable develop-
ment as one of the basic concepts of the transition from the 20th to the 
21st century lies in its very foundations. Establishing the environment, 
society, and the economy as three overlapping dimensions, or the three 
supporting pillars, of sustainable development, has been shown to be an 
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unavoidable trap that appears before almost every concrete step toward a 
more sustainable and more just society. Right at the very beginning, the 
problem for sustainable development was that it was an attempt in which 
the three pillars that should bear its weight were understood to represent 
equally valid and powerful categories. However, in modern societies, the 
environment does not have the same level of political strength and accept-
ance as the economy, and each year, society is losing its capacity to facilitate 
a wish for continuous growth in the economy. Regarding this conceptual 
flaw, it is unsurprising that sustainable development has failed in practice. 
The economy is a product of society and it does not exist in isolation 
from it. It must fulfil its function of facilitating the exchange of goods and 
services among members of a society. The economy emerges from society 
and it is subordinated to the interests of its members. The environment 
exists independently of both the economy and society (IUCN 2006a). Of 
course, society is not in a position to satisfy its interests if the situation 
in the environment is continuously deteriorating at an accelerating rate. 
This was also shown in a piece of ambitious global research by more than 
1,000 scientists, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2007), which con-
cluded that we have already destroyed 15 of the 24 services of the global 
ecosystem due to their unsustainable use and an unsustainable approach. 
Some authors are stressing that we have already reached, or that we are 
approaching, peak use for the majority of the most important resources 
(Heinberg 2007). 
We can further add that the aforementioned research has led to an even 
further-reaching conclusion, which states that if the conditions within 
ecosystems are destroyed to a level whereby they cannot carry out their 
services, then in those areas society is not in a position to provide security, 
to satisfy basic human needs, and to ensure adequate health and social con-
nections. More briefly stated, in the long-term there is no well-being in 
society or a high quality of life without sustainable ecosystems. Modern 
civilization overlooks this and behaves as if the status of the economy is a 
condition for everything and that everything is subordinated to the goal of 
continuous linear economic growth. In this work we will show why such 
an out-of-balance situation is the chief cause of all crises, and the cause of 
a situation in which the environment has been damaged, the cause of the 
deteriorating situation in most global ecosystems, while the economy has 
not succeeded in improving quality of life in a satisfying and equitable man-
ner for most of Earth’s population. 
In other words, to approach the problem from another angle, we want 
to investigate whether it is possible for the economy to support sustain-
able development, and to uncover what kind of economy this would be, 
serving the needs of society and the sustainable management of the en-
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vironment. In 2006, the IUCN, one of the largest global organizations for 
the preservation of the environment, organized a forum on the future of 
sustainable development in which several hundred participants took part 
via the Internet. One of the key conclusions in terms of our work was that: 
“Participants critiqued the traditional three-pillar model of 
sustainable development and referred to new models which 
conceptualize ecosystems as the foundation stone or life sup-
port systems of the economy and society.” (IUCN 2006b, VII). 
So, for the purpose of this work we consider sustainable devel-
opment only as a process of “improving the quality of human 
life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting 
eco-systems.” (IUCN, UNEP and WWF 1991).
The damage to relationships between the environment, society, and the 
economy have never been clearer than today. And those relationships have 
become especially vivid since the summer of 2007, following the beginning 
of the global financial and economic crisis. Many people expected that the 
crisis would be used as an opportunity for a new beginning. Yet the dispro-
portion between the three supporting pillars of sustainable development 
– the environment, the economy, and society – only became greater and 
deeper. Thus, as recently as at the end of 2008, an incredible seven billion 
dollars was invested in the troubled banks, and this was not the last attempt 
to “rescue” the economy in this way (Jackson 2009c). The money was being 
given exactly to those banks that were responsible for the crisis because 
they had pumped up the balloon of demand and credit, turning around the 
same amount of money several times and betting on their uninterrupted 
growth and success. Governments had decided that the best solution to the 
crisis would be to reward those who created it at the expense of taxpayers, 
who are the least responsible for it. Furthermore, by this act they have, 
with regard to today’s monetary and fiscal regulations, about which more 
will be said later, increased public debt and made dependents of future 
generations, increased unemployment (because banks do not wish to in-
vest in times of crisis), and decided to compensate all of that spending in a 
way that reduces a taxpayer’s right to and his or her contributions to social 
needs, education, health, and other things that are the foundation of the 
quality of life in any society. 
We have already emphasized that this imbalance, or crisis, is to be found 
in the foundations of the system itself. Although before the global financial 
crisis became apparent to everyone and achieved its full breadth and scope, 
this internal instability and the inclination to a perpetual return to crisis, 
was best observed in the book A Theory of Global Capitalism by William Rob-
inson (2004) as several smaller crises within a larger one that encompassed 
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all of them. Robinson emphasizes that the crisis of capitalism in the 21st 
century can be viewed in the following aspects or four smaller crises:
1. Overproduction or underconsumption (overaccumulation) 
2. Global social polarization. 
3. The crisis of state legitimacy and political authority. 
4. The crisis of sustainability.
Let us examine each of the above in the context of their importance to our 
society and the planet.
1. Overproduction or underconsumption (overaccumulation)
Although the messages of mainstream politics and economics emphasise 
the need for a growth in production and a growth in consumption, and with 
that the growth of the economy, from the point of sustainability there is a 
need to slow down, and to change the direction of our development. 
At present, we can speak of too large a quantity of production that is 
being offered to consumers by convincing them that they need those prod-
ucts. There are two publicly known techniques in industrial design that 
support such unsustainability: planned obsolescence, which mandates plac-
ing low-quality products on the market whose lifespan has been intention-
ally shortened and which cannot be repaired so that we quickly need new 
products; and perceived obsolescence, whereby we are constantly being 
convinced that we must have the latest possible product, otherwise we 
have devalued as people, regardless of whether, for example, our clothing, 
mobile phone, car or some other device is still functioning well. A problem 
arises because in this kind of economic system the majority of people never 
have enough money to buy everything that they think, or are convinced, 
that they need and so they go deeper into debt. Most of these same people 
will never be able to break this vicious circle of debt, which leads to a situ-
ation of complete dependence on further indebtedness with increasingly 
risky and dangerous consequences. 
We can follow the consequences for the planet itself through the exces-
sive exploitation and destruction at the beginning of this circle, and at the 
end by the weaker global ecosystems that cannot support this quantity of 
waste and consumption. As long as it creates the possibility of making a 
profit and the circulation of money, this economic system will recognize 
it as beneficial.
The problem with the capitalist system is the need for a never-ending in-
crease in consumption. An even greater problem, as Robinson notices when 
he speaks about the internal contradictions of capitalism, is that “society 
is unable to consume the wealth it has created given the nature of capital-
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ist relations” (2004, 148). These contradictions ease, or are less apparent, so 
long as it is possible to raise money and new credit, or as long as new mar-
kets can be found that will purchase a surplus. But the moment when this 
linear direction is disrupted, consumption is reduced and we are in crisis. 
This is why we can monitor the transition from hyper-production and ex-
cessive consumption to a reduction in consumption and overaccumulation. 
2. The increasingly large gap between the rich and the poor
Whenever we have overaccumulation we have a blockage in society because 
an excessively large amount of amassed resources stand in the accounts of 
the wealthier layer of society and if they do not see an opportunity for a 
return on their investments, it is safer and better for them to keep their 
money in the bank and earn interest on their savings. Every new economic 
crisis, including the current one that began in 2007, always works to the 
detriment of those who have less, creating an even greater gap between the 
wealthy and the poor. We can note such trends in almost every country in 
the world, regardless of which group of countries we may belong to – the 
developed countries, those with a “fast-growing economy,” or any other 
kind of development. 
A society that is increasingly differentiated becomes a society that does 
not communicate and a society whose citizens are isolated from one an-
other. When there is no communication and we are all mere individuals, 
or consumers, fear and enmity among the population increases. And where 
there is fear there is no trust, and without trust there is no sustainable 
development. The British researchers Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett 
(2010) have demonstrated this many times, bringing their findings together 
in the book, The Spirit Level – Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do 
Better. Using the example of developed countries from the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), they showed how 
countries that have greater inequalities within their society have more 
problems with a whole range of social categories: the level of trust, mental 
illness (including alcoholism and drug dependency), lifespan and infant 
mortality, obesity, education, the teenage pregnancy rate, the murder rate, 
the percentage of the population in prison, and social mobility. Following 
Wilkinson and Pickett, many other authors began to gather information 
on the huge disproportions in society and the cost of inequality (Dorling 
2012; Lansley 2012; Stiglitz 2013).
Although the poor in societies with less economic inequality may also 
have health and social problems, in societies that have a higher rate of in-
equality, these problems affect more citizens. In this way, Wilkinson and 
Pickett showed that the level of economic inequality in a country also de-
4. What Kind of Economy Does Sustainable Development Require? 123
termines the quality of life, and we might say the level of happiness in that 
country. Societies that exhibit growth in economic inequality and feelings 
of isolation and dissatisfaction are “dysfunctional societies” (Willkinson 
and Pickett 2010). 
3. Declining confidence in the system of democracy and political  
authority
The third crisis is a consequence of the previous two. It is logical that a 
society that cannot ensure happiness and satisfaction, or one in which 
happiness and satisfaction are achieved primarily through shopping and 
consumption, leads to a system in which a feeling of discontent prevails be-
cause something is always missing and our happiness is constantly slipping 
away, even though we have the feeling that it is within our grasp. Hyper-
production creates hyperneurosis. This is what the Slovenian theoretician 
Renata Salecl (2013) calls the greatest success of capitalism – the fact that 
regardless of the sheer number of choices, people are filled with a sense of 
dissatisfaction, auto-destruction, and an obsession with themselves and 
with an individualised life. 
The foundation of democracy is that the people govern. However, today 
people do not have a sense that they are governing, but that they have been 
dragged into a show of political-media-corporate juggling of attitudes and 
values. It is logical that a feeling of powerlessness, apathy, and distrust is 
appearing. The problem is that today this feeling has reached the level of 
“cultural pathology” – a deeply rooted belief that those in authority are 
trying to deceive us (Brewer 2009). 
Of course, this fear did not appear by itself and data from the largest 
global public opinion polling agencies show the level of that apathy and dis-
trust is increasing, alongside declining confidence in politics, as well as in 
the opportunity for and the purpose of political activity (on an equal basis), 
and especially in representative democracy as it functions today. “Trust,” 
political scientist Eric Uslaner has written, “is the chicken soup of social 
life” (Wike 2008). On a global level, 46% of people state that “they do not 
believe that politicians in power ever speak the truth (The Economist 2012). 
Of course, the connection between a low level of trust and a high level of 
corruption and crime can be even more clearly emphasised. 
 
4. The destruction of ecosystems and the foundations of sustainability
Despite the omnipresence of sustainable development in public life, the 
increased number of protected areas, a greater awareness of the need to pro-
tect the environment and the importance of natural resources for our fu-
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ture, we have not succeeded at the global level in reducing the destruction 
of ecosystems and in increasing sustainability compared to the resources 
that we are taking from nature. 
In 2008, the ecological footprint, as an indicator of human influence on 
the planet, or rather of the level of our consumption, was 50% greater than 
the biocapacity of the planet, i.e. the biological resources that the planet 
offers us. That year, the ecological footprint amounted to 2.7 gha (global 
hectares) per person and the biocapacity limit demanded that we reduce 
our consumption to 1.8 gha. This means that at a global level we were living 
with a deficit of 0.9 gha, that is to say, our planet would need one year and 
five months to compensate for and absorb everything that we consumed 
that year (WWF and GFN 2012). It is interesting to note that we are in debt 
to the planet in the same way that we are in debt in strict economic terms. 
The level of our capabilities and power to influence the environment and 
our planet is unparalleled in history. When all of the harmful acts against 
the environment and the problems of the planet are counted, many observ-
ers emphasise that we ought to speak of life on a new, different planet, one 
on which it will be more difficult to live (McKibben 2010; Foster, Clark 
and York 2010; Heinberg 2011). Immanuel Wallerstein has concluded that 
“historical capitalism is in fact in crisis precisely because it cannot find rea-
sonable solutions to its current dilemmas, of which the inability to contain 
ecological destruction is a major one, if not the only one” (Speth 2008, 185). 
For the purposes of this work, it is interesting to emphasise the fact 
that all four of these smaller crises came into existence through the power, 
rules, and values of the financial sector and the global economy. And the 
situation in which that financial sector and the economy now find them-
selves, i.e. caught up in their own crises, further worsens and complicates 
the situation over the course of these smaller crises. This complication is, 
in fact, one of the main determinants of the financial-economic system so 
that fewer people understand what is going on. The extent to which the 
general confidence and attitude that, despite all the problems discussed 
and criticisms made, there was no alternative to the prevailing financial-
economic system and that it was the only one in which we can believe, 
was widespread is shown in an analysis carried out by the Dutch academic 
Dirk Bezemer on a variety of scientific and media texts before the crisis. He 
found that only twelve people predicted the crisis with supporting argu-
ments and explanations (Keen 2011). 
Although not cited as one of the twelve, Tim Jackson’s seminal book, 
Prosperity without Growth (2009c), was extremely important in the period 
after the crisis and continues to be so for the topic of our work. The book 
received an incredible amount of publicity and recognition; it has been 
translated into fourteen languages, and was downloaded for free from the 
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Internet page of the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) more 
than any other previous report. There are many reasons for this kind of 
success; one of them is, of course, good timing. This is a period when the 
concept of growth and the general rules and values of economic theory 
and practice are starting to be questioned. At the same time, some member 
countries of the European Union (EU), such as Austria, Great Britain, and 
France, have established expert bodies that have analysed the possibility of 
sustainable development and have called into question the use of GDP as a 
measure of progress on the part of some countries (Wuppertal Institute 
for Climate, Environment and Energy 2010). And in 2009, the European 
Commission itself announced its own development plan, unconnected 
with GDP (COM 2009). But it is even more important that Jackson succeeded 
in posing two mutually related and critical questions:
1. Is it possible to achieve prosperity in society without growth?   
or, more precisely:
2. How to separate prosperity from growth in a society in which prosper-
ity depends on growth?
The basic problem is the structure and foundation of today’s economy it-
self. The economy is designed so that it depends on a continuous increase 
in consumption, and accordingly, on the gross domestic product (GDP). 
If GDP does not grow each year by a certain amount, the system reacts 
negatively and we approach a crisis situation. We can say that if there is no 
economic growth, most incomes goes down, the government reduces its 
contributions, consumption declines, unemployment increases, the costs 
of investing increase, and the spiral of recession begins. 
This is also one of the basic arguments of those who approved of the 
prevailing method of resolving the crisis, which, as we stated earlier, is by 
pumping incredible amounts of taxpayers’ money into the restoration of 
failing banks and investment funds. The reason for this justification was ex-
tremely prosaic, and follows the attitude that a certain part of the financial 
sector and market is too important to today’s economies and societies, that 
if something bad were to happen to that sector it would automatically have 
an effect on the rest of the economy, or on other areas of society. The man-
tra, “too big to fail,” which was used to justify the rescue of those companies 
most responsible for the crisis – the major financial conglomerates on Wall 
Street – achieved its ideal goal: the possibility of blackmailing all of society 
because of the prevailing proportions that they had attained. Or as Jackson 
himself pointed out when considering the questions posed: “Growth may 
be unsustainable, but de-growth appears to be unstable” (2009c, 10).
In the United States it was manifested by paraphrasing the well-known 
slogan that it was necessary to help Main Street (the true, real economy 
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– industry – the employment of people) and not Wall Street (the large fi-
nancial corporations that created the mechanisms for creating the crisis), 
with the message that Wall Street was the engine that moves Main Street 
and that the stability and health of the global economy, and society itself, 
would be impossible without this type of financial sector. 
There is no doubt that economic growth has saved millions of people 
from poverty and has provided them with a more dignified life, which, as 
we said at the beginning, is one of the basic roles of the economy in society. 
But today, the question is increasingly being asked of whether this method 
of providing prosperity has reached its peak because the costs of maintain-
ing it have become too high, and day by day, limitations on the spread of 
prosperity on a global level are ever more present. Even the United Nations, 
which is always positively oriented towards economic growth, in one of its 
most recent publications of the Report on Social Development (undp 2010) 
pointed out that there are more countries, especially poor ones, that are 
making progress in social development, but only because of investment in 
health and education, and not in economic growth as a category of the Hu-
man Development Index (HDI). Other research has also shown to a certain 
extent the importance of economic growth to quality of life, after which 
other indicators influence prosperity, feelings of satisfaction and general 
welfare in society (Speth 2008; Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Envi-
ronment and Energy 2010; Heinberg 2011). 
When a society reaches a certain level of economic prosperity, approxi-
mately 10-15,000 dollars per year per capita, variables such as relations with 
others, the safety of a local community, free time, health, etc. have more 
influence on further growth in the feeling of happiness and satisfaction 
with their own life than on further growth in earnings (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2009). This new realisation has resulted in more frequent research 
being conducted on the use of different indicators that would show pros-
perity in its entirety and not only in regard to the circulation of money and 
consumption as GDP does. 
Although related, this topic is separate and too large for the scope of our 
work and we do not have enough space to enter more deeply into the area 
of alternative development indicators that applied around the world. We 
will only add that the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and 
Energy published Towards Sustainable Development – Alternatives to GDP in 
Measuring Progress (2010), which is to date the most extensive and system-
atic review of indicators besides GDP that measure quality of life and social 
progress in some countries;, after analyzing them, presented them with 
their main characteristics, advantages, and shortcomings. These indica-
tors included: the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), Index of Sustainable 
Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Savings, Human Development Index 
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(HDI), Ecological Footprint, Happy Planet Index (HPI), Sustainable De-
velopment Indicators (SDI), and many others. All of these indicators have 
experienced a renaissance in popularity after 2008, especially in scientific 
circles, which are trying to replace and expand in a more precise and em-
pirically based fashion what the classification of countries based on GDP 
provides. 
Always dependent
The end of the latest global financial crisis cannot really be discerned if we 
follow Robinson’s concept of a crisis of the system with which we began 
this work. Heinberg (2011) emphasised that the economic growth to which 
we have become accustomed will never return, although short periods of 
economic upswings spurred by higher sales and consumption are possible, 
yet in the long-term he thinks we are entering an era without growth. An 
increasing number of writers are now looking not only at the global econo-
my but at the entire structure of our civilization as a system in which crisis 
is inherent and constantly self-generating without end. 
Although it has already been remarked in this work, we must now ex-
plain in greater detail the inherent crisis situation in the global economy, 
and in capitalism, with regard to its dependency on economic growth and 
debt:
The dependence on growth
We have already mentioned how the manifestation and rise of the promo-
tion of ‘economic growth’ has clearly initiated new discussions, analyses 
and research related to the relationship between the economy and quality 
of life. We can also monitor the first appearance of new concepts, the ac-
companying literature, and the public events that have inquired into and 
criticised the concept of economic growth as such. Although we also had 
such paradigmatic shifts earlier, from the most well-known – The Limits to 
Growth (1972) – by the Club of Rome, and the joint work of William Nor-
dhaus and James Tobin: Is Growth Obsolete? (1972); such attempts for the 
majority of the public and society as a whole were premature and very 
quickly forgotten, after which there were cyclical phases of prosperity and 
increased consumption. Today, this shift is being led by a large group of au-
thors, from the programmatic Farewell to Growth (2013) by Serge Latouche 
to the already-mentioned The End of Growth (2011) by Richard Heinberg. 
Some other scientists, activists, politicians, and the public are trying 
to separate this dependence on growth from resources and the ecosystem 
by separating the growth of energy and resource consumption from GDP 
growth. Decoupling, or separation, would ensure future economic growth 
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without an increase in size of the ecological footprint. In 2002, the OECD 
emphasized that decoupling should find a solution to separate “economic 
goods” from “environmental bads.” This approach for the continued insist-
ence on the need for growth found its place in the new concept of a “Green 
New Deal,” or ideas for basing future growth on employment in clean in-
dustries, renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, waste management, 
and a generally green economy. This concept would maintain the level of 
economic growth necessary for prosperity and social peace, ensure employ-
ment in new professions, and reduce pressure on the planet and ecosystem 
thanks to lower consumption rates via the use of green technologies. It calls 
for a “green engine of growth” (Jackson 2009c). 
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the institution that 
most energetically promotes the green new deal, stressed that a green 
economy is a winning combination that is simultaneously “pro-growth, 
pro-jobs and pro-poor,” and an economy that results in “an improvement 
in the quality of life and social equality, and which significantly reduces 
the exhaustion of and risk to the environment (UNEP 2011, 16). The special 
driving force here should be renewable energy sources, which in 2011, di-
rectly or indirectly, employed 5.7 million people (REN21 2013). Global invest-
ment in 2011 grew by 17 percent compared to the previous year to a total 
amount of 257 billion dollars, which was a new record. Perhaps even more 
importantly, renewable energy sources in that year accounted for 44 per-
cent of all new generation capacity (UNEP 2012). All of these developments 
are most welcome, but they only reveal part of the picture, and we have 
already stated at the beginning that our goal is to provide a comprehensive 
and holistic consideration of the relationship between the economy and 
sustainable development.
The problem is that today we might be facing a “relative decoupling,” or 
the ability of technology to produce more with less consumption and less 
use of resources. We have a whole range of energy efficient technological 
solutions and there is no disputing the outcome of a reduction of energy 
intensity in highly developed and wealthy societies. We have already writ-
ten about this elsewhere (Šimleša 2011), so we will only reiterate the facts 
provided by the data that show how, since the 1970s, energy intensity – by 
which we mean how much energy we need to expend in order to achieve a 
certain level of GDP – has declined by 33 percent, especially in the wealthier 
countries. Since 1990, it has fallen every year by 0.7 percent. Despite this, 
since the1970s, CO2 emissions have increased by 70 percent, and since the 
1990s by 40 percent, because of an overall increase in energy consump-
tion. Stabilising emissions requires an annual reduction in emissions of 
4.9 percent (we now have growth at the level of 3 percent), and the index 
of energy intensity should be declining by at least ten times more than it 
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does at present. This means that despite energy efficiency, consumption is 
growing, as is the pressure on and exploitation of the ecosystem. 
The term “rebound effect” (Polimeni et al. 2008) summarises this and 
what is interesting is that in the UNEP plan for green development only half 
a page out of a total of 626 is devoted to this, although the report points out 
that in Western developed countries there is a parallel process as concerns 
the introduction of energy efficient devices or technology and growth in 
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and ecological footprint.
That is why it is a mistake to approach this problem only as a techno-
logical one and not also as a political-economic or evolutionary one, be-
cause countries with the greatest efficiency are those that use the greatest 
amount of natural resources (Foster, Clark and York 2011). 
We have not succeeded in attaining “absolute decoupling” or an overall 
reduction of the resource footprint only because in that situation this kind 
of global economy would not exist. Together with the accepted externaliza-
tion of costs as a legitimate form of operation by global business and politi-
cal elites (Heinberg 2011), dependence on growth is woven into the very 
foundation, into the heart, into the bloodstream of the global economy. The 
problem, of course, is that this is unsustainable. Today, it does not pay to 
invest in savings or in an efficient design that would reduce absolute con-
sumption, nor does it pay off economically to aim for a sustainable lifestyle 
directly, for that would really reduce economic growth, and the importance 
of growth is unquestionable. 
That is why it should not surprise us that according to data from the 
Institut für Weltwirtschaft of the University of Kiel, only 13 % of the total 
global amount invested in economic recovery and labelled green economy 
was invested so as to result in the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. 
These actual investments in absolute decoupling were so insignificant 
that they resulted in a reduction of only 0.5 percent of potential global 
emissions (Wuppertal Institute 2009). Also, proponents of the “Green 
New Deal” predict that the growth of investments in renewable energy 
(RE) or energy efficiency depends on the growth of the general, if not to 
say the “dirty,” economy, so the media have rushed to announce the news 
of the decline in investments in RE by 11 percent in 2012 compared to the 
previous year because of the worsening crisis in the United States and 
the EU and the continued reductions in subsidies for green technologies 
(The Guardian 2013). In this sense, we should also be aware of the various 
types of developmental support that policy directs – for example, there 
are 300 billion dollars in annual investments for all of RE, but use of fossil 
fuels alone is being subsidized at the level of 650 billion dollars per year 
at a global level.
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The Wuppertal Institute has drafted a report, A Green New Deal for Europe, 
where it was concluded that “support to eco-industries is not enough be-
cause even green economic growth can be damaging if it only contributes to 
an increase in already unsustainable high levels of consumption of natural 
resources” (2009, 12) and that we need more than a technological platform 
for “eco-industries;” we need structural changes at all levels of society.
The dependence on debt
Dependence on debt is linked to a dependence on a belief in the need for 
ever increasing economic growth. The global economy is dependent upon 
the creation of new credit. The accumulation and growth of debt that today 
has reached unsustainable levels, means that it is now impossible to repay. 
The problem that emerges has likely grown as the process is this completely 
intangible. It is played out on computer screens and electronically stored, 
yet has a serious effect on the real economy and peoples’ lives. 
We do not have space here to delve deeper into a review of the emer-
gence of the fractional reserve system upon which the current banking 
system of debt production rests, but with regard to what has been said 
until now, we deserve an explanation as to why it is impossible to get out 
of debt. 
Economic growth depends on cheap loans and an increase in overall 
debt, and for us as consumers this provides the possibility to buy greater 
quantities of goods and services. The entire story is based on an unsustain-
able system of interest, and that is why today there is always more debt 
than there is money to pay for it (Kennedy 2011). This is often neglected, 
because as individuals if we are lucky and/or able to, we can get out of debt, 
or a country might get out of debt if it engages in the massive production 
of goods or services that the world wants and thus make a huge profit in a 
short period of time. But here we forget that on the other side of the see-
saw there is always someone or some country that had to go into debt in 
order to be able to buy the offered and desired good or service. 
Ninety-seven percent of today’s money has been created as debt, from 
the users’ perspective, as a credit that the user promises to pay back with 
added interest. What is concerning is that private institutions – banks – 
are creating that debt and entire countries can be in debt to them. Of even 
greater concern is the fact that the banks themselves are not holding that 
money (Brown 2010). There is virtually no limit to lending as long as there 
is some confidence that the credit will be paid back. In the real world we do 
not accept a promise from someone when they offer to lend us something 
that they actually do not have. Banks would not be able to do this without 
policy support. 
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The only way that we can settle a debt is to convert more of our life into 
tangible objects, or by borrowing even more. This is why debt is always 
larger than the amount of money that is available; the creation of money 
in essence always generates the creation of more debt. For an economy, 
everything is fine when the growth in interest can follow economic growth 
by converting more of one’s life into tangible objects and their sale on 
the market. Possible social, ecological, and other consequences of this are 
omitted in such an analysis. In economics these are known as boom years. 
But even during those years, debt is almost always growing. We simply 
do not worry about growing debt because the economy is also growing 
(Eisenstein 2011). 
Today, we are in crisis because there are fewer natural, social, cultural, 
spiritual, and other types of capital to transform into goods. Or at least 
there is not a large enough amount as today’s economy requires. 
Oliver Tickell (2013) explains that the banks are provoking the crisis 
via their “normal” business operations, so that we ignore other causes. 
In good years credit is cheap and optimism reigns, regardless of the fact 
that it is not founded on anything real. This is how it was in the years 
before the crisis; getting credit was not a problem. In bad years, those of 
so-called “belt tightening,” banks behaved completely differently and 
became very selective in determining who is worthy of receiving credit. 
Since everyone took on debt during the good years, and they went into 
debt cheaply and easily, following the crisis citizens and businesses were 
unable to go further without incurring new debt, and if the crisis turns 
out to be long and serious, like the current one, such people would declare 
bankruptcy, leading to further crises in the property sector and others, 
whereby those who cannot survive the bad years are left with nothing. 
When the financial crisis also spills over into what we call real economy, 
we come to a reduction in consumption; a fear of the future emerges and 
unemployment increases, so that many everyday people have an even 
more difficult time paying back what once seemed to be easy credit. 
Money is then transformed into a scarce resource, even though there is 
enough of it, those who control it do not want to put it into circulation, 
and in that way they raise money’s value and power, and also theirs as 
its owners. 
Classical economics explains crises as part of the normal and almost nat-
ural cyclical movement between good and bad years, as if nothing structural 
or in the social sphere occurs as a result of these crises. The wealthy always 
come out of a crisis even wealthier, in the sense of ownership. They are then 
the only ones who have enough money to buy real estate, companies, etc. 
whose value has declined.
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How can we achieve a sustainable economy?
Now we will turn to answer the main topic of the paper, i.e. the question 
posed in the title of the paper. 
From everything written so far, it should be clear that creating a sustain-
able economy means creating a completely different kind of economy; deep 
reforms in the economic sector are also a condition for change as regards 
the environment, social justice, solidarity and equality, alongside social 
participation in political decision making by all citizens. It is also clear that 
it will also be necessary to change the manner in which money functions 
and is created if we want to apply and live by sustainable principles. In his 
latest book, Bernard Lietaer (2013), one of the most well-known and active 
authors in the field of alternative economics says that we must “rethink 
money” in order to move from resources that are scarce to resources that 
ensure prosperity and well-being.
Heinberg (2011, 237) cites the economic historian Niall Ferguson of Har-
vard, who states that states have six options at their disposal to resolve a 
debt crisis:
1. increasing the rate of GDP
2. reducing interest rates
3. offering bailout
4. accepting fiscal pain – reductions in benefits and standard of living
5. injecting more money into the economy
6. accepting defaults, including every type of non-compliance with the 
original terms of the debt contract. 
As a proponent of “the end of growth,” Heinberg emphasizes that in the 
long term we can immediately ignore the first option. In many highly con-
sumer-oriented countries interest rates are already at record lows, so this 
does not help. As debt grows, the third option is more expensive and less 
effective. The fourth option is now occurring, but not only does it fail to 
reduce debt, it also destroys social cohesion and increases poverty. The fifth 
option is an option only for the United States, which can recycle dollars at 
the global level, but this is not sustainable in the long term. The conven-
tional wisdom is that the sixth option, if widely applied, would lead to a 
collapse of the monetary-financial system. 
However, Heinberg states that the last two options should be considered 
in a post-growth economy. It is necessary to implement a kind of organised 
and structured “debt jubilee” because the total debt is impossible to repay 
and its existence is a burden to all of society and is dragging down the qual-
ity of life of hundreds of millions of people.
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As a second solution, a government itself should undertake to print 
money that is free from debt for strategic investment, public works, and 
generally those areas and sectors that benefit everyone. 
None of these options is without its shortcomings and risks, but they 
are the only options that can ease the transition. Of course, the greatest 
fear is of unstoppable inflation if a government begins to print money, 
but Brown (2009) emphasises that this is a realistic option only if there is 
neither production nor work. Today, there is demand, but there is no offer 
because the banks do not want to lend money. There is no money because 
it is better, more fruitful and safer to hold it in the banks. 
Both of these decisions lead to reduced economic activity, which the 
world has before it anyway, but they will at least mitigate the terrifying 
combination of recession and increased debt. Of course, a law should be 
enacted that all property below a certain size should be protected from re-
possession. Debt above some limit should be reduced by simply removing 
one zero. Such a proposal is controversial, painful, and confusing because it 
would rearrange relations in the economic field. But, according to Brown, 
such a process would allow us to take advantage of the crisis to transform 
the economy into one that is sustainable and resilient. In any case, the 
printing of money should be returned to the government; one without the 
other will not work. Douhtwaite (Heinberg 2011) states that we should also 
reward those who are currently not in debt or those whose savings will be 
reduced, so that once the available money is shared out equally to every-
one they end up in a slightly better position. Everyone should accept that 
with a deepening of the crisis their money would lose its value anyway in 
the long term.
We can find such proposals among all proponents of deep economic re-
forms: the previously mentioned Ellen Brown (2010), the economics think 
tank New Economics Foundation (NEF 2008; 2009), Thomas Greco (2010) 
and many others. In addition to the government printing money free from 
debt and a global jubilee day, they cite the following necessary measures 
and activities for a more sustainable and more just economy and society: 
•	 abolishing the fractional reserve system, or the ability of banks to lend 
money that they do not have; 
•	 strong taxing or at least greater supervision over the entire stock spec-
ulation mechanism and the models of business operations that have 
transformed the financial sector into a casino;
•	 separating the banking sector, in which are deposited salaries, pen-
sions, and savings, from the investment, which risks their value; 
•	 media reforms to reduce the influence of the private sector on the 
democratic process and elections;
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•	  the establishment of local and regional banks on the model of the Bank 
of North Dakota, which is owned by the state government and whose 
primary goal is to support local entrepreneurship and farmers so that 
they do not fall into the slavery of indebtedness. 
The economist Peter Victor has perhaps gone the farthest in his criticism 
of the existing economic system, the foundations upon which its rests, and 
the manner in which it functions. In his book Managing Without Growth 
(2008) he stated a direct and concrete proposal for Canada to reduce its de-
pendence on economic growth with an increase in employment and the 
quality of life over a period of thirty years. The changes that Victor is pro-
posing relate to the investment sector in which the role of the government 
is strengthened, a more just and general tax system, the establishment of 
an equitable and realistic taxation of greenhouse gas emissions, and dis-
couraging consumerism of the kind “buying for buying’s sake”. Neverthe-
less, his major proposals are in the area of the labour market – a reduction 
in the length of the working week and in the number of working hours. 
This also involves the globalisation of these localised solutions, so there 
are a series of proposals for the creation of a system for the exchange of na-
tional currencies according to an agreed upon index of standardised prices 
or on an agreed upon “basket” of products and their value (Greco 2009; 
Brown 2010; Liataer 2013).
With this approach and solutions, the economy would become one of 
the pillars of sustainable development.
A post-growth Croatia?
We are now in a position to pose a fundamental question concerning Croa-
tia’s position in relation to the topic of this paper. Croatia as a state is an ex-
ample of a state in a dependent position as concerns economic growth and 
debt – the primary basis of our criticism of the global economy in our work. 
We can argue that such a typical crisis situation in Croatia offers the perfect 
moment to make the required deep reforms in line with the well-known 
saying that a crisis is the best time for change. On the other hand, it must be 
emphasised that at present there is no relevant nor influential political op-
tion that could take advantage of the current crisis for the changes that we 
need (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012), or for changing the paradigm. 
First impressions suggest the conclusion that, in the best case scenario, 
Croatia is at present far from the solutions advocated by Heinberg, Brown 
and others. The country has been in recession for several years. Since the 
beginning of the crisis in 2008, GDP has fallen by 7.2 percent, industrial 
production by 12 percent and the number of unemployed has increased to 
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the limit of 20 percent, whilst amongst younger people it is even higher. 
In addition, public debt is growing and the government claims to be unable 
to ensure normal functioning without taking on new debt under increas-
ingly unsatisfactory terms. Therefore, many people are asking how realistic 
and how possible the “less work, less consumption” option is for Croa-
tia. Wouldn’t a more appropriate solution be “green growth” and a “green 
economy” (Matutinović 2012a; Stubbs 2013). Here the solution is being 
sought in the sectors of eco-friendly food production and the use of renew-
able energy sources. Of course, we have earlier cited that a better variant 
of post-growth or degrowth is considered to be inappropriate for Croatia, 
but we can say that the worse variant, degrowth, in the context of limiting 
economic growth, is considered a more certain means for the strengthen-
ing of extreme and radical political options. An additional problem is one of 
psychology and the insufficiently long period of enjoyment of a consumer 
paradise, which after the war and the postwar years (until the year 2000), 
lasted but a few years until 2008. Croatia’s citizens are now having a diffi-
cult time accepting the idea that unsustainable indebtedness and consump-
tion are an obstacle, so a concept or strategy that advocates this will have 
a difficult road to public acceptance (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012). 
However, it should be emphasised that proponents of the degrowth con-
cept are not advocating an unprepared and momentary halt to economic 
activities that would lead to “less work and less consumption.” The de-
growth concept implies a gradual, organized, and just transition to a society 
designed to ensure that a better quality of life can be achieved with “less 
work and less consumption.” In addition, they warn that in any case there 
will be reduced growth for reasons that were explained at the beginning of 
this work and the only dilemma is whether we will do this in an organised 
way or leave it to the uncontrolled or unpredicted economic crashes ‘ele-
ments’ as we have until now (Martinez-Iglesias and Garcia 2012; Cha-
ronis 2012). But it is clear that it is impossible to begin to make such a huge 
change without a greater understanding, awareness, and increased level of 
solidarity in society and it is questionable whether such a sufficient level 
of these characteristics exists in Croatian society. In addition, research 
shows a growth in economic inequality and social polarisation between 
the wealthy and the poor and a low level of trust within society, not only 
in institutions and the political-economic elites, but amongst the citizens 
themselves (UNDP 2007; UNDP 2013). As Sandel has stated: “An increasingly 
socially stratified society has little chance of engaging in a democratic de-
bate about alternative developmental trajectories” (Domazet, Cvijanović 
and Dolenec 2012).
On a more general level the biggest problem with the degrowth strategy, 
especially valid for states such as Croatia, is that there are few places where 
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it has been attempted and practiced. If we were to close our eyes to Kallis’s 
explanation in defence of the degrowth concept, some might think that 
we are speaking about a green economy. In many places it also acknowl-
edges integrating into “an economy after growth” certain characteristics 
of a green economy, such as attitudes toward waste, efficiency, energy 
savings, and others. Compared to the green economy, degrowth offers a 
next step, the advanced version, a long-term goal within which the limits 
of the growth of the economy and debt are clearly set. There remains only 
the question of whether it is possible to reach that goal without making 
the initial steps – whether it is possible to reach it without a greening of 
the economy.
More concretely, the greatest problem for Croatia remains its low level 
of production (which is also an obstacle for a quality degrowth strategy, 
although we would not think so at first glance), and the state’s too great 
dependence on the import of energy, food and money: in short almost eve-
rything comes from abroad. Here it is important to emphasise again how we 
are talking about “selective degrowth” (Latouche 2009), meaning that as 
a civilisation there is a need for less extraction–production–consumption 
activities, whilst there is obviously a need for more locally produced goods- 
designed for small input-products and services for quality living conditions.
The combination of insufficient production and debt that is burdening 
all sectors of society and strangling Croatia’s production potential repre-
sents a slowing down of the movement towards a more just and sustainable 
society. From such a position it would be very demanding, to say the least, 
to transform the economy into one that is not based on debt and growth. 
In this context, it is rather unrealistic to copy the strategy of some Latin 
American countries that decided to invalidate a portion of their debt and 
to refuse to repay it (Toussaint 2012). 
Of Croatia’s total foreign debt of 46.6 billion euros, a significant por-
tion is citizens’ private debts. The fact that these private debts amount to 
41 percent of GDP tells us that the accumulation of debt was done in full 
awareness of the alluring framework of consumer capitalism. This means 
that it would be very difficult in Croatia to delegitimise debt by a dictatorial 
manipulation and by barring ordinary people from yielding responsibility 
for the results of the growth of debt. Here, Croatia is “hostage” to the pos-
sible success of global efforts to write off debt that was described earlier, 
where its legitimacy is disputed because of the impossibility of paying back 
the total debt and the devastating consequences of that on all of society. 
Because of its position, if Croatia were to pull off some instant act for ne-
gating its debt, this would certainly result in an even graver economic and 
social situation. The alternative to this would be the willingness of citizens 
for “external punishment” that would bring for most of the population an 
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unimaginably more modest and less prodigal lifestyle, to which, according 
to public opinion polling, the residents of Croatia are disinclined. 
We can say that there are enough indications that confirm the position 
that “capitalist society is an immature system that intrinsically pursues 
growth as long as it is not kept in check by a response from the system at 
higher levels – in this case the natural environment. This means that only 
after the shock of a physical limitation will the capitalist system be in a 
position to accept radical reforms, or comprehensive institutional reforms 
in the economy” (Matutinović 2012a). But even if we believe in the possi-
bility of institutional and structural changes from above, in the right place 
and at the right time, or if we think that this system is in a state to being 
undergoing the necessary changes for greater sustainability and equality 
only after outside circumstances and limitations “force” it to do so, then 
we are faced with the necessary and unquestioned need to prepare and 
strengthen as much as possible the most vital and essential sectors of that 
system so that the “day after” would be experienced more as a recovery, 
however difficult, than as a total collapse and chaos.
Croatia is definitely too small a country to initiate major global changes 
and that is a burden that it should not have to bear. But Croatia can use the 
“snowball effect” to bring together a large number of smaller local projects 
and approaches that could move in the direction of important changes to 
the economic and political paradigm. Then they could be gathered together 
and assisted in their expansion and strengthening of local production with 
longer term development. And here the situation does not look so bad. 
People are increasingly interested in the practical applications of sustain-
able living and are attending lectures, workshops, and fairs that promote 
“post-growth” solutions.
In several cities exchange groups have been established for food that 
link small producers with people in the city who want to become part of 
the food production cycle once again and to control what they are support-
ing with their money. There are also very frequent gatherings because of 
surplus or large quantities of some crops, fruits, and other foods that must 
be picked, gathered for free, or shared so they do not spoil. Both as regards 
food and energy there are an increasing number of examples of returning 
power to the people through the establishment of energy cooperatives to 
the benefit of local resources and the local community. There are also real 
and already functional models on city levels, such as at Krk, Čakovec or 
Koprivnica where they proved to provide at capacity levels and have gained 
public acceptance for responsible and sustainable waste management, the 
renewable use of resources and environmentally friendly buildings. Per-
haps most important at this moment is the rise of social enterprises and 
cooperatives, which should receive institutional and systematic support 
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very soon with a new state back-up Strategy for the Development of Social 
Enterprises. Although the process of social enterprise development hasn’t 
had an easy history and acceptance, today we can talk about a hundred of 
these kinds of business model that are not based on growth, but on eco-
nomic stability, use of resources with awareness, social cohesion and local 
community development. 
Although the situation here has lately become more muted compared 
to examples from the rest of the world, some initiatives are slowly being 
implemented here for strengthening a sustainable and just economy., We 
have seen initiatives such as the “time bank” project in Pula, where people 
divide up their own time to help those who need help, volunteering for 
the general good, and creating initiatives for founding ethical banks and 
transition cities. Such examples are worth following if we care about the 
future of Croatia.
Conclusion
“Every society has its myths. Our myth is economic growth.” 
(Jackson 2009c, 8). 
It is clear that every society takes its myths seriously as they constitute the 
foundation of its identity and values. How big is the influence of prevailing 
values in any given society? Our self-analysis of how much we have satisfied 
certain expectations is indicated by data that shows that of the 13 percent 
of the population of the United States that lives below the poverty level, 
80 percent of them have air-conditioners, 75 percent of them have at least 
one vehicle, and 33 percent of them have a computer, a dishwasher, and a 
second car (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). This is why an increasing num-
ber of authors (Korten 2006; Rifkin 2010; Heinberg 2011) emphasise that, 
above all, we are faced with changes in the social aspect of sustainability, 
where psychology, pedagogy, epigenetics and anthropology will have much 
to say, because without these approaches it will not be possible to enact the 
required deep changes in society. 
Changes in the use and consumption of energy are always followed by 
changes in communication that shape the way in which our brain under-
stands and organises reality. New energy/communications revolutions 
have led to new social contracts. In his work Emphatic Civilization (2010) 
Rifkin states that we are on the brink of a new social contract, a contract 
that will encompass our entire planet and the life on it and that will lead 
us in the direction of true sustainable development. 
Heinberg states that we are facing the fifth major turning point in the 
history of our species. The appearance of language, the discovery of fire, 
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the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution were the first four 
epochs that delimited the key changes and processes that were essential 
to the shaping of our species. “We are now participating in the turn from 
fossil-fueled, debt and growth-based industrial civilization toward a sus-
tainable, renewable and steady-state society” (2011, 284). 
We have already stated that it is crucial for the government to take an 
active role in the creation of money that is free from debt. 
One of the pioneers of a steady-state economy, Herman Daly, states that, 
in addition to government printing of money that is free from debt, the 
following actions are also required: 
1. a cap-auction-trade (or cap-and-dividend) system for extraction rights 
for basic natural resources.
2. a shift away from taxing income toward taxing resource depletion and 
environmental pollutants. 
3. limits on income inequality.
4. more flexible workdays.
5. the adoption of a system of tariffs that would allow countries that 
implement sustainable policies to remain competitive in the global 
marketplace with countries that do not. (see Heinberg 2011, 251-252).
It is clear that Daly – as regards ecosystems and the social dimension of so-
ciety – is advocating the strengthening of the commons, which David Bolier 
(2012) considers the “DNA for creating our economy, politics, and culture 
again.” The first meaning of the commons is that it is something given to 
us as a gift and that we all use that gift. We can divide the common good 
into three groups:
1. Natural: air, water, photosynthesis, oceans, soil, minerals, solar energy
2. Community: public areas, vacations, libraries, museums, markets, 
playgrounds, universities 
3. Culture: languages, science, music, astronomy, the internet (Barnes 
2004).
Commons offers us a new perspective. Instead of ownership it focuses on 
management and administration, on the long-term protection of collective 
social and ecological interests, and not on short-term and quick profit. Com-
mons refers not only to resources, but resources plus community with its 
protocols and values for the management of joint resources (Barnes 2006; 
Eisenstein 2011; Rowe 2013).
In this sense, alternative currencies of a local or regional character are 
also commons because ownership is less important; more important is the 
relationship itself toward a resource and the need for a just and equitable 
way for it to circulate, so that the resource is managed for the long-term 
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benefit of the user. Local currencies that are successful are always designed 
in a way that discourages accumulation and ownership, or control and pow-
er, and more movement and circulation. In some examples, the value of a 
local currency is reduced as time passes in order to encourage circulation 
fulfilling its main function, which is to make exchanges flow more freely. 
This would be a kind of tax on the possession of or a negative interest rate 
on the value of the money. The German-Argentine economist Silvio Gesell 
wrote about this in his epochal work from 1906 The Natural Economic Order. 
The main idea is that people should not become rich by possessing na-
ture, resources or money. If they have something, they are guardians and 
caretakers, and if they cannot guard it or care for it in a socially useful sense, 
then ownership should be given to someone who wants to and can. 
We have tried in this work to explain the manner in which money be-
comes ownership, in which it becomes energy, a resource by which some-
one who accumulates it acquires power and influence. As with the com-
mons, in alternative local currencies money again becomes only a means 
of exchange and it is difficult to manipulate it. 
Unfortunately at this moment it is more certain that those who control 
production and the flow of money, i.e. those who have ownership of it, will 
not move towards a more sustainably designed economy and money. We 
have explained what would be a responsible and progressive role for policy 
in an economy designed on the principles of sustainable development. But 
as Rob Hopkins (2008; 2011), a permaculture designer and the founder of the 
concept and the movement Transition Towns, says: “If we wait for govern-
ments, it will be too late; if we act as individuals, it will be too little; but if 
we act as communities, it might be just enough, just in time.” 
Transition Town is a global movement of local and regional communities 
of activist citizens who in an organized way confront and find solutions for 
the major problems in the world today: climate change, the destruction of 
resources and their increasingly difficult availability, and the financial cri-
sis. Hopkins also states that any concrete response to climate change and 
the excessive use of resources requires a response by and the participation 
of governments and the business sector. But he also emphasises that there 
is no longer time to wait for them and the strengthening resilience of lo-
cal communities to the challenges and risks that they are facing today can 
only help alongside a possible, serious and coordinated series of actions 
coming from above.
It is important to emphasise that in addition to the opportunities and 
activities required for an economy based on sustainable development to 
emerge, it is necessary to carry out reforms from above, yet there is also a 
need for solutions that should be started and practiced today from below, 
for at least with regards to money ‘the people’ again become sovereign. The 
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best proof of local, regional, and credit solutions can be found in the book 
People Money (2012) by Margrit Kennedy, Bernard Lietaer and John Rogers, 
written after several years of research into alternative, complementary cur-
rencies around the world. The book cites 4,000 such economic initiatives 
from below and although they stress that while no currency has a wide 
influence on the overall economy, with the exception of the Swiss WIR 
Bank, a great number of them do play a role in strengthening local econo-
mies and social roles linking actors at the local level and the making of local 
community resilience. Also, following the unforeseen influence of major 
crises, they remain possible economic systems that will have to be adapted 
and improved, but are nonetheless present as living models ready for use. 
Nevertheless, what is encouraging is that in contrast to times past, when 
the political elites, central governments, and banks destroyed vital and 
economically and socially important projects for local currencies without 
objection (such as in the 1930s with the Austrian Wörgl or in the 1950s with 
the French Lignières-en-Berry), today we have several examples of more 
friendly relationships. The central bank of Brazil and government agencies 
for “economic solidarity” are cooperating with the Institute Palmas, which 
started a regional currency, Banco Palmas, with the goal of expanding and 
promoting their concept. Another new currency, the Bristol Pound, has the 
support of the municipal council, which has employed one full-time person 
to assist in expanding and strengthening the project. In Nantes, France, 
an initiative has been undertaken for the creation of a regional currency, 
which has been included in the municipal Agenda 21 from 2006, but which 
the now advanced financial crisis has accelerated through the initial steps. 
Today the project is being supported by the chamber of commerce and the 
regional cooperative bank Crédit Municipal de Nantes. Such support and 
cooperation was impossible and unimaginable until a few years ago. For a 
positive exit from this general crisis it is not enough only to declare that 
global capitalism is passing through an organic crisis that contains within 
itself both a structural (objective) component and a legitimating (subjec-
tive) component (Speth 2008). 
For progressive and profound change we also need a visible and positive 
alternative that makes sense to people, and local currencies fulfill exactly 
that role. 
In any case, we are of the opinion that it is rather unrealistic to expect it 
to be possible to return to the old way of doing things. The reasons for this 
are: reduced accessibility to the most important resources, a strengthening 
and widening of ecological problems arising from excessive and inefficient 
use of resources which then snowball into even greater ecological prob-
lems with resources and a financial crisis that is not able to solve the most 
important of today’s problems. This is a situation out of balance. Although 
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it is clear that there cannot be a return to the old way, it is still not clear to 
the majority of people what a new way might entail, especially as regards 
the economy. We hope that we have succeeded in this work in presenting 
what this “new way” might entail.
Heinberg emphasises how the past behaviour of political and economic 
elites has shown us that we will learnt to live more sustainably, but across 
and through a crisis that will be more than a little unpleasant. The econo-
mist Peter Victor points out that we are faced with the need to build econo-
mies that are “slower by design, not by disaster” (Jackson 2009c, 19). In this 
work we have tried to approach, explain, and present this kind of design for 
an economy that sustainable development requires. 
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Prosperity and environmental sacrifice 
in Europe: Importance of income for 
sustainability-orientation 
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5
Democratic change towards sustainability
It is taken as a given premise now by a number of expert institutions, as 
well as development agencies and business consultancies (Meadows et 
al. 1972; Munskgaard and Pedersen 2001; Bastianoni et al. 2004; Stern 
2006; Peters and Hertwich 2006; Peters and Hertwich 2008; Speth 2008; 
Romm 2009; PWC 2012; Schellnhuber et al. 2013) that climate change and 
overall global environmental change pose an insurmountable obstacle to 
the existing model of social metabolism (Fischer-Kowalski 2000; Marx 
1981; Cifrić, this volume; Žitko, this volume). This is not just a matter 
of shortage of ‘input’ natural capital that such a process requires, but also a 
matter of global ecosystem’s inability to absorb and neutralize its long-term 
harmful side-effects (Anderson and Bows 2011; Hughes 2001; D. Meadows 
2000; Rockström et al. 2009; Cifrić, this volume). In absence of extinc-
tion of the large segments of global human population, this will require a 
change in social metabolism (material throughput), expectations and aspi-
rations, behaviours and attitudes of the majority of the global population 
included into the global material and information flows we call civilisation 
(Biermann 2012; Griggs et al. 2013). For some it is a question of modifying 
aspirations and focusing on those whose realisation is most sustainable and 
most valued in the long-term period (developing world), whilst for others 
it is a matter of sacrifice of existing material manifold of wellbeing, a re-
duction in extraction of environmental resources and dumping of waste, 
in order to provide room for the most pressing needs of the three billion 
most vulnerable humans existentially pressed to improve the material un-
derpinning of their living standard (Meyer and Maniates 2010; Barnettew 
et al. 2010; Matthews 2012). 
All the countries covered in this chapter, despite noticeable differences 
between them, are European countries with very high level of develop-
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ment from a global perspective (UNDP 2011). This, again from a global per-
spective, puts them in a group of countries for which the existing global 
predicament requires a new set of political and ethical demands to respond 
to the perceived limits of the key ecological and resource systems to deliver 
more wealth and absorb additional abuse. In that respect it is important to 
acknowledge a material connection between the level of development, as 
expressed by Human Development Index1 (UNDP 2011), and the impact a 
particular nation has on the global environment, as expressed by the Eco-
logical Footprint (global Footprint network 2012). 
Table 1  Development, footprint and income indicators 
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Austria AUS 0,894 5,29 0,760
Belgium BEL 0,897 7,11 0,756
Bulgaria BUL 0,780 3,56 0,592
Croatia CRO 0,804 3,92 0,537
Czech Republic CZCH 0,872 5,27 0,712
Denmark DEN 0,901 8,25 0,764
Finland FIN 0,892 6,21 0,757
France FRA 0,893 4,91 0,732
Germany GER 0,919 4,57 0,741
Latvia LAT 0,809 3,95 0,583
Lithuania LITH 0,814 4,38 0,605
Norway NOR 0,953 4,77 0,797
Slovakia SLK 0,838 4,66 0,692
Slovenia SLO 0,885 5,21 0,729
Spain ESP 0,892 4,74 0,659
Sweden SWE 0,915 5,71 0,772
Switzerland SWITZ 0,912 5,01 0,760
United Kingdom UK 0,875 4,71 0,709
01 The UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure of 
life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for countries 
worldwide, used for comparative purposes of measuring relative develop-
ment levels (UNDP 2011, 169). 
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For analyses in this text it is worth bearing in mind how selected Eu-
ropean countries are spread according to development attainment and 
ecological footprint. In this sense Denmark, Finland and Belgium form a 
group of countries with much higher footprint than the development level 
would suggest, whilst Norway and Germany form a group for which the 
footprint is lower than the level of development would suggest. The other 
countries covered here more or less fall into clear groups of lower develop-
ment- lower ecological footprint (Croatia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Slovakia) and the rest. In those development level increases from 0.87 to 
0.95 as does EF from 4.5 to 5.7. The increase in development equivalent to 
change between the latter two groups (of about 0.1 on HDI scale) would, if 
globalized to the whole world at European rates of development-footprint 
ratio, require another half of planet Earth (from current 2.5 to 3 Earths) to 
support that level of development increase for everyone. 
But, the common knowledge says that the citizens of wealthy consumer 
societies will never sacrifice their level of consumption, and policy mak-
ers aren’t foolish enough to insist that they do, according to Meyer (2010). 
Which leaves only a catastrophic event that would shock people into action 
or efficient policing by expert eco-guardians, to impose necessary sacrifices 
before it is too late for the planet’s biophysical systems (Meyer and Ma-
niates 2010; Gardiner 2010). Relying thus on the global calls for change 
(Domazet et al. 2012; UN SG HP GS 2012; Griggs et al. 2013), and mindful of 
the fact that neither catastrophe nor expert guardianship are particularly 
heart-warming future scenarios, this chapter sets to examine various di-
mensions of popular support for attitudes that would readdress the balance 
between respect for the environmental limits and material consumption in 
18 European states, both core and semi-peripheral. In that respect it helps 
set off the populations from European semi-periphery countries against a 
wider background of a spread of differently wealthy, powerful and histori-
cally diverse European nations.
Transformation required for societies to adopt more environmentally 
sustainable practices whilst maintaining or improving achieved levels of 
individual wellbeing and social and political protection is indeed challeng-
ing ( Meadows 2004; MEA 2005; IPCC 2007; UN SG HP GS 2012; Domazet et 
al. 2012). In terms of technical feasibility this is largely achievable rela-
tively quickly (McDonough and Braungart 2002; Karlsson 2007; Parry 
et al. 2009), but without popular support would require a scale of global 
redistribution, rebalancing of power and aspiration frustration that could 
only be brought about by enlightened tyranny which in itself is an abolish-
ment of social and political structures and freedom protections historically 
achieved (Gardiner 2010; Bowerman et al. 2011). It would thus provide a 
survival that modern humans can legitimately wonder whether it is a sur-
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vival worth having (Beck et al. 1994). And provided we can implement the 
ecological, societal, nutritional and technological adjustments needed to 
minimise the material throughput sufficiently swiftly but not in a radical 
authoritarian fashion, we could ask what kind of population would support 
these measures, rather than view them as outright curtailment of their 
inherited cultural and economic achievements (Stone 1997; Beck 2010; 
Swyngedouw 2010).
In fact, despite threats being environmental and their implications eco-
nomic, it is often emphasised in literature that transformation to sustain-
ability (as a response to threats and understanding of their implications in 
economics) has a cultural and social essence that requires a fundamental 
transformation of attitudes and practices (Schafer 1994; Urry 2011; UN 
SG HP GS 2012). To achieve a different combination of environmental and 
economic priorities societies need to reassess dominant values and their 
roles in construction of social and economic institutions (Shi 2004; Hulme 
2009; Hedlund-de Witt 2012). This is because these values and attitudes 
lie at the heart of collective actions of individuals, whilst the institutions 
provide the modes to address both individuals’ needs and overall societal 
constraints (Shi 2004; Hulme 2009). This makes the analysis of individual 
attitudes and values, and their translation into aggregate national strategy 
potentials, critical to a solution involving transformation to sustainability 
(Ehrlich and Kennedy 2005; Buenstorf and Cordes 2008; Urry 2011). 
As Hedlund-de Witt points out, the sustainability-oriented attitudes and 
behaviour involve pro-environmental or pro-ecological, frugal, altruistic 
and equitable attitudes and appropriate behaviours, whilst the empirical 
evidence shows that there are significant interrelationships between these 
groups of actions and attitudes (De Young 1993; Schultz 2001; Corral Ver-
dugo 2012; Hedlund-de Witt 2012). There is of course an awareness of the 
great gap between public expression of concern and attachment to values, 
and actual pro-environmental and sustainability oriented behaviour (the 
‘missing link’ or ‘paradox of epic proportions’, ‘attitude-behaviour gap’; cf. 
Glasser 2004, based on surveys in NEETF 2001; Crompton and Kasser 2009; 
Brajdić Vuković, this volume). However, although expressing environ-
mental concern does not in and of itself guarantee behaviours and political 
support for actions leading to sustainability transformation, it is a neces-
sary step in that direction. Namely, there is even less connection between 
expressing anti-environmental attitudes and values whilst practicing cona-
tive sustainability-oriented behaviour. 
Matutinović’s (2012) analysis of values and behaviours with potential 
for transformation to sustainability, constructed into a European values 
and behaviours matrix, concludes that in the EU 27 society there is no im-
mediate transformation potential to a sustainable society. This is because 
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most of the values and behaviours that European populations report hold-
ing and practicing with regards to environmental protection fall within 
the Old Paradigm which relies on low effort and does not have sufficient 
impact to signify transformation to sustainable throughputs by the said 
societies. What is more, a specific group of values and behaviours he terms 
as indicating the core of the potential for a sustainability transformation 
are insufficiently diffused throughout European and other leading econo-
mies’ societies. However, with threshold set high at a deterministic 50%, 
it is perhaps almost theoretically impossible to reach a stage where the 
potential for transformation to sustainability dominates in European socie-
ties. Though his data shows that even the 30% threshold is barely reached 
in some societies, it nonetheless gives some indication of a more realistic 
starting point for political negotiation. 
Three explanatory models dominate the issues of cross-national dif-
ferences of environmental concern as one of the fundamental aspects of 
values and attitudes attuned to transformation to sustainability. These are 
Inglehart’s (1997) prevalence of post-materialistic values in developed soci-
eties, Dunlap and Mertig’s (1997) estimation of concern through spread of 
globalized attitudes and direct experience of environmental degradation 
and Diekmann and Franzen’s (1999) prosperity thesis linking environmen-
tal concern to national wealth, regardless of the dispersion of value-sets. 
For our purposes, Diekmann and Franzen’s thesis is most significant, argu-
ing for the strongest correlation between national wealth and environmen-
tal concern. As populations become wealthier, they say, demand for higher 
environmental quality rises, as well as the ability to financially respond to 
that demand, which in the end results in a positive correlation between a 
country’s average wealth and its level of environmental concern. What is 
more, Franzen and Meyer (2010) subsequently show on the preceding two 
intervals of ISSP Environment data-sets (from 1993 and 2000) that “cross-na-
tional as well as between individual differences in environmental concern 
are clearly related to wealth and income respectively, which lends strong 
support to the prosperity hypothesis” (Franzen and Meyer 2010, 220). It 
is worth warning that aggregate national data-sets, such as are used here 
as well, risk committing an ecological fallacy, i.e. hiding influences other 
than wealth behind the overall population’s mean. 
Aiming to go some way to uncover those factors where influences of 
wealth and income behind the overall population’s mean weaken, we de-
viate somewhat from Franzen and Meyer (2010) in both instruments and 
initial assumptions behind their application. Original prosperity thesis of 
Franzen and Meyer (2010) is based on concepts of environmental econom-
ics (Field 1994), which are insensitive to nuances captured in prosperity 
indicator we will use in our analyses that is based on averages of inequality-
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adjusted national incomes (“III”, UNDP 2011). Namely, environmental eco-
nomics attributes prevalence of environmental concern to commoditisa-
tion of environmental services in more affluent societies. That is, Franzen 
and Meyer say (following Baumol and Oates 1979; Field 1994) that environ-
mental quality, both locally and globally, is not only a public good but also 
a good “the demand for which rises with income” (2010, 221). Furthermore, 
they say, individuals face a trade-off between consumption of goods and the 
quality of the environment. However, Haanpää (2006), reports that envi-
ronmental concern can be high in lower income countries as well, both over 
direct effects of pollution and over global problems, even if lower income 
populations have other existential priorities to list above environmental 
concern. So as not to assume that quality of the environment is a commod-
ity we prefer to rely on UNDP’s inequality-adjusted income index, which is 
positively correlated with the overall GDP per capita in selected countries 
and, because of the measures involved in its calculations (presented in de-
tail later in this chapter), is also perceived as less insensitive to inequality 
in individual incomes within those countries (for the spread see table 1). 
Testing the relation between nations’ wealth and environmental 
concern
As previously mentioned, in this chapter we go some way to testing the 
Prosperity Hypothesis at a finer level of detail. We disaggregate the Franzen 
and Meyer (2010) environmental concern index into several components, 
partially overlapping with the component measures they used on the 1999 
and 2000 data. Though Franzen and Meyer (2010) used national GDP per 
capita as a measure of prosperity available to the population on a global 
scale, in the case of the selected European countries these values are actu-
ally not broadly dispersed, whilst we expect that individual attitudes are 
more sensibly connected to incomes available to individuals, correlated to 
relative income inequality levels within society in addition to overall na-
tional wealth. Therefore we test the national populations’ performances on 
measures of environmental concern in correlation to the UN’s ‘Inequality-
adjusted Income Index’ (UNDP 2011). Inequality-adjusted income index (III 
– or ‘triple I’) is a component of the national Inequality-adjusted Human De-
velopment Index (IHDI) and is a composite measure of inequality-weighted 
national income averages, based on GINI and GDP (UNDP 2011, 170) data for 
the given country. We use this less familiar instrument for two reasons. 
On the one hand it is an indicator of overall national wealth and economic 
prosperity as it is positively correlated with the national GDP per capita in 
the group of selected countries. On the other, and with further analysis 
presented in Dolenec et al. (this volume) in mind, we wanted to use an 
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instrument that is more sensitive to differences between countries con-
cerning the social inequalities arising from individual income differences. 
Related to the divergence from Franzen and Meyer’s construct, it is also 
important to say that we also focus on a narrower band of European coun-
tries in the ISSP dataset (ISSP Research Group 2012), with an intention 
to increase the validity of findings as background cultural factors are less 
diverse and can be provisionally ‘held constant’. Thus the applied concepts 
are not overstretched as might be the case in global studies which use con-
cepts as placeholders for very different phenomena. 
Given this narrower selection of countries we expect to identify the 
aspects of environmental concern (as conceptualised through combina-
tions of existing ISSP variables) which diverge from the pattern of prosper-
ity thesis. On issues of willingness to pay or to commit to other sacrifices 
closely related to material prosperity it could be expected that prosperity 
thesis link between prosperity (based on income) and a mean of composite 
attitude measures and indicators will be re-created. On other attitudes and 
commitments necessary for sustainability transformation (especially from 
a global perspective), it is expected that differences in attitudes between 
selected European countries will begin to diverge from the trend in pros-
perity range (cf. Dolenec, domazet and Ančić, this volume). 
Through such combinations of national development indicators and 
aggregate of populations’ attitudes, we seek correlations between the ob-
jective indicators displaying a society’s potential for sustainability-shift 
from an external perspective, with population’s values and attitudes as a 
political and social reflection of that external potential. In this way we aim 
to elucidate possible correlations between society’s objective potential to 
transform its practices and material throughput to those more suitable to 
a globally just long-term sustainability, and its population’s support for 
required social transformations. The measures we use in this text focus on 
environmental protection and its trade-offs with economic activities as one 
of preconditions of support for sustainability-shift policies. Indirectly they 
measure the awareness of the extent of global environmental crisis, but also 
a more direct willingness to act with environmental sustainability in mind 
and commit to material sacrifices. We focus on environmental and eco-
nomic oriented indicators in this text because we recognise the importance 
of environmental concern in motivating a sustainability switch (Takacs-
Santa 2007), though we do not reduce the values and behaviours associated 
with sustainability solely to those oriented on environmental protection. 
Other texts in this volume (cf. Part II and Part III of this volume) focus 
on indicators of social and developmental aspects of sustainability. 
Although in each country investigation of the background factors is de-
sirable, we are also looking for coarse and broad trends Europe-wide so as 
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to better situate the specific contextual findings for Croatia and Bulgaria 
(cf. Kufrin, this volume; Bieri and Stoilova, this volume). We must 
also not forget that though different, European countries enjoy a greater 
similarity of developmental paths and attainment than they do with other 
countries round the globe. Simply put, overall Croatia is still more similar 
to Switzerland than to Gabon or Mexico. It is of course acknowledged that 
next to macro level effects of national population averages of wealth and 
development, there are also individual level variables (such as age, gender, 
residence status, education, religion etc.) that are expected to influence 
environmental concern and attitudes identified as suitable to sustainability 
transformation. In that vein Franzen and Meyer (2010) report finding that 
individuals’ concern for the environment (along their index measure) var-
ies more within countries than between countries (2010, 229). 
However, as states are still primary global political subjects we are con-
cerned with reporting the differences between countries, and as income is 
still a strong predictor of differences within countries (Franzen and Mey-
er 2010, 229) we report on the European spectrum of measures related to in-
come and increasing divergence from this trend. Whilst income, value-sets 
and education are all strong predictors of environmental concern, perhaps 
exceeding the macro level effect of national inequality-adjusted income, as 
attitudes and concern should translate into sustainability-oriented govern-
ance that is executed at the macro level of national states, we present the 
national macro level trends as potential for sustainability transformation 
at societal level.
Data and Measurement 
We use the data for 18 countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) 
from ISSP module Environment, which was fielded during 2009, 2010 and 
2011, together with the existing measures constructed in order to enable 
longitudinal and cross-sectional comparison, focusing on designing meas-
urements of sustainability-ready populations in terms of values, expecta-
tions, attitudes and commitments from the sets of questions available in 
ISSP questionnaire (ISSP Research Group 2012; Rydzewski 2010). 
For the purposes of this text a set of two composite and three single-
variable indicators are used in analyses as dependent variables together 
with a country-level aggregate measure of the inequality-adjusted income 
index as independent. 
Our survey-based indicators are grouped into composites of variables 
that reflect values and attitudes on the individual level, and those express-
ing individuals’ support for different wholesale societal strategies, based 
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on previous research findings but also on the results of reliability analysis. 
There are two composite indicators measuring individual concern, will-
ingness to take appropriate action and commitment to material sacrifice 
named Attitudes of Concern and Activation and Attitudes of material sacrifice. 
The former consists of ISSP variables not reported in such configuration 
before, whilst the latter consists of variables that overlap with the conative 
component of the environmental concern index in Franzen and Meyer (2010). 
Figure 1
Composite indicator of ‘Attitudes of Concern and Activation’, higher value signifies 
higher agreement with the statement, (mean) by country
Composite indicator of ‘Attitudes of Concern and Activation’ includes measures 
of disagreement with statements playing down the level on contemporary 
environmental crisis, as well self-evaluation of individual’s knowledge of 
8 
 
 Figure 1. Composite indicator of ‘Attitudes of Concern and Activation’, higher value signifies higher agre ment with the statement, (mean) by ou try 
 
Composite indicator of ‘Material Sacrifice Attitudes’ directly measures the individual’s self-reported willingness to pay higher prices and taxes with environmental protection in mind. It is thus a direct expression of the diffusion within a particular state’s population of individuals willing to make sacrifices and support policies that demand greater material investments from individuals whilst providing smaller material benefits for them from resource extraction. The latter is what is required for reduction of the ecological footprint of individual societies, and the overall global population in the end, in order to bring them in line with the projected sustainable state. Mean scores of the composite indicator for every country are presented in Figure 2. 
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harmful and helpful activities. Higher performances on this composite 
indicator suggest a population with higher proportion of individuals who 
say that they know what effect their lifestyles have on the environment, as 
well as how truly worrying those effects can be. They also see themselves as 
efficacious in implementing appropriate behavioural and lifestyle changes 
based on their intrinsic motivation. Mean scores of the composite indicator 
for every country are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 2
Composite indicator of ‘Attitudes of Material Sacrifice’, higher value signifies more 
willingness to pay higher prices and taxes with environmental protection in mind 
(mean) by country
Composite indicator of ‘Attitudes of Material Sacrifice’ directly measures the 
individual’s self-reported willingness to pay higher prices and taxes with 
environmental protection in mind. It is thus a direct expression of the dif-
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 Figure 2. Composite indicator of ‘Material sacrifice attitudes’, higher value signifies more willingne s to pay higher prices and taxes with env ronmental protection in mind (mean) by country  Besides composites, we use three single-variable (attitude) indicators.  Indicator of environment-
economy trade-off reports on the prevalence of individuals within states’ populations who disagree with statements that concern for the environment is exaggerated and unjustifiably prioritised over economic activities and progress. It does not express statements about individual’s personal values and behaviour, but their comment on the general societal development trends, particularly the trade-offs between environment and employment. This is linked to considerations of efficacy of action, as a prerequisite for transformative mobilization, not just on individual but on societal level, as part of collective-action problems (Ostrom 2010). 
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fusion within a particular state’s population of individuals willing to make 
sacrifices and support policies that demand greater material investments 
from individuals whilst providing smaller material benefits for them from 
resource extraction. The latter is what is required for reduction of the eco-
logical footprint of individual societies, and the overall global population 
in the end, in order to bring them in line with the projected sustainable 
state. Mean scores of the composite indicator for every country are pre-
sented in Figure 2.
Besides composites, we use three single-variable (attitude) indicators. 
Indicator of environment-economy trade-off reports on the prevalence of 
individuals within states’ populations who disagree with statements that 
concern for the environment is exaggerated and unjustifiably prioritised 
over economic activities and progress. It does not express statements about 
individual’s personal values and behaviour, but their comment on the gen-
eral societal development trends, particularly the trade-offs between en-
vironment and employment. This is linked to considerations of efficacy of 
action, as a prerequisite for transformative mobilization, not just on indi-
vidual but on societal level, as part of collective-action problems (Ostrom 
2010). Again, even on the collective level, perceptions of efficacy are vital to 
one’s willingness to make sacrificial transformation commitments (Meyer 
2010). In that respect we connect perceived and normative attitudes within 
populations following Meyer’s (2010) conceptual sketching of when and 
how people might act on behalf of environmental concerns. 
Two single-item indicators Non-growth indicator1 and Non-growth indi-
cator2 measure the normative side of economic growth and environment 
protection. They capture the prevalence within European populations of 
individuals who disagree with a single item statement that their country 
needs economic growth in order to protect the environment, and agree 
with a single item statement that economic growth always harms the en-
vironment. It is important to stress that whilst congruent to it, these items 
do not on their own indicate prevalence of support for degrowth strategies 
(Daly 1996; Kallis 2011). Whilst the latter might be seen as the only viable 
strategy to lessen the burden of the Anthropocene societies on the global 
ecosystem (Kallis 2011), higher performances on our indicators do not im-
ply unequivocal calls for degrowth and materially sacrificial social strate-
gies (Wapner 2010). They do however signal support for a shift away from 
the developmental paradigm by which economic growth leads to remedy-
ing of environmental problems and overall improvement of environmental 
quality within a given country, regardless of its effects on the global level. It 
can thus indicate a potential for deviation from a strategy of environmental 
protection through exporting of dirty industries based on increased afflu-
ence. Such a reading conceptually combines with the overall acceptance 
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that the all forms of economic growth necessarily have an environmental 
cost, as suggested by agreement with Non-growth indicator 2. 
All indicators used in our analyses and described above are presented in 
more detail in Table 2. It is important to note that all responses are coded 
in a way that higher scores indicate greater concern for environmental 
protection, but also greater commitment to act with environmental pro-
tection in mind and more willingness to prioritise environmental stability 
over economic growth. 
Table 2  Instruments
INDEXES ITEMS
Attitudes of concern 
and activation
The reliability 
coefficient 
(Cronbach’s alpha) 
for the scale for 18 
countries varied 
from 0.59 – 0.77
0.35 – 0.54 inter-
item correlation
“How much do you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements?”a
(a)“there are more important things to do in 
life than protect the environment”
(b)“ many of the claims about environmental 
threats are exaggerated”
(c)“it is just too difficult for someone like me 
to do much about the environment”
(d)“there is no point in doing what I can for 
the environment unless others do the same”
(e) “I find it hard to know whether the way I 
live is helpful or harmful for the environment”
Attitudes of material 
sacrifice
The reliability coef-
ficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for the scale 
for 18 countries var-
ied from 0.73 – 0.89
0.56 – 0.80 inter-
item correlation
“How willing would you be to:”b
(a) “pay much higher prices in order to protect 
the environment”
(b) „pay much higher taxes in order to protect 
the environment”
(c) “to accept cuts in your standard of living in 
order to protect the environment“
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SINGLE-ITEM 
INDICATORS
ITEMS
Indicator of 
environment – 
economy trade-off
“And how much do you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements?”a
“We worry too much about the future of the 
environment and not enough about prices and 
job today”
“How much do you agree or disagree with:”a
Non-growth 
indicator1
“Our country needs economic growth in order 
to protect the environment”
Non-growth 
indicator2
“Economic growth always harms the environ-
ment”
a Measured on Likert scale: 1 = “strongly agree”; 2=”agree”; 3=”neither agree nor disa-
gree”; 4=”disagree”; 5 = “strongly disagree”
b Measured on Likert scale: 1 = “very willing”; 2=”fairly willing”; 3=”neither willing 
nor unwilling”; 4=”fairly unwilling”; 5 = “strongly unwilling”
Our study analyses the above described indicators for all European samples 
included in ISSP Environment dataset (18) in the context of the independ-
ent indicator of the respective populations’ inequality-adjusted average 
income index – III, its results for 2012, and representing State’s level of pros-
perity in our analyses. 
Results and discussion
Individual-level sustainability-commitment greater in richer 
European societies 
As Franzen and Meyer (2010) suggested, level of environmental concern in 
a society influences the population’s environmental behaviour, and so the 
maintenance or even increase of environmental concern is an important 
component for environmental protection. The question remains, follow-
ing Matutinović (2012) and Hall (2010), at what absolute level and extent 
of diffusion among population does such concern become high enough to 
indicate potential to surpass a given nation’s activation threshold. Activa-
tion threshold would be a tipping point over which the environmental 
aspects of sustainability-orientation in European populations become suf-
ficient to warrant the potential for transformation to a more sustainable 
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society (Matutinović 2012b; Kelly et al. 2003) that would be prepared to 
democratically support taking radical steps in order to avoid dangerous col-
lapse of Earth’s biophysical systems (cf. Rogelj et al. 2009 for the severity 
of steps required). 
Starting from these insights, next we analyse how components of sus-
tainability behaviour relate to the respective countries’ inequality-adjusted 
average income (III). Table 3 shows data on all chosen indicators, while the 
graphs that follow explore their relationship with inequality-adjusted av-
erage incomes. 
Table 3  Sustainability indicators
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Austria (AUS) 17,33 8,11 46,7 32,4 34,2
Belgium (BEL) 16,01 8,09 34,5 26,1 21,7
Bulgaria (BUL) 14,29 6,31 38,7 9,5 38,2
Croatia (CRO) 15,68 6,32 32,0 18,4 19,9
Czech R. (CZCH) 14,89 6,58 34,2 14,1 28,5
Denmark(DEN) 17,02 9,32 54,3 29,2 23,8
Finland (FIN) 17,28 8,14 37,5 52,3 36,7
France (FRA) 16,17 7,76 29,2 27,6 32,1
Germany (GER) 16,32 8,52 49,1 26,5 29,0
Latvia (LAT) 14,62 5,73 30,3 15,8 25,3
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Lithuania (LITH) 14,75 6,45 31,7 13,2 30,5
Norway (NOR) 16,66 8,44 50,0 37,6 14,7
Slovak R. (SLK) 15,24 7,50 33,9 11,5 32,8
Slovenia (SLO) 16,34 7,91 29,6 18,9 35,7
Spain (ESP) 15,99 7,80 36,7 28,4 25,4
Sweden (SWE) 17,20 8,42 48,8 20,0 13,4
Switzerland (SWTZ) 17,33 9,76 50,0 50,9 38,5
United  Kingdom (UK) 15,24 7,66 33,2 18,9 15,3
Total 16,07 7,77 38,7 26,0 27,6
* Range is from 5 to 25: 5-8=very unsustainable; 9-12=unsustainable;
13-16= undecided; 17-20=sustainable; 21-25=very sustainable.
** Range is from 3 to 15: 3-4= very unsustainable; 5-8= unsustainable;
9-10= undecided; 11-13= sustainable; 14-15= very sustainable.
As Table 3 indicates, based on our construct of attitudes expected to be held 
by the populations with sustainability transformation potential, majority 
of European nations are not characterised by overwhelming sustainability-
readiness. As we will show later, those are as a rule the more prosperous 
European nations, though as attitudes move away from the expressions of 
immediate personal material commitment this prosperity relation weak-
ens and disappears. We thus find that on index of attitudes of concern and 
activation only Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Nor-
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way fall into the sustainability-ready group by mean sample values, whilst 
all other countries are in the undecided range. On the index of attitudes of 
material sacrifice less prosperous countries (Croatia, Latvia, Bulgaria and 
Lithuania) and Czech Republic are on average in the not-sustainability-
ready group, whilst all other countries covered here are in the undecided 
group. Denmark and Switzerland clearly diverge towards the top within 
the undecided2 group. 
In terms of percentage of population expressing adherence to sustain-
ability-oriented interpretations of the single-variable attitude indicators 
related to trade-offs between environment and economy in most countries 
covered there are non-negligible segments of the population expressing 
sustainability-readiness-compatible attitudes (often at or over the level of 
30% of population). More precisely, on environment-economy indicator 
of immediate trade-off between environmental health and current prices 
and jobs, most countries are positioned between 25% and 40% support for 
sustainability-orientation. In this group, there are no differences between 
more and less prosperous countries. Another group is again formed by the 
exclusively more prosperous countries with over 45% of population ex-
pressing support for sustainability-orientation on this trade-off (Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland; cf. Table 1). 
These percentages drop somewhat when representing proportion of 
population that abandons their country’s economic growth as a necessary 
requirement for further environmental protection (non-growth indica-
tor 1). A group with proportion below 20% includes all the least prosper-
ous countries, as well as Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, United King-
dom and Sweden. Most other countries are in the 20%-40% representation 
group, except Finland and Switzerland where just over 50% of population 
expressed support for disassociation of economic growth from environ-
mental protection. Post-hoc tests also single out Switzerland and Finland’s 
divergence from other European countries as statistically significant. 
Finally, proportions of populations representing agreement with neces-
sary detrimental impacts of economic growth on the environment (non-
growth indicator2) display no difference between prosperous and less pros-
perous European countries covered in this chapter. The percentages are 
spread between 13% and 40%, with Sweden at the lowest point of 13.4% and 
Switzerland and Bulgaria at the highest (approx. 38%). As will be discussed 
later, no trends are extracted here; with Austria and Finland, for example, 
again being in the top of the range (with over 30%), but Denmark (23.8%) 
closer to the middle and Sweden and Norway (14.7%) at the very bottom. 
02 Post-hoc tests to be reported below, show statistically significant differ-
ence in these countries’ means from everyone else in the group. 
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Overall, diversity of countries’ performances on the range of indicators pre-
sented here suggests that sustainability-orientation is a multidimensional 
construct with multitude of socio-economic and cultural influences. Other 
texts in this volume (Dolenec et al., this volume; Brajdić Vuković, this 
volume) address other differences between European societies’ perfor-
mance on indicators of environmental concern and commitment to differ-
ent development strategies. 
‘I value environmental protection and can do something about it, 
even if others won’t’ 
As can be seen from Figure 3, concern and activation attitudes are more 
positive in the prosperous European countries (r=0.752, sig. .000). This 
indicates that overall prosperity of a country can be seen as a significant 
predictor of population’s readiness to prioritise environmental concern 
and individual potential for activation on environmental issues. It can be 
noted that countries with inequality-adjusted income index values below 
about 0.725 have similar average value of composite concern and activa-
tion attitudes indicator (about 15, except Croatia and Spain), regardless of 
great spread of inequality-adjusted income index values (0.575-0.725). It 
suggests that when differences in the individual income average are low, 
their effect on attitudes of awareness and activation is weaker. 
Figure 3
Inequality-adjusted income index – Index of attitudes of concern and activation 
correlation
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‘I value environmental protection and can do something about it, even if 
others won’t’  
 Figure 3: Inequality-adjusted income index – Index of attitudes of concern and activation correlation  As can be seen from Figure 3, concern and activation attitudes are more positive in the prosperous European countries (r=0,752, sig. ,000). This indicates that overall prosperity of a country can be seen as a significant predictor of population’s readiness to prioritise environmental concern and individual potential for activation on environmental issues. It can be noted that countries with inequality-adjusted income index values below about 0.725 have similar average value of composite concern and activation attitudes indicator (about 15, except Croatia and Spain), regardless of great spread of inequality-adjusted income index values (0.575-0.725). It suggests that when differences in the individual income average are low, their effect on attitudes of awareness and activation is weaker.  However, when inequality-adjusted income index value is above 0.725 average value of attitudes of concern and activation shows more positive direction, with Slovenia, Germany, France and Belgium making one group (below value of 16.5) and Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway another (above 16.5). It is the latter group where the mean of the index of attitudes of concern and activation value suggests a majority of population expressing both concern for environment, knowledge of its limits and the willingness to act upon the issues, and this comes about with a barely noticeable change in inequality adjusted income average (Inequality-adjusted Income Index) from about 0.750 to 0.775. Post-hoc analysis shows the differences between all these groups to be statistically significant, but only the latter group displaying overall sustainability transformation potential within respective societies.  
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However, when inequality-adjusted income index value is above 0.725 
average value of attitudes of concern and activation shows more positive 
direction, with Slovenia, Germany, France and Belgium making one group 
(below value of 16.5) and Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway another (above 16.5). It is the latter group where the mean of 
the index of attitudes of concern and activation value suggests a majority of 
population expressing both concern for environment, knowledge of its lim-
its and the willingness to act upon the issues, and this comes about with a 
barely noticeable change in inequality adjusted income average (Inequality-
adjusted Income Index) from about 0.750 to 0.775. Post-hoc analysis shows 
the differences between all these groups to be statistically significant, but 
only the latter group displaying overall sustainability transformation po-
tential within respective societies. 
In the case of countries with inequality-adjusted income index values 
below about 0.725, samples of Croatia and Spain present indicative detach-
ment from the overall trend. For example, in the case of Croatia, despite 
lowest value of inequality-adjusted income index, attitudes of concern 
and activation regarding environmental issues are on average more posi-
tive than in a range of wealthier new and old European democracies3. To a 
degree, the Spain sample shows similar tendency which, together with the 
case of Croatia, presents indications of counterexamples to a theory that 
countries’ overall prosperity available to the population results in more 
positive attitudes regarding environmental concern. 
As stated above, this is in part caused by the use of instruments and 
background assumptions different to the environmental economics para-
digm (Field 1994) employed in the prosperity thesis. Inequality-adjusted 
income index (III) is an indicator of prosperity sensitive to level of income 
inequality within a given population, and it places Croatia and Spain rela-
tively lower on the prosperity ranking than their average GDP per capita. 
If environmental quality is a commodity the demand for which rises with 
available income (as assumed in environmental economics behind prosper-
ity thesis) then, as we presume, indicator that is result of the calculation 
with less skewed distributions (III compared to GDP) should show more 
accurate correlation with overall population’s expression of concern and 
activation. As our prosperity indicator, when compared to the general popu-
03 Post-hoc test for analysis of variance shows that there is no statistically 
significant difference of mean value on the index of attitudes of concern 
and activation between Croatia (from a lower income band) and Slovak 
Republic, United Kingdom, Spain, Czech Republic, or even Belgium for that 
matter. There is a significant difference of mean of the index of attitudes 
of concern and activation value between Croatia and Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Lithuania in the same income band. 
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lation survey samples in the individual countries, is presumed to be more 
sensitive to individual (as recorded in survey responses) trade-off between 
consumption and environmental protection we indicate possible devia-
tions from the prosperity thesis trend. In this sense, despite the overall 
trend showing more positive attitudes of concern and activation in more 
prosperous European countries, examples of Croatia, Czech Republic and 
United Kingdom’s deviations from the income-concern trend should not 
be lightly disregarded.
‘To protect environmental quality I will pay more and sacrifice my 
living standard’ 
Transformation of material and social infrastructure into those more suit-
able to sustainability will also require willing sacrifices on individual lev-
el, in terms of greater costs of living or taxes for maintenance of public 
environmental services (Wapner 2010). This is expressed in attitudes of 
material sacrifice composite indicator which partially overlaps with what 
Franzen and Meyer call ‘conative component of environmental concern’. 
It expresses not just willingness to sacrifice (Wapner 2010) but also a striv-
ing or commitment to purposeful action. Significant correlation between 
composite indicators of concern and activation attitudes and material sac-
rifice attitudes (r=0.358; sig. .000) suggests a close conceptual connection 
between individual concern and efficacy, and willingness for material sacri-
fice. Together they indicate an aware, concerned and efficacious population 
to act on sustainability imperatives. 
There is of course an important obstacle, similar to general ‘willingness 
to pay’ problems, to the use of this in comparative indications of different 
countries’ commitments to a common cause. Given the differences in af-
fluence between countries, especially among our lower income countries, 
this might be more of a measure of ‘ability to pay’ than ‘willingness’, and 
thus be more of an objective development indicator than a measure of 
population’s willingness for different development strategies (Haanpää 
2006). In our case it is important to bear in mind both the income (III; Table 
1) and difference in development level (HDI; cf. Dolenec, domazet and 
ančić, this volume), as well as ecological footprint (EF, cf. Table 1) of the 
countries are in the overall ‘not-sustainable’ range (below 7 on the index 
of attitudes of material sacrifice). 
Average results for countries’ samples regarding attitudes to material 
sacrifice are mostly lower, or less directed in desired sustainability-orien-
tation, than the averages regarding attitudes of concern and activation. It 
is still easier to express concern and willingness to act, than the willingness 
to commit to material sacrifice. Post-hoc analyses show that Czech Republic 
displays a significant deviation from the prosperity-sacrifice trend, with 
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statistically significant difference on the index of attitudes of material sac-
rifice indicator from all countries in its inequality-adjusted income index 
range and development ranges. Switzerland and Denmark, on the other 
hand, show the most positive average attitudes, despite not having the 
highest inequality-adjusted income index, and their disassociation from 
the rest of the group is also statistically significant according to post-hoc 
tests.
Figure 4
Inequality-adjusted income index – Index of attitudes of material sacrifice correlation
What is particularly interesting for our purposes, though, is that overall 
range of the inequality-adjusted income index is insufficient to flip any of 
the countries from undecided to clearly committed category along the es-
tablished trend, i.e. that increase in ability to pay is still not a clear enough 
guarantee of overall majority commitment to commitment to pay more in 
aid of environmental protection. In other words, our data does not suggest 
a value of average income (and subsequently national GDP behind it) that 
would push the overall population in the direction of achieving sustain-
ability through higher material and financial sacrifice.
So, we can see here that willingness to pay keeps increasing with avail-
able income, seemingly in disregard for the lower cost of environmental 
protection in the most highly developed societies. That is, environmen-
tal-economics-based prosperity thesis suggests that over certain level of 
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development environmental quality in a country increases, making the 
immediate willingness to pay for it among the population drop as it ceases 
to be a scarce commodity. As some of the European countries included in 
this sample are amongst the most highly developed in the world, and are 
those with historically highest investment in environmental regeneration, 
straightforward prosperity thesis would suggest their populations’ willing-
ness to pay should be lower despite the maximally high development and 
ability to pay. 
On one hand these could simply reflect the socially desirable responses 
in the developed societies where cultural norm of the pressure of envi-
ronmental sacrifice has enjoyed a comparatively greater penetration. On 
the other hand, absence of such drop might indicate either a greater pen-
etration of global environmental issues whose relevance has not dropped 
with development, such as CO2 emissions (Khanna 2002; York et al. 2003) 
in the understanding of environmental concern, or the disassociation of 
environmental concern from the environmental economics justification 
based on marketable costs of environmental services. According to princi-
ples of environmental economics we would expect the willingness to pay 
to decrease with the decreased demand for environmental quality due to 
its shifting back to a freely available public good, perhaps most notably in 
a group of highly developed countries with a comparatively lower EF such 
as Germany and Norway. But this is not the case in this analysis (Figure 4). 
Overall, the differences between selected European countries along the 
two composite indicators charting individual prioritising of environmental 
concern, activation potential and willingness for material sacrifice are at 
first instance best explained by the inequality-adjusted prosperity of the 
population, as measured by the inequality-adjusted income index. Our data 
thus most readily confirms the prosperity thesis that a society’s inequality-
adjusted income level makes it more predisposed to adopting environmen-
tal attitudes in line with the sustainability switch. But consistencies in 
deviation from this trend in case of some countries indicate that factors 
other than sheer prosperity might be at play.
Wealthier, footprint-heavy European societies do not display 
more balanced attitudes towards environment-economy 
trade-offs 
Other than individual behaviour, a population’s acceptance of economic 
strategies that are not focused primarily on GDP growth is an important 
precondition of implementation of such strategies in order to strive to 
dematerialize and decarbonize the economy (Radermacher 2002; Speth 
2008; Cifrić, this volume; Šimleša, this volume; Žitko, this volume). 
It is especially important to consider trade-offs between environmental 
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protection and economic activity. Our economy-environment trade-off 
indicator endeavours to chart support for just such strategies among popu-
lations of the European countries covered. It is important to note that this 
is not an indicator measuring support for degrowth strategies, but merely 
a more equitable balancing between respect for the environment and eco-
nomic activities. 
Figure 5
Inequality-adjusted income index – Economy-environment trade-off indicator
As presented in Figure 5, economy-environment trade-off indicator on av-
erage displays greater disagreement with prioritising economy over envi-
ronment as a country’s inequality-adjusted income average rises (Kendall´s 
tau_b r=0.493; sig. .004). However, a break in the linear pattern more prom-
inent than in previous indicator-income relationships can be observed. The 
wealthiest countries like Denmark, Switzerland and Norway have about 
50% of population considered sustainability-oriented in economy-environ-
ment trade-off frame. As some other prosperous European countries, such 
as Germany, Sweden and Austria are not far behind, the broken pattern is 
most prominent amongst the more prosperous and footprint-heavy Euro-
pean countries covered. Namely, Finland, Belgium, United Kingdom and 
France, though in the mid-range of European development and prosperity 
scales (cf. Fig. 3, and Dolenec et al., this volume) exhibit same or lower 
prevalence of support for environment over immediate economic concerns 
than the least prosperous European countries with 20% lower EFs. It seems 
that on this dimension, greater wealth does not necessarily tip societies 
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 Figure 5: Inequality-adjusted income index – Economy-environment trade-off indicator As presented in Figure 5, economy-environment trade-off indicator on average displays greater disagreement with prioritising economy over environment as a country’s inequality-adjusted income average rises (Kendall´s tau_b r=0,493; sig. ,004). However, a break in the linear pattern more prominent than in previous indicator-income relationships can be observed. The wealthiest countries like Denmark, Switzerland and Norway have about 50% of population considered sustai ability-oriented in economy-environment trade-off frame. As some other prosperous E ropea untries, such as Germany, Swed n an  Austria are not far behind, the broken pattern is most prominent amongst the more prosperous and footprint-heavy European countries covered. Namely, Finland, Belgium, Great Britain and France, though in the mid-range of European development and prosperity scales (cf. Fig. 3, and Dolenec et al. this volume) exhibit same or lower prevalence of support for environment over immediate economic concerns than the least prosperous European countries with 20% lower EFs. It seems that on this dimension, greater wealth does not necessarily tip societies over into sustainability-ready attitudes (cf. Matutinović, 2012) nd that a clear (perhaps developmental history path-dependent) division exists within the group of most highly developed European countries in terms of tipping the economy-environment trade-off in the direction of preference for the environment (cf. Brajdić 
Vuković this volume).  
Economic growth for environmental protection  Other than general attitudes to trade-off between development and environmental protection, it is also important whether populations of selected European countries perceive economic growth as a precondition of environmental protection within their own country. Whilst that might be a developmentalist attitude supported by the likes of prosperity thesis, structure of the shift to sustainability paths within this century will require separation of the growth-imperative from environmental protection, and population’s support for such strategies (cf. Heinberg 2011, cited in Šimleša, this volume).  
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over into sustainability-ready attitudes (cf. Matutinović 2012b) and that 
a clear (perhaps developmental history path-dependent) division exists 
within the group of most highly developed European countries in terms of 
tipping the economy-environment trade-off in the direction of preference 
for the environment (cf. Brajdić Vuković, this volume).
Economic growth for environmental protection 
Other than general attitudes to trade-off between development and en-
vironmental protection, it is also important whether populations of se-
lected European countries perceive economic growth as a precondition of 
environmental protection within their own country. Whilst that might 
be a developmentalist attitude supported by the likes of prosperity the-
sis, structure of the shift to sustainability paths within this century will 
require separation of the growth-imperative from environmental protec-
tion, and population’s support for such strategies (cf. Heinberg 2011, cited 
in Šimleša, this volume). 
In order to more closely test the populations’ adherence to the environ-
mental economics principles behind the prosperity thesis (cf. Franzen 
and Meyer 2010, and above), it is worth considering their disagreement 
with the statement that their respective countries need economic growth 
in order to protect the environment. The more population disagrees with 
that statement the more they exhibit the potential for separation from the 
concepts behind the prosperity thesis trend according to which wealthier 
societies (those with more disposable income produced by growth) will pay 
more and secure better environmental quality. 
In this sense, post-hoc analyses show that only Switzerland and Fin-
land’s populations could be characterised as predominantly sustainability-
oriented on this measure whilst everyone else falls into the undecided 
range. Those two are also statistically significantly different from the rest 
of the countries covered. Whilst an overall prosperity thesis trend is still 
evident (Figure 6), with most prosperous European countries covered dis-
playing disagreement with growth-imperative towards the top of the scale 
(at about 40% or above) and least prosperous towards the bottom (at about 
20% and below), differences between the prosperous and less prosperous 
groups are increasingly blurred. Thus, United Kingdom, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Sweden display only 20% or lower prevalence of 
disagreement with the statement that economic growth is a precondition 
of environmental protection in the respective countries, just like the least 
prosperous and lower-EF countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovakia). Post-hoc analyses show no statistically significant differ-
ence in this respect between United Kingdom and Bulgaria, or Croatia and 
Germany for that matter. 
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Figure 6
Inequality-adjusted income index – Non growth indicator 1
Other than contemporary imperative for economic growth, sustainability 
transformation also requires awareness of the historical detrimental im-
pacts on the environment by growth-generating economic activities. As 
Šimleša (this volume) describes our hopes for benefits of economic growth 
free from negative environmental impacts have largely not been realised. 
Thus, despite perhaps prioritising growth in order to raise their own liv-
ing standards and wellbeing presently, we expect sustainability-oriented 
populations to be aware of the environmental impacts such growth might 
leave. Non-growth indicator 2 is used as a measure of just that type of attitude 
amongst populations of European countries covered. In addition, as Figure 
7 shows, this is where the prosperity thesis trend is entirely abandoned. 
As Figure 7 illustrates, on a measure such as this universal statement, 
there is no correlation between prosperity and prevalence of the popula-
tion agreeing with statement that economic growth is always harmful to 
the environment. Though prevalence of such agreement is below 40% in 
all European populations, it is above 30% in a segment of less prosperous 
and more prosperous European countries alike. Thus Bulgaria, Switzerland, 
Finland, Slovenia and Austria are characterised by the greatest prevalence 
of sustainability-oriented populations on this measure, whilst Sweden, 
Norway, United Kingdom and Croatia by the least. It is interesting that 
Croatia’s population expresses relatively low agreement with that state-
ment and Domazet et al. (2012, 45) note that the tendency to agree with 
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such statement is greater among the Croatian population with incomes 
below minimum wage than among those above that income threshold.
 
Figure 7
Inequality-adjusted income index – Non growth indicator 2
Conclusion
It is clear that there is an overall dominant trend of increasing sustainabil-
ity-orientation with increasing prosperity among 18 European countries 
covered in this chapter on most of the measures employed. Whilst on is-
sues of environmental concern and commitment to material sacrifice at the 
level of individual respondents this trend is more dominant, on matters of 
general strategies of trade-off between economic growth and environmen-
tal protection the trend is less prominent or altogether absent. The latter 
is the case with the support for statement that economic growth always 
harms the environment, where support is not found to be correlated to 
the inequality-adjusted income index of individual states. Overall, Franzen 
and Meyer’s (2010) prosperity thesis that relates development attainment 
of individual states with their population’s expression of sustainability-
oriented attitudes is confirmed in our analysis as well 
However, our analysis on a range of indicators disaggregating Franzen 
and Meyer’s (2010) complex measures shows that there are many signifi-
cant digressions from the prosperity thesis trend. Prosperity thesis thus 
cannot be taken as a single reliable predictor of the attitudes matching 
policies that will prepare populations for democratic support for para-
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digm transformation of practices and value-sets needed to shift to a more 
sustainable existence within this century. Such a shift would not, given 
the examples of different European countries, require a drop in develop-
ment achievement as fast as the necessary reduction in environmental 
impact. Although all European countries covered in this chapter need to 
substantially reduce their footprints to bring them down to long-term 
sustainable levels, for most this reduction needn’t immediately herald an 
equally substantial reduction in development attainment and attendant 
wellbeing of the population. For some, in fact, the ratio of development 
attainment and environmental impact is comparatively favourable, whilst 
for others it is extremely unfavourable suggesting that climatic conditions, 
historic development paths and current socio-economic practices all play 
a part in how much wellbeing their populations eventually enjoy from 
the environmental extraction. But it is also a clear trend among European 
countries that material development comes at a greater environmental 
cost, whilst variations in the intensity of the trend are clearly noticeable in 
the case of different countries at top levels of development (cf. domazet 
and marinović jerolimov, this volume). 
The overall performances on indicators constructed in our analysis paint 
an inspiring picture of European potential for democratic transformation 
to sustainability, though serious obstacles remain. Namely, in the most di-
rect expression of willingness to sacrifice material abundance for the sake 
of environmental protection (index of attitudes of material sacrifice) no 
European population covered here displays a majority support for a range 
of sacrificial measures. But the differences within the group of countries 
whose mean performances fall into the undecided range, as well as the 
abundance of countries in that range, indicate that potentials for transfor-
mation exist and not just in the countries with highest level of develop-
ment, prosperity and environmental impact. 
It is also encouraging that in many European countries covered 30% or 
more of the population will express support for the single-variable indica-
tors critical of economic development’s imbalanced trade-off with envi-
ronmental protection. It is interesting that Switzerland’s positive example 
here is accompanied by Bulgaria and other less prosperous countries, whose 
footprints (EF) are on the whole lowest of the European countries covered, 
and 30% lower than Switzerland’s. However, the fact that some countries’ 
populations exhibit consistently comparatively low levels of concern and 
notional support for sustainability-oriented attitudes despite very high 
development attainment; and the fact that there is across Europe least 
support for individual-level sacrificial acts to be implemented presently is 
a cause for concern over true depth of Europe’s potential for democratic 
transformation to sustainability. 
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More to the point, when it comes to most direct expression of the pros-
perity thesis (including the environmental economics justification behind 
it), which is contained in our index of attitudes of material sacrifice, Euro-
pean countries exhibit neither great overall willingness to pay nor disasso-
ciation from prosperity thesis in comparative differences between nations. 
More income means greater willingness to sacrifice financial and material 
resources in Europe, and overall this income tends to be tied to a greater 
environmental impact (cf. EF, Table 1). This thus becomes a vicious circle, 
but some notable exceptions have been pointed out above. Likewise, when 
sacrifice is to be accompanied by appropriately directed concern, awareness 
of one’s abilities and conviction of efficacy of one’s actions (cf. Hall 2010), 
as combined in the index of attitudes of concern and activation here, in-
comes available in the country are overall again the most straightforward 
predictor of population’s potential for voluntary sacrifice for sustainability. 
But when considering economic strategies that would aim to prioritise 
environmental protection and, in absence of technological super-fix, aim 
to lower material throughput in the economy in general (i.e. degrowth or 
steady-state economics), the prosperity link, whilst still present, begins 
to falter. Thus, differences begin to appear both in the group of the more 
prosperous European countries covered, but also within the group of less 
prosperous ones; whilst general differences between the more and less 
prosperous lessen. In terms of specific tools for democratic transition to 
sustainability, one that avoids both environmental devastation and out-
right tyranny (Hall 2010, 80), knowledge of the veracity of external limits, 
appreciation of the greater value of the long-term good, focus on the bigger 
picture and alignment of actions with values are among necessary require-
ments. Dispersion of support for general attitudes of economy-environ-
ment trade-off from the income level of a nation becomes an indication of a 
reversal of “Promethean environmentalism” (Wapner 2010, 37) that claims 
that greater prosperity is not so much the cause of greater environmental 
harm as the solution to it. This is the encouraging aspect of both prosper-
ous and less prosperous European populations’ sustainability-potential. 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the ranges of performance on our 
sustainability-oriented indicators to the relationship between develop-
ment and ecological footprints of the countries covered here. Thus, though 
Denmark often features at the top of the range of sustainability-ready 
commitments it is also the country with the highest EF (Table 1). Of the 
other countries from the top of the range covered here Finland, Sweden and 
Austria are in the top range of EF as well as HDI (cf. Table 1). Germany and 
Norway, on the other hand, have among the lowest footprints (EF) of the 
more prosperous and more developed countries covered, but still higher 
than those of the less prosperous and comparatively less developed (cf. HDI 
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range in domazet and marinović jerolimov, this volume). It is thus 
encouraging to see Bulgaria and Croatia’s occasional divergence from the 
prosperity- environmental concern- ecological footprint grouping, indicat-
ing that sustainability-orientation of the population is a multi-dimensional 
construct affected by much more than material prosperity. What is more, 
these comparisons with in Europe, though of a limited range from a global 
perspective, support Prescott-Allen’s (2001, 107) findings that increases in 
human well-being need not be path-dependent, that a high level of develop-
ment and quality of life can be achieved with a more limited environmen-
tal impact. Although our results indicate that, in terms of environmental 
aspects of sustainability-potential, money goes a long way in Europe, we 
can conclude that money alone does not go all the way. 
Why power is not a peripheral concern: 
Exploring the relationship between 
inequality and sustainability
Danijela Dolenec / Mladen Domazet / Branko Ančić
6
Introduction 
Unlike studies which define sustainability as mitigating the human impact 
on the environment so the latter could keep sustaining human societies, 
we start from a definition which Glasser (2004) terms eco-cultural sustain-
ability. As an ideal, eco-cultural sustainability requires that we are able to 
support the flourishing of cultural and biological diversity, forms of govern-
ance that are democratic and socially just; and economies which are in tune 
with natural constraints, limiting the life-cycle costs of production and 
consumption. In other words, we start from a recognition that the world’s 
current developmental paradigm, which is characterised by inequalities 
and hugely disparate life chances, at the same time as being destructive of 
the natural resources, is not sustainable (UNESCO 2011). 
Inequality between the world’s rich and poor is growing, and more than a 
billion people still live in poverty (UN SG HP GS 2012). According to the UNDP 
Human Development Report (2005), 80% of the world’s population have 
experienced the negative side-effects of rising inequality. Even before the 
economic crisis of 2008 which further exacerbated this trend, while 40% 
of the world’s population accounted for 5% of global income, the richest 
10% accounted for 54% (UNDP 2005, 4). It seems hard not to recognise that 
environmental problems cannot be solved without addressing the failings 
of the dominant economic model, while solutions should be sought in the 
interconnections between the economy, society and the natural environ-
ment (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012). 
This realisation is growing ever more urgent. According to the latest 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report (2013, 3), the “warm-
ing of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia”. Similarly, 
the World Bank (2013) warns of an alarming scenario according to which the 
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world could reach 2ºC within one generation, bringing ‘widespread food 
shortages, unprecedented heat-waves, and more intense cyclones’ (2013: 
xi). In other words, there is no doubt that climate change poses the grav-
est threat to human development today (Fischer-Kowalski 2000; Stern 
2006; Peters and Hertwich 2006; 2008; Speth 2008, etc.). After the most 
recent report of the IPCC (2013), the debate about human impact on climate 
change has hopefully also been put to rest1. Our global footprint exceeds 
the world’s regenerative capacity by a full 30 percent, which means that 
an extra planet would be required to sustain prevailing consumption pat-
terns beyond (roughly) the next 25 years (Living Planet Report 2008, 
cited in Soron 2010). In addition to that, the impact of climate change will 
disproportionally hit the poorest areas of our planet, greatly harming ‘the 
lives and the hopes of individuals and families who have had little hand in 
raising the Earth’s temperature’ (World Bank 2013, xi; cf. also Parry et al. 
2007; Martinez-Alier 2002).
Already well-documented impacts of global environmental change in-
clude unusual and unprecedented heat extremes, rainfall regime changes 
and water availability, changes to agricultural yields and nutritional qual-
ity, terrestrial ecosystem shifts, sea level rises, and damage to marine eco-
systems (World Bank 2013, xx). Once critical thresholds are reached, the 
world can expect abrupt system changes. While technological optimists 
tend to put their faith in heroic feats of engineering that will provide a solu-
tion, the World Bank report makes clear that the world is already at a point 
where it needs both dramatic technological change and full international 
cooperation to change the trajectory towards a more sustainable future. 
While “most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even 
if emissions of CO2 are stopped” (IPCC 2013, 19), the last global summit in 
Rio in 2012 failed to push the agenda for a global agreement forward. Ever 
since the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992, though there is a growing recog-
nition of the ecological costs of overconsumption, ‘this uneasy awareness 
has failed to engender an effective political response’ (Soron 2010, 172).
In the face of this threat, some continue to put faith in economic growth 
and the commodification of environmental resources as the response to 
the current environmental crisis. In contrast to that, we start from the as-
sumption that a fundamental reorientation is necessary, which cannot be 
pursued by extending the capitalist mode of production, but rather by im-
01 Quote from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis Summary for Policymakers: “Human influence on the 
climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing, observed 
warming, and understanding of the climate system” (2013, 10).
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plementing radical changes in the basic institutions of property and work, 
to name only a few (Kallis 2011). A serious commitment to sustainability 
entails a structured process of socially sustainable and equitable reduction 
in the amount of materials and energy that a society extracts, processes, 
and eventually returns to the environment as waste (ibid.). Simply put, a 
reorientation towards sustainability requires the integration of economic, 
social and environmental dimensions of development (Domazet, Dolenec 
and Ančić 2012).
Concepts and Main Argument 
Given this context, this paper attempts to shed light on the relationship be-
tween inequality on the one hand, and the attitudes and behaviours needed 
for a switch to sustainable human societies on the other. Many argue that 
individual attitudes and values are critical for a sustainability reorienta-
tion (e.g. Ehrlich and Kennedy 2005; Buernstorf and Cordes 2008). 
Studies have shown that pro-environmental attitudes cluster together, 
and they are related to behaviour and actions (De Young 1993; Schultz, 
2001; Corral Verdugo 2012; Hedlund-de Witt 2012), though the attitude-
behaviour gap (Glasser 2004) must not be underestimated when devising 
developmental strategies. Although expressing environmental concern 
does not guarantee behaviours and political support for actions leading to 
sustainability transformation, it represents a necessary step in voluntary 
individual commitment to that direction (Domazet, Ančić and Brajdić-
Vuković, this volume). Taking this on board, we explore conditions under 
which citizens become more responsive to behavioural changes necessary 
for more sustainable development trajectories. At the same time, since the 
inequality of living conditions and life prospects are central to our analysis, 
we keep in mind the fact that, while sustainable or unsustainable practices 
are on the whole a matter of humanity’s choice, for too many people on 
Earth the problem is not unsustainable choices, but a lack of choice in the 
first place (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012). Real choice is only possible 
where basic human needs have been assured.
While both the causes and the consequences of global environmental 
change are unevenly distributed, aggregate measures of wealth such as 
GDP per capita or the UN’s measure of human development – the Human 
Development Index (which are most often used in empirical analyses) are 
average scores, which hide income and quality of life differences within 
societies that are sometimes truly substantial. The poorest segments of 
society are most vulnerable to instabilities in food supply and other basic 
infrastructure like water and electricity. Therefore, according to the pros-
perity thesis (Diekmann and Franzen 1999, Franzen and Meyer 2010), 
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their value orientations are directed towards achieving material security 
regardless of the environmental cost. This is one aspect in which income 
inequality poses a serious obstacle to a switch towards more sustainable 
development trajectories.
That inequality is an obstacle to human development more broadly 
speaking has already been fairly well documented in the literature. Wilkin-
son and Pickett (2010) showed that within-society inequality is linked to 
many negative social phenomena such as lower child well-being and poorer 
performance in schools, higher incidence of teenage births, higher inci-
dence of drug abuse, higher homicide rates and rates of imprisonment etc. 
In addition to that, they showed that more unequal societies fuel status 
competition and consumerist behaviour. Needless to say, the latter two 
characteristics stand in direct opposition to value orientations and be-
haviour patterns conducive to a sustainability switch in highly developed 
European nations (see also Šimleša, this volume). Development experts 
at the UN have caught on the relevance of inequality for human develop-
ment, recently supplementing their main measure of human development 
(HDI), with an inequality-adjusted measure, named IHDI. According to the 
UNDP2, IHDI should be interpreted as indicating the actual level of human 
development, while the HDI stands for potential human development. Un-
der perfect equality of income, educational chances and access to health-
services, the two measures equal out, but for as long as there is substantial 
inequality in a society, it blocks its full development potential.
Approaching the question of sustainability from the perspective of in-
equality, we take issue with the simplifying assumptions that lie behind 
the prosperity thesis (Diekmann and Franzen 1999; Franzen and Meyer 
2010). According to this proposition, the higher a country’s level of devel-
opment, measured as GDP per capita, the more its population exhibits en-
vironmental concern and willingness to change their behaviour towards 
more sustainable practices. In this line of reasoning, a nation’s wealth is a 
precondition for raised awareness of the human impact on the planet and 
the need for human societies to undertake far-reaching changes in how 
they are organised. This finding is related to another well-established the-
sis in the literature, according to which only after securing their material 
wellbeing, individuals are able to devote their energy and time into seek-
ing more individual freedom and autonomy (Inglehart 1995; and later). 
Inglehart (1995) argued that people with post-materialist values, which 
emphasise self-expression and quality of life, give higher priority to pro-
tecting the environment and joining environmentalist groups. 
02 For more information about these indicators visit the official UNDP web-
site, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ihdi/. 
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Post-materialism is a value orientation that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) 
place within a wider cluster of self-expression values, arguing that their ap-
pearance and spread is directly related to a country’s level of socioeconomic 
development. Using large datasets from the World Value Surveys, Inglehart 
and Welzel (2005) empirically verified the old modernisation theory that 
linked socioeconomic development to individual emancipation in the first 
step, and to the strengthening of democracy in the second step. According 
to them, the process of transformation towards post-material value sys-
tems starts with socioeconomic development, by raising incomes, improv-
ing educational attainment and diversifying human interaction, thereby 
reducing “constraints on autonomous human choice” in the economic, 
cognitive and social domains (ibid., 151). This in turn nurtures a sense of 
existential security and autonomy, leading people to give priority to hu-
manistic self-expression values that emphasise emancipation, liberty, di-
versity and autonomy. According to the authors, autonomy does not mean 
egocentrism, but humanism; post-materialists endorse many universal 
goals, including those of environmental protection and ecological sustain-
ability (2005, 12). These constituencies in developed Western societies chal-
lenge the emphasis on economic growth at any price and show increasing 
concern for sustainability (ibid., 25). 
Along the same lines, theorists of post-modernity argue that increased 
individual autonomy in affluent Western societies has meant an increas-
ing awareness of the risks of civilisation (Giddens 1990; 1991; Beck 1992). 
Post-modern individuals who have the time, information and resources, 
understand that humanity now has so much power over its environment 
that it can destroy life on this planet, and they represent the constituency 
that is most ready for a behavioural switch to sustainable development 
trajectories. However, this being so, it is said that behavioural changes 
should not be framed in terms of sacrifice. Demanding personal sacrifice 
for the sake of sustainability is often seen as a “political impossibility” 
(Maniates and Meyer 2010). What is advocated instead is the power of in-
centives, which relies on assumptions of human nature as deeply individu-
alistic and utilitarian. This neoclassical assumption treats environmental 
degradation as a market failure which can be ameliorated by introducing 
pricing signals, misframing the problem as solvable with technical solu-
tions, without changing human behaviour that has proven destructive of 
our natural environment (Mirowski, Walker and Abboud 2013). This was 
made possible by divorcing ethical and political aspects from economic 
thinking in the transformation from classical to neo-classical economics 
(Mirowski 1988; Mirowski 1989), reducing society to atomised individuals 
each pursuing their own interest. In the process, nature became separated 
from economics, becoming a free good to be used in the pursuit of growth 
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(Kilbourne and Polonsky 2005). The neoclassical position is necessarily 
resource optimistic (Burkett 2006), believing that the market automati-
cally secures resource substitution and technological advance (see also 
Žitko, this volume).
However, today we know that “the clash between economy and the 
environment cannot be convincingly solved by pious invocations to ‘inter-
nalize the externalities’ into the price system” (Martinez Alier 2002, 54). 
Therefore, we start from the assumption that human behaviour must be 
modified in order to come in line with our natural environment. Hence, if 
people are not willing to “surrender something they value in the service 
of a greater value” (Hall 2010), then the world might be left with very few 
options, which do not have a democratic air about them. As Maniates and 
Meyer (2010, 6) emphasise, assuming that citizens will not forego prosper-
ity today for future gain rests on the “implausible belief that most of us are 
wholly content with our lives and the society within which we live now”. 
Not only does an overwhelming majority of people around the world live 
in conditions that are a far cry from desirable; the second missing factor 
in dismissing the politics of sacrifice is the fact that ‘individual choice’ of 
whether to drive a car or take the tram is made within a framework of social 
rules and social relationships which make certain choices ‘natural’ or given. 
Milbrath (1984) uses the concept of dominant social paradigm to refer to 
beliefs, institutions and habits that formulate a social lens through which 
individuals interpret the social world. As Brajdić-Vuković emphasises (this 
volume), a paradigm is not dominant because it is held by the majority of 
people in society, but because it is used by dominant groups to reinforce and 
justify existing institutions. The imperative of economic growth, belief in 
limited government and faith in science and technology, as key elements of 
the dominant social paradigm, seem to be directly related to environmental 
crisis (Brajdić-Vuković, this volume). 
Two important implications can be drawn from this. While sociologists 
of post-modernism emphasise affluent and well-educated citizens as the 
constituency for behavioural change towards sustainability, given that 
these groups are aware of human impact on the planet, if we approach 
the switch to sustainability from the perspective of giving something up 
in order to gain something else, then those groups in society that are less 
content with their current way of life become important constituencies in 
building a momentum for change. Second, in addressing any societal group 
it is important to keep in mind that changes in prevailing social norms 
affect what is perceived as sacrifice, as opposed to what is understood as 
a ‘naturally’ preferred choice. In other words, advocating a switch to sus-
tainability inescapably entails challenging the dominant social paradigm of 
economic growth, limited government and faith in technocratic solutions.
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To summarize, we do not dispute the basic assumption of the prosper-
ity thesis, but we do reject the overly simplistic version that it often takes, 
whereby analysts conclude that “economic growth itself can be regarded 
as a remedy to environmental problems” (Torras and Boyce 1998, 148), 
while distributional issues are supposedly taken care of by the ‘trickle 
down’ effect of economic development. As Grossman and Krueger (1995) 
emphasised, there is nothing automatic in the relationship between rise in 
income and better environmental protection. They introduce the question 
of power into the analysis, leaving behind the false reliance on automatic 
effects of average rises in incomes. Similarly, in analysing the relationship 
between inequality and sustainability from the perspective of balance of 
power between winners and losers of environmental degradation, Boyce 
(1994, 18) posited that greater inequalities of power and wealth lead to more 
environmental degradation, among other things, because “inequality rais-
es the rate of time preference applied to environmental resources by both 
the poor and the rich, by increasing their poverty and political insecurity”. 
The key implication here is that equality and democracy are not only im-
portant as normative ends in themselves, but as means to achieve a switch 
to sustainability. Economic development may or may not lead to a more 
equitable distribution of power within society, and without the second 
component environmental sustainability is much less likely. As Torras and 
Boyce put it (1998, 150):
“efforts to achieve a more equal distribution of power, for ex-
ample, via more equitable income distribution, wider literacy, 
and greater political liberties and civil rights, can positively 
affect environmental quality. The effects of these variables ap-
pear to be particularly strong in low-income countries. From 
an environmental standpoint, then, the distribution of power 
is not a peripheral concern”.
In a nutshell, concentration of power and growing income inequalities pose 
fundamental obstacles to achieving sustainable human development. As 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2010, 272) argue, “greater equality is the material 
foundation on which better social relations are built”. In contrast to that, 
when material conditions of life and resulting life chances become as vastly 
disparate as they are today, people live in disassociated realities (Sandel 
2012), lacking a basic sense of shared humanity without which we cannot 
engage in democratic debate on the features of a just society (Wright 2011). 
Therefore, reducing inequality and ensuring basic human security are nec-
essary ingredients in the reorientation towards sustainability.
In addition to that, Torras and Boyce (1998) challenged the prosperity 
thesis by postulating that people with higher incomes, because they gen-
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erally own more assets and consume more commodities, reap a higher net 
benefit from pollution-generation. As a result, their preference for environ-
mental quality is offset by their consumer preferences, so it may take the 
form of choosing private or semi-private goods such as luxury houses and 
pollution-free resorts. In this respect, less well-off groups in society may 
be faced with a simpler calculus in preferring more sustainable develop-
ment trajectories. So, while inequality is an obstacle to sustainability, it is 
not exclusively the affluent post-materialists that represent the political 
addressees of appeals for environmental sustainability. Though poverty 
and material insecurity are indisputable obstacles to sustainability in that 
they narrow the scope of individual choice, there remains much to be said 
about the opinions and preferences regarding sustainability among the less 
well-off groups in society, rather than dismissing them off hand. 
Right along those lines, Haanpää (2005) grounds her analysis on two 
varieties of environmental concern. The first relates to post-materialist 
values as hypothesised by Inglehart (1995) and others, whereby environ-
mental concern is most pronounced among affluent, younger and educated 
populations which value self-expression and quality of life (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005). In contrast, the second version of environmentalism 
stresses objective problems, whereby citizen’s actual experiences with 
environmental hazards in poorer countries can motivate them to protect 
the environment (ibid.). In this version of the argument, environmental 
concern is not simply a value orientation, but a perception of direct, real 
environmental threats (Brechlin 1999). In the literature that focuses on 
the experience of environmental degradation in developing countries, 
this second variety has been conceptualised as ‘environmentalism of the 
poor’ (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997; Guha 2000). Finally, Martinez-Alier 
(2002) associates ‘environmentalism of the poor’ with claims for distribu-
tive justice, arguing that social movements for environmental justice in 
Western countries and the environmentalism of the poor in the Global 
South belong to the same current that draws attention to ecological dis-
tribution conflicts. In our analysis we explore these two varieties of envi-
ronmentalism, looking for evidence of sustainability orientations in less 
affluent European societies.
In the following sections we put two of the presented arguments to em-
pirical scrutiny. The first hypothesis, designed to supplement the prosper-
ity thesis, is that inequality of income and of material life circumstances 
is an obstacle to sustainability orientations in European societies. The sec-
ond hypothesis is that, while wealthier societies overall exhibit stronger 
environmental concern, the perception of direct environmental risks is 
stronger in less affluent European societies. 
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Empirical strategy and measurements
The analysis relies in large measure on the results of a comparative survey 
conducted within the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the 
oldest annual international research project in the field of social sciences, 
which takes place in 48 participating countries. In 2011 the survey module 
on the environment was implemented in Croatia for the first time, ena-
bling important new comparative insights into opinions and attitudes of 
Croatia’s citizens. Overall the ISSP module Environment was fielded dur-
ing 2009, 2010 and 2011, in a total of 32 countries. In this paper we focus 
on the European context, analysing 18 countries which participated in the 
module: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Our analysis 
combines aggregate measures such as IHDI, GINI, and Eurostat’s indicators 
with ISSP survey data on individual value orientations and attitudes. Data 
is for 2011, unless otherwise specified. 
As has been introduced, the UNDP recently supplemented their main 
measure of human development (HDI), with an inequality-adjusted meas-
ure, IHDI, which should be interpreted as indicating the actual level of 
human development as opposed to potential human development that 
the HDI stands for. Hence, in the following analysis we contrast these two 
measures on a sample of European countries to draw attention to the dif-
ferences between potential and actual human development. In addition 
to that, we use the GINI coefficient as a measure of inequality. According 
to the World Bank, GINI ‘measures the extent to which the distribution 
of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution’3. A GINI 
index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies per-
fect inequality. 
Furthermore, in order to capture a more nuanced perspective of inequal-
ity as it relates to sustainability orientations, we use two Eurostat’s indi-
cators, risk of poverty and material deprivation. According to Eurostat’s 
indicator ‘risk of poverty’, an individual is considered at risk of poverty 
if the equivalised income of her household is below 60 percent threshold 
of the national household equivalised median income, which means that 
poverty is defined in relative terms (Eurostat 2010). On the other hand, 
the indicator of material deprivation tries to capture the extent to which 
people are able to meet basic needs, irrespective of whether they access 
03 World Bank online dataset, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.
GINI 
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this via income or not. The use of Eurostat’s indicators in a comparative 
framework has only recently become possible, since Croatia started col-
lecting and reporting this information in 2010. In that respect our analysis 
offers some novel insights.
Table 1  Instruments constructed from ISSP Environment 2011 module
Indices Items
ACA
Attitudes of concern
and activation
The reliability coefficient 
for the scale for 18 
countries varied from 
0.59 – 0.77
0.35 – 0.54 inter-item 
correlation
“How much do you agree or disagree 
with each of these statements?”*
(a)“there are more important things to 
do in life than protect the environment”
(b)“ many of the claims about 
environmental threats are exaggerated”
(c)“it is just too difficult for someone like 
me to do much about the environment”
(d)“there is no point in doing what I can 
for the environment unless others do the 
same”
(e) “I find it hard to know whether the 
way I live is helpful or harmful for the 
environment”
AMS
Attitudes of
material sacrifice
The reliability coefficient 
for the scale for 18 
countries varied from 
0.73 – 0.89
0.56 – 0.80 inter-item 
correlation
“How willing would you be to:”**
(a) “pay much higher prices in order to 
protect the environment”
(b) „pay much higher taxes in order to 
protect the environment”
(c) “to accept cuts in your standard 
of living in order to protect the 
environment“
Notes: * The 5-point Lickert scale ranges from 1=strongly agree;    
 2=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree;
 5=strongly disagree.  
 ** The 5-point Lickert scale ranges from 1=very willing;    
 2=fairly willing; 3=neither willing nor unwilling; 4=fairly   
 unwilling; 5= strongly unwilling 
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With respect to indicators and indices from the ISSP 2011 dataset, we rely 
on indices and indicators introduced in Domazet, Ančić and Brajdić-Vuković 
(this volume). We analyse the Attitudes of concern and activation index 
(ACA), the Attitudes of material sacrifice index (AMS) and the Non-growth 1 
indicator. Information about the two composites constructed from ISSP 
survey items used is shown in Table 1, while for the mean country scores 
of the two composites we refer to Figures 1 and 2 in Domazet, Ančić and 
Brajdić-Vuković (this volume).
The ACA index attempts to measure the prevalence of attitudes among 
citizens that signal concern for environmental protection but also a com-
mitment to act with environmental protection in mind. It aggregates re-
sponses to the following statements: (a) there are more important things to 
do in life than protect the environment, (b) many of the claims about envi-
ronmental threats are exaggerated (c) it is just too difficult for someone like 
me to do much about the environment, (d) there is no point in doing what 
I can for the environment unless others do the same and (e) I find it hard 
to know whether the way I live is helpful or harmful for the environment4. 
The AMS index aggregates responses to the following statements: How 
willing would you be to: (a) pay much higher prices in order to protect 
the environment; (b) pay much higher taxes in order to protect the envi-
ronment and (c) accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect 
the environment5. This index is taken as an expression of prevalence of 
attitudes among citizens that are willing to make sacrifices in order to 
reduce the ecological footprint in order to bring it in line with a projected 
sustainable trajectory. The strength of the non-growth preference among 
citizens of European countries is assessed by analysing responses to the 
statement: our country needs economic growth in order to protect the 
environment6. 
04 The items were measured on a 5-point Lickert scale (1 = “agree strongly” 
through 5 “strongly disagree”). The reliability coefficient for the scale for 
18 countries varied from 0.59 – 0.77 with 0.35 – 0.54 inter-item correla-
tion. Responses were coded so that higher scores indicate greater concern 
for environmental protection, but also commitment to act with environ-
mental protection in mind.
05 The items were measured on a 5-point Lickert scale (1 = “very willing” 
through 5 “strongly unwilling”). The reliability coefficient for the scale for 
18 countries varied from 0.73 – 0.89 with 0.56 – 0.80 inter-item correla-
tion. Responses were recoded in a way that high scores indicate respond-
ents are more willing to take sacrifices. 
06 Measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “agree strongly” through 5 “strong-
ly disagree”). The scores are coded in a way that the high scores indicate 
more non-growth oriented attitude.
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In addition to these, we use several other items from the ISSP 2011 En-
vironment module which aim to measure the extent of trust in fellow citi-
zens, citizens’ preferences for redistribution, both domestically and inter-
nationally, as well as direct awareness of specific environmental risks. The 
extent to which they exhibit interpersonal trust was captured by analysing 
the survey item where respondents could choose whether they think that 
most people could be trusted or that you can never be too cautious. On a 
scale of 1 to 5, 1 signalled maximum distrust, while 5 signalled maximum 
trust in people. Preference for within country redistribution was measured 
with the question “is it the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes and those with 
low incomes”, while the question “poorer countries should be expected 
to make less effort than richer countries to protect the environment” was 
used as an indicator of the preference for international redistribution7. 
Finally, we explore perceptions of risk from environmental pollution, cap-
tured in 7 items in the survey which asked respondents to assess the danger 
of specific sources of pollution such as driving cars, using GMO crops and 
river pollution, as is explained in more detail in sections that follow8.
Analysis
Figure 1 shows HDI and IHDI scores for 18 European countries, data for 
2012. The selection of European countries is based on those countries that 
were included in the ISSP survey in 2011, which makes it possible to analyse 
aggregate country scores against survey data, as well as enables comparison 
with findings from Domazet, Ančić and Brajdić-Vuković (this volume). 
Figure 1 shows that out of the 18 European countries included in this 
analysis post-communist countries unsurprisingly show lower levels of 
development than the Western European group. Nota bene, Slovenia and 
the Czech Republic represent somewhat of an exception since in terms of 
development they are on a par with their Western counterparts. However, 
the main finding of Figure 1 is the shortfall between HDI and IHDI as a 
07 Since both question had the same 5-point Lickert scale (1 = “agree strong-
ly” through 5 “strongly disagree”) it was recoded in a way that higher 
scores indicate greater sustainability orientation (answers “agree” and 
“agree strongly” were recoded in “sustainability orientation”, while the 
other three answer points were recoded in “un-sustainability orienta-
tion”).
08 For each environmental risk, the respondents were asked to assess it on 
a 5-point Lickert scale, ranging from 1- extremely dangerous for the envi-
ronment, to 5 – not at all dangerous for the environment. 
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result of introducing data on income inequality, which is easy to establish 
since countries are ranked according to IHDI status. As can be seen, Croa-
tia fares worst of the group of 18. Even though its HDI is higher than that 
of Bulgaria, when inequality is factored in Croatia convincingly falls to 
the bottom of the group. Finally, while the average distance between HDI 
and IHDI for these 18 countries is 0.07, in the case of Croatia the drop is 
0.12 – again the largest of the group. Overall this finding indicates that in 
Croatia inequality poses a significant obstacle to realising the full potential 
of human development. Among the Western European countries there is 
a noticeable difference between Norway, Sweden and Germany as a clus-
ter where inequality has a smaller effect on development, and France, UK 
and Spain on the other hand, where inequality leaves a stronger negative 
impact on development.
Figure 1
HDI and IHDI indices for 18 European countries, 2012
Source: UNDP data, website: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ihdi/ 
Linking this back to the prosperity thesis, according to which environmen-
tal concern is clearly related to wealth and income (Franzen and Meyer 
2010), we suggested that it was not enough that a nation was wealthy and 
had a sufficient proportion of the population embracing post-materialist 
values. In addition to that it needs to have strong redistributive policies 
to avoid large differences in income and access to public services such as 
education and health. In order to explore this hypothesis, in the following 
paragraphs we analyse relationships between measures of inequality and 
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items from the ISSP survey that capture various aspects of the sustainabil-
ity orientation. Figure 2 shows the relationship between income inequality, 
measured by GINI coefficient, and the Attitudes of concern and activation 
index (ACA) that was introduced earlier. The GINI coefficient is commonly 
used as a measure of inequality of income, where higher values indicate 
more inequality of income.
Figure 2
GINI and ACA index
As can be seen in Figure 2, the GINI coefficient is inversely correlated with 
the ACA index, meaning that in more unequal societies the population is 
less concerned and willing to act on environmental issues. The correlation 
is moderately strong (-0.58), and significant at 0.05 level, offering an initial 
tentative confirmation of our first hypothesis.
Next, GINI is also inversely correlated with the readiness of the popula-
tion for material sacrifice, as shown in Figure 3. 
The correlation is -0.48, significant at 0.05 level. Though among the 
developed affluent European countries such as Switzerland, Denmark 
and Germany differences with respect to readiness for material sacrifice 
do not seem to be related to the level of inequality, overall this relation-
ship holds. It is perhaps most pronounced in the lower right hand corner 
of the distribution, where it can be seen that in the most unequal Euro-
pean countries – Latvia and Croatia, which are also least affluent, their 
populations are least ready to make individual material sacrifices for the 
sake of sustainability.
Figure 2: Gini and ACA index  
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Figure 3
GINI and AMS index
That income inequality is an obstacle to sustainability orientations in Eu-
ropean populations is also confirmed when observing its relationship with 
other items from the ISSP survey. GINI is inversely correlated with the non-
growth orientation (r=-0.48; sig. 0.05) as well as with trust (r=-0.47; sig. 
0.05). The non-growth preference captures the extent to which respond-
ents see economic growth as necessary for environmental protection, and 
this inverse correlation suggests that people who live in more unequal 
societies more often tend to see economic growth as a precondition for 
environmental protection. 
Next, we also explore the relationship between inequality and trust, 
which has been recently theorised by Michael Sandel (2012). According to 
him, increasing commodification of spheres of life means that life becomes 
harder for those with modest means; it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to ensure one’s material reproduction without insufficient income. How 
is this related to trust? Democratic regimes rest on the assumption of shar-
ing in common civic rights and obligations, and so in order for the social 
glue to work, citizens should have a sense of community and nurture so-
cial bonds. This is being eroded when differences in income separate them 
into groups that populate separate spaces, rarely encountering each other 
except through monetary exchange and generally leading increasingly 
disparate lives. A corollary of increasing inequality is segregation of the 
well-off, the strengthening of corrosive individualism and a lack of com-
munity spirit. 
Figure 3: Gini and AMS index  
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From there it seems obvious why a lack of trust is problematic for a 
switch to sustainability – accepting material sacrifices and changing your 
behaviour for the benefit of not only your identifiable local population, but 
for the benefit of the global population and of future generations seems pos-
sible only if citizens share a minimum consensus about what constitutes 
a community and if they trust that their behaviour will be rewarded with 
the behaviour of others. Alternatively deeply individualistic behaviour shall 
prevail, whereby the conviction that others will not modify their behaviour 
leads us to free-ride, refuse to change our behaviour, and incur further costs 
on the environment. In other words, Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons 
represents a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts, since increased commodifica-
tion of all spheres of life corrodes a sense of community, thereby leading to 
even fiercer disregard for the commons. Conversely, reducing inequalities 
and democratising the political and economic spheres are preconditions for 
launching virtuous circles towards sustainable development trajectories.
Summarizing the findings so far, income inequality measured by the 
GINI coefficient corroborates our first hypothesis according to which in-
equality is an obstacle to sustainability. In the following analysis we show 
that these findings also hold if we use an alternative measure of income ine-
quality – Eurostat’s indicator of risk of poverty. This indicator captures those 
living in a household with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of 
the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers)9. 
Using data for 2011 and comparing this indicator with elements of the sus-
tainability orientation from the ISSP dataset for the same 18 countries, we 
find strong and statistically significant correlations, shown in Table 1.
Table 2  Risk of poverty and sustainability orientations
 
Concern 
and 
activation
Material 
sacrifice 
index Trust
It is the responsibility 
of the government to 
reduce the differences in 
income between people 
with high incomes and 
those with low incomes.
correlations -0.723** -0.728** -0.589** 0.5888*
significance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
09 More information about the indicator and data sources: http://epp.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_
poverty_or_social_exclusion 
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As can be seen from Table 2, crucial elements of individual sustainability 
orientation – concern and activation and readiness for material sacrifice– 
show significant association with the prevalence of risk of poverty, in an 
inversely correlated relationship. The more poverty there is in society, less 
are citizens concerned about the environment, ready to change their be-
haviour or incur material sacrifice to this end. Interestingly, this holds even 
in more affluent European countries, where the absolute level of the pov-
erty risk threshold is as high as the national median income in poorer coun-
tries. This might indicate the importance of relative prosperity within one’s 
community alongside absolute national prosperity presented in Domazet, 
Ančić, Brajdić-Vuković (this volume). That segments of society exposed 
to existential risks of poverty and other forms of material insecurity are 
less prepared to modify their own behaviour seems reasonable given that 
their scope of choice is severely constrained, and that their consumption is 
substantially lower from the consumption of their well-off fellow citizens. 
Furthermore, the same inverse relationship holds for the extent to which 
citizens are willing to trust each other, corroborating our previous findings. 
If we accept that inequality is an obstacle to sustainability, then redis-
tribution seems a necessary logical step in realising more egalitarian soci-
eties. As can be seen from column five in Table 2, societies with a greater 
proportion of citizens at risk of poverty are more supportive of income 
redistribution by the government. The respondents were asked whether 
they agreed that the government was responsible for reducing income 
differences among people with high and low incomes, with higher scores 
indicating a stronger preference for redistribution. This finding seems to 
suggest that, while overall inequality is an obstacle to sustainability orien-
tations, being exposed to risk of poverty unsurprisingly produces demands 
for redistribution. In societies where greater proportions are exposed to 
risk of poverty perhaps it is more visible that changes to individual con-
sumption patterns form only a part of the changes required for a switch 
to sustainability, which may help explain their stronger preferences for 
redistribution by the government. 
Next, since both GINI and risk-of-poverty are measurements based on 
income, a possible objection to our analysis may be that measurements of 
income only partially capture actual social dynamics when it comes to in-
equality. Apart from their recorded income, people also rely on unrecorded 
income, both from the grey economy and from other non-monetized sourc-
es of social reproduction, like unpaid domestic labour or access to food via 
subsistence farming. These practices are fairly widespread in less developed 
countries (ILO 2011). EU data agencies have recently introduced an indicator 
measuring material deprivation, which tries to capture the extent to which 
people are able to meet basic needs, irrespective of whether they access 
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this via income or not. The difference between this indicator and the one 
measuring risk of poverty is in that the former aims to capture real material 
conditions of livelihoods which are not fully reliant on monetary exchange. 
This indicator is based on measuring whether individuals are able to face 
unexpected expenses, have one week of annual holiday away from home, 
pay mortgage and rent (utility bills etc.), have a meal with meat, chicken or 
fish every other day, keep the home warm, have a washing machine, colour 
TV, telephone and personal car. It is defined as the proportion of people liv-
ing in households who lack at least 3 of these 9 items because they cannot 
afford them (Eurostat 2010).
Table 3 shows correlations between material deprivation and the same 
items from the ISSP survey as before. The analysis was done for 16 countries 
since there is no data on material deprivation for Germany and Slovakia. 
Table 3  Material deprivation and sustainability orientations, 2011
 
concern 
and 
activation
material 
sacrifice trust
It is the responsibility 
of the government to 
reduce the differences in 
income between people 
with high incomes and 
those with low incomes.
correlations -0.758** -0.740** -0.627** 0.535*
significance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
Table 3 shows that when a measure of inequality of income is replaced 
with a measure capturing material deprivation, associations with crucial 
elements of sustainability orientation remain strong. As was the case when 
analysing risk of poverty, the extent of material deprivation of a given coun-
try’s population is inversely strongly associated with the concern and readi-
ness of those populations to modify their behaviour towards sustainability, 
accept some material sacrifices and trust their fellow citizens. Similarly, the 
more material deprivation is widespread in a given country, the stronger 
the preferences for redistribution by the government. 
Up to this point, our analysis has returned consistent findings regard-
ing the relationship between inequality and sustainability orientations. 
Regardless of which measure of inequality we use (GINI, risk of poverty 
or material deprivation), and irrespective of which aspect of individual 
behaviour we focus on, the findings support our first hypothesis according 
to which inequality is an obstacle to sustainable orientations. In addition 
6. Why power is not a peripheral concern 191
to that, these findings support our amendment of the prosperity thesis, 
since in addition to a country’s average level of wealth, it is the distribu-
tion of that wealth within society that provides an important driver of 
environmental concern. 
Building on this, in the rest of the analysis we focus on our second hy-
pothesis, according to which important aspects of sustainability orienta-
tion may be found in less affluent societies. In order to try to capture this 
empirically, we use Haanpää’s (2005) thesis about two types of environmen-
tal concern. The first is related to the spread of post-materialism in affluent 
Western societies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), while the second variety 
of environmentalism is not simply a value orientation but a perception of 
real environmental threats (Brechlin 1999; Guha 2000; Glasser 2004). 
While Haanpää’s thesis is stronger when applied to the global North and 
South, in the following sections we explore whether it holds when observ-
ing differences among European countries. 
Haanpää (2005) tested this hypothesis of two types of environmental-
ism on ISSP data from the 2000 implementation round. She divided the 
countries in her sample into two groups, more and less affluent, using as 
the cut-off point the GDP per capita of $20,000. After creating two groups 
of countries, she compared the attitudes of respective populations to en-
vironmental risks such as pollution caused by cars, industry, pesticides in 
farming, water pollution and a rise in the world temperature. Her main 
findings supported her thesis regarding the two types of environmental-
ism between more and less affluent nations. In the following section we 
replicate her analysis by using the ISSP 2011 data for our set of 18 European 
countries. If we apply the same threshold of $20,000 GDP per capita in 2011, 
two groups of countries emerge, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Affluent European countries Less Affluent European countries
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Norway, Slovenia, 
Spain,Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom
Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia
Following Haanpää’s procedure, we analyse the difference in means be-
tween the two groups, looking at descriptive data in Table 5, as well as per-
forming independent sample t-tests. Table 5 shows the means for a number 
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of items in the survey which asked the respondents about their perceptions 
of risk of environmental pollution. In the survey respondents chose from a 
five-point Lickert’s scale, where 1 stood for ‘I strongly agree’, while 5 stood 
for ‘I strongly disagree’. In other words, a lower mean in Table 5 should be 
read as stronger awareness of a given environmental risk.
Table 5
 Item 
 
Affluent Less Afluent
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Air pollution 
caused by cars 
17650 2,58 ,81 5335 2,26 ,86
Air pollution 
caused by 
industry
17683 2,12 ,79 5312 1,99 ,81
Pesticides and 
chemicals used in 
farming
17527 2,22 ,89 5305 1,96 ,84
Pollution to 
rivers and lakes 
dangerous
17583 2,25 ,91 5303 2,08 ,87
Rise in world 
temperature 
caused by climate 
change
16970 2,38 ,98 5132 2,22 ,96
Genetic modifying 
of crops
15945 2,59 1,07 4901 2,22 ,99
Nuclear power 
stations
17181 2,40 1,06 5160 2,11 1,06
As Table 5 clearly shows, for all seven items included in the 2011 module, 
respondents from less affluent countries are more aware of environmental 
risks than respondents from more affluent countries. These findings echo 
those from Brajdić-Vuković (this volume); though instead of a measure 
of wealth she uses indicators of a knowledge economy and dominant so-
cial paradigm, she finds that respondents from countries that have a weak 
knowledge economy and less prevalent neoliberal values (growth impera-
tive, limited government and technocratic optimism) are highly aware of 
environmental risks. Our analysis points to the same conclusion. 
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In addition to that, independent samples t-tests show these differences 
among groups to be statistically significant at 0,001 level. Therefore, our 
findings support Haanpää’s (2005) argument according to which poorer 
populations may have a stronger perception of direct, real environmental 
threats despite not expressing great individual activation and commitment 
to personal material sacrifice. Taken together, the findings regarding redis-
tributive preferences, and these which suggest that less affluent societies 
are more aware of environmental risks can be taken to support our second 
hypothesis according to which important aspects of the sustainability ori-
entation are present in less affluent societies.
Conclusion
How do our findings reflect on the general proposition of the prosperity 
thesis, according to which wealthier societies are more environmentally 
friendly? Overall, by finding empirical support for both our hypotheses, 
we have managed to challenge the simplistic versions of the prosperity 
thesis. We argued that inequality should be considered a major obstacle in 
the reorientation towards more sustainable developmental trajectories, 
both within societies and globally. The empirical support for this argument 
seems clear – regardless of which measure of inequality we used, it proved 
corrosive for environmental concern, readiness for material sacrifice and, 
no less important, the preparedness of people to trust each other. Our 
findings corroborate the argument according to which the relationship 
between rise in income and environmental protection is anything but auto-
matic (Grossman and Krueger 1995). When economic development is not 
accompanied by a more equitable distribution of power and income within 
society, environmental sustainability is directly jeopardised.
Secondly, we have argued that, just as we should not expect economic 
prosperity to deliver solutions to environmental crisis, it is also a fallacy to 
expect that only affluent societies hold value orientations important for 
the switch to sustainability. While post-materialists are important in that 
they have the resources to push this political project forward, sometimes 
their consumer preferences take the form of choosing gated communities, 
while less well-off groups may face a simpler calculus in preferring more 
sustainable development practices (Torras and Boyce 1998). Our analysis 
shows that less affluent European societies where large segments of soci-
ety are exposed to risk of poverty and various forms of material insecurity 
exhibit important aspects of the sustainability orientation. First of all, they 
exhibit stronger redistributive preferences, which arguably represent a 
crucial aspect of a determined societal effort for a reorientation towards 
a sustainable development trajectory. Secondly, our findings suggest that 
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less affluent societies exhibit a heightened awareness of the risks posed 
by environmental degradation, which is in line with the second variety of 
environmentalism (Martinez-Alier 2002) that stresses power relations 
and ecological distributional conflicts. 
In summary, we hope to have made a case in support of an argument 
according to which what matters for sustainability is a more equitable dis-
tribution of power within society, which may or may not occur with eco-
nomic development. Following Torras and Boyce (1998, 150), we argue that 
“distribution of power is not a peripheral concern” – on the contrary, a more 
equitable income distribution combined with stronger political rights and 
individual emancipation are key factors in garnering public support for the 
reorientation towards sustainable development trajectories. 
The sustainability potential of the 
knowledge society: Empirical study
Marija Brajdić Vuković
7
Introduction
An opinion poll on climate change carried out in Germany in 2013 by 
‘Spiegel Online’ (the Internet portal of one of the most influential politi-
cal and daily news magazines in Germany, ‘Der Spiegel’) asked respondents 
whether they were ‘afraid of climate change’. According to the poll results, 
60% of respondents answered ‘no’, yet 67% believed that ‘climate changes 
predictions are credible’ and 60% perceived that ‘global warming mainly 
entails drawbacks’1. This combination of beliefs and attitudes reveals an 
interesting – and somewhat paradoxical – perception of environmental 
risks within the sample of German citizens. If the respondents perceive 
global warming as a real and scientifically proven threat that will mainly 
cause drawbacks for the population, what is the explanation for the lack 
of fear about climate change? 
Researchers have long been preoccupied by how little concern both citi-
zens and politicians express about climate change and its consequences 
(Weber 2006). Researchers argue that most citizens, especially in the West-
ern world, have not yet experienced the effects of global warming and 
that ‘the time-delayed, abstract, and often statistical nature of the risks of 
global warming does not evoke strong visceral reactions’ (ibid., 103) and 
that the perception of risks is mediated by self-interest and personal gains/
losses (Blake 2001). Other authors have discussed the fact that most of the 
public has misconceptions about climate dynamics and that their lack of 
knowledge prevents the development of a more explicit or active concern 
for the environment (Sternman and Sweeney 2007). Such explanations 
for the lack of fear about climate change deal with micro-level, individual 
01 http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/photo-gallery-global-warming-on-
pause-fotostrecke-101776-8.html
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responses to the global threat. From the sociological point of view, how-
ever, it is important to understand whether adopting a ‘relaxed’ position 
on climate change is influenced by the wider sociopolitical framework of 
a given society (and if so, how) and whether such a position on climate 
change also influences pro-environmental behaviour (both of individuals 
and societies).
In searching for such answers, this study will focus its discussion on two 
concepts that are widely used in political debates, and yet are often used 
imprecisely: ‘knowledge society’ and ‘sustainable development’. This study 
examines the idea (or even ‘ideology’) of the knowledge society that has 
dominated the political narrative of liberal democracies of Europe since 
the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2000 (Room et al. 2005). The study is es-
pecially concerned with the belief implied by politicians that the develop-
ment of the knowledge economy and, more broadly, of knowledge societies 
will result in sustainable development (Rodrigues 2002; Room et al. 2005). 
This study aims to establish how the cultures and contexts of countries that 
can be considered as knowledge economies/societies affect, on one hand, 
citizens’ perceptions of environmental risks and, on the other hand, the 
extent to which they engage in pro-environmental behaviour. To answer 
this question, an analysis will be made of the relationship between the level 
of development of the knowledge society in specific countries, perceptions 
of environmental risks and engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, 
with an aim to determine whether sustainability and the knowledge so-
ciety grow together – that is, whether the development of a knowledge 
society at the same time results in what Beck (2010) calls ‘the greening of 
modernity’. For this purpose, I use data from the International Social Sur-
vey Programme (ISSP) (the Environment module) carried out in 2010. I ana-
lyse data for 17 European countries (mainly European Union member states 
with the addition of Norway and Switzerland), together with knowledge 
society indicators gathered by the European Commission in 2011.
The next section presents the theoretical framework, Section 3 intro-
duces data and measurements and Section 4 presents the results. The find-
ings and limitations of the study are discussed in Section 5, which also 
draws conclusions.
Theoretical framework
The concepts of the ‘knowledge society’ and ‘sustainable development’ 
have been the subject of diverse research and debate. The following litera-
ture review is therefore intended as being illustrative and not exhaustive, 
with a primary aim to explain the theoretical background of the ideas that 
are questioned and researched in this study. 
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Beginning with the Lisbon Treaty in 2000, the European Union directed 
its development towards the goal of creating a ‘knowledge society’. This 
‘new direction’ of the European Union (which actually had more to do 
with creating a ‘new knowledge economy’ than a knowledge society in its 
broader sense) was a direct result of recent global developments. Rodrigues 
(2002) emphasises that the most prominent problem relating to the future 
of the European Union at the beginning of the century was the impact of 
globalisation, technological change and an ageing population on the wel-
fare state, resulting in its need to be redefined. Through the Lisbon Treaty, 
two important demands were made of European leaders: to speed-up the 
transition towards a knowledge economy, with more jobs and more social 
cohesion; and, at the same time, to make Europe more a competitive and 
dynamic economy. In other words, the knowledge economy was seen as 
solution that could to produce economic growth, which in turn would en-
sure employment and welfare and thus improve the lives of all members 
of society (Rodrigues 2002). 
However, as a result of the growing awareness of the limited environ-
mental potential of exploiting the planet’s natural resources, the European 
Union also, at least in principle, became concerned with the limits of its 
member states’ potential for economic growth, and thus called for the devel-
opment of ‘green policies’ of economic development. As Beck (2010) argues, 
the main question for ‘green politics’ has been how to reach the goal of an 
‘alternative modernity’ that includes a ‘new vision of prosperity’ (which yet 
needs to be invented and pioneered) and that defines wealth ‘not in gross 
economic terms but as overall “well-being”’ (p. 256). Although initially being 
oriented towards creating more cohesion in society, better jobs and ensuring 
well-being for all citizens, the highest political structures of the European 
Union in practice have avoided such an approach and have instead framed 
discussions about the creation of a knowledge society almost exclusively 
in terms of the knowledge economy. Especially so through emphasising the 
priorities of ‘competitiveness’, ‘development of digital technology’, ‘in-
novativeness’ and ‘private investment in R&D and ICT’ (Rodrigues 2002; 
Room et al. 2005). In such a context, the knowledge economy presents new 
challenges to European societies, especially in the domain of education, 
because it ‘treats people as forms of human capital that can be rendered 
more or less productive in the economy depending on the extent of their 
knowledge’ (Guile 2010). Such an approach also presents a challenge to 
the domain of politics and the economy, because not all European mem-
ber states are equally likely to successfully develop knowledge economies.
Recent research has shown that a given society’s culture or dominant 
values, as well as its politics, influences its scientific, technological and (at a 
general level) innovation development (Cole and Phelan 1999; Inonu 2003; 
II Comparative empirical insights 198
Schofer 2004; Carillo and Papagni 2006; Kaasa and Vadi 2010). Research 
has also shown that the relationship between science and technology on one 
hand, and the economy on the other hand, is not a simple or straightforward 
one (Carillo and Papagni 2006; Dosi et al. 2006). Regarding the potential 
of countries to contribute to sustainable development, researchers have 
claimed that science and technology policies can influence the orientation 
of a given country’s sustainability policy in different ways, depending signifi-
cantly on how scientists and scientific information are regulated by govern-
ment policy (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Young 2002; Cash et al. 2003; 
Stehr 2003; EC 2007). The approach that a given society takes to sustainability 
also depends on the ethics, knowledge and attitudes to risk prevalent within 
that society (Adger et al. 2009). As a result, European countries struggle 
with the development of the ‘knowledge economy’ in different ways. The 
extent to which certain countries put emphasis on having ‘green politics’ in 
place or the level of priority that the country places on the goal of economic 
competitiveness, varies significantly in Europe, from west to east and from 
south to north (David and Foray 2002; Room et al. 2005; Dosi et al. 2006). 
In this study, I focus on citizens and their potential for pro-environmen-
tal behaviour in the context of the knowledge society. There are diverse 
possibilities for carrying out research on beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and 
behaviour of the public regarding the environment and there is a wealth 
of empirical results available on this topic. Many authors have examined 
the link between environmental beliefs and the intent to engage in pro-
environmental behaviour or, more precisely, between clusters of environ-
mental beliefs (such as three varieties of environmentalism – altruistic, 
egoistic and biospheric) and their correlation to the willingness of indi-
viduals to take political action to protect the environment (Stern et al. 
1993). These correlations have consistently been demonstrated as positive, 
irrespective of whether the research is older or more recent (for example 
Weigel and Newman 1976; Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Gigliotti 1992; 
Grob 1995; Steel 1996). For the purpose of this study, I will not focus on 
the perception of environmental beliefs and attitudes, but rather envi-
ronmental risks, conceptualised as the perceived likelihood that a specific 
environmental phenomenon will have negative consequences to oneself 
and/or to society. Research on the topic of perceived environmental risks 
and behaviour is not as rich as on environmental beliefs and attitudes, but 
it has been established that perception of environmental risks is also a pow-
erful independent measure of pro-environmental behaviour (O’Connor et 
al. 1999). As O’Connor and associates argue, the very nature of long-term 
and uncertain environmental problems makes it likely that specific per-
ceptions of risk will significantly relate to pro-environmental behaviour 
(1999, 462), and, according to their findings, the risk perceptions are ‘not a 
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surrogate for general environmental beliefs but have their own power to 
account for behavioural intentions’ (ibid., 469).
According to Beck (2010), environmental risks are: 
‘man-made, incalculable, uninsurable threats and catastrophes 
which are anticipated but which often remain invisible and 
therefore depend on how they become defined and contested 
in knowledge. As a result their “reality” can be dramatized or 
minimized, transformed or simply denied, according to the 
norms which decide what is known and what is not.’ (p. 256). 
Environmental risks are thus socially (or even politically) constructed. 
Therefore, in the same way as the likelihood of developing a knowledge 
society varies depending on specific characteristics of a country, beliefs 
and attitudes on environmental issues and pro-environmental behaviour 
of citizens can also be perceived as mediated by the dominant culture and 
especially the sociopolitical context of a given society (Kaasa and Vadi 
2010; Kilbourne et al. 2002; Spangenberg 2005). 
The starting point of this research, according to which an analysis of 
the wider sociocultural context is imperative to an understanding of the 
underlying causes of environmental decline (Kilbourne et al. 2002, 195), 
is not a new one. This top-down approach to citizens’ beliefs and attitudes 
is well elaborated in the concept called the ‘dominant social paradigm’ 
(DSP) used by Milbrath (1984) in explaining environmentalism and pro-
environmental behaviour. Milbrath defines the DSP as ‘the values, meta-
physical beliefs, institutions, habits etc. that collectively provide social 
lenses through which individuals and groups interpret the social world’ 
(ibid., 7). However, a paradigm is not made dominant by virtue of being 
held by the majority of people in society, but only by virtue of being held 
by dominant groups who use it to justify a prevailing institution. As Cot-
grove (1982, cited in Kilbourne et al. 2002) explains, a paradigm ‘becomes 
a justification for social and political action by the group, and, as such, 
functions as ideology’ (p. 194). In a study on environmental attitudes 
and the DSP, Kilbourne and associates (2002) argued that the relevant 
dimensions of the DSP in the environmental context are political, eco-
nomic and technological. These dimensions are parallel to those of state, 
business and science, which (according to Beck 1995) are the dimensions 
whose powerful interplay characterises modern industrial societies. Em-
pirical research findings on the DSP and environmental attitudes support 
abovementioned concept. Although Cotgrove (1982) and Milbrath (1984) 
did not measure the political, economic and technological dimensions, 
they included items on each of these dimensions in their multinational 
surveys. They concluded that ‘paradigm issues are at the heart of the 
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environmental crisis’ (Kilbourne et al. 2002, 195) and they found that 
significant dimensions of the paradigm were faith in science, technology 
and economic growth, as well as support for laissez-faire government. In 
more recent research, Kilbourne and Carlson (2008) also found that the 
political, economic and technological dimensions of the DSP are inversely 
related to environmental attitudes. 
Kilbourne and associates (2002) have extensively tested batteries related 
to the three socioeconomic dimensions of the DSP and defined the dimen-
sions in the following way: 
•	 Political dimension: defined as the normative framework of liberal de-
mocracy, with its focus on freedom of the individual, private property 
and limited government;
•	 Economic dimension: defined also from the liberal democracy per-
spective, with self-interest expressed through economic rationality 
as generally considered as being the sole motivator of behaviour. It is 
also defined through the belief that the economic growth will solve 
short-term inefficiencies of free markets; 
•	 Technological dimension: defined as a general character of technologi-
cal optimism and technological politics, a belief that technology can 
and will solve problems when they become severe. 
Together, the values that are inherent in these three dimensions reflect 
the individualisation and normative framework of liberal capitalism. It 
has also been suggested that, because the sum of individual goods does not 
automatically result in a collective good, the combination of these three 
dimensions, which represent the DSP in Western industrial societies, in-
evitably leads to “the tragedy of the commons”2 (Ophalus 1977; Dryzek 
02 In his widely cited article from 1968 that focuses on the worlds’ overpopu-
lation problem, Garrett Hardin criticised, among other subjects, the invis-
ible hand and the concept of freedom as a good way of regulating market 
and societies’ goods in general. In describing of the dangers of unregu-
lated market behaviour and its consequences for common material (natu-
ral) goods, Hardin used a metaphor of open pasture and herdsmen: „As a 
rational being, each herdsmen seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or im-
plicitly, more or less consciously, he asks: „What is utility to me of adding 
one or more animals to my heard?“ (…) the rational herdsman concludes 
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal 
to his heard. And another, and another… But this is the conclusion reached 
by each and every rational herdsman shearing a common. Therein is the 
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase 
his herd without the limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destina-
tion towards all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. The freedom of the commons 
brings ruins for all. “ (ibid., 162).
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1996 in Kilbourne et al. 2002). As Kilbourne and associates (2002) have 
found in their empirical study, environmental attitudes of individuals are 
directly influenced by their attitudes towards the DSP, and the political, 
economic and technological dimensions of the DSP are inversely related 
to the measures of environmental concern, but also to the willingness to 
engage in pro-environmental behaviour (p. 202-203).
Spangenberg (2005) also argues that the normative framework of West-
ern liberal democracies, being (neo)liberal capitalism, is opposed to sus-
tainable development because it promotes a concept of individualisation 
and dismantling of social structures. For the most part, the mostly used 
‘technology-supply-focused’ instead of ‘demand-centred’ technological 
paradigm as Spangenberg writes: 
‘can be disruptive force for social cohesion (… and) the short 
term orientation and the mixtures of commercial, military 
and other preoccupations that motivate much of the science-
based technology development are most often controversial 
from a sustainability perspective based on peace, justice and 
environmentally sound development’ (2005, 88). 
Spangenberg does observe that there is potential in several European coun-
tries for the development of sustainable knowledge society, but this poten-
tial lies in supporting active citizenship, a demand-centred economy and 
the development of science and technology. 
Based on the concepts previous research described above, this study 
aims to establish whether the orientation of European countries towards 
the goal of becoming knowledge societies also develops or encourages an 
orientation of its citizens towards pro-environmental behaviour. The study 
will examine the wider sociopolitical and normative framing of European 
countries (their DSP), the beliefs and attitudes of their citizens towards en-
vironmental risks and their engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, 
all in the context of citizens’ broader attitudes towards the success of their 
countries as knowledge societies.
Hypotheses
Approach of this study is based on the notion of ‘postmodern industrial 
democracies’ (Beck 1995) and Spangenberg’s critiques of the (neo)liberal 
framework of knowledge societies (2005), together with the concept of 
the dominant social paradigm empirically tested by Kilbourne and associ-
ates (2002). Based on these authors’ perspectives and research findings, it 
can be expected that the development of a knowledge society will be ac-
companied by a widespread values that are tied to liberal capitalism, such 
as a belief in economic growth, limited government and powerful science.
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H1: The level of development of the knowledge society is higher in 
the countries where the DSP is higher – that is, in societies in which 
the norms of liberal capitalism are prevailing.
 
Based on previous research (O’Connor et al. 1999), I expect that the rise in 
individuals’ perception of environmental risks will be an important indica-
tor of their intent to engage in pro-environmental behaviour, irrespective 
of other contextual differences between European countries. 
H2: The intent to engage in pro-environmental behaviour rises to-
gether with the perception of environmental risks.
Because previous research has established that the socioeconomic dimen-
sion of the DSP is reversely correlated to general environmental beliefs 
and attitudes (Kilbourne et al. 2002), I expect that both the perception 
of environmental risks and pro-environmental behaviour will be lower in 
the countries where the DSP is higher. And because of the hypothesised 
relationship between the DSP and the level of development of the knowl-
edge society, I expect that rise in the knowledge society indicators will 
also have a negative effect on the perception of environmental risks and 
pro-environmental behaviour.
H3a: The perception of environmental risks is lower in countries 
where the DSP has a stronger emphasis on liberal capitalism.
H3b: The perception of environmental risks is lower in countries 
with a higher level of development of the knowledge society.
H4a: The intent to engage in pro-environmental behaviour is lower in 
countries where the DSP has a stronger emphasis on liberal capitalism.
H4b: Pro-environmental behaviour is lower in countries with a high-
er level of development of the knowledge society.
Methods
Data sources and procedures
The analyses in this study were made based on data from the Environment 
module of the International Social Survey Project (ISSP), which was carried 
out in 32 ISSP member countries in 2010. For the purpose of this study, 
17 European countries were selected: nine ‘old’ European Union member 
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states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Spain, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom), six ‘new’ member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and two non-mem-
ber states (Norway and Switzerland)3. 
The Environment module of the ISSP consists of different batteries re-
lated to general environmental beliefs and attitudes of individuals, such 
as awareness and concern for environmental issues or the willingness to 
change one’s way of life in order to contribute to environmental preserva-
tion. For the purpose of this study, the ‘perception of environmental risks’ 
and ‘pro-environmental behaviour’ batteries were chosen. Variables for the 
perception of environmental risks are those that measure the respond-
ents’ perception of the dangerousness of certain pollutants or new (bio)
technologies for people and nature (such as car gasses, industrial pollution, 
pesticides and chemicals, genetic modification and nuclear plants). Pro-
environmental behaviour is presented by a set of variables that, rather than 
measuring actual behaviour, measures respondents’ intentions to take part 
in pro-environmental behaviour environment, such as recycling of glass, 
plastic and paper, buying ‘green’ products, saving water and choosing alter-
native means of transportation instead of travelling by car or saving energy. 
The Environment module of the ISSP is not constructed with the aim to 
test for the political, economic and technological dimensions of the domi-
nant social paradigm (DSP) concept. In the previously cited research from 
Kilbourne and associates (2002), four variables are used to account for each 
of these three DSP dimensions4. However, for a better understanding of the 
influence of sociopolitical and normative contexts on environmental risks 
perception and environmental effort of the analysed countries, this study 
will use variables from the ISSP Environment module that can represent 
the three dimensions of the DSP. After statistical testing, three variables 
were selected in order to test the level of the DSP of the countries analysed 
in this research. The variables that were selected are optimism about sci-
ence5, belief in economic growth and belief in limited government, which 
03 The data are weighted based on age, sex and educational level for more 
than half of countries- samples, excluding Croatia, Denmark, Germany, 
Latvia, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland for which no weighting 
procedure was avaliable.
04 At the same time, however, Kilbourne and associates themselves acknowl-
edged that these variables do not necessarily represent the best fit and 
call for more statistical testing (Kilbourne et al. 2002, 200)
05 Science related optimism represents or is inserted in our study instead of 
the technological dimension, basing on the Becks’ notion of state, busi-
ness and science whose powerful interplay characterises modern indus-
trial societies (see page 5). 
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are all beliefs and attitudes that can usually be associated with the concept 
of liberal democracy and liberal capitalism. 
The data used as knowledge society indicators for all the countries in the 
sample were gathered from the Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 
– 2011 edition, specifically from Chapter 2 and from the Chapter entitled 
‘Overall review of EU member states and associated countries’ (EC 2011). 
The latter consists of country reports on indicators related to innovation 
and research investment and outcomes such as the intensity of research 
and development (R&D), business enterprise expenditure on R&D, patent 
applications, patent revenues from abroad, but also numbers of doctoral 
graduates, numbers of researchers per thousand labour force, scientific 
publications within the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as a 
percentage of total scientific publications of the country, etc. Based on the 
reviewed literature and on previous research findings, the following indi-
cators were selected as knowledge society contextual variables: business 
enterprise expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP (BERD), researchers 
per thousand labour force (full-time equivalent – FTE), scientific publica-
tions within the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as a percentage 
of total scientific publications of the country and PCT (Patent Corporation 
Treaty) patent applications per billion GDP (in PPS€)6.
Indicators
Environmental risks perception indicator: this indicator is a composite of 
the answers to seven questions related to the perception of environmen-
tal risks. Perceived risks are measured according to a scale of 1 to 5, based 
on the following possible responses: (1) ‘not dangerous at all’, (2) ‘not very 
dangerous’, (3) ‘somewhat dangerous’, (4) ‘very dangerous’, (5) ‘extremely 
dangerous’. The frequencies for the countries are presented in the Table 1 
06 According to the Eurostat “The purchasing power standard, abbreviated 
as PPS, is an artificial currency unit. Theoretically, one PPS can buy the 
same amount of goods and services in each country. However, price dif-
ferences across borders mean that different amounts of national currency 
units are needed for the same goods and services depending on the coun-
try. PPS are derived by dividing any economic aggregate of a country in 
national currency by its respective purchasing power parities. PPS is the 
technical term used by Eurostat for the common currency in which na-
tional accounts aggregates are expressed when adjusted for price level 
differences using PPPs. Thus, PPPs can be interpreted as the exchange rate 
of the PPS against the euro.“ (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statis-
tics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Purchasing_power_standard_(PPS), 
accessed 1.10.2013)
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Table 1  Perception of environmental risks by countries (very and  
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Austria 45.9 72.2 61.9 52.9 58.6 61.5 76.9
Belgium 27.1 48.7 38.3 39.5 31.4 18.7 31.3
Bulgaria 55.4 64.6 66.3 67.4 60.8 58.7 49.1
Croatia 57.9 75.7 72.5 39.5 67.8 61.1 77.4
Czech Republic 44.1 63.5 57.0 55.0 43.0 36.7 26.4
Denmark 31.1 43.1 48.4 42.5 37.0 25.4 33
Finland 23.1 54.1 43.0 48.7 43.0 34.7 39.3
France 31.4 61.3 64.4 61.8 42.3 48.9 39
Germany 44.1 69.6 57.9 59.1 59.1 53.6 57.8
Latvia 34.2 46.9 53.4 45.6 36.6 46.6 58.6
Norway 23.5 39.0 32.1 28.8 33.0 25.3 48.5
Slovak Republic 61.8 69.0 61.2 60.5 55.8 44.1 43.5
Slovenia 37.9 67.1 69.5 64.9 58.9 54.7 64.7
Spain 55.2 66.5 61.4 66.9 60.8 42.8 55.7
Sweden 36.0 52.6 46.3 48.2 40.2 32.1 27.6
Switzerland 33.3 57.5 51.4 39.0 53.0 44.2 70.4
United Kingdom 24.7 42.3 33.4 40.8 56.6 28.1 32.1
All of risks perception variables are highly saturated on the single factor 
(47% of the explained variance) and the scaling reliability (Cronbach’s al-
pha) for the whole sample is 0.80, ranging from 0.74 (Austria) to 0.85 (Croa-
tia). Based on those indicators, all risk perception variables were added to a 
scale, ranging from 23.31 (Norway) to 28.26 (Croatia). The result is a meas-
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ure of overall perception of environmental risks of the sample countries, 
according to which higher values represent a higher perception of risks. 
The average for the sample countries for the environmental risks perception 
indicator is presented in the Figure 1.
Figure 1
Environmental risks perception indicator (average) by country
(> extremely dangerous)
Pro-environmental behaviour indicator: this indicator is a composite of the 
answers to six questions related to the intended environmental behaviour 
of respondents. Pro-environmental behaviour is measured on a scale from 
1 to 4, according to the following responses: (1) ‘never’, (2) ‘sometimes, (3) 
‘mostly’, (4) ‘always’. Frequencies for the sample countries are presented 
in Table 2.
All pro-environmental behaviour variables are highly saturated on the 
single factor (47% of the explained variance) and the scaling reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for the whole sample is 0.77, ranging from 0.69 (Slove-
nia) to 0.86 (Croatia).
Based on those indicators, the variables were added to a scale ranging 
from 11.45 (Bulgaria) to 16.52 (France), thereby measuring the level of pro-
environmental behaviour in the sample countries, with higher values rep-
resenting a higher level of engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. 
The average for the sample countries for the pro-environmental behaviour 
indicator is presented in Figure 2.
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Table 2  Pro-environmental behaviour by sample country
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Austria 93,8 53,9 27,4 39,9 43,1 46,6
Belgium 96,9 29,8 23,0 53,1 50,8 27,7
Bulgaria 25,9 25,4 3,3 5,2 14,5 24,3
Croatia 42,4 45,7 13,4 20,8 33,5 25,5
Czech Republic 72,4 22,0 15,1 27,0 46,9 22,6
Denmark 82,0 45,7 16,6 42,7 44,4 36,0
Finland 87,9 24,6 18,2 42,3 39,6 35,0
France 92,8 43,8 29,8 26,8 65,6 55,7
Germany 94,2 57,1 29,0 44,9 55,3 42,7
Latvia 27,0 35,5 5,6 7,6 17,0 30,0
Norway 85,8 19,4 18,3 38,2 17,2 20,7
Slovak Republic 65,5 20,6 9,8 16,0 28,6 17,0
Slovenia 85,7 40,5 17,5 42,0 36,9 29,5
Spain 74,4 16,2 12,3 31,0 55,3 31,6
Sweden 89,3 36,2 17,6 37,5 16,4 27,7
Switzerland 95,4 57,4 34,1 46,6 45,9 48,2
United Kingdom 85,9 36,6 18,8 33,4 32,1 28,3
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Figure 2
Pro-environmental behaviour indicator (average) by country
(> more often practiced)
Dominant social paradigm (DSP) indicator: this indicator is based on previous 
research findings and is a construct that is derived from the Environment 
module of the ISSP. Based on their statistical characteristics and their scope, 
the following three variables were selected as representative of the DSP: 
•	 The variable for the political dimension of the DSP is the response to 
the statement ‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes and those 
with low incomes’, measured on a Likert scale from (1) ‘strongly agree’ 
to (5) ‘strongly disagree’ ( = 2.23, SD = 1.17). Because the variable is 
skewed in the direction of agreeing strongly, for the purpose of us-
ing it as a single variable in statistical analyses it was recoded as (1 – 0) 
‘strongly agree and mostly agree’ and (0) ‘neither agree nor disagree, 
mostly disagree and strongly disagree’; 
•	 The variable for the economic dimension of the DSP is the response 
to the statement ‘Economic growth always harms the environment’, 
measured on a Likert scale from (1) ‘strongly agree’ to (5) ‘strongly 
disagree ’ (= 3.19, SD = 1.01); 
•	 The variable for the scientific (technological) dimension of the DSP 
is the response to the statement ‘Overall, modern science does more 
harm than good’, measured on a Likert scale from (1) ‘strongly agree’ 
to (5) ‘strongly disagree’ (= 3.45, SD = 1.07). 
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All three dimensions/variables have a significant level of mutual cor-
relation, with all correlations being positive (p > 0.001). Because the vari-
ables in themselves represent beliefs and attitudes about completely 
different social problems, no scaling procedures were used in order to 
construct the DSP indicator. The DSP indicator was calculated separately 
for each sample country based on the arithmetic mean of the three vari-
ables (which were not recoded) for each of the sample countries. This 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 3 In this way, the resulting DSP com-
posite indicator ranges from 7.76 (Bulgaria) to 10.08 (Norway), with the 
higher result indicating a DSP that has a stronger orientation towards 
liberal capitalism. 
figure 3
Dominant social paradigm (variable – dimension arithmetic means) by country
(> higher liberal capitalism orientation of the DSP) 
Knowledge society contextual indicator: this indicator represents a compos-
ite of contextual indicators from the European Commission Report „Re-
search and innovation performance in EU Member States and associated 
countries“ (Norway, Switzerland and, at that point, Croatia as a candidate 
country) (EC 2011). As mentioned earlier in this study, based on the review 
of previous research findings (Stehr 2003; Rodrigues 2002; Room et al. 
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2005; Dosi et al. 2006), the following indicators were selected as knowledge 
society contextual variables: 
•	 business enterprise expenditure on R&D as % BDP (BERD)
•	 researchers per thousand labour force (FTE)
•	 scientific publications within the top 10% most cited publications 
worldwide as % of total scientific publications of the country 
•	 PCT patent applications per billion GDP (PPS€). 
Indicators for all the sample countries are presented in Figure 4. They were 
all added to the composite that represents the knowledge society indicator 
and they range from 8.05 (Latvia) to 41.57 (Finland), with higher values 
on the scale indicating a higher level of development of the knowledge 
society.
figure 4
Knowledge society contextual indicator (values of four separate indicators added) 
by country (> rise in knowledge society)
Finally, for the purpose of a multivariate analysis, the following standard 
demographic variables were used: age (in years), sex (1: ‘male’; 2: ‘female’) 
and educational level (from 0: ‘no formal qualification’ to 5: ‘university and 
higher’) of the respondents.
16 
 
Indicators for all the sample countries are presented in Graph 3.2.4. They were all added to the 
composite that represents the knowledge society indicator and they range from 8.05 (Latvia) to 
41.57 (Finland), with higher values on the scale indicating a higher level of development of the 
knowledge society. 
Graph 3.2.4 Knowledge society contextual indicator (values of four separate indicators added) by 
country (> rise in knowledge society) 
 
 
 
Finally, for the purpose of a multivariate a alysis, the following standard demographic 
variables were used: age (in years), sex (1: ‘male’; 2: ‘female’) and educational level (from 0: ‘no 
formal qualification’ to 5: ‘university and higher’) of the respondents. 
 
 
0,2 
0,2 
0,3 
0,2 
0,9 
0,7 
1,2 
1,4 
1,2 
1,0 
1,3 
1,9 
1,9 
2,2 
2,0 
2,5 
2,8 
3,6 
5,7 
5,1 
6,3 
7,4 
11,5 
9,1 
12,7 
14,7 
14,3 
15,8 
14,5 
13,8 
18,2 
17,5 
16,3 
13,7 
3,6 
3,2 
3,8 
4,7 
5,7 
5,7 
6,8 
7,8 
8,4 
10,1 
7,6 
8,1 
7,1 
5,7 
10,5 
9,8 
15,1 
0,7 
0,4 
0,9 
0,5 
1,0 
1,3 
2,6 
3,9 
3,5 
3,1 
3,7 
5,1 
7,7 
9,2 
7,9 
11,0 
10,0 
0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 40,0 45,0
Latvia (8,05)
Bulgaria (9,44)
Croatia (10,12)
Slovak Republic (11,69)
Czech Republic (15,01)
Spain (19,20)
Slovenia (19,66)
France (25,72)
Great Britain (27,79)
Norway (28,42)
Belgium (28,45)
Austria (29,61)
Germany (30,54)
Switzerland (35,25)
Denmark (37,93)
Sweden (39,65)
Finland (41,57)
C
ou
nt
ri
es
 
BERD Scientific publications Researchers Patents
United Kingdom
Co
un
tr
ie
s
7. The sustainability potential of the knowledge society 211
Results
Relationship between the dominant social paradigm and the 
knowledge society
Firstly, I explore the relationship between the indicator of the dominant 
social paradigm (DSP) and the contextual indicator of the knowledge soci-
ety in order to better understand the sociopolitical and normative framing 
of the knowledge society. There are statistically significant differences be-
tween the sample countries in each of the three DSP dimensions: the politi-
cal (F = (16, 21 543) 73.026, p = .000), economic (F = (16, 20 979) 43.071, p = 
.000) and scientific dimensions (F = (16, 21 213) 88.308, p = .000). As can be 
seen from Figure 3, the DSP is more oriented towards liberal capitalism in 
Scandinavia, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland. 
On the other hand, countries such as France, Spain, Austria and especially 
the ex-socialist countries/new EU member states (Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slo-
vak Republic and Croatia) have a DSP that is less oriented towards liberal 
capitalism (with the Czech Republic being an exception). We can see a 
similar situation with the contextual indicator of the knowledge society: 
Finland, Austria and Belgium have a somewhat higher result and the United 
Kingdom and Norway lower.
figure 5
Dominant social paradigm indicator (> more liberal capitalism oriented DSP) by 
Knowledge society indicator (> rise in knowledge society indicator)
(r= .632, p > 0.001)
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It is therefore no surprise that Figure 5 shows that the DSP increases to-
gether with the contextual variable – the knowledge society indicator – 
with the Pearson correlation being significant and positive (r = .632, p > 
0.000). The bottom left-hand corner of the graph shows the countries with 
the lowest values of the scale of the knowledge society indicator, and these 
are primarily eastern and south-eastern European countries that also have 
lower results on the scale of the DSP indicator: Latvia, Slovak Republic, 
Croatia and Bulgaria (new EU member states). In the top right-hand corner 
of the graph we find the countries with the highest values on the knowl-
edge society scale but also with higher values on the DSP scale and these are 
the Scandinavian countries Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Norway is a bit 
lower regarding the knowledge society indicator when comparing to other 
Scandinavian countries, but has the highest DSP value of the whole sample. 
The described results confirm the hypothesis that knowledge society 
indicators are higher in the countries where the DSP is more oriented to-
wards liberal capitalism.
Relationship between pro-environmental behaviour and 
perception of environmental risks 
Secondly, I explore the relationship between individuals’ perception of en-
vironmental risks and the extent to which they engage in pro-environmen-
tal behaviour. In Figures 1 and 2, we can see that the sample countries have 
statistically significant differences in the perception of environmental 
risks (F = (16, 18 615) 152.881, p = .000) and in pro-environmental behaviour 
(F = (16, 16 761) 158.914, p = .000). Both environmental risks and pro-envi-
ronmental behaviour indicators show mixed results when comparing the 
different European countries in the sample. On one hand, the ex-socialist 
countries/new member states Croatia and Bulgaria have the highest percep-
tion of environmental risks, with Austria, Germany and Spain also showing 
similar results. On the other hand, Scandinavian countries have a lower per-
ception of environmental risks (the difference in perception is statistically 
significant), as do the United Kingdom and Belgium. There are also mixed 
results regarding the indicator of pro-environmental behaviour, whereby 
such behaviour is most prominent in France, Switzerland, Germany and 
Austria and is lowest in the new EU member states Croatia, Latvia, Bulgaria 
and the Slovak Republic. Interestingly, pro-environmental behaviour is not 
high in Scandinavia, with Norway having the lowest result of all Scandina-
vian countries, at a level that is similar to ex-socialist countries. 
However, as can be seen from Table 3, the correlation between the indica-
tors of pro-environmental behaviour and environmental risk perception is 
significant and positive for all of the sample countries in the study (with the 
exception of Latvia and Bulgaria), even though the results were mixed when 
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separately comparing the countries’ indicators of environmental risks and 
pro-environmental behaviour. I can therefore accept the overall hypothesis 
linking pro-environmental behaviour and perception of environmental 
risks and state that the propensity to engage in pro-environmental behav-
iour increases with the level of perception of environmental risks.
Table 3  Pearson’s correlation between the indicators of perceived  
  environmental risks and pro-environmental behaviour, by 
  country
COUNTRY Pearson’s r
Austria .290***
Belgium .284***
Bulgaria .118
Croatia .364***
Czech Republic .305***
Denmark .336***
Finland .394***
France .343***
Germany .261***
Latvia .004
Norway .402***
Slovak Republic .132**
Slovenia .379***
Spain .259***
Sweden .332***
Switzerland .226***
United Kingdom .355***
* p > 0.05 ** p > 0.01 *** p > 0.001
Relationship between perception of environmental risks, the
dominant social paradigm and the knowledge society 
Thirdly, I explore the hypothesis on the indicator of perceived environmen-
tal risks. For this purpose, two different linear models were built because 
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of the high partial correlation that exists between the contextual indica-
tor of the knowledge society and the DSP indicator. Since the indicator of 
perceived environmental risks is dependent in both models, the first model 
contains the contextual indicator of the knowledge society as a predictor 
(together with age, sex and educational level of respondents), while the sec-
ond model contains the knowledge society contextual indicator, combined 
both with the aforementioned demographic variables with the dominant 
social paradigm. The overall model is not the strongest because there are 
obviously other predictors not included in this study that influence envi-
ronmental risks perception. However, as can be seen from Table 4, the sta-
tistic for the first model on environmental risks and the knowledge society 
shows that older respondents, men and those who are more educated are 
less perceptive regarding to environmental risks. When controlled for age, 
sex and educational level, the knowledge society contextual indicator is 
negatively correlated to the perception of environmental risks. 
Table 4   Linear regression models of the indicator of perceived   
 environmental risks
 
Model A. 
Environmental 
risks perception 
(> higher risks)
Model B. 
Environmental 
risks perception 
(> higher risks)
Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff.
Age of respondent in years -.046*** -.046***
Sex (1 = male) .144*** .146***
Educational level (from 0 = no for-
mal qualification to 5 = university)
-.025*** -.035***
a. DSPI -.230*** —
b. KSCI — -.199***
F-ratio 393,620 325,863
F-Sig. .000 .000
R-squared .079 .066
Adjusted R-squared .078 .066
* p > 0.05 ** p > 0.01 *** p > 0.001
Notes: DSPI = dominant social paradigm indicator;
 KSPI = knowledge society contextual indicator
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The findings of Model B also show that, although the model is not strong, 
it is sufficient for our purposes because it shows the correlation of the 
DSP indicator to the indicator of perceived environmental risks, even after 
controlling for age, sex and educational level of respondents. The model 
therefore confirms the hypotheses 3a and 3b: that perception of environ-
mental risks is lower in societies which have higher values on the scale of 
knowledge society indicators and where the DSP is more oriented towards 
liberal capitalism.
Relationship between pro-environmental behaviour, the Domi-
nant social paradigm and the knowledge society 
Fourthly, I explore the relationships between three sets of indicators: the 
pro-environmental behaviour, the DSP and knowledge society contextual 
indicators. These relationships are explored within two models with the 
same demographic variables as in the predictors. 
The results of this analysis are somewhat unexpected. In Table 5, we can 
see in Model A (which is a significant, but not particularly strong model) 
that older, more educated respondents and women have a higher likeli-
hood of engaging in pro-environmental behaviour, and when controlled 
for age, sex or educational level, the DSP is negatively correlated with pro-
environmental behaviour.
However, Model B presented in Table 5 (which, although it is not a strong 
model, is significant and sufficient for the purpose of this study’s research 
question) shows that – when controlled for age, sex or educational level of 
respondents – pro-environmental behaviour increases together with the 
contextual indicator of the knowledge society. The presented results are in 
favour of the hypothesis that the orientation towards liberal capitalism is 
not in favour of society’s pro-environmental behaviour, but on the other 
hand opposes the hypothesis on the relationship between the knowledge 
society and pro-environmental behaviour. Rather, it seems that countries 
with a higher level of development of the knowledge society are more in 
favour of pro-environmental behaviour.
However, such interesting results also require further statistical analy-
ses. Namely, if the DSP indicator and the contextual indicator of the knowl-
edge society increase together, how can I explain that I have found op-
posite results regarding pro-environmental behaviour? Is it possible, as 
Spangenberg (2005) argues, that there are sustainable and less sustainable 
knowledge societies, depending on their normative framework? To explore 
this emergent thesis, I have built two additional models that include all the 
assumptions that need to be tested.
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Table 5  Linear regression models of the pro-environmental behaviour  
 indicator
Model A. Pro-
environmental 
behaviour         
(> more effort)
Model B. Pro-
environmental 
behaviour                  
(> more effort)
 Beta Coeff.  Beta Coeff.
Age of respondent in years .186*** .161***
Sex (1=male) .114*** .109***
Educational level (from 0 =no for-
mal qualification to 5 = university)
.064*** .046***
a. DSPI -.042*** —
b. KSCI — .169***
F-ratio 198,668 322,161
F-Sig. .000 .000
R-squared .046 .077
Adjusted R-squared .045 .077
* p > 0.05 ** p > 0.01 *** p > 0.001 
 
Sustainable (knowledge) societies? 
For the purpose of the final analysis I have built two models using pro-en-
vironmental behaviour and perception of environmental risks as depend-
ents (similarly to the previous models in this study), but using a different 
approach with regards to the knowledge society and DSP indicators. By 
intersecting the averages of both indicators I have created four groups of 
sample countries, based on the arithmetic mean of the DSP indicators and 
contextual indicators of the knowledge society for the whole sample7. The 
intersection and the four resulting groups of countries can be seen in Figure 
6 and are the following:
07 Averages for the countries are shown in Figures 1 and 2 The average of the 
DSP indicator for the whole sample is 8.85 and the average for the contex-
tual indicator of the knowledge society is 24.95
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•	 High DSP / highly developed knowledge society: the following coun-
tries have higher (above average) values on the scale of DSP indicators 
and higher (above average) values on the scale of knowledge society 
indicators: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom;
•	 Low DSP / highly developed knowledge society: the following coun-
tries have lower (below average) values on the scale of DSP indicators 
and higher (above average) values on the scale of knowledge society 
indicators: Austria, Belgium and France;
•	 High DSP / less developed knowledge society: the following countries 
have higher (above average) values on the scale of DSP indicators and 
lower (below average) values on the scale of knowledge society indica-
tors: Czech Republic and Spain;
•	 Low DSP / less developed knowledge society: the following countries 
have both lower (below average) values on the scale of DSP indicators 
and lower (below average) values on the scale of knowledge society 
indicators: Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
Figure 6
Dominant social paradigm indicator (> more liberal capitalism oriented DSP) by 
Knowledge society contextual indicator (> rise in knowledge society indicator)
In the Model A (Table 6), I use environmental risks perception as the cri-
terion, the demographic variables as predictors and the sample countries 
(representing categories of interference of the DSP and knowledge society 
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indicators) as dummies. The sample countries with high values on the scale 
of DSP indicators and high values on the scale of knowledge society con-
textual indicators are used as the reference category. All predictors in the 
model are significant, showing that, when controlled for age, sex and educa-
tional level of respondents, the group of sample countries with high values 
on both the DSP and knowledge society scales are significantly less aware 
of environmental risks compared to the three other groups in the model. 
Table 6  Linear regression models of the indicator of perceived   
  environmental risks and the indicator of 
  pro-environmental behaviour
 
Model A. 
Environmental 
risks perception                 
(higher risks)
Model B.                      
Pro-environmental     
behaviour                        
(> more often 
practiced)
Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff.
Age of respondent in 
years -.045*** .106***
Sex (1 = male) .145*** .159***
Educational level (from 0 
= no formal qualification 
to 5 = university)
-.031*** .051***
DSP/KSC: Higher DSPI 
and higher KSCI Reference reference
DSP/KSC: Higher DSPI 
and lower KSCI .116*** -.091***
DSP/KSC: Lower DSPI 
and higher KSCI .162*** .154***
DSP/KSC: Lower DSPI 
and lower KSCI .237*** -.151***
F-ratio 256,839 347,135
F-Sig.  .000 .000
R-squared .077 .111
Adjusted R-squared .077 .111
* p > 0.05 ** p > 0.01 *** p > 0.001 
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Model B, which is related to the pro-environmental behaviour of respond-
ents (Table 6), shows that (when controlled for age, sex and educational 
level) sample countries that have lower values on the DSP scale and higher 
values on the knowledge society scale have a higher propensity to engage in 
pro-environmental behaviour compared to those that have high values on 
both the DSP and knowledge society scale. However, the sample countries 
with low values on both the DSP scale and the knowledge society scale (as 
well as those with high DSP values and low knowledge society values), ex-
press significantly lower levels of pro-environmental behaviour compared 
to the countries with high values on both scales. These findings show that 
pro-environmental behaviour indeed increases with the development of 
the knowledge society, but increases more in countries where the DSP is 
less oriented towards liberal capitalism.
Discussion and conclusions
Before considering the study’s findings and implications, a note should be 
made of its methodological limitations. The limitations are related, first of 
all, to the use of contextual indicators related to the knowledge society and 
to the use of dominant social paradigm (DSP) indicators. 
The contextual indicators of the knowledge society, and especially of 
the sustainable knowledge society, can be a matter of discussion (Bossel 
1999; Spangenberg et al. 2002; Spangenberg 2005). By choosing indicators 
that rely on private investment in R&D, patents, scientific productivity and 
the number of researchers, it can be argued that the study positions itself 
critically towards the normative framework of liberal capitalism because 
it chooses indicators of competitiveness rather than indicators of social 
cohesion and well-being. Had different indicators been chosen, the study 
may have yielded different results. These indicators were chosen because 
they are used in the official policy documents and reports of the European 
Commission and because most authors who write about the concept of the 
knowledge society stress the importance of the European Union’s orienta-
tion towards the commercialisation of science, technology and education 
(see, for example, Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Rodrigues 2002; Room 
et al. 2005; Dosi et al. 2006). The chosen indicators therefore seem to be the 
best choice when trying to understand the sociopolitical framing of Euro-
pean knowledge societies.
The limitation related to the DSP indicator used in this study represents 
a more serious methodological challenge. Using a single variable for each 
of the three dimensions of the DSP (the political, economic and scientific 
dimensions), instead of a set of variables for each of the dimensions is an 
objective weakness of this study. However, using such a larger set of vari-
II Comparative empirical insights 220
ables was not an option: on one hand, the data from the Environment mod-
ule of the ISSP cannot provide such variables; on the other hand, there are 
currently no available tested set of variables with a good statistical fit that 
could measure each of the dimensions of the DSP, since the concept is still in 
the phase of empirical testing (Kilbourne et al. 2002). The single variables 
used in this study for each of the three dimensions have shown consistency 
in terms of their mutual correlation and the correlation of each with the 
perception of environmental risks and pro-environmental behaviour. They 
are therefore in the line with the results of previous research on the DSP 
dimensions regarding general environmental beliefs and attitudes, in the 
sense that all three dimensions of the DSP are negatively correlated with 
perception of environmental risks and pro-environmental behaviour (Kil-
bourne et al. 2002). For this reason, I consider that the variables used in this 
study are credible and reliable in our findings, although I do call for more 
empirical exploration of the concepts of political, economic and scientific/
technological dimension of the DSP. As a consequence of the above-men-
tioned limitations, the results of this study should be viewed tentatively. 
The first hypothesis of this study was confirmed by the findings: the in-
dicator of the knowledge society and the DSP indicator are positively cor-
related, since the knowledge society develops together with the acceptance 
of norms related to liberal capitalism. At the same time, however, looking 
at the spread of countries in this study’s sample (according to both the 
indicators of the knowledge society and of the DSP), we find results that 
are somewhat (although not entirely) unexpected. At the lower end of the 
spectrum (the countries with the lowest results regarding knowledge so-
ciety contextual indicators but also regarding the level of the DSP) we find 
ex-socialist countries that were weakened by the process of socioeconomic 
transition and whose economies are not strong and mostly not competi-
tive. It is therefore not surprising that those countries have not made much 
progress in the transition to the new economy and also have a lower ac-
ceptance of the DSP norms that are related to liberal capitalism. However, 
it is surprising that Spain is only a little bit higher than the ex-socialist 
countries on the interception of the DSP and the contextual indicator of 
the knowledge society. Another surprising finding is that the acceptance 
of the DSP is highest in Scandinavia and not so high in ‘the heart of the 
Europe’ – in Austria, France, Belgium and Switzerland.
According to Spangenberg (2005), the normative framing of knowledge 
society can be found in two forms. The first is a (neo)liberal framing, which 
suggests that public funding should be decreased in all areas, and in particu-
lar in the field of development and fusion of new technologies. Instead of 
public funding, the ‘free market plus free expression of individual prefer-
ences should be the institutions which define future trajectories for tech-
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nology and its societal applications’ (p. 87). Spangenberg argues that this 
view has long dominated the political philosophy of the United States. The 
second normative framing of the knowledge society, on the other hand, is 
one that can be ascribed to Europe, where ‘the market is perceived as a pow-
erful and indispensable institution for optimisation, whereas the institu-
tional framework (society, expressing its preferences through the political 
mechanisms of the state) was considered the main institution for defining 
orientation’ (2005, 87). Comparing this view with our results on the DSP 
indicator (which measures optimism about science, limited government 
and economic growth), we find that the heart of Europe is consistent with 
Spangenberg’s second form of normative framing of the knowledge society, 
whereas we find that the social democracies of northern Europe are more 
consistent with the first (and more neo-liberal) form of normative framing. 
Even if we accept that the results regarding the DSP should be viewed 
tentatively, other results of the study are also consistent with the argu-
ment mentioned above. Spangenberg (2005) also argues that the (neo)liber-
al normative framing of the knowledge society is detrimental to the devel-
opment of a sustainable knowledge society. His opinion echoes the findings 
of Kilbourne and associates (2002), according to which the three dimensions 
of a given society’s DSP are negatively correlated to pro-environmental 
beliefs and attitudes. The findings of this study confirm both Spangenberg 
and Kilbourne and associates to some extent. Firstly, the study has shown 
that the perception of environmental risks and pro-environmental behav-
iour is significantly lower in countries with higher DSP. However, look-
ing at the countries’ results regarding perceived environmental risks and 
pro-environmental behaviour separately, the study shows mixed results 
that are difficult to interpret. Perception of environmental risks is lowest 
in Scandinavian countries (especially Norway and Sweden) and is not so 
low in the countries of ‘old Europe’ (Austria, Spain and France), whereas 
the perception of environmental risks is extremely high in ex-socialist 
countries such as Bulgaria and Croatia. At the same time, however, pro-
environmental behaviour is highest in Spain, Austria and Finland, but is 
not so high in France and in the ex-socialist countries (with the exception 
of Slovenia). Based on the models built for this study, it is obvious that pro-
environmental behaviour increases with the level of development of the 
knowledge society, while – at the same time, and somewhat counterintui-
tively – the perception of environmental risks lowers. A deeper analysis 
of these findings has shown that we can indeed distinguish between the 
countries that have both high values on the DSP scale and high values on 
the scale of knowledge society indicators (Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and those that 
have lower values on the DSP scale and higher values on the knowledge so-
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ciety scale (Austria, France and Belgium). A comparison between those two 
groups of countries has shown that there is a significant difference between 
those two groups regarding their sustainability potential, as measured by 
the level of their perception of environmental risks and by the level of 
engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. It would therefore appear 
that countries with a lower DSP (that have lower acceptance of the norma-
tive framing liberal capitalism) are more likely to be sustainable because 
of being more likely to perceive environmental risks and more in favour of 
pro-environmental behaviour. 
I can only speculate as to the reason for this finding. One possible ex-
planation is that the countries that have achieved a higher level of devel-
opment of the knowledge society automatically request more pro-envi-
ronmental behaviour of their citizens (such as different waste disposal, or 
lower taxes for energy saving technology), since they have a higher level of 
GDP and technologically modern infrastructure. However, even such a top-
down approach to pro-environmental behaviour has its limits and those 
limits are set in the dominant values of society. If those values are more in 
favour of scientific optimism, endless economic growth and limited govern-
ment, the sustainability potential of that society is significantly lowered.
Despite some identified shortcomings in the research methodology, the 
study does show an interesting (even intriguing) development related to 
the sustainability potential of European societies. Firstly, the study shows 
that the indicators of the knowledge society are not an end in themselves 
not just in terms of the policy implication, but rather that the indicators 
should be examined in a broader cultural and political context, especially 
within the normative context of given societies. Secondly, although the 
concept presented here should be more thoroughly researched, one of the 
most important findings of the study is that the sustainability potential 
of the knowledge society varies depending on the type of knowledge soci-
ety, which echoes the findings of all critical researchers that have warned 
of the negative consequences of the normative framework of (neo)liberal 
capitalism.  
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Introduction
Environmentalism has received the attention of scholars across disciplines. 
Theoretical treatment of environmentalism as a multidimensional concept 
is primarily distinguished by studies conceptualizing environmentalism as 
a behavior or as an attitude. Environmental behavior has been treated in the 
public and private spheres of social life (Hadler and Haller 2011). Public 
green behavior includes participation in green governmental and non-gov-
ernmental organizations and active support in their goals through petition 
writing or protests. Private green behavior has been measured in actions 
like recycling, conservation, and consumption of ecological products (Stern 
2000). In addition to the analyses on ecological behavior, environmentalist 
attitudes have also received much scholarly attention. Attitudinal aspects of 
environmentalism that have been studied are perceptions regarding threats 
posed by various environmental problems; attitudes toward local, national, 
and global level regulations; and opinions regarding the importance and 
compatibility of environmental protection relative to other values, espe-
cially vis-à-vis economic growth. Some studies have also linked behavior and 
attitudinal aspects of environmentalism; however correlations and causal 
links between the two are surprisingly weak (Diamantopoulos et al. 2003).
In this chapter, we explore social factors that shape individuals’ environ-
mental concern as a key component of green attitudes. Previous literature 
has found that income, post-materialistic values, and various socio-demo-
graphic factors are important in predicting environmental attitudes. What 
remains underexplored in the environmental concern research is the role 
of social trust. This issue however, appears particularly salient when explor-
ing environmental concern in periphery contexts, where social trust levels 
tend to be significantly lower (Paldam and Svedsen 2002; Raiser 1999; Kun-
ioka and Woller 1999; Kaasa and Parts 2008). Empirical investigations on 
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the determinants of environmental concern have predominantly focused 
on North America and Western Europe and little is known about causal fac-
tors explaining environmental attitudes in the transition nations. Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries have received much less attention 
in this literature, despite strong evidence that regional and local contexts 
matter when it comes to environmental concerns (Marquart-Pyatt 2012; 
Haller and Hadler 2008): “concerns in CEE countries may be higher given 
their experience with abject environmental conditions that might height-
en such awareness. The communist model of industrial development’s 
emphasis on heavy industry produced severe regional environmental deg-
radation, and citizens in these countries were often exposed to polluted 
environmental conditions as a result… heightened levels of concern remain 
anticipated given the industrial legacy of the former communist system” 
(Marquart-Pyatt 2012, 652). 
In Bulgaria, two particular events shaped public consciousness and led to 
reduced trust in government to protect the population from trans-border 
ecological risks: the explosion in the Chernobyl nuclear power station and 
the pollution from Romania’s Giurgiu chemical works. Complete silence 
was maintained regarding the dangers resulting from the Chernobyl dis-
aster. An information blackout was imposed by the Bulgarian communist 
authorities and very scarce data exist on the impacts of Chernobyl in Bul-
garia. School children were asked to march in the customary First of May 
parade in 1986, despite the radioactive rainfall that day. “Except for the 
top rank nomenklatura, all others were left at the mercy of fate. A select 
group of people were supplied with food and mineral water from abroad” 
(Kovachev 2010, np). Maintaining solidarity with foreign communist gov-
ernments was more important to the Bulgarian authorities than citizens’ 
health or their rights to be informed about those ecological risks. 
Quite similar were the circumstances in the Bulgarian Danube town of 
Ruse. During the 1980s, Ruse was heavily polluted with chlorine and other 
byproducts from the chemical plant in the Romanian city of Giurgiu on the 
opposite river bank of the Danube. The Bulgarian communist ruling party 
and government authorities closed their eyes to the ecological disaster. In 
response, a highly significant citizens’ movement – the Ruse Committee – 
formed. The Ruse Committee later helped spark the national Ekoglasnost 
efforts, which in turn played a key role in the dismantling of the communist 
leadership (Baumgartl 1995). “More so than in any other ECE [East Central 
European] country, it was concern about the deteriorating environment 
and its impact upon health that sparked off the protest which led to the 
collapse of the old regime in Bulgaria” (Baker and Baumgartl 1998, 195). 
In this chapter, we investigate the determinants of environmental con-
cern with case study evidence from Bulgaria, treating environmental at-
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titudes in a transition country. Building on previous research, we inves-
tigate the relative effect of income, post-material values and social trust 
on environmental concern in Bulgaria using data from the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2010 Environmental survey. In the first 
part of this chapter, we review the literature that has linked environmental 
attitudes with people’s economic situation, their value systems, social de-
mographic characteristics, and the role of social trust. Next, we introduce 
our case study country and present empirical data comparing levels of en-
vironmental concern and perceived threats toward specific environmen-
tal issues in Bulgaria and Europe. In the following section, we discuss our 
regression analysis (probit model) results on the determinants of environ-
mental concern in Bulgaria. We conclude the chapter with a brief review of 
our results, offering some reflections on the implications of the findings, 
and put forward suggestions for further research. 
Explaining Environmental Concern
Individual financial well-being has been found to be positively related to 
various environmental attitudes and behaviors. Higher income individuals 
in a society tend to be more likely to express concern over environmental 
problems, to favor environmental regulation, to be willing to sacrifice, and 
to engage in ecological consumption (Jones and Dunlap 1992; Klineberg, 
McKeever and Rothenbach 1998). Others argue however that, rather than 
income, it is the value system tied to material well-being that is in fact ex-
plaining those differences: economically better situated citizens possess 
post-materialistic values, which support pro-ecological attitudes (Inglehart 
1990; 1995; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2008). According to Inglehart’s theory, as 
societies develop and become richer, people experience a fundamental shift 
in their value systems. They are less concerned about fundamental survival 
problems and instead can focus on so-called post-materialistic objectives, 
including self-fulfillment, political rights, or environmental protection. 
A significant body of research has assessed various socio-demographic 
factors in shaping environmental attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, the 
effects of age, gender, education and ethnicity have been theorized and 
empirically studied. While there are studies which find no or inconclu-
sive results about whether age matters with regard to environmentalism 
(Derksen and Gartrell 1993), much of the empirical findings suggest that 
younger people are more environmentally concerned than their older coun-
terparts (Mohai and Twight 1987; VanLiere and Dunlap 1980; Jones and 
Dunlap 1992). There are several competing arguments on why young people 
might be more environmentally concerned. Some argue that it is due to 
youth’s norms and values of freedom and spontaneity that lead them to be 
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more environmentalist (Kanagy, Firebaugh and Humphrey 1994), having 
more time and resources to partake in social movements and their activi-
ties (Gillham 2008), growing up in times of economic prosperity which 
promotes post-materialistic values (Inglehart 1990), or because young 
people have more to loose from environmental destruction (Murphy 1994). 
However most research does not assess whether the age effect captures 
life-stage or cohort dynamics: do individuals change their attitudes and 
behavior on environmental matters due to reaching a certain stage in their 
life or because they belong to a certain cohort/generation? Life-stage argu-
ments hold that there are particular age relevant characteristics that shape 
environmental attitudes and behavior over the course of one’s lifetime, as 
the ones discussed above. Cohort based arguments stress that generations 
share political and cultural norms that likely have an impact on environ-
mental attitudes, concerns, and behavior. For instance, individuals born 
prior to1960 were socialized during a time when environmental problems 
were rarely discussed and environmental threats were not yet defined as 
major social problems requiring solutions: “Socialisation of people born 
after 1960 in EU-15 countries took place when environmental damage, such 
as air and water pollution or the risk of using nuclear energy, were increas-
ingly perceived in the public as societal problems. Environmental issues 
were barely discussed in public during the socialization period of people 
born before 1960” (Gerhards and Lengfeld 2008, 15). 
Some studies have found higher environmental concerns by women 
compared to men (Blocker and Eckberg 1989; Mohai 1992; Davidson and 
Freudenburg 1996; Zelezny, Chua and Aldrich 2000). Gender differences 
concerning environmental concern are grounded in gender socialization 
theories. Women’s and men’s beliefs, attitudes, and values are rooted in 
gendered environments: “as the children grow, the male is able to objectify 
and control his environment, and to define himself as separate from the 
world around him. The female, on the other hand, defines herself in rela-
tion to the world around her, or as part of a community in a subjective en-
vironment” (Davidson and Freudenburg 1996, 304). Socialization assigns 
males and females different roles, responsibilities, and interests, which in 
turn may affect differences in public opinion on environmental matters. 
Overall, race and ethnicity appear only weakly and inconsistently linked 
to environmental concern (VanLiere and Dunlap 1980). For example, Mo-
hai and Bryant (1998) found that blacks reported higher concern over some 
environmental risks (air pollution), while whites were more concerned 
about other risks (ozone layer depletion). Theoretically, two arguments are 
put forth: on the one hand, following relative deprivation theory, minority 
groups express higher environmental concern due to their greater exposure 
to environmental degradation. On the other hand, according to Inglehart’s 
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post-materialism theory, the more well-to-do and those that have enjoyed 
the privileges of civil liberties, care more about the environment. Therefore 
racial and ethnic minorities, who are more likely not taking for granted civil 
liberties and material well-being, would display less environmental concern. 
Education appears to have a positive effect on green behavior and at-
titudes, however empirical results are not consistent (VanLiere and Dun-
lap 1980; Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlap 1992; Inglehart 1995; Bakvis and 
Nevitte 1992). Education is linked to knowledge about environmental is-
sues, which in turn has been identified as an important precondition for 
green behavior and concern. A further theoretical reasoning links education 
with exposure to pro-environmentalist global norms: “Higher education 
increases an individual’s number of contacts with global ideas and is con-
sidered as the most important institution propelling world societal ideas” 
(Hadler and Haller 2011, 317-8). These macro level norms on environmen-
talism, translate into more green attitudes amongst educated individuals. 
Social trust has been identified as an important determinant of environ-
mental attitudes and concern in the United States (Adeola 2007). Higher 
trust in authorities and government has been linked to lower levels of 
perceived environmental risks (Adeola 2007; Lee et al. 2005). Similarly, 
people with high trust have been found to associate less risk with specific 
technologies, like nuclear or chemical plants (Bord and O’Connor 1997; 
Siegrist, Gutscher and Earle 2005; Spies et al. 1998). Thus, environmental 
concern is lower for those individuals who have high trust in the institu-
tions that are in charge of managing those risks and environmental threats. 
People who lack trust are unsure that environmental risks can be properly 
safeguarded and therefore exhibit higher environmental concern. However 
much of the empirical investigations have focused on North America and 
Western Europe, while is little known about the links between trust and 
environmental attitudes in the transition countries. Building on this re-
search, we investigate the relative effect of social trust on environmental 
concern in Bulgaria. 
Environmental Concern and Perceived Threats: Situating Bulgaria in 
the European Context
Bulgaria has experienced rapid social and economic changes in the past two 
decades, which have also affected public environmental attitudes. On the 
one hand, public opinion and societal attitudes, including on nature pro-
tection, have been shaped by the socio-economic transformations moving 
from a communist to a capitalist economy (Baumgartl 1995; Desai and 
Snavely 1998; Dainov 2000; Genov 1993). In addition, the country has wit-
nessed rapid economic growth, including the expansion of mass tourism 
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(Stoilova 2007). The protection of nature areas rich in biodiversity and the 
construction of new resorts in the mountains and the seaside has led to im-
portant public debates regarding environmental protection and sustainable 
development across the country (Staddon and Cellarius 2002; Stoilova 
and Bieri 2010; Mantarova 2010). Survey research shows that a majority of 
Bulgarians oppose excessive building in protected nature areas, especially 
on the coast and in the mountains; are against the imports of genetically 
modified foods; favor a ban on the extraction of shale gas; and oppose the 
development of nuclear energy in the country, specifically, the plans for 
building a second nuclear power station (Pickard 2013; Vaisova 2013).
Moreover, the emergence of the third sector including a host of green 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) marks one of the key socio-po-
litical changes in Bulgaria (Cellarius and Staddon 2002; Desai and Sna-
vely 1998). The rise of Bulgaria’s green civil society sector is evident in the 
sizable number of active green NGOs and the frequency and visibility of 
campaigns and protests organized on environmental issues (Stoilova 2007; 
Mantarova 2010). The green sector of civil society in Bulgaria comprises 
numerous group initiatives and organizations in defense of natural ter-
ritories or endangered animal and bird species. A most recent example is 
the “Occupy Wall Street” inspired “Occupy Orlov Most” movement, which 
was joined by thousands of protestors in early June 2012. The movement 
and protests emerged in opposition to amendments to the Forest Act that 
would allow for new constructions infringing on nature protected areas, 
forest cutting and further developments of the ski resorts.1 
Despite these civic society developments important challenges remain. 
Numerous reports have identified low membership numbers and persis-
tent public distrust in non-governmental organizations as key obstacles 
for an effective and sustainable third sector in the country (Kabakchieva 
and Hristova 2012; CIVICUS 2011; USAID 2010; 2012). Still, environmental 
NGOs appear to enjoy greater public trust than organizations in other sec-
tors. A recent analysis showed that more than 80 percent of Bulgarians 
believe that environmental organizations help to preserve nature; while 
01 Although quite prominent and visible, this green civic movement “Occupy 
Orlov Most” was overshadowed by a new and entirely unrelated initiative 
named “Orlov Most Movement” protesting high electricity prices in early 
2013. Aside from the common name – locating their protests on the Ea-
gle’s Bridge (Orlov Most) and using its symbolism – there is no connection 
between the two civic initiatives. In fact, they have very diverging political 
orientations. Political analysts have interpreted these second Orlov Most 
protests as “attempts at taking over civil society by creating imitations of 
civic organizations and activities” (Stoyanov 2013, np). Such imitations or 
co-optations contribute to public confusion and to public distrust against 
civic initiatives in Bulgaria (Vaisova 2013).
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fewer than 20 percent believe that green NGOs hinder economic growth 
(Stoilova and Bieri 2010). 
The processes outlined above have all likely impacted on societal at-
titudes on environmental issues, including environmental concerns and 
perceived environmental risks. Table 1 displays the percentage of people 
that report being concerned about environmental issues. The findings are 
based on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2010. 
In addition to showing the levels of concern in Bulgaria, we also display 
average rates for EU and transition countries in order to situate Bulgaria in 
the larger European context.
As shown in table 1, on average, Bulgarians report significantly higher lev-
els of concern on environmental issues compared to other EU and transition 
countries. Fifty-six percent of respondents in Bulgaria report being very con-
cerned or concerned about environmental issues. In comparison, that level 
stands at 53 percent in the EU and at 46 percent in transition countries. A 
similar picture emerges with respect to a diverse set of environmental issues.
When asked about the environmental danger of air pollution caused by 
cars, 63 percent of Bulgarian respondents state that the issue is extreme-
ly or very dangerous. Lower average levels of concern can be observed in 
transition countries, with 56 percent, and even lower levels of perceived 
danger – 50 percent – in the EU. Although significant differences in public 
opinions can be noted with respect to air pollution caused by cars, no such 
divergence is observed when looking at air pollution caused by industry. 
Here the perceived levels of threat are similar across the countries.
In Bulgaria, 77 percent perceive the environmental threat from the use 
of pesticides and chemicals in farming as extremely or very dangerous. Only 
slightly lower is the percent in transition countries (with 74 percent) and 
in the EU it stands at 70 percent. As shown in table 1, the level of concern 
over river, lake and stream pollution once again is highest in comparison 
to other transition or the fellow EU countries. In Bulgaria, 71 percent of 
respondents report the rise in the world’s temperature caused by climate 
change as extremely or very dangerous. The average level of concern in EU 
and transition countries is markedly lower, with 58 and 57 percent respec-
tively. When compared to the other environmental threats, fewer Bulgar-
ians rate nuclear power as dangerous. Still the country’s share of concerned 
individuals (60 percent) is significantly higher compared to average levels 
of concern in the EU (55 percent) or transition countries (56 percent).2
02 The Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011 likely had significant effects 
on public attitudes toward nuclear power in the various countries. The data 
for ISSP 2010 Environment III were collected in 2010 for some countries and 
in 2011 for others. Comparisons on this item are therefore problematic.
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Table 1  Levels of environmental concern and perceived dangers: 
  EU Countries, Transition Countries, and Bulgaria.
EU
Countries
Transition 
Countries
Bulgaria
Percent of respondents that 
report being very concerned 
or concerned about 
% % %
environmental issues 53* 46* 56
Percent of respondents that 
report specific issue extremely 
dangerous or very dangerous
% % %
air pollution caused by cars 50* 56* 63
air pollution caused by 
industry
72 75 75
pesticides and chemicals used 
in farming
70* 74 77
pollution of rivers, lakes and 
streams
68* 68* 79
a rise in the world’s 
temperature caused by 
climate change
58* 57* 71
nuclear power stations 55* 56* 60
modifying the genes of 
certain crops
53* 58* 70
Data Source: ISSP 2010.
EU Countries: Bulgaria, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom; Transition Countries: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
* Indicates that the difference between Bulgaria and comparison 
countries (EU or Transition Countries) is statistically significant 
(t-tests).
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The largest difference – 17 percent – between the EU and Bulgaria in per-
ceived threats can be observed on the issue of Genetically Modified Organ-
isms (GMOs). Seventy percent of Bulgarians report GMOs as extremely or 
very dangerous to the environment. Among its fellow European Union 
members that percentage stands at 53 percent. What likely explains the 
high levels of concern over GMOs in Bulgaria is a widely publicized and 
successful anti-GMO campaign in 2009-2010. The campaign was organ-
ized against a new law permitting the dissemination and use of GMOs in 
the country (Stoilova and Bieri 2010). Initially the campaign was mostly 
internet based, but quickly caught major media attention, which in turn 
was followed by developments in institutional decision making at gov-
ernmental and parliamentary level. Eventually, it led to the adoption of 
the Genetically Modified Organisms Act, which introduced even stricter 
restrictions than those maintained in a number of European countries 
with regard to GMOs3.
Empirical Analysis: Determinants of Environmental Concern in Bulgaria
To investigate the determinants of environmental concern, we use data on 
Bulgaria from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2010 Envi-
ronmental III. The ISSP 2010 survey asks a broad set of questions regarding 
environmental attitudes, behavior, and beliefs. In addition, the data allow 
us to study the effects of income, post-materialistic values, and trust on 
environmental concern. The ISSP 2010 survey in Bulgaria was based on a 
nationally representative sample, with a sample size of 1003. After exclu-
sion of missing values the total number of respondents included in this 
analysis is 788. 
We now discuss the specific survey items that we use for our analysis. 
Our dependent variable is environmental concern. We use the following 
survey question to measure environmental concern: “Generally speaking, 
how concerned are you about environmental issues?” The answer options 
range from 1 “Not at all concerned” to 5 “Very concerned”. As table 2 shows, 
only 5 percent of Bulgarian respondents reported that they are not at all 
concerned about environmental issues. Twenty-six percent stated that they 
are very concerned and another 30 percent marked the second highest level 
of concern. The distribution of the answers indicates that more Bulgarians 
hold rather strong concerns, while a minority of the population is not con-
cerned about environmental issues. 
03 A law banning GMOs on the territory of Bulgaria was passed on March 18, 
2010. 
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The ISSP 2010 survey includes two questions that measure post-materi-
alistic values based on Inglehart’s theory. Respondents are asked to mark 
the highest and second highest priority the country should have. The post-
materialistic items on the list are: give people more say in government deci-
sions and protect freedom of speech. The materialistic items are: maintain 
order in the nation and fight rising prices. The maximum post-material 
score is 2 for people who select a post-materialistic item as the country’s 
first and second priority. The minimum score is 0 for people who select 
two materialistic items. Three percent of Bulgarian respondents marked 
two post-materialistic items as the desired priorities for the country and 
therefore exhibit strong post-materialistic values. Nearly 50 percent of 
Bulgarians selected at least one post-materialistic item, and 48 percent 
marked exclusively materialistic items as desired priorities for Bulgaria.
Following previous literature, we study two aspects of trust: trust in gov-
ernment (Adeola 2007; Lee et al. 2005) and generalized social trust (Kunio-
ka and Woller 1999; Paldam and Svedsen 2002; Raiser 1999). We measure 
trust in government with the following survey question: “Most of the time 
we can trust people in government to do what is right”. Respondents could 
mark whether they strongly agreed, agreed, neither agreed or disagreed, 
disagreed, or strongly disagreed with that statement. When looking at gov-
ernmental trust, we can observe that only a small minority (3 percent) of 
respondents expressed strong trust, while 18 percent stated that people in 
government can be trusted. A larger share of the population expressed lack 
of trust: 35 percent disagreed and 23 percent strongly disagreed that people 
in government can be trusted. Thus, nearly sixty percent of respondents 
lack trust in government. 
The following survey item is used to measure generalized social trust: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Answer options ranged 
from 1 “You can’t be too careful” to 5 “Most people can be trusted”. As 
shown in table 2, the distribution is strongly tilted toward distrust, with 
over 70 percent of respondents reporting not trusting unknown others. 
Nearly 40 percent of respondents stated that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people. A relatively small fraction of respondents, five per-
cent, reported that most people can be trusted. The social trust patterns 
that we observe in this survey with respect to government and to unknown 
others mirror similar findings from other sources (i.e., Eurobarometer, 
World Value Survey).
The socio-demographic characteristics of the survey respondents are 
shown in appendix table 1. Survey respondents were asked to report their 
average monthly income in the local currency, leva. The average personal 
income reported is 347 leva, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 2,500 
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leva. The average age of survey respondents was 52 years. The youngest 
respondent was 18 and the oldest was 90 years old. Fifty-eight percent of 
respondents were women, indicating a slight over-representation. Sixteen 
percent of the respondents were minorities, identifying themselves either 
as Turk or Roma. Twenty-four percent of respondents have completed a 
college or university education. 
Next we investigate how environmental concern is impacted by people’s 
post-material values, their trust levels in addition to income and socio-
demographic characteristics. We expect that people with higher incomes, 
those with post-materialistic values, and higher education express greater 
levels of environmental concern. Bulgarians who trust the government are 
expected to be less concerned. The effect of generalized trust is unclear. 
Younger people and women are expected to show greater concern, while 
the direction of the effect of ethnicity is unclear. 
For our regression analysis we recoded the above specified variables as 
follows. We recoded the dependent variable – environmental concern – as 
a dummy variable, which equals to 1 for respondents who report being very 
concerned or concerned with the survey item and 0 for all others. To ana-
lyze our binary dependent variable we use a probit model. The independ-
ent variables also were recoded. Income was recoded as categorical variable 
with values ranging from 1 to 10, capturing monthly personal income in 
increments of 100 leva: 1=less than 101 leva, 2=101-200 leva….10=more than 
900 leva. Both trust measures were recoded as dummy variables. Trust in 
Government takes on the value of 1 for respondents who strongly agree or 
agree with the statement “most times we can trust people in government 
to do what is right” and 0 for all others. Generalized Trust equals to 1 for 
those that report to high or very high trust in people and 0 for all others. A 
summary of the recoded variables is provided in appendix table 1. 
In column one, we present our baseline results from our probit model4. 
We find no significant effects of income on respondents’ environmental 
concerns. The results indicate that women are significantly more likely to 
state concern about environmental issues. The coefficient suggests that 
women are 8 percent more likely to state being very concerned or con-
cerned compared to men. Similarly, we find significant effects for ethnicity. 
Respondents that identify as either Turk or Roma are nearly 20 percent less 
likely to state concern over environmental issues compared to respond-
ents identifying as ethnic Bulgarians. We note no significant differences 
04 We also conducted robustness checks with different specifications. We 
included various age measures, income as continuous variable, and trust 
as categorical variables, as well as the inclusion of additional control vari-
ables. The results remain unchanged.
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by age. We also tested for non-linear effects of age on concern, but found 
no significant evidence of this. Higher education appears to have a positive 
effect: respondents with higher education are 22 percent more likely to re-
port being concerned compared to respondents without higher education.
Table 3  Determinants of Environmental Concern.
(1) (2) (3)
Income
0.001
(0.009)
0.001
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.009)
Post-Materialism
0.023
(0.033)
0.018
(0.034)
Trust in Government
-0.084*
(0.047)
Generalized Trust
0.193***
(0.049)
Female
0.084**
(0.039)
0.090**
(0.039)
0.075*
(0.040)
Minority
-0.195***
(0.049)
-0.190***
(0.050)
-0.177***
(0.052)
Age
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Higher Education
0.223***
(0.007)
0.214***
(0.046)
0.215***
(0.046)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0566 0.0566 0.0667
No. of Observations 788 778 757
 
The model presented in the second column includes an additional vari-
able: post-materialistic values. When controlling for gender, education, 
ethnicity and age, we find no significant effects of income or post-material 
values on respondents’ level of environmental concern. The results for the 
socio-demographic characteristics are consistent with the findings in the 
previous model. 
Next, we introduce social trust as explanatory variables: trust in govern-
ment and generalized social trust, that is, trust in unknown others. We 
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find that trust in government has a significant negative effect on concern: 
respondents who strongly agree or agree that those in government can 
be trusted are 8 percent less likely to report being very concerned or con-
cerned about environmental issues compared to respondents who report 
not trusting people in government. This supports previous findings that 
point to the fact that trust in government reduces concern (Adeola 2007; 
Lee et al. 2005; Siegrist, Gutscher and Earle 2005; Spies et al. 1998). The 
argument is that those who trust the government have confidence that 
environmental problems can be resolved through government policies. 
The opposite pattern can be observed with generalized trust, which ap-
pears to raise people’s level of concern. Respondents who trust unknown 
others are 19 percent more likely to report being concerned compared to 
respondents that do not trust others. The process may be as follows: indi-
viduals who have greater trust in unknown others are more likely to trust 
information about environmental threats by the media, by NGOs, by ex-
perts or risks communicated in conversations with others. Further research 
is required to establish the precise mechanisms through which generalized 
social trust affects people’s concern over environmental problems. The 
findings presented here point to the importance of considering social trust 
in research on environmental concerns. In addition, the results indicate the 
need to differentiate in the analyses between specific components of social 
trust, taking into account its multi-dimensionality.
 
Conclusions
In this chapter, we explored the social factors that shape individuals’ en-
vironmental concern. Previous literature has found that income, post-ma-
terialism, and various socio-demographic characteristics are important in 
predicting environmental attitudes. Building on these studies, we have 
investigated the effects of income, post-materialistic values and social trust 
– a factor that remains underexplored – on environmental concern in Bul-
garia, using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
2010 Environmental survey. The analysis sheds light on the determinants 
of environmental concern in transition contexts, an area which has re-
ceived only marginal attention. 
We find that in Bulgaria, income or post materialistic values do not sig-
nificantly affect environmental concern. Higher education appears a con-
sistent and strong predictor for people’s environmental concerns. Simi-
larly we note consistent and substantial gender differences, with Bulgarian 
women reporting higher levels of concern compared to men. Age does not 
appear to influence environmental concern in Bulgaria. We find that eth-
nic Bulgarians state higher levels of environmental concern compared to 
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ethnic minorities in the country. We find that people’s social trust has sig-
nificant consequences for their respective levels of concern. 
When differentiating between different types of trust, the following 
pattern emerges: while trust in government decreases people’s concern 
over environmental issues, trust in others increases their level of concern. 
We offer the following interpretation: higher trust in authorities indicates 
higher confidence in the ability to solve environmental problems, while at 
the same time, higher generalized trust means greater confidence in infor-
mation about the seriousness of environmental calamities. These findings 
suggest that more nuanced measures of social trust are important in order 
to disentangle those differential effects. 
Particularly useful would be further research on the effects of the fol-
lowing dimensions: trust in various information providers including the 
media and non-governmental organizations, trust in scientists, and trust 
in different levels of government (local, national, and international). Such 
studies would be able to analyze how people’s environmental concerns 
are linked to their trust in green NGOs, in the enforcement of particular 
legislation, in various political institutions in and beyond the nation state. 
Further attention is also required to assess how trust in government affects 
concerns and risk perceptions of specific environmental issues, like GMOs, 
global warming, or nuclear power. Lastly, comparative investigations are 
needed in order to test macro level theories on environmentalism. Con-
cretely, empirical comparative work should study various dimensions of 
globalization and its impact on environmentalism, examining the particu-
lar realities of globalization in the local contexts of transition countries. 
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Structure and action potential of 
environmental attitudes and knowledge 
of environmental problems in Croatia
Krešimir Kufrin
9
Introduction: Socio–Ecological Studies in Croatia
There is a relatively long tradition of survey based studies examining so-
cio–ecological1 issues in Croatian sociology. The first study of this kind was 
conducted in 1986 as part of the project “Environmental Awareness among 
Young People” (Cifrić and čulig 1987; Cifrić 1988) and another was con-
ducted in 1987 as a part of the project “Environmental Aspects of Social 
Development” (Cifrić 1989). These initial studies were conducted on spe-
cific and relatively small samples: the first one on a sample of high school 
and university students in Zagreb (N=548), and the second one on a sample 
of inhabitants of three rural settlements in Posavina2 (N=164). These first 
research efforts attempted to shape a theoretical framework considered ap-
propriate for examining socio–ecological issues in the Croatian context and 
to check the initial research instruments, bearing in mind contemporary 
theoretical discussions and empirical studies conducted in other countries.
As early as 1988–9, also in the scope of the project “Environmental As-
pects of Social Development”, the first major socio–ecological study was 
conducted on a nationally representative sample (N=2714). This study used 
a particularly extensive questionnaire to explore attitudes on various so-
cio–ecological issues (the relationship between nature, technology and hu-
mans, problems associated with pollution, ways of solving environmental 
problems, problems concerning population, food and resources, participa-
tion in solving environmental issues etc.). A large portion of the question-
01 The adjective “socio–ecological” is used because the sociological approach 
to the issue of environment is characterised by examining the interaction 
between society and the environment; the environment is not regarded 
primarily as an objective fact but as a social relation and construct.
02 A region in central Croatia, around the river Sava (ed.).
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naire was reserved for topics relating to production and the consumption 
of energy. In addition, different concepts of progress and development 
were also examined and an array of individual and societal values was stud-
ied in detail. Relatively complex statistical procedures were used in data 
analysis, such as factorial and multiple regression analysis as well as the 
canonical correlation analysis, although these were not commonly used 
in works from the field of sociology. The aim of these complex analyses 
was to investigate “environmental consciousness”, that is, the structure 
and presence of socio–ecological orientations (anthropocentrism, natural-
ism, technocentrism).3 This study had a manifold effect on later studies of 
socio–ecological topics in Croatia, which mainly followed its conceptual 
postulates and analytical and interpretative framework, using verified re-
search instruments with minor or major modifications. In addition, the 
above mentioned projects had a considerable impact on the establishment 
of environmental sociology (social ecology)4 within the Croatian sociology, 
as well as on the founding of the journal “Socijalna ekologija” (eng. Social 
Ecology) which today represents the main forum for studies and research 
in the field of environmental sociology and related domains.5
It should also be noted that all the stated projects and the rest of the survey 
studies mentioned in this overview were conducted by the Research unit 
of the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb. This 
fact is not a result of the author’s bias; to our knowledge, no other scientific 
or teaching institution in Croatia has conducted systematic socio–ecological 
survey studies. Some smaller studies conducted outside of the Department 
of Sociology were performed in the scope of postgraduate level dissertations 
(Racz 1992), or were a result of certain authors’ specific interests concern-
ing local environmental problems (Kantar et al. 2009; Stanić et al. 2009), 
or problems regarding their profession (šajković 1993; Uzelac et al. 1997). 
03 A more detailed explanation of this study’s conceptual framework was giv-
en in Cifrić 1990 and Čulig 1992. The discussed analytical and interpretative 
approach, aimed primarily at questioning socio–ecological orientations, is 
visible not only in the mentioned publications but also in the works of the 
mentioned authors and other members of the research team published in 
the journal “Social Ecology”. The later works – especially those by I. Cifrić 
– use the terms “biocentrism” and “ecocentrism” instead of the original 
term “naturalism”. 
04 One should also bear in mind that the course “Social Ecology” was intro-
duced into the undergraduate curriculum for Sociology at the Department 
of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb even earlier, in the school 
year 1985–6, and postgraduate study of “Social Ecology” was also intro-
duced in 1986 at the same department (Cifrić 2011).
05 In 1994, journal “Social Ecology” has started to publish books in a series 
called “Razvoj i okoliš” (eng. Development and the Environment).
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Due to financial difficulties, the following several survey studies by the 
Department of Sociology were conducted on smaller samples, using either 
convenience or intentional samples. So, the 1992 study6 (Cifrić 1994), that 
was based on the previous research both in concept and operationalization, 
was conducted on a representative sample of students at the University of 
Zagreb and the University of Rijeka (N=547). The 1994 study7 encompassed 
seven professional groups (N=682) and it predominantly explored various 
topics regarding environmental policies (Cifrić et al. 1998). The following 
study, conducted in 19978, used a sample of students from four faculties at 
the University of Zagreb (N=685). Along with the socio–ecological topics, 
this study also examined attitudes towards the use of genetic technology 
(Cifrić 1998). Another study was conducted on a student sample in 2002. 
This study was more specific than earlier studies, as it paid more attention 
to proenvironmental behaviour and knowledge of environmental issues 
(Kufrin 2002a).
The later studies, conducted by the Department of Sociology in the scope 
of the project “The Modernisation and Identity of Croatian Society”, placed 
a much smaller emphasis on environmental issues. Thus, the questionnaire 
used in the 2004 study (N=1202, representative national sample) included 
only a few questions on this topic, and the 2010 study (N=1008, a repre-
sentative national sample) contained only one question that allowed for 
the categorization of participants according to their socio–ecological ori-
entation. The questionnaires in these two studies were dominated by other 
topics, relevant for the construction of social identities (Cifrić 2008b; 
Cifrić et al. 2013). Socio–ecological orientations were considered to be just 
one of the relational dimensions of identity (Cifrić and Nikodem 2006).
In addition to the above stated studies, the Department of Sociology con-
ducted some other research dedicated to specific, but still socio–ecologically 
relevant topics such as toxic waste disposal (Kufrin and Smerić 1992), the 
utilisation of municipal waste (Karajić and Smerić 1992), production and 
the use of energy (čaldarović and Rogić 1990; Domac et al. 2004a; Kufrin 
et al. 2004) and perceptions of landscape (Cifrić and Trako 2008a; 2008b).
All in all, one can assume that environmental sociology (social ecology) 
has been one of the most active research fields in Croatian sociology over 
the past quarter of a century and that many valuable insights concerning 
the relations between various segments the population and a number of 
06 The study was conducted in the scope of the project “Socio–ecological 
Aspects of Development”.
07 The study was conducted in the scope of the project “Socio–ecological 
Aspects of Development”.
08 The study was conducted in the scope of the project “Socio–ecological 
and Modernisation Processes in Croatia”. 
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issues regarding the environment and environmental problems have been 
realized owing to these survey studies. However, even though the studies 
were relatively numerous and conducted over intervals of several years, a 
variability of samples used (regarding the size, type and population they 
represented) makes the job of accumulating and systematising these find-
ings, of comparing their results, and studying trends quite difficult. In ad-
dition, the predominant research focus was on socio–ecological values and 
attitudes concerning various aspects of socio–ecological problems. This has 
resulted in relatively less research having been conducted on the other two 
members of the “holy trinity” of socio–ecological space – knowledge of en-
vironmental problems and proenvironmental behaviour. The smaller num-
ber of studies on these topics has been influenced by – besides the personal 
preferences and interests of research teams – the fact that institutions in 
charge of environmental protection and finding solutions to environmen-
tal problems have shown no interest in applying the results obtained. Ap-
plied studies were conducted very sporadically and only a small portion of 
their results have been published.
As concerns the described history of socio–ecological studies in Croa-
tia, we cannot fully agree with the remark made by Domazet et al. that 
“until the ISSP conducted their survey, there were no systematic studies 
or examinations of attitudes towards ecology and environmental issues 
in Croatia, only isolated parts of studies of a small number of interested 
scientists” and that “because of this, there has been no insights into how 
informed the citizens of the Republic of Croatia are on issues concerning 
the environment and what their attitudes are on this topic” (Domazet, 
Dolenec and ančić 2012, 26). However, we do agree that the inclusion of 
Croatia in The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and research 
into socio–ecological issues in the framework of ISSP’s module dedicated to 
the environment “does not just provide researchers with new possibilities 
for discovering the attitudes of the public on environmental topics but it 
also allows us to compare Croatia to other countries that are taking part in 
this research programme, opening up the possibility of further longitudinal 
research.” (Domazet, Dolenec and ančić 2012, 26). These “new possibili-
ties” are considered extremely significant, even though the questionnaire 
used in the ISSP’s module on the environment can be regarded as only a 
partial elaboration of the socio–ecological issues9.
09 For instance, ISSP’s module does not permit something that has been a 
dominant topic in studies conducted by the Department of Sociology as 
well as in some other research traditions (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978, Dun-
lap et al. 2000, Milbrath 1985, Herrera 1992) – the reconstruction of rather 
complex structures of values and attitudes, such as ecological paradigms 
or socio–ecological orientations. In addition, the ISSP’s survey marginalises 
knowledge of environmental issues. 
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Scope and the Aims of the Study
The basic aim of this study is to examine the action potential of attitudes 
and knowledge on environmental issues, that is, to determine to what ex-
tent their variations can explain the differences in Croatian citizens’ readi-
ness for personal contribution to environmental protection. The analysis 
will be conducted using results obtained in 2011 on the ISSP module “En-
vironment III” for the Republic of Croatia.10 Previous studies have shown 
that Croatian citizens tend to have proenvironmental attitudes and value 
orientations, but that their knowledge of the environment and environ-
mental problems is quite modest, as is their willingness to demonstrate 
their dedication to proenvironmental values through actions and behav-
iour for the benefit of the environment (Kufrin 1996; Kufrin 2002b). In 
spite of this, studies conducted so far – especially those that used samples 
from general population – have rarely investigated the relationship be-
tween proenvironmental behaviour and attitudes or knowledge regarding 
environmental issues (Cifrić 1997a; Karajić 1999). We are hoping that this 
paper will fill this void, at least to a certain degree. In addition to theoreti-
cal relevance, the correlation of behaviour with attitudes and knowledge 
has a practical relevance as it allows for the efficient evaluation of potential 
attempts to stimulate proenvironmental behaviour amongst certain parts 
of population through activities aimed at improving their knowledge of 
environmental problems, or strengthening proenvironmental attitudes. 
In the following part of this work, we shall first present and interpret the 
results from certain instruments that are used to measure environmental 
knowledge, attitudes towards the environment and environmental prob-
lems with various degrees of generality and foci, and proenvironmental 
behaviour. The following instruments – i.e. survey questions – were used:
•	 level of knowledge regarding the causes of and solutions to environ-
mental problems (questions 8a, 8b)
•	 general sensibility (concern) for environmental issues (question 6)
•	 the importance of environmental protection in comparison to other 
social problems (question 1a, 1b)
•	 the importance of certain environmental problems for Croatia with 
regard to their individual effects (questions 7a, 7b)
•	 the estimated danger for the environment from various sources of pol-
lution and the use of certain technologies (questions 14–14g)
10 The research was conducted in Spring 2011 on a sample of 1210 respondents. 
The sample can be considered representative for the population of adult 
citizens of Croatia considering their regional background, residential status, 
age and sex. The data were gathered through individual interviews. More 
details on this sample can be found in Domazet, dolenec and ančić 2012, 26.
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•	 attitudes towards the purpose and effects of personal participation in 
environmental protection (questions 13a–13g)
•	 willingness to make material sacrifices in order to protect the environ-
ment (questions 12a–12c)
•	 proenvironmental behaviour (questions 20a–20f, 21, 22a–22c).
After the assessment of proenvironmental orientation of Croatian citi-
zens expressed through their answers to the questions mentioned above, 
measurement instruments (scales) needed to determine the relationship 
between proenvironmental behaviour and environmental attitudes and 
knowledge will be constructed and evaluated.
The instruments obtained will be used in multiple regression analysis 
intended to provide an answer to primary question of this study: to what 
extent can proenvironmental behaviour be predicted from environmental 
attitudes and knowledge?
Finally, conclusions resulting form the conducted analyses will be pre-
sented, as well as some recommendations for further research on the re-
lationship between environmental attitudes, knowledge and behaviour.
Bearing in mind the fact that earlier socio–ecological studies in Croatia 
were conducted using different research instruments and that some of 
them were limited to studying specific populations, their results do not per-
mit us to develop empirically–based hypotheses that could be tested here. 
Therefore, the analyses presented in this work are of an explorative nature. 
Results of the Study and Discussion
Knowledge about the Causes of Environmental Problems and 
Solutions to them
There are two possible approaches to the measurement of environmental 
knowledge, i.e. two types of survey instruments that can be used.
Objective knowledge tests are instruments consisting of a number of 
items that can differ regarding the question format and tasks set to the 
participants, as well as regarding the format of the answers. There are two 
frequently used kinds of instruments of this type. The first includes a series 
of sentences displaying facts or misconceptions regarding certain topics, 
and participants are required to evaluate whether or not they are correct/
true. The other type of objective knowledge test offers several answers to 
each question among which participants are required to choose the answer 
considered to be correct. The number of given answers can vary from test 
to test (most usually from three to five with only one correct answer). It is 
desirable that the number of answers is the same for all questions in a test. 
It is also beneficial to have a large number of alternatives as this prevents 
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one from selecting the right answer by choice alone, but it is often rather 
hard to formulate a large number of incorrect answers that are neither too 
apparently incorrect nor too close to the correct answer. The objective 
character of these tests stems from the fact that grading these answers is 
strictly guided by an unambiguous list of correct answers, which means 
that the test results do not depend on the subjective assessment of a person 
that evaluates the answers. The element of arbitrariness that may be intro-
duced by the evaluator’s subjective assessment of an answer is the reason 
why tests without pre–established answers, i.e. tests with open–ended 
questions are seldom used. Regardless of the style of test, they themselves 
may differ in the extent and homogeneity of content they include: from 
those focused on a relatively narrow single topic (for instance, the effects 
of climate changes, energy efficiency etc.) to those which include a whole 
range of content that can be considered part of some general topic (for in-
stance, the causes of global environmental problems).
The second way of measuring environmental knowledge is self–eval-
uation: respondents themselves evaluate their own knowledge, placing 
themselves on a certain point of a given scale. Some instruments of this 
kind are quite simple, reduced to a single variable. Such instruments are 
used to measure general environmental knowledge rather than knowledge 
of specific environmental issues. The more complex measurement instru-
ments may ask participants to position themselves on several continua, 
grading their knowledge of multiple topics, more or less related. Measuring 
environmental knowledge through respondents’ self–assessment also has 
its difficulties. First of all, the consistency of the assessment criteria is very 
questionable – some participants will make self–assessment by comparing 
themselves with experts, others will assess themselves in comparison to 
friends or acquaintances, while some will base the evaluation on their own 
assumptions regarding the knowledge of the majority of the population. 
In addition, self–assessment largely depends on certain personal traits. Fi-
nally, the question is – especially when single item instruments are used 
to measure general knowledge – which aspects the participants take into 
consideration when making their assessment.
Even though both methods of measuring environmental knowledge are 
often used, we believe that a well–designed objective test is a more valid 
measure of environmental knowledge than a well–designed instrument 
based on participants’ self–assessment.11
11 For additional discussion concerning conceptual and operational ap-
proaches and problems with measuring environmental knowledge, see 
Kufrin 2003.
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In three waves of the research on environmental issues in the ISSP pro-
gramme, both types of instruments have been used. The first two studies 
used a certain modification of the objective test. The survey questionnaire 
used in the first wave, conducted in 1993, contained twelve questions, six 
of which were predominantly used to measure scientific knowledge (how-
ever, some of those questions were also relevant to environmental knowl-
edge). Further two questions measured inclinations towards superstition 
or a scientific world view, and four focused on measuring certain elements 
of environmental knowledge – two covered the causes of the greenhouse 
effect and two dealt with the decreasing biological diversity and air pol-
lution caused by road traffic. Interestingly enough, these questions came 
with four degrees response set, making it unclear whether the instrument 
was designed to measure knowledge or attitudes.12
The second wave, conducted in 2000, kept six of the twelve questions 
used in 1993, two of which can be considered to measure environmental 
knowledge in the narrow sense of the word. The assessment scale remained 
the same as in 1993.
In the third wave (2010) – covered in this work – the questions measur-
ing environmental knowledge were completely changed. On the one hand, 
participants’ self–assessment was used instead the objective test; on the 
other hand, question focus was shifted from very specific topics to general 
knowledge of “environment–related problems” and their current and pos-
sible solutions.
We welcome this change as it allows for an easier examination of the 
relationship between environmental knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour. 
The expected correlation between the three entities is somewhat greater 
when all three are at the same level of generality and deal with a similar 
topic (Prišlin 1993; Kufrin 1996). In this respect, the measure of general 
environmental knowledge – even if it is based on a self–assessment – better 
fits a general character of measures of attitudes and behaviour used in the 
2010 questionnaire than would be the case with the thematically narrow 
questions used in the 1993 and 2000 surveys.
According to the distributions and mean values of the results given us-
ing the two scales, the average level of environmental knowledge can be 
12 1 – definitely true; 2 – probably true; 3 – probably not true; 4 – definitely 
not true. The correct answers were considered to be 1 and 2 or 3 and 4, de-
pending on the question (Gendall et al. 1995). So, participants are left a cer-
tain margin within which their answers were considered correct or incor-
rect. Of course, one could also grade their answers differently, depending 
on the degree of certainty in choosing the “right side” of the scale. Some 
studies by the Eurobarometer (for instance: EB 55.2) use almost identical 
questions but with a dichotomous answer format (correct/incorrect).
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described as moderate (Table 1). The difference between the (somewhat 
better) knowledge of causes and the (somewhat worse) knowledge of solu-
tions to environmental problems is not large, but it is also not so small to be 
devoid of any theoretical and practical relevance. One should also note the 
tendency of the participants to place themselves in the middle of the scale 
and their aversion to choosing more extreme answers. This “escape from 
extremes” is not an uncommon phenomenon with instruments based on 
participants’ self–assessment.
Table 1  Self–assessment of general knowledge concerning the causes of 
  and solutions to environmental problems (valid percents, valid 
  number of participants, mean value, standard deviation)
8. How much do you 
feel you know about 
KN
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1 2 3 4 5 N M SD
8a the causes of 
these sorts of 
environmental 
problems? 
6.2 15.5 42.0 25.5 10.7 1192 3.19 1.03
8b solutions to 
these sorts of 
environmental 
problems?
11.1 22.1 41.3 18.6 6.8 1183 2.88 1.05
General Concern for Environmental Issues and Problems
The term environmental concern, usually used in the English social science 
literature to refer to a set of attitudes towards environmental issues and 
problems, is hard to translate to Croatian language. In this phrase, the noun 
concern has several layers of meaning that need to be taken into considera-
tion. First of all, concern can be understood as being concerned or worried 
about something (in this case, the environment) which represents a real or 
potential threat. However, this term can also be interpreted as taking care 
of something we are related to. Ultimately, concern can refer to the interest, 
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attention that we give to something as it affects us.
Bearing in mind all the above mentioned meanings, it seems worthy to 
note that the formulation of the question and the assessment scale used 
in the Croatian version of the questionnaire to examine general relation 
towards “environmental issues and problems” was aimed primarily at the 
first meaning mentioned above – concern about environmental issues and 
problems, that is, about the threat they represent.13 Even though the sur-
vey question does not specify whether it refers to “environmental issues” 
on a global, national or any other even narrower level, we believe that the 
answers to this question can be used as a measure of general concern about 
environmental issues and problems.
The results (Table 2) show that the level of environmental concern 
amongst the Croatian population is moderate: even though the answers 
that refer to higher levels of “concern about environmental issues” are 
almost twice as frequent as those that deny or minimise that concern, the 
mean value of the results is close to the midpoint of the assessment scale.
Table 2  General concern for environmental issues and problems 
  (valid percents, valid number of participants, mean   
  value, standard deviation)
6. Generally speaking, 
how concerned 
are you about 
environmental 
issues? N
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1 2 3 4 5 N M SD
7.4 14.8 36.3 28.1 13.0 1204 3.25 1.09
This finding is in accordance with the low importance attributed to the 
“environment” in relation to other social questions and problems: only 2% 
of citizens consider the “environment” to be “the most important ques-
tion in Croatia today”, and another 5.2% place “environment” in second 
13 Editors’ note: In this text the original phrasing of questions from the Eng-
lish language version of the questionnaire is used in tables. Possible varia-
tions in meaning between English and Croatian questions are explained in 
the text. 
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place when listing the most important problems. Problems relating to the 
economy, poverty, and social services such as healthcare and education, and 
criminality are regarded as much more important social issues.14
If the comparison is limited to environmental problems and their rela-
tive importance in Croatia today, one can see that citizens do not consider 
any of the environmental problems to be important enough to be clear-
ly separated from the rest. When dealing with assessments that refer to 
“Croatia in general”, the biggest importance is attributed to the pollution 
of the water (16.4%) and air (15.5%), as well as the depletion of natural re-
sources (15.3%). Estimates of the effect of environmental problems on the 
personal and family level are even more balanced: the biggest threat here 
is considered to be water (15.3%) and air (13.4%) pollution, while geneti-
cally modified food (12.9%), household waste disposal (12.5%), the use of 
chemicals and pesticides (11.7%), and the effects of climate change (11.2%) 
are considered to be just slightly less dangerous.15
If we try to draw a conclusion concerning how Croatian citizens per-
ceive the state of the environment, one could say that they consider it to 
be relatively good, both regarding the level of their own general concern 
about the environmental issues and regarding the urgency and the effect 
of specific – both classic and “modern” – environmental problems at the 
local and national level. However, one should bear in mind that estimates 
in certain locations could significantly deviate from the described overall 
values, since the territory of Croatia is most definitely not homogenous in 
terms of the particular environmental problems and hazards affecting it, 
including air pollution, water pollution and the quality of the water supply, 
the inadequate management of household and other types of waste, and 
the contamination of soil and water with pesticides and other chemicals. 
Since this analysis is not the focus of our work, we are simply warning that 
a generally favourable perception of the general state of the environment 
and of the risks form various environmental problems possibly obscures 
pronounced inequalities between different areas, even micro locations, in 
Croatia. It is possible that a more detailed analysis of this issue would show 
that “environmental inequalities” should be added to the image of Croatia 
as a country of growing inequalities (Domazet, dolenec and ančić 2012).
14 More details regarding the answers to this survey question (1a, 1b) can be 
found in Domazet, dolenec and ančić 2012, 31–33.
15 More details regarding the answers to this survey question (7a, 7b) can be 
found in Domazet, dolenec and ančić 2012, 34–35.
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Perceived Danger for the Environment from Various Sources 
of Pollution and Technologies
The results obtained on the sixth question in the survey that measured 
general sensibility to environmental issues and problems, i.e. the general 
level of concern about the environment, can be somewhat complemented 
with the answers to the question no. 14 that measured the perception of 
dangers to the environment from various activities and technologies (Table 
3). The seven variables included in this question allowed the participants to 
evaluate the “classic” environmental hazards caused by industry, agricul-
ture and traffic (air, water, and soil contamination) as well as some newer 
hazards, which already have the status of “global ecological problems” 
(nuclear power plants, global warming, GMO).
Among the mentioned threats to the environment, the greatest danger 
was attributed to nuclear power plants. More than half of the participants 
(55.7%) considered them to be “extremely dangerous for the environment”, 
and nearly a further quarter considered them to be “very dangerous”.
The difference in the degree of perceived danger for the environment 
from other sources is very slight: a relative majority of participants (36–
40%) described each of these hazards as “very dangerous”, and the portion 
of those that consider them as “extremely dangerous” is generally only a 
few percents smaller. On the other hand, less than 10% of participants have 
relativized – completely or to a very high extent – the dangers that any of 
these hazards pose to the environment. Consequently, the estimates were 
quite similar regarding their mean values that fluctuated around the value 
2 (“very dangerous”). Only after acknowledging the afore mentioned simi-
larities in the estimates, one can say that somewhat more danger was at-
tributed to air pollution caused by industry whilst slightly less danger was 
ascribed to genetically modified crops and car traffic pollution.
In conclusion, one can say that the citizens of Croatia attribute very high 
degree of danger to different activities, facilities, and technologies – as they 
are conducted/used and applied today – embedded into the foundations 
of the “modern way of life”. However, a similar level of perceived danger 
does not imply that the same activities, facilities, and technologies will be 
similar in terms of assessments of the feasibility and desirability concern-
ing the means through which it is possible to reduce dangers resulting from 
them. Should some technologies be abandoned or is it possible to “have 
everything under control” and to minimise the resulting dangers? In what 
cases are the technological fixes possible and good enough, and when the 
change is needed in policies, values, and even in the “modern way of life”? 
Since these issues are not the focus of interest in this work, they are simply 
marked here as a potential topic for further research, especially since the 
survey questionnaire does not allow for more direct and complete answers. 
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It should be noted that the problems discussed here are not devoid of in-
terpretative difficulties that stem from differences in the character of the 
estimates requested in certain questions. Some of them (14a, 14b, 14e) 
emphasise that they are looking for a “general” assessment, but only one 
question (14e) stated that it refers to the global environment (“world”); it is 
not certain that all participants understood the remaining two questions in 
the same way. Furthermore, in one question (14d), the estimate was limited 
to Croatia alone, while some other questions (14c, 14f, 14g) were set more 
indeterminately, without specifying “the area of risk”.16
Finally, it seems useful to compare the results of assessments of the dan-
gers associated with major threats to the environment with the expressed 
level of “general concern about the environmental issues”. While a large 
majority of the participants perceive all the threats to be “very” or “ex-
tremely” dangerous, the level of “general concern about the environmen-
tal issues” is only moderate (the mean value is 3.25 on a 5–degree scale). 
Such results seem to suggest that the level of “environmental sensitivity” 
increases with specification of environmental threats. The validity of such 
a conclusion should be tested in further research, as well as the possible 
reasons for this kind of discrepancy in the assessments.
Purpose and effect of personal participation in environmental 
protection
The inclination towards personal participation in activities that contrib-
ute to environmental protection depends, among other things, on opin-
ions regarding the prerequisites, context and the effect of these activities. 
These opinions, that can stimulate or inhibit proenvironmental behaviour, 
16 In short, the problem with questions from 14a to 14g is that they do not 
clearly indicate whether the participants estimated the dangers on a glob-
al or a more narrow level, that is, whether they used the same referential 
framework in all their estimates except in 14d. If not, their estimates are 
not mutually comparable. It is interesting to compare these survey ques-
tions to those used in 1993, when the environment–related module was 
first used. In that research wave, each danger was estimated twice: the 
first time as in our questionnaire from 2010, and the second time with 
regard to dangers for the participants and their families. In the question-
naire used in 2000, the estimated danger for the participants and their 
families was kept only in the case of air pollution from car traffic, and this 
aspect was completely abandoned in the third wave. Even though this 
double estimate of danger somewhat minimises the problem of consist-
ency regarding the referential framework, it does not solve the problem 
completely. Cf.: ISSP 1993 source questionnaire (GESIS 2013a); ISSP 2000 
source questionnaire (GESIS 2013b); ISSP 2010 Overview on questions, vari-
ables and replications (GESIS 2013c).
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are guided primarily by the effect of environmental problems on people’s 
everyday life, the importance they have over “other things in life”, and the 
credibility of warnings regarding their severity.
By commenting on questions 1a and 1b, we have already pointed out the 
low priority the environment has when compared to other current social 
issues. Thus, it is no wonder that – when the relative importance attributed 
to protection of the environment is shifted from the collective to the indi-
vidual level – the number of those who consider that “there are more im-
portant things in life” that one should focus on rather than the protection 
of the environment is twice the size (42%, Table 4) of those who disagree 
with this claim (22.1%). In addition, a third of the participants (33.2%) agree 
that environmental problems have a direct impact on their everyday life, 
while the share of those who disagree with this statement is barely smaller 
(30.2%). The attitude towards the credibility of claims about environmental 
threats is only slightly proenvironmental: 26.1% citizens believe that many 
of these threats are exaggerated, while 41.5% disagree.
Attitude towards personal competence to assess the effect of one’s indi-
vidual “way of life” on the environment is characterised by the same ori-
entation: almost half of the participants (46.5%) think they can properly 
evaluate the benefits and harm that they inflict on the environment, and 
22.8% consider themselves unable to do so. The two items that reflect the 
expected effect of individual proenvironmental engagement provide anal-
ogous results. The ratio of people who do not accept the claim that personal 
engagement has no purpose unless we can expect that such behaviour is a 
social norm is 46.4%: on the other hand, 29.5% participants tend to insist 
on such a reciprocal relation. A relative majority of the participants (43%) 
disagree that “people like them” can not make a major contribution to en-
vironmental protection, but those who disregard the possible effect of the 
“common people” also make up a significant part of the population (35.8%).
The described opinions can be summed up in the results on the remain-
ing item of this survey: one third of the citizens (35%) do what is good for 
the environment even if it costs them more time or money, and an equal 
portion of them do not do so (33.8%) or cannot evaluate which category 
they belong to (34.2%). In conclusion, one could say that the opinions re-
garding the prerequisites, context and the effect of personal involvement 
in environmental protection are factors that encourage or inhibit proenvi-
ronmental behaviour of comparable portions of general population.
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Willingness to Make Material Sacrifices for Environmental 
Protection
The willingness to make material sacrifices to protect the environment was 
measured by an instrument which included three items formulating the 
“sacrifice” in various terms: as a willingness to pay higher prices and taxes, 
and as a readiness to accept a lower standard of living.
Regardless of the indicator, the willingness of Croatian citizens to con-
tribute to environmental protection in a way which would imply a decline 
in their material standard is very low: nearly two thirds of the participants 
express a lack of willingness to accept any of the three types of sacrifice, 
and this figure is dominated by those that are “very unwilling” to do so 
(Table 5).
Table 5  Willingness to Make Material Sacrifices to Protect the   
  Environment (valid percents, valid number of participants, 
  mean value, standard deviation)
12. How willing 
would you be to … in 
order to protect the 
environment? V
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Y 
W
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N
G
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N
G
N
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N
G
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R 
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N
G
FA
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N
W
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N
W
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G
1 2 3 4 5 N M SD
12a             …pay much 
higher prices … 
1.8 10.0 21.4 32.9 33.9 1170 3.87 1.05
12b            …pay much 
higher taxes … 
1.1 8.4 21.4 29.9 39.2 1171 3.98 1.02
12c          …accept cuts 
in your standard
of living… 
2.4 12.2 20.8 28.4 36.2 1174 3.84 1.12
We cannot discuss here to what extent this attitude reflects the gener-
ally unfavourable material situation and uncertain existence with which a 
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growing number of Croatian families faces, and to what extent it reflects 
the perception of efficiency in spending assets collected this way, assess-
ment of the probability that these assets will be used what they are in-
tended for, or the level of responsibility for environmental problems that 
should be attributed to citizens in comparison to other social actors. In 
any case, it is indubitable that any measure that would place an additional 
financial burden on citizens in order to collect assets to protect the envi-
ronment would result in a failure. One should also bear in mind that two 
out of three items included in this survey question are formulated in an 
extreme fashion (significantly higher prices; significantly higher taxes). The 
fact that citizens do not accept significantly higher increases in prices and 
taxes does not necessarily mean they would be as opposed to moderately 
higher expenditures. However, we may only speculate about this. We be-
lieve that this option is worth investigating in further research, with ap-
propriate modification of the survey question.17
We should also mention another feature of the answers to the survey 
question that is not visible from the Table 5. Almost 60% of the partici-
pants used the same answer for all three items, which suggests that their 
responses were predominantly affected by the assumed intention (“the 
government wants to snatch from the household budget”), whose execu-
tion mode was mostly irrelevant.
Proenvironmental Behaviour
Proenvironmental behaviour was measured using three instruments in-
cluding 10 variables.
The most comprehensive instrument measured individual proenviron-
mental behaviour that was mostly under personal control and dependent 
on the will of participants and members of their households. The partici-
pants were asked to estimate the frequency of several actions that ob-
jectively contribute to the well–being of the environment, and some of 
them could even have a direct positive effect on family health. In some 
cases (using cars, the decreased use of energy sources, saving water, buying 
fruits and vegetables grown without the use of pesticides and chemicals), 
it was difficult for participants to distinguish to what extent their actions 
were the results of proenvironmental intentions and to what extent they 
were motivated by economic reasons or caring for one’s own health. This 
17 It seems that – instead of insisting on significantly higher prices and sig-
nificantly higher taxes – a more useful result would emerge if one tries to 
determine the margin to which citizens would be willing to accept an in-
crease in prices or taxes in order to protect the environment. For example 
of such a formulation of a survey question see Domac et al. 2004b.
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problem in measuring proenvironmental behaviour is nothing new. Re-
gardless of the motivation, all these types of actions are objectively proen-
vironmental and may be considered as a measure of proenvironmental 
behaviour.
The other two instruments operationalised those types of actions that 
are achieved on a collective, societal or political level.
In terms of the frequency of individual proenvironmental actions (Ta-
ble 6), the most common is “buying fruits and vegetables grown without 
the use of pesticides and chemicals”, which is a common practice of ap-
proximately one fifth of the population (20.4%). In all likelihood, it is no 
accident that this is the action which has the most apparent and direct 
positive health effect. Of the activities that can be considered primarily 
proenvironmentally motivated, sorting useful waste from domestic gar-
bage (16.4%) and conserving water (10.2%) are the most common practices. 
These same three types of behaviour remain the most common when we 
include participants that practise these activities “often”, but even then, 
the portion of those who perform them does not exceed one half of the 
population. Any other kind of proenvironmental behaviour is somewhat 
rarer. Less than one tenth of Croatian citizens that are able to perform 
these actions do so “always”, while only a third or less perform them “al-
ways” or “often”.18
It is interesting to note that reducing car use seems to be the hardest 
“environmental sacrifice” – almost half of respondents with a car never do 
that. However, on the basis of this question it is not possible to assess to 
what extent this reflects an adopted cultural pattern or a way of life, and to 
what extent it reflects the presence of various obstacles such as inadequate 
public transportation, the particularities of certain work places, or overly 
high fuel prices that reduce the possibility of a completely proenvironmen-
tally motivated decision to use the car less, since the car usage has already 
been reduced to a minimum.
The other two instruments, the results of which are presented here, 
refer to those types of proenvironmental behaviour achieved through the 
common actions of interested citizens.
18 The percentages, means and standard deviations in Table 6 were com-
puted excluding the participants unable to perform certain actions: those 
who do not have a car and those who do not live in places which have 
facilities for depositing sorted useful waste, or who do not have access 
to fruits and vegetables grown without the use of pesticides and chemi-
cals. The share of these participants is reflected in the difference between 
the size of the sample and the number of those that answered particular 
questions (N).
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The results from the first instrument (Table 7) show that the number of 
survey participants that belong to “groups whose main goal is to preserve 
and/or protect the environment” is extremely low, almost marginal – 2.6%, 
regardless quite benevolent question formulation that permitted participa-
tion in some “ecological groups” considered less formal, more temporary 
and fluid, in addition to “green” organisations and associations.
Table 7  Membership of groups preserving and/or protecting the  
   environment (valid percents, valid number of participants)
21. Are you a member of any group whose 
main aim is to preserve or protect the 
environment?
YES NO N
2.6 97.4 1210
This finding is in accordance with the results of earlier studies, which give 
a similar proportion of citizens who are members of these types of groups. 
In the European Values Study (EVS) in 2008, 2.2% of participants said that 
they are members of organisations for “preserving the environment, ecol-
ogy, animal rights”, and almost the same percentage (2.1%) was obtained 
in the EVS study conducted in 1999. One should also note that the share 
of those who performed unpaid voluntary work in those organisations is 
much smaller: 0.7% in the 1999 study and 1.5% in the 2008 study (Rimac 
2010, 432). The World Values Study conducted in Croatia in 1995 also record-
ed a significant difference between the number of “members” and “active 
members”: the proportion of members of eco–organisations is estimated at 
4.4% while the share of those who consider themselves to be active mem-
bers is only 1.2% (štulhofer and Kufrin 1996, 180). Therefore, we consider 
the 2.6% who declare themselves as members of “ecological groups” noted 
in our study at least partly overrated, as it – in all likelihood – includes those 
who are completely or mostly inactive.19 
The second instrument used to measure collective proenvironmental 
behaviour asked the respondents about their participation in specific col-
19 Rimac and Štulhofer have already noted the difference. Considering the 
proportion of participants included in non–governmental organisations 
obtained “through measuring the density of social networks” (...) to be of 
“questionable reliability since it is insensitive to different levels of activ-
ity”, they used “the amount of free time that participants spend working 
on activities relating to the associations of which they are members” as a 
more appropriate measure of the density of social networks (Rimac and 
Štulhofer 2004, 300–301).
III Country case studies 264
lective actions regarding environmental issues over the past five years. The 
results show (Table 8) that a negligible segment of the population took part 
in a “protest or demonstration about an environmental issue”: 1.9%. Donat-
ing money to an “environmental group” is also rare (4.1%), while the share 
of those who “signed a petition about an environmental issue” is several 
times higher, but the frequency of this type of activity is still small (15.7%)
Table 8  Participation in collective proenvironmental activities over  
  the previous five years (valid percents, valid number of  
  participants) 
22. In the last five years, have you ... YES NO N
22a              … signed a petition about an 
environmental issue?
15.7 84.3 1209
22b                            … given money to an 
environmental group?
4.1 95.9 1209
22c                                    … taken part in a 
protest or demonstration about
an environmental issue?
1.9 98.1 1209
We should also mention that 81.7% of participants did not take part in any 
of the four types of collective proenvironmental behaviour. About 14.2% 
of participants engaged in one type of behaviour, 2.9 % engaged in two 
types, and the number of those who were engaged in three or four types 
of behaviour is a single–digit one.
Based on the results presented, one can conclude that proenvironmen-
tal behaviour mostly consists of individual activities, some of which may 
also be motivated by expectations of economic or health benefits, while 
the membership in environmental groups and the participation in col-
lective political activities for the well–being of the environment are rare, 
especially when it comes to those types of activities which imply a more 
significant sacrifice, whether expressed in terms of money or through the 
possible resultant inconveniences and risks if practiced.
Construction and Evaluation of Measurement scales
In order to examine to what extent proenvironmental behaviour can be 
explained by various attitudes and level of environmental knowledge, we 
have created – based on the previously described survey questions – a se-
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ries of scales designed to summarise the respondents’ proenvironmental 
behaviour, knowledge and various types of attitudes. All the constructed 
scales are additive: the result of a person on a scale is equal to the sum of 
his/her results on items constituting that scale, provided that he/she has a 
valid result on all the items; participants who do not meet this criterion are 
excluded from procedure, that is, they are assigned a system–missing value 
on a scale. For some items, the response scale was reverse–coded before 
calculating the result on a scale. In other words, the items were recoded 
so that the same numerical values on all the items of a scale express the 
same orientation and intensity of attitude or some other measured entity.
We used factor analysis and internal consistency measure (Cronbach 
alpha) to evaluate the basic metric properties of the constructed scales.
Factor analyses were conducted using the principal components method 
of factor extraction and the Kaiser–Guttman criterion to determine the 
number of common factors to be retained. In the case of multiple latent 
dimensions, initial factor solution was transformed into a simple solution 
using the oblimin rotation. Finally, the adequacy of a single factor solution 
was examined through the exclusion of particular items.
When assessing the reliability of a scale using the Cronbach alpha co-
efficient, we tried to maximise the reliability, provided that its increase 
through the exclusion of an item would not significantly deteriorate the 
content validity of the instrument.
The basic properties of each of the constructed scales, presented in the 
following text, will include:
•	 the title of the scale
•	 its constituent items
•	 the theoretically possible range of scale values 
•	 the factor structure and percentage of instrument variance explained 
by common factors
•	 the reliability coefficient 
•	 basic descriptive statistics of the distribution of results (number of 
cases with valid values on the scale, minimum and maximum recorded 
value, mean, standard deviation).
Additional remarks shall be used to describe the particularities of a certain 
scale and the procedure used in its creation.
Knowledge of environmental problems scale
•	 Scale Items: 8a, 8b
•	 Theoretically possible range of scale values: 2–10
•	 Factor structure; percentage of explained variance: single–factor; 
84.7%
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•	 Reliability coefficient: α = 0.819
•	 N = 1176; Min = 2; Max = 10; M = 6.07; SD = 1.91
•	 Remarks: Higher results reflect a better knowledge of environmental 
problems.
Scale of perceived danger for the environment 
•	 Scale Items: 14a, 14b, 14c, 14d, 14e, 14f, 14g
•	 Theoretically possible range of scale values: 7–35
•	 Factor structure; percentage of explained variance: single–factor; 
53.2%
•	 Reliability coefficient: α = 0.851
•	 N = 1139; Min = 7; Max = 35; M = 13.73; SD = 4.48
•	 Remarks: Higher results reflect a smaller perceived danger.
Attitude towards the purpose and effects of personal participation in environ-
mental protection scale
•	 Scale Items: 13a, 13b, 13c, 13d, 13e, 13f; excluded item: 13g
•	 Theoretically possible range of scale values: 6–30
•	 Factor structure; percentage of explained variance: without item 
13g single–factor; 43.9%; two factors with all the items; 55.3%; 
•	 Reliability coefficient: α = 0.742; with item 13g α = 0.730
•	 N = 1114; Min = 7; Max = 30; M = 18.60; SD = 4.14
•	 Remarks: (1) Higher results on the scale reflect stronger proenviron-
mental attitude orientation. (2) Due to their different formulation, 
items 13b and 13g were recoded. (3) In the initial factor analysis, items 
13b and 13g were forming a separate factor. By omitting item 13g, 
which was dominant in this latent dimension, a single–factor solution 
was achieved. This situation, in which items that have to be recoded 
constitute separate latent dimensions, is not rare in the factor analysis 
of similar instruments. Unfortunately, it is difficult to asses whether 
the multidimensionality of the instrument is primarily determined by 
the item contents or whether it is a result of their different formula-
tion. 
Individual proenvironmental behaviour scale
•	 Scale Items: 20a, 20b, 20c, 20d, 20e, 20f
•	 Theoretically possible range of scale values: 6–24
•	 Factor structure; percentage of explained variance: single–factor; 
59.8%
•	 Reliability coefficient: α = 0.859
•	 N = 899; Min = 6; Max = 24; M = 17.01; SD = 4.24
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•	 Remarks: (1) Higher results on the scale indicate weaker or less fre-
quent proenvironmental behaviour. (2) It should be pointed out that 
only 899 out of 1210 participants have a valid result on the scale. The 
others were assigned a system–missing value on the scale, as they were 
unable to engage in at least one type of behaviour. These were the par-
ticipants that do not own a cars, so the item 20c cannot refer to them, 
and those that cannot recycle secondary raw materials (20a) or buy 
fruits and vegetables grown without the use of pesticides and chemi-
cals (20b), as they are unavailable in their place of residence.
Based on the three items in question 12, we have created a Scale of willing-
ness to make material sacrifices for the protection of the environment, but we 
decided against using it. At first glance, by adding the results of items 12a, 
12b, and 12c a scale with good metric properties is obtained: it is unidimen-
sional (with 81.9% of the instrument variance explained by the common 
factor) and highly reliable considering the number of items (α = .888). How-
ever, using this scale in further analysis would be problematic due to the 
pronounced asymmetry and multimodality of the distribution of results. 
Such a distribution is the result of an already mentioned tendency of the 
participants to select the same answer for all three items, which means 
that the values 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 appear with a much higher frequency 
compared to their neighbouring values. Because of this, the only measure 
of material sacrifice that will be used is variable 12c, whose formulation we 
consider to be the least problematic of the three. However, its distribution 
is also quite asymmetric.
An attempted construction of the Scale of collective proenvironmental 
behaviour based on items 21, 22a, 22b, and 22c did not result in a usable 
instrument either. The reliability of the scale that includes all four items 
is not satisfactory (KR–20=0.515), and neither is the reliability of the scale 
that would include only the items 22a, 22b, and 22c (KR–20=0.419). The 
low reliability of these scales reflects the fact that the same individual was 
rarely engaged in several types of collective proenvironmental behaviour. 
For instance, out of 31 participants that are members of an environmental 
protection group, 22 signed a petition, 14 donated money to the environ-
mental protection group, and 8 took part in protests or demonstrations. In 
addition to low reliability, this also caused the distribution of the results 
on the additive scales consisting of these items to be extremely asymmet-
ric. For this reason, our further analysis will be limited to attitudes and 
environmental knowledge as predictors of individual proenvironmental 
behaviour.
III Country case studies 268
Attitudes and Environmental knowledge as predictors of 
Proenvironmental Behaviour
In order to determine to what extent the variations in frequency of indi-
vidual proenvironmental behaviours can be explained by variations of the 
results on the other previously described scales and variables that measured 
attitudes and knowledge, we have conducted a multiple linear regression 
analysis with the results on the Individual proenvironmental behaviour 
scale as a dependent variable. The set of predictors consisted of the follow-
ing instruments: 
•	 Knowledge of environmental problems scale
•	 General Concern for Environmental Issues and Problems (question 
six, one item)
•	 Scale of perceived danger for the environment 
•	 Attitude towards the purpose and effects of personal participation in 
environmental protection scale
•	 Willingness to accept cuts in personal standard of living in order to 
protect the environment (question 12c, one item).
Regression analysis was conducted using the forward method to include 
predictor variables in the regression model, with probability of F set to 
PIN < 0.05 as entry criterion. The regression analysis included only those 
participants who had a valid value on all the variables used. Since the 
number of participants without valid values was significant for some 
scales, the regression analysis included a total of 772 participants (64% 
of the sample).
Before turning to the results of the regression analysis, we present the 
matrix of inter–correlations of all the variables used (Table 9). Although all 
the correlations are statistically significant at α level of 0.001, the strength 
of association between variables is only moderate, and in some cases even 
weak. The direction of all correlations is logical and expected. The item that 
measured the willingness to accept cuts in personal standard of living in 
order to protect the environment has a somewhat lower correlations with 
other variables, which is expected considering the expressed lack of will-
ingness to make this sacrifice; this unwillingness is only partially reduced 
by eventual proenvironmental orientation of attitudes, knowledge and 
behaviour. On the other hand, somewhat higher correlations with other 
measures were obtained on variables which measured general concern for 
environmental issues, proenvironmental behaviour and attitude regard-
ing the purpose and effects of personal participation in environmental 
protection.
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The results of the regression analysis are in accord with the described 
correlation matrix (Table 10). First of all, it should be noted that the re-
gression model, which included all the predictor variables as statistically 
significant, explained 33.1% of the variance of the results on the Individ-
ual proenvironmental behaviour scale. Given that few similar analyses 
have been conducted in Croatia, and even then using different samples 
and instruments (for instance: Kufrin 2002, 297–217), we are not able to 
discuss whether proenvironmental behaviour is more present in Croatia 
now in comparison with other periods, and whether the importance of 
attitudes and knowledge as factors that foster environmental behaviour 
has changed. Regardless of that, the above mentioned percentage of ex-
plained variance of the criterion variable points to the fact that attitudes 
and environmental knowledge are important determinants of proenvi-
ronmental behaviour. However, the inclination of Croatian to proenvi-
ronmental behaviour is also affected by numerous other factors, such as 
material status, level of education, age, region, and the size of the place of 
residence etc. Due to limited space, the importance of these factors can 
not be discussed here.
The values of standardized coefficients (beta) show that the measures 
of attitudes are slightly better predictors of proenvironmental behaviour 
than the measure of environmental knowledge. The only exception is the 
“notorious” willingness to accept cuts in personal standard of living in 
order to protect the environment; that variable was the last to enter the 
regression model (and just barely, due to relatively low entrance criteria), 
making a small contribution to the explained variance.
Finally, the last two columns in Table 10 show that correlations between 
predictor variables are not of such a magnitude to cause a severe multico-
linearity, which would threat validity of regression analysis.
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Conclusion
1. The data gathered in Croatia in 2011 using the ISSP’s module “Environ-
ment III” enable us to examine Croatian citizens’ inclinations towards 
proenvironmental behaviour on two levels: at the level of individual be-
haviour, which is mostly under control of individuals and their households, 
and at the level of participation in collective actions, by which citizens can 
– through various social networks – achieve their specific interests that 
relate to their use of the environment as a societal resource.
The inclination towards individual proenvironmental behaviour is not 
at a level that could be considered satisfactory. Even when we limit the 
analysis to only those participants who can objectively contribute to the 
well–being of the environment performing activities stated in the survey 
questionnaire, the share of those who take part in any of such activities 
“regularly” is below 20%, and for some activities this share is even several 
times smaller. If we include those persons who take part in such activities 
“often”, we will rarely reach half of the population. On the other hand, at 
least one half of the population does not participate in such activities at all 
nor does so sporadically. Based on the modal values and means of the results 
on items that measure the frequency of proenvironmental behaviour, we 
can summarily claim that the citizens of Croatia “sometimes” take part in 
such activities. A particular aversion was shown towards those activities 
which have a less evident direct health benefit, and which imply a reduc-
tion in comfort or an additional expense.
Participation in collective proenvironmental activities is extremely rare. 
A very small part of the population see these activities as a way through 
which they can achieve their specific goals and satisfy needs that the “gov-
ernment” does not deal with or does not handle in a way deemed appropri-
ate by citizens. Participatory democracy (the active engagement of citizens 
in environmental issues) is far from the Croatian reality at present, and far 
from the world view of most citizens, who are very inclined towards state 
paternalism in this respect. The answers to the survey question 15a show 
that a large number of citizens (74.6%) think that “government should pass 
laws to make ordinary people protect the environment, even if it interferes 
with people’s rights to make their own decisions”, rather than to “let ordi-
nary people decide for themselves how to protect the environment, even 
if it means they don’t always do the right thing ” (25.4%).
Proenvironmental behaviour should definitely be improved, either 
through legislature that would bind people to it, or through stimulating 
participation in non–governmental organisations and other forms of self–
government of the people regarding the environment. Some measures pre-
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scribed “from above” in Croatia are to be expected soon.20 A longer period of 
time and bigger efforts are needed to increase the engagement of citizens in 
participatory activities, and this implies not only financial investments that 
are hard to expect at this point, but also a different political and civic culture, 
which in itself happens to be a scarce resource in Croatia for the time being.
2. The studies conducted so far have shown that Croatian citizens are 
very much inclined toward proenvironmental value orientations and par-
adigms, bearing in mind that these orientations are analytically recon-
structed based on very general attitudes on desired ways of “humankind’s” 
relationship towards the “environment”. The expression of such attitudes 
should be expected also because they belong to the domain of values that 
are considered normal, desirable and “politically correct”. However, ex-
pressions of proenvironmental value orientations were not followed by 
willingness to give up certain unsustainable practices that form the ba-
sis of a “modern lifestyle”. The ambivalence between the recognition of 
manifestations of the ecological crisis and a lack of willingness for the 
necessary social and political change was bridged through expectations 
that environmental problems will be settled through development and the 
application of technology (Kufrin 2002). Attitudes concerning the environ-
ment presented in this work were not measured at such a general level, as 
the survey did not contain variables needed to reconstruct general value 
orientations of that type. Therefore, we are unable to either support or to 
reject the findings of previous research.21
The results on attitude measures used in this work show that almost 
all threats to the environment are considered to be “very dangerous”, but 
also that general concern for environmental issues is only moderate and 
that the “environment” does not fall into the category of the most impor-
tant social problems to be addressed. Attitude towards the purpose and ef-
20 Cf.: “Minister Zmajlović: ‘Sorting the waste and using secondary raw ma-
terials is becoming a standard for all Croatian citizens’”, published on 3rd 
July 2013 on the website of the Croatian Government under the heading 
“News and announcements” (Vlada Republike Hrvatske 2013).
21 The “lack” of variables that could be used to reconstruct socio–ecological 
value orientations is a result of two facts – (1) the limited number of vari-
ables that a module can include; and (2) the thematic orientation of the 
module, with an inclination towards attitudes on economic and political 
aspects of environmental protection rather than towards general opinions 
on the relationship between society and the environment. This focus of 
the survey is, of course, completely legitimate, so the remark regarding 
the insufficient representation of variables that would allow a reconstruc-
tion of socio–ecological value orientations should be taken as an observa-
tion of fact, rather than as an objection emphasising a shortcomings of 
the questionnaire.
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fects of personal participation in environmental protection is only slightly 
proenvironmentally oriented. The weakest sensibility for environmental 
problems is expressed through a lack of willingness to make a personal fi-
nancial sacrifice in order to solve environmental issues, exhibited by two 
thirds of the participants. In general, all these attitudes point to the gen-
eral conclusion that the population covered by the survey is at best mildly 
proenvironmentally oriented.
3. The level of knowledge of environmental problems and ways of solv-
ing them have also proved to be moderate, with knowledge of potential 
solutions being somewhat lower. When evaluating this finding, one should 
also bear in mind that previous studies warn that the results from objective 
knowledge tests only moderately correlate with the results of participants’ 
self–assessment. In addition, the results were also probably influenced 
by the already mentioned tendency of participants to assess themselves 
choosing the middle value of the response set. In any case, the level of 
knowledge of Croatian citizens can be significantly improved, especially 
with regard to means of solving those environmental problems that have 
a more direct effect on their everyday life.
4. The regression analysis confirmed that approximately a third of the 
variations of the results registered on the measure of proenvironmental be-
haviour can be explained by the results on attitudes and knowledge meas-
ures, wherein attitudes, knowledge, and behaviour are connected in a logi-
cal and coherent manner22. The relationship between attitudes, knowledge, 
and behaviour is most often conceptualised through the assumption that 
attitudes and knowledge affect the behaviour. That assumption – which, 
from the statistical viewpoint, is neither necessary nor the only possible 
one – is also implicit in the logic of the multiple regression analysis and 
the usual manner of interpreting its results. By relying on socio–psycho-
logical theories regarding the relationship between attitudes, knowledge, 
and behaviour, we conform to this common understanding, aware of the 
simplification that it involves. Having this reservation in mind, the results 
of the regression analysis allow for the assumption that promotional and 
educational activities aimed at strengthening proenvironmental orienta-
tion of attitudes and enhancing the environmental knowledge amongst 
Croatian citizens would have an effect on proenvironmental behaviour 
that should not be neglected.
22 The coherence of space defined by the applied measures of attitudes, 
knowledge, and behaviour is also indicated by the fact that the factor 
analysis of all variables used in the regression analysis results in a single–
factor solution, explaining 44.7% of the overall variance.
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5. This paper was limited to testing the role of attitudes and knowledge 
as determinates of proenvironmental behaviour. Due to space limitations, 
we were unable to examine the effect of other factors which may have a 
much larger cumulative effect, since two thirds of the variance of results 
on the measure of proenvironmental behaviour remains unexplained by 
applied measures of attitudes and knowledge. Such an analysis would sig-
nificantly complement the findings stated here; we hope this work will 
encourage it. 
6. At several points in this work we stated some remarks regarding the 
character and execution of survey questions and the resulting interpreta-
tive inaccuracies. Even though the ISPP’s module “Environment III” surely 
provided renewed encouragement to faltering socio–ecological studies in 
Croatia and introduced some new topics characteristic for policy studies, 
our suggestion is that some of the instruments should be improved, at least 
to a degree that allows for the comparison of results obtained in different 
waves of the survey.
7. More as a result of the features of the surveyed population, rather 
than emerging from the difficulties stemming from the survey questions, 
the problem of collective proenvironmental behaviour has been merely 
touched upon here. Considering the potential importance and effects of 
such activities, it would be beneficial to examine the reasons why these 
activities are fairly uncommon in Croatia. The possibilities offered by the 
ISSP’s “Environment III” module are limited in this respect; further re-
search in this domain should be conducted on different populations using 
qualitative methods, more appropriate to studying “rare events”. 

Industrial policy for sustainability
Igor Matutinović
10
Introduction
In 2008 the Western economies were hit by the strongest recession since 
the Great Depression. In itself this was not an unexpected phenomenon: 
upturns and downturns are systemic properties of a capitalist economy and 
their magnitude is power-law distributed (Ormerod and Mounfield 2001; 
Matutinović 2005; 2006). Therefore, once in a while large-scale events will 
necessarily happen for one reason or the other – from productive overca-
pacity, energy shocks, to financial recklessness, or, as it happened, all of 
them together. What makes this event particular is only its larger historic 
context: a decade in which critical global problems like climate change and 
the rising price of conventional oil were calling for major changes in energy 
supply mix and consumption habits. Such structural changes, which are 
necessary if the humanity is not soon to cross the threshold of 2C° of global 
average temperature increase, require very focused and consistent national 
and international policies: at the one side they should keep the two-thirds 
of fossil fuel reserves in the ground prior to 2050 (IEA 2013a), at the other, 
they should provide renewable, carbon-free energy to compensate required 
curtails in fossil fuels extraction. 
A hope appeared at the beginning of recession that this time counter-
cyclic policies may result in a different direction of economic recovery – 
the so called New Green Deal – named after an investment plan announced 
by the US President Barrack Obama (Bloomberg 2008). This hope, how-
ever, was short-lived and as soon as in 2009 one could tell, on the basis 
of economic and policy signs reported in business media, that Western 
economies will miss this opportunity to “change course” (Matutinović 
2009). In Europe, political attention was soon turned to sovereign debt 
crisis and quantitative easing was replaced by austerity programs which 
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immediately cut subsidies to renewable energy sources and discouraged 
new investments1. In the US, the success of hydraulic fracturing technology 
opened up large reserves of shale gas while horizontal drilling increased 
domestic conventional oil production, driving down the energy prices and 
equally discouraging new investments in renewable energy2. The overall 
result has been a global decrease of investments in clean energy over the 
past few years, the largest one – 22% – was recorded in the first quarter of 
2013 (Bloomberg 2013b). 
This is not only an episodic account of Western government’s inability 
to act in a consistent way towards major goals – reduction of CO2 emissions 
and increasing rapidly renewable energy supply. More than twenty years 
after the initial political commitments stated at the Earth Summit in Rio 
we record a total failure to reach its objectives: according to IEA (2013b), 
the “global energy supply is as carbon energy intensive today as it was in 
the nineties” while global emissions of carbon dioxide increased by 3% in 
2011, reaching an all-time high of 34 billion tonnes (Olivier et al. 2012)3.
This failure to reach long-term goals of major systemic importance sug-
gests following insights: (1) the policies promoted so far by governments 
have not only been inconsistent but basically inadequate; (2) in the absence 
of stable and mutually consistent institutional framework, markets will 
not be able to guide business investments and consumer preferences in 
a desired direction (reduction of greenhouse gases by whatever amount 
required to keep climate within 2C° increase). Since the world’s major 
CO2 emitters are far behind the schedule and some of them are actually 
promoting policies that work in an opposite direction, we can conjecture 
that 2C° goal will not be attained and that adaptation and mitigation should 
be considered together with emission reduction policies. Indeed, a recent 
World Bank-commissioned report (2012) warns that the world is on track 
to a “4°C world” marked by extreme heat-waves and life-threatening sea 
01 Besides cuts in subsidies to renewable energy, falling prices for carbon 
credits in the EU weakened the incentive to invest in low-emission tech-
nologies such as wind, solar and nuclear power” (Bloomberg 2013a).
02 Lower prices of natural gas are pushing the US energy policy in a opposite 
direction than the one announced in the Green New Deal: “Sixteen of the 
29 states with renewable portfolio standards are considering legislation 
that would reduce the need for wind and solar power” (Bloomberg 2013b). 
03  In the period 1990-2011 the EU 15 countries reduced their total CO2 emis-
sion by 10%, the US increased by 8,7%, Japan by 6,9% and China by 3,86 
times (Olivier et al. 2012). Note that in 2007 the EU 15 emissions were 1% 
higher than in the base 1990 year, meaning that the major contribution to 
overall reduction came from a slowdown in economic activity instead as a 
result of a consistent policy implementation. 
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level rise, which will asks for increased support for adaptation, mitigation, 
inclusive green growth and climate-smart development.
The path to the “4°C world” carries three basic features that will be 
discussed in more detail later: (1) higher energy prices due to either (a) 
expected policy measures that would aim at discouraging extraction of 
fossil fuels, or (b) the growing scarcity of conventional oil and cheap coal 
(extraction peaks); (2) higher food prices as a consequence of heat waves, 
droughts, and higher agricultural production and transport costs due to 
more expensive energy: and (3) higher global prices of industrial goods 
caused by higher transport costs. 
Here I discus policy implications of this scenario for small economies 
that, in most of the cases, are only marginal CO2 emitters but because of 
their relative economic weakness and low endowment with natural re-
sources and energy are likely to experience a strong impact with the above 
mentioned features of the transition to the “4°C world”. I argue that in or-
der to adapt to new environmental constraints and mitigate the negative 
consequences of the “4°C world” governments must not rely on markets 
only, but should pursue an active industrial policy (see also Naudé 2011). 
However, under the new constraints, they must adopt a different approach 
to industrial policy than the traditional one oriented at increasing national 
competitiveness in a global economy (Hochfeld et al. 2010). I call this new 
approach the industrial policy for sustainability, which is oriented at serv-
ing society’s material needs under the treathening boundary conditions 
arising from treats of global warming, energy scarcity, water scarcity, and 
general deterioration of world ecosystems. The analysis is focused on Croa-
tia but it may be well applied to the neighboring countries – from Slovenia 
and Hungary across Balkans to Greece.
The text is organized as follows: first section deals briefly with impend-
ing resource and climate issues; second is addressing the rationale for the 
new industrial policy; third presents the current economic and resource 
situation in Croatia; fourth proposes industrial policy outline and the fifth 
closes with conclusions.
Change in boundary conditions
Climate change
Socioeconomic systems depend on larger scale systems for their function-
ing and survival– ecosystems – from which they extract resources and a 
multitude of biological services and into which they discharge wastes, heat, 
and emissions. They represent immediate boundary conditions for their op-
erations. Long-term patterns of precipitation, local temperature variations, 
and consequently, biological productivity in ecosystems is controlled at a 
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higher scale by global climate – the average global temperature variations 
which tend to be constant over millennia. Global climate, as a higher level 
constraint, may be affected by perturbations that humans induce at a lower 
level – that of ecosystems – like, for example, large scale deforestation and 
burning of fossil fuels. Scale refers to spatial dimension and rates of change 
in relevant processes, which differ by at least one order of magnitude across 
the hierarchical levels (Salthe 1993; 2012). Therefore, economic processes 
that refer to material throughput and energy degradation change much 
faster than analogous macro-ecological processes (e.g. changes in standing 
biomass and in energy throughput per unit mass in mature ecosystems) 
while global average temperature appears as a “constant” with respect to 
ecological dynamics. 
This separation of dynamics across hierarchical levels has been provid-
ing stable operating conditions to socioeconomic systems and, in absence 
of large perturbations, stability to natural processes at the higher levels. 
Since the Industrial Revolution, however, Western economies have been 
perturbing global climate by burning fossil fuels at an ever increasing rates 
with the consequence of raising the level of CO2 in the atmosphere from 
280ppm to 400.03 ppm4. This cumulative effect of lower level perturba-
tions manifests itself at the uppermost level as an increase in the average 
global temperature and in the intensity of extreme weather events like 
droughts and hurricanes. So destabilized boundary conditions are already 
affecting global ecosystems in a discernible way (Rosenzveig et al. 2008) 
and creating a complex cascade of feedback loops between rising temper-
ature and other climate variables like, for example, respiration rates of 
plants (Schiermeier 2013) and permafrost thaw (Schuur and Abbott 2011). 
This process of destabilization, initiated at the human system level, is feed-
ing back from global climate trough ecosystems back to our societies where 
we expect major negative consequences in agricultural productivity5 and 
water management in the short term, and in flooding of coastal regions 
and mass migrations of affected populations in the longer term. As these 
complex feedback loops initiated by climate change process are not fully 
understood (Schiermeier 2007; Maslin and Austin 2012) the humanity is 
playing a global experiment which risks cannot be entirely and precisely 
04 Measurement of atmospheric CO2 for April 2013 taken at Mauna Loa Obser-
vatory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (http://ftp.cmdl.
noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_weekly_mlo.txt. Accessed on June9, 2013.
05 Here I am principally referring to the fact that weather extremes like 
droughts and floods are likely to damage crops everywhere while average 
increase in temperature and regional changes in precipitation will have 
different impact on different regions in the world.
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captured in climate change models. This is the key reason why we need to 
reduce carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere to the level that is 
believed by climate scientists to be safe for humanity.
However, in spite of two decades of global political summits and initia-
tives, carbon intensity of energy has been decreasing nowhere in the world 
(Raupach et al. 2007; IEA 2013b) and, expectedly, global emissions of carbon 
dioxide has slightly increased (Olivier et al. 2012). This trend is not likely 
to be reversed any time soon as the world seems to be on a development 
and energy path that will bring with it a surge in CO2 emission (Pielke et 
al. 2008) and where the “4°C world” scenario (World Bank 2012) is a logical 
consequence6. In such a situation, some warn that “The time of irrevers-
ible change may be so close that it would be unwise to rely on international 
agreements to save civilization from the consequences of global heating” 
(Lovelock 2006, 16). This brings to the forefront the need for envisaging 
regional and national policies aimed at adaptation and mitigation, which 
implementation should start long before the cascade of negative events 
erodes valuable resources necessary for the task at hand.
Energy crisis
Carbon dioxide emissions result from burning of fossil fuels, which have 
been the basic energy input for industrial civilization and still represent 
85% of the world total energy mix (Tollefson 2011). In spite of the lip-
service paid to de-carbonization of the energy sector, fossil fuels extraction 
is supported worldwide by governments with subsidies that amounted to 
$523 billion in 2011, up almost 30% on 2010 and six times more than sub-
sidies to renewables (IEA 2013a). Besides giving clear preference to subsi-
dizing fossil fuels, governments reduced funding for energy research and 
development in the past two decades (Nature 2006). No wonder that re-
newable energy sources, excluding the burning of traditional biomass such 
as wood, make up only about 7% of global energy production (Tollefson 
2011). While there is huge potential for growth in renewables, we cannot 
expect in the foreseeable future, even with more commitment from gov-
ernments, that wind, solar, biomass, tidal and geothermal energy sources 
could substantially substitute fossil fuels in the global energy mix.
The intrinsic dynamics of capitalist economy and the socially-dominant 
paradigm of growth provide a relentless push to consumption of energy and 
06 “Strong growth in non-OECD energy consumption, especially of coal, 
translates into continued growth of global CO2 emissions. The growth of 
global CO2 emissions from energy averages 1.2% p.a. over the next twenty 
years (compared to 1.9% p.a. 1990-2010), leaving emissions in 2030 27 per-
cent higher than today” (BP 2011).
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resources which has moved southwards in the past twenty years with rapid 
industrialization of China and India. A typical projection into the future 
sees economic growth and energy consumption as a “natural givens”- the 
West will continue to grow while the South will keep catching up. For ex-
ample, the European Commission estimates the GDP growth in EU 27 from 
2010-2030 at 46% with a gross energy consumption increase of mere 2.4%, 
thanks to technological innovations and the efficiency of markets (Capros 
et al. 2010)7. Even if EU manages to reduce the energy intensity of its GDP 
to that extent, by 2030 the world primary energy consumption is likely 
to grow anyway by 39%, most of which in Non-OECD countries (BP 2011). 
The underlying assumption of increase in consumption of fossil fuels 
is their continued availability and price-affordability. However, a number 
of studies are pointing at approaching of Hubbert’s peak in extraction of 
conventional oil (see Matutinović (2009) for an overview)¸which, once 
crossed over, represent a “phase transition” in the world transport patterns 
and trade flows (Rubin 2009). Murray and King (2012) demonstrated that 
oil supply has become inelastic and that since 2005 the world production 
fluctuated around 75 million barrels per day, suggesting that we might have 
already reached the plateau. The sign that conventional oil reserves cannot 
meet further demand increases is supported by the fact that new oil wells 
are drilled in ever more expensive sites like deep sea beds or tap expensive 
and environmentally destructive unconventional reserves like tar sands 
(Schindler 2010; Pfeifer and Chazan 2013). The situation is similar with 
coal – the major fuel for generating electricity: recent studies show that 
useful coal – in terms of extraction costs and energy return on energy in-
vestment (EROI) may be less abundant than previously assumed and that 
peak of world coal production may be only years away (Patzek and Croft 
2010; Heinberg and Friedley 2010). Taken together, passing the peaks in 
world oil and coal production will raise energy costs in all economic sectors 
and thus transform radically our current patterns of production, consump-
tion and world trade. Given these trends, Heinberg and Friedley (2010) sug-
gest that “nations should immediately begin to plan for higher fossil fuel 
prices and to make maximum possible investments in energy efficiency 
and renewable-energy infrastructure”.
De-globalization
At the level of national economy, globalization process have been pro-
ducing over decades a structural shift from an “integrated” to a “segre-
gated” economy in the sense that industrial production has been losing 
its primary function of serving local needs and adapting its output for 
07 Calculated from tables at p.56 and p.68 (Capros et al. 2010).
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distant markets whereby less competitive national sectors were gradually 
replaced by foreign imports from cost-efficient global suppliers (Morris 
1996; Daly 1999). As a result, the functional logic of national industrial 
structure has been disrupted to a different extent in different countries, 
and more in those that run trade deficits across many sectors. As a conse-
quence of high transport prices, which would make long-distance trade in 
many food and manufacturing products uneconomic, current globaliza-
tion process would come to a halt and be replaced by an abrupt transition 
to a smaller world (Rubin 2009). For small, import-dependent countries 
with segregated industry, such a transition may present a challenge for 
national security as it would suddenly create shortages and price spikes of 
imported food or manufactured goods (Matutinović 2000). This perspec-
tive calls for the use of industrial policy as a tool for reinforcing functional 
integrity of national economies and reducing their import dependency 
from far-away markets.
 
Industrial policy for sustainability
The old paradigm in a new context
Taken together, the challenges presented in the previous section cannot 
possibly be resolved through the markets alone and need a timely and long-
term policy commitment from governments. 
Industrial policy has always been one of the salient characteristics of 
capitalism. Targeted investments in infrastructure, like railways, roads 
and ports were undertaken by all states on their way to industrialization 
(Rostow 1960). Later, and especially after the World War II and until 1980, 
industrial policy “meant the direct intervention of the state in the econo-
my, the direct control by the government of large parts of the production 
apparatus and a set of public actions aimed at limiting the extent of the 
market and at conditioning productive organization” (Bianchi and Labo-
ry 2006, xv). Afterwards, the focus of policymakers shifted more towards 
creating favorable environment for firm creation, cluster development, 
and innovations – all with the goal of enhancing the competitive advan-
tage of national firms and industries in a global economy. The latter policy 
orientation is usually labeled “horizontal” and the former “vertical”, dis-
tinguishing between undifferentiated interventions with respect to firms 
and sectors and concentration of efforts on the development of selected 
domains or activities (De Bandt 2006, 107). As a passing note, the shift to-
wards horizontal policy coincided with the rise of neo-liberal ideology in 
the UK and USA and the belief that government should not interfere with 
the working of free markets. In a certain sense, horizontal policy with all its 
merits in creating an enticing environment for all players seems incapable 
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to respond to pressing societal needs and to commit to specific goals, like 
reducing carbon intensity of the economy. 
Already in the past, the industrial policies which have proved 
to be efficient were essentially those  which, referring to 
some type of plan rationality, were pursuing specific targets, 
whether “grand programs” (in the case of France) or sectoral 
restructuring policies (in many countries) or industrial de-
velopment strategies (in the case of Japan). With increased 
complexities and uncertainties, the justifications for such a 
selective approach and for the concentration of efforts and re-
sources on specific domains, projects or subsystems are again 
much stronger (De Bandt 2006, 107).
Given the changing boundary conditions in which our economies oper-
ate, discussed in the previous section, industrial societies are facing un-
precedented uncertainties and complexities. Under such circumstances, 
standard industrial policy oriented towards creating national “competitive 
advantages” in a world of unlimited growth potential and abundant energy 
sources is no longer adequate. Instead, policy makers must return to its 
historic origins and look at the new challenges that lie ahead in the simi-
lar fashion as they did in the past when new infrastructure and industries 
had to be built in order to enable take-off of the industrialization process 
(Rostow 1960) or quick reconstruction and development after the WWII. 
This time, however, the goal is not any longer growth and development but 
adaptation to new constraints and mitigation of negative consequences 
that the “4°C world” and similar scenarios may bring along. In other words, 
industrial policy for sustainability is not about what an industry needs to 
be globally competitive but about what kind of industries a society needs 
to be sustainable over long run and under conditions of uncertainty posed 
by climate change and energy crisis. Moreover, according to Hochfeld et 
al. (2010, 21-22) modern and postmodern industrial policy as a strategic ap-
proach broadens the focus from manufacturing sectors to all economic 
sectors including among others agriculture and energy . 
Industrial policy for sustainability (IPS) is, therefore, oriented at serv-
ing society’s material needs under the new historic conditions arising from 
treats of global warming, energy scarcity, water scarcity, and general dete-
rioration of world ecosystems8. Its principal goals are creating new infra-
structure and restructuring current industries in order to respond to new 
08 I do not mention explicitly population growth here, but it is clear that it 
represents one of the most important driving factors of present negative 
resource and environmental trends.
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challenges. These goals are accomplished by coordinated action of govern-
ment and private sector. 
The role of government
The principal task of government is to set social priorities and then op-
erationalize them through the standard set of industrial policies: indus-
trial strategy definition, competition policy and regulation, technological 
policy, regional and territorial policies, methodological approaches and 
conceptual analysis (Bianchi and Labory 2006, 26). Defining long-range 
social priorities, like for example, decarbonizing energy sector or increas-
ing self-sufficiency in food production is a crucial feature of IPS. Such goals 
have economy-wide repercussions and require at least a decade of consist-
ent policy making and regardless who is currently in political power. Indus-
trial strategy would refer to identify crucial sectors and industries which 
are needed to realize social priorities and to assess their current strength 
and development capacity through cluster analysis (Porter 1990). Cluster 
analysis would also identify the extent of new investments (setting-up of 
missing links in a cluster) and the preferred technologies to be pursued as 
well as the nature of potential investors: state-owned firms, public-private 
partnerships, private domestic investors and Greenfield investments. Con-
ceptually, the IPS does not mean returning to import-substitution poli-
cies or autarchic economy: clusters may function at a supranational level 
as some of their members may be outsourced regionally and production 
back-ups may even exist in distant markets. Besides setting-up state-owned 
firms where necessary and financing infrastructure projects, government 
can intervene directly also by supporting selected technologies via its pro-
curement policy and R&D grants (Alic et al. 2010), and, more convention-
ally, by providing subsidies and enacting selective tax policies.
The role of markets
Compared to governments’ ‘designer’ role in setting the goals of IPS, mar-
kets take on the vital part of self-organization which is irreplaceable in 
the implementation process (Matutinović 2006). Markets are not only 
intrinsically tied to economic complexity that characterizes industrial 
society but are also instrumental to its evolutionary capacity. They con-
stantly generate a variety of products and services on which the selective 
pressure of competition acts – the necessary precondition for technologi-
cal change and adaptation to unknown challenges that may appear in the 
future (Matutinović 2010). The private sector, therefore, covers two main 
roles: (1) the role of self-organizing division of detailed sub-goals and of 
fine-detail execution of single tasks under the general rules set by indus-
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trial strategy9, and (2) the role of generating innovations under the joint 
stimulus of subsidies and competitive processes. Markets and the private 
sector cannot set societal priorities nor can they look far enough into the 
future but are, nevertheless, instrumental to efficient realization of the 
IPS goals.
IPS and free trade
Strategic execution of IPS at the national or regional (EU) levels is likely 
to clash with free trade arrangements under WTO rules, as these were de-
signed for the world of unbounded resources and economic growth. This 
opens up space for possible protectionist policies disguised as IPS like pro-
tecting a certain industry or national employment instead of pursuing 
long-term societal goals. Under the new constraints, however, protection-
ism as a goal in itself would miss the track to create more energy efficient 
and resilient local or regional economy. 
However, by looking ahead in the future, countries may decide to apply 
protective measures for industries that under new constraints emerge as 
strategic ones. For example, Germany who has the world strongest solar en-
ergy industry and the highest number of installed solar panels in the world, 
may find it more attractive to protect its cutting-edge solar energy cluster 
from Chinese low-cost imports in order to give it more space for technologi-
cal development. If such a policy would be adopted across different sectors 
and by a wide number of countries, the current free trade arrangements 
under the WTO would unravel and world trade may revert again to regional 
and bilateral arrangements. Conceptually, this would imply returning to 
Ricardian comparative advantages of trade instead of insisting on absolute 
advantages, which are based on the total mobility of capital and relocation 
of production to countries with the lowest labor cost (Daly 1999) – the para-
digm that drove globalization process since the eighties of the past century 
but becomes counterproductive under the new constraints.
An outline of IPS for Croatia
Initiating conditions  
Before going into details of IPS for Croatia, let me briefly state the overall 
situation in the economy and in the target sectors as they represent a set 
of initial conditions in which policy measures will be operating and which, 
to a certain extent, constrain the range of choices and define priorities. 
09 All details concerning cluster development – entries and exists of firms 
and sourcing of a myriad of small suppliers is left to self-organization of 
markets.
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Macroeconomic profile
Unjust and ill-conceived privatization, the ensuing crony capitalism and 
more than two decades of economic mismanagement destroyed industrial 
sector and created high public and external debts – 66% and 112% of GDP 
respectively. These debts considerably constrain government’s capability 
to deal with short-term and long-term issues, like counter-cyclical policies 
and IPS. 
In 2013, Croatian economy has been through its fifth year of recession, 
which left deep marks on its output and employment: the first contracted 
by 11.9% since 2008 and the second reached one of the highest the levels 
in Europe – 21.9% – with youth unemployment at 52%10. Such a high un-
employment level creates fertile ground for political instability as rising 
income inequality and poverty erode social fabric. Data for 2010 show that 
in Croatia 20.6% of the population was below the poverty line while in-
equality in the distribution of family income measured by Gini index was 
32, compared, for example, with Sweden’s score of 23 (CIA 2013).
Croatian GDP structure is typical of middle-income industrialized econ-
omies: agriculture 5.1%, industry 24.9%, and services 70% (CIA 2013). In-
dustrial production has never reached its pre-transition levels and has still 
been contracting in 2013, thus increasing the import dependency of the 
economy: exports covers only about 55% of imports, out of which 90 per-
cent refers to manufactured goods (HGK 2013). Under the changing bound-
ary conditions, such a high import dependency may result in price shocks 
while a weakening industrial sector is not providing a safe basis for meeting 
challenges of an uncertain future.
Food sector
In spite of the relatively high contribution of agriculture to GDP, Croatia 
imports 50% of its food requirements. We can summarize the weakness of 
the agricultural following Znaor (2009):
•	 Nearly two-thirds of its farmland are not put to productive use
•	 With 1.2 million acres of farmland under current use, Croatia is among 
the European countries with the least agricultural land per capita (0.27 
ha)
•	 The livestock in 2008 was 1.5 times smaller than in1991, and as much 
as 2.4 times smaller than in 1911
10 Youth unemployment of 52% refers to the age group 15-24. The significance 
of this reading, which refers to the March 2013, can be grasped when we 
compare it to pre-recession times when it read 22.30% (March 31, 2008). 
Source: Eurostat, http://ycharts.com/indicators/croatia_youth_unem-
ployment_rate_lfs. Accessed on July 5, 2013.
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•	 Bad agricultural practices result in loss of soil fertility.
•	 Outdated technology commands low agricultural productivity and 
expensive production.
To that we can add a weak irrigation network that stands in stark contrast 
to large freshwater endowments: Croatia has about 5.790ha under irriga-
tion while, for example, Hungary irrigates 292.147ha and Serbia 163.311ha. 
In the context of likely threats posed by reduced precipitation, heat waves, 
and droughts (Seth et al. 2008), this is not only suboptimal in a technical 
sense but presents a risk for preserving agricultural yields at their current 
level.
Energy sector
In terms of energy mix, its use efficiency and the prospects of self-supply, 
Croatia is far from being on a sustainable pathway. In 2010, the Croatian 
total primary energy supply or use11 per inhabitant was 2226 kilograms of 
oil equivalent or 34.7% lower than the EU27average (MGRP 2011, 52). At the 
same time it used 14.6 percent more energy than the European average 
to produce 1.000 US$ of GDP at PPP (MGRP 2011, 38). Looking at its energy 
balance, Croatia exports 48% of its primary energy production (PEP) and 
imports 72% of its energy consumption, most of it – 91% – refers to fossil fu-
els. In total, 25% of Croatian PEP comes from renewables: hydropower, fuel 
wood and renewables (solar energy, geothermal energy, and biogas). How-
ever, according to projections until 2030, its energy self-supply, defined 
as the ratio between total primary energy production and total primary 
energy supply, will be declining from 55,5% in 2010 to 30% in 2030 (MGRP 
2011) – a sign that substantial investments in renewables will be needed if 
Croatia wishes to keep its energy import dependency at the present level 
and reduce its imports of fossil fuels.
A recent study concluded that Croatia is on a development path that puts 
excessive pressure on the environment whilst deepening social inequali-
ties but is in a comparatively good position to pursue change and embark 
on the path to a more sustainable existence (Domazet, dolenec and ančić 
2012, 59). Here I would add that under the changing boundary conditions, 
current economic profile and especially high imports of food, weak in-
11 Total primary energy domestic supply (sometimes referred to as energy 
use) is calculated by the International Energy Agency as production of fu-
els + inputs from other sources + imports - exports - international marine 
bunkers + stock changes. It includes coal, crude oil, natural gas liquids, 
refinery feedstocks, additives, petroleum products, gases, combustible re-
newables and waste, electricity and heat. http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/
detail.asp?ID=6328
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dustry, and increasing energy dependency represent a threat to economic 
security and social stability in the next ten to twenty years. 
 
Policy outline
The issue of how to pursue sustainability in Croatia has been addressed 
by different authors and from many different perspectives providing a 
comprehensive framework for policy making (Horvat and Dvornik 2004; 
Matutinović 2006a; Horvat 2007; Lay and Šimleša 2012; Domazet, dole-
nec and ančić 2012). Most of these works, in one way or another, point at 
the importance of increasing local food production and improving energy 
security while at the same time creating a more just and equitable society 
(Lay and Šimleša 2012; Domazet, dolenec and ančić 2012). These works, 
combined with the present assessment of initial and impending boundary 
conditions represent a background for setting an outline for IPS, a theme 
that was initially addressed in Matutinović (2000).
The strategic goal of the policy is to streamline new capital formation 
towards economic restructuring which is necessary for adaptation and 
mitigation under the negative consequences of climate change, rising en-
ergy prices and global environmental degradation. At the same time, new 
capital formation would have positive short to medium term consequences 
on employment, industrial production and economic recovery. Based on 
the preceding analysis, I discuss briefly following target investment areas 
divided by specific policy goals: food, transport and energy.
Food security 
Large-scale transition to organic farming in Croatia might provide more 
jobs, grow more food, create less environmental costs and be more profita-
ble than the current production methods (Znaor 2013). The role of the state 
in enacting this transition is twofold: it should provide funding for educa-
tion and training to farmers because organic farming requires high human 
and social capital; secondly, it should offer the vast portions of state-owned 
unused agricultural land under preferential conditions for long-term lease 
if it is used for organic produce. In that respect, long standing inefficiency 
(unused fertile land) would be turned into sudden advantage as chemically 
untreated land is ready for quick organic produce certification. Another 
investment area in the food sector is the large scale application of smart 
irrigation systems12 with the aim of increasing crop yields and mitigating 
12 Smart irrigation systems let farmers know when to switch their watering 
system on or off depending on the levels of moisture in the soil. It knows 
exactly how much water any crop needs to be fully grown by the day it is 
picked.
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negative effects of droughts along with optimizing water usage efficiency. 
Here a combination of public works (for building the required infrastruc-
ture) and private investments may be an optimal way to go, where in the 
latter case the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development can 
provide loans to farmers for purchasing equipment under favorable interest 
rates. Since we can expect that warmer climate and intense heat waves will 
put traditionally used crop varieties under pressure, state should provide 
funding for research of heat resistant crops to protect future yields from 
undesirable losses. Having provided basic support for a more efficient and 
resilient crop production, the state should streamline domestic and foreign 
private investment into food processing industry to round up the produc-
tion chain and secure enough capacity for domestic needs and surpluses for 
exports13. This is a clear example of the systemic interrelatedness betweeen 
crop production and food processing goals under the single roof of IPS. 
On the more general level of policy making, there are a couple of insti-
tutional changes that would underpin the aforementioned vertical poli-
cies. In the first place, government should change current legislation that 
enables agricultural land conversion to urban or industrial uses by charg-
ing only a minor premium fee to investors. It should be replaced with a 
special permission, which would enable a societal control of this critical 
resource and discourage its depletion driven by market value of land usage 
and not long term societal interests. Fertile land – this critical resource for 
survival and physical well-being that belongs to the category of national 
wealth – should be protected from “land-grabbing”, which has taken global 
momentum in the past ten years. Government should make institutional 
provisions that forbid long-term lease of agricultural land to foreign own-
ers that invest with the primary interest to produce food for their own 
domestic needs. Finally, the state should lease its unused land to domestic 
farmers and enterprises with the priority of enhancing the capacity of small 
and medium-scale farmers as the only way to bring their productivity closer 
to European levels. In this context, state could run special programs of land 
lease and for unemployed and particularly for unemployed youth who are 
willing to make their living off land. If successful, this policy would reduce 
social tensions that arise from high unemployment rates and improve de-
mographic profile of agricultural settlements.
13 According to business press, EU imports about 50% of organic food it 
consumes annualy in the value of more than 10 billion Euros (Poslovni 
dnevnik. Zelenim planovima udobrovoljili Bruxelles, a ekoproizvođače os-
tavili na tržišnoj vjetrometini. http://www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/zelenim-
planovima-udobrovoljili-bruxelles-a-ekoproizvoace-ostavili-na-trzisnoj-
vjetrometini-242924. Accessed on 30.06.2013.
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Transport efficiency
High prices of fossil fuels and the pressure to reduce CO2 emissions, both of 
which will increase in the near future, require transport systems different 
from the ones that defined the era of low energy prices. State and public-
private investment partnerships (PPIP) are needed to improve the current 
and develop new infrastructure. For example, obsolete and declining rail-
road network should be turned into the main interurban transport mode. 
Here, one of the major investment areas is building a high- speed rail on the 
east-west and south-north axis with the aim to increase energy efficiency 
of major traffic flows and reduce its carbon footprint. In the urban areas, 
investments are needed to improve density and efficiency of public trans-
port via new generations of surface tramways, self-service bicycle stations, 
and appropriate traffic regulation that would stimulate public over indi-
vidual transportation. Foreign and domestic investors should be attracted 
to invest in the existing manufacturing cluster that produces trains and 
tramways, which may well be one of the most dynamic industries of the 
future. Complementary to policy measures that drive private transporta-
tion towards mass and public modes is the monetary incentive for switch-
ing to low-carbon options by providing, for example, a stimulating VAT to 
consumers for purchases of hybrid or electric cars14.
Energy security
The basis for an integrated and efficient production and distribution of re-
newable energy in Croatia – solar, biomass15, hydro, and to a smaller extent 
wind – is a well designed (decentralized) and managed electricity transmis-
sion infrastructure. Public investments in smart grids is one of the major 
steps in increasing current efficiency of electrical energy transmission and 
building the appropriate infrastructure for future transition to low-carbon 
energy system. As in all cases where an infrastructure project is de-facto 
a public good, like railways, ports and bridges, its primary investor is the 
state. Generation of renewable energy in large power plants should then be 
left to the state, PPIP, and to private investors depending on the strategic 
importance and value of an individual project. An indispensable element 
of energy security policy is efficiency, like investments in energy efficient 
buildings: large-scale renovation of public buildings that will be in use in 
the next 20 and more years and tax incentive for private owners to do the 
14 Behavioral research (Ariely 2008, 63-64) indicates that a zero VAT may the 
appropriate level needed to engender large-scale behavioral changes. It 
is clear that in that case there should be in place a plan for developing an 
adequate nation-wide charging stations network. 
15 Refering to forest residues, timber industry waste, and agricultural waste.
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same. Part of that policy can be a program of installing a solar panel on 
“every roof” in the coastal area, which the state could support with income 
tax deductions and zero VAT on equipment. Since it is very unlikely that in 
the foreseeable future Croatian energy consumption can be entirely sup-
plied with renewables, the state should look for the lowest carbon energy 
mix for the remaining balance. This means giving preference to natural 
gas over coal and, providing that the issue of storage of nuclear waste is 
successfully solved, taking into consideration the nuclear option in coop-
eration with the neighbouring countries. In the context of energy sector 
de-carbonization, phasing out subsidies to fossil fuels and redirecting them 
to renewables16 is an unavoidable policy step. However, this requires an 
EU-wide policy coordination as an isolated action in the common market 
would likely be a self-penalizing move in economic competitiveness. Last 
but not least, a recent UNDP report (Vlašić 2013) showed that a focused 
and comprehensive policy aimed at increasing energy efficiency and share 
of renewables in the energy mix, could create about 80.000 new jobs in 
the green sector, which is a goal to be pursued on its own merit given that 
it represents a reduction of more than one fifth of the current registered 
unemployment.
Conclusions
The IPS outline in the preceding section is by no means exhaustive: not all 
areas have been covered17 and there are many other policy measures that 
have already been proposed in order to cope with the challenges of climate 
change and related energy and food problems (see for example Seth et al. 
2008; Vlašić 2013). What I have proposed here is the very concept of IPS, 
its rationale (changing boundary conditions), and the prioritized areas of 
action as I see them. The imposing constraints coming from the current 
16 Currently, Croatia spends 5-6% of its GDP on subsidies for imported fossil 
fuels (Vlašić 2013, 4-5)
17 In the context of sustanability, areas like waste and water management 
are intrinsically tied to success of IPS. On the other hand, I do not see, 
for example tourism to be a relevant area for IPS because it hardly con-
nects to its main goal – that of serving society’s material needs under the 
global threats, which arise from global warming and the sunset of fossil 
energy sources. Tourism sector growth exerts pressure on land conversion 
to recreational uses, leading to losses of natural ecosystems and fertile 
land destined for food production. It puts under seasonal strain local wa-
ter and landfills capacities. For that reasons, in the context of IPS tourism 
belongs to those economic activities that have to be socially constrained 
rather than being unconditionally stimulated in the pursuit of short-term 
economic growth.
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macroeconomic weaknesses – the level of public debt and budget deficit – 
restrain any government’s short-term capability to engage in investment 
projects. The government has, however, the option to use foreign and do-
mestic private investment in the pursuit of IPS goals. So far, Croatian gov-
ernment has been very far from this strategy (Matutinović 2013).
In order for industrial policy for sustainability becoming politically ac-
ceptable and consistent over many changes of government, we need to 
have in the first place a socially shared belief that negative trends are real: 
that global climate is posing immediate treats which may only increase in 
the future; that fossil fuels are finite and can only become more and more 
expensive in the future; that all of these, in concert with growing global 
population, will cause food scarcity, which will heavily impact on small 
import-dependent economies. Finally, we have to recognize that current 
model of economic growth and neoliberal ideology cannot offer solutions 
to these problems, but can only make things worse in the future. The na-
tionally oriented IPS outline proposed here is viable within the current EU 
political and economic settings: to the author’s best konwledge none of its 
measures is running against published EU policy papers and sector strate-
gies. Investing taxpayers money in smart irrigation systems, smart grids, 
solar panels, or in modern railways is in no way an exceptional proposal. 
Under the current EU market conditions, the investments in organic food 
is verly likely to be profitable for the private sector. What is exceptional 
is that none of the above has been happening at a scale that would nearly 
match the challenges discussed in the first section. This lack of political 
and private action provides the rationale for defining and implementing 
IPS at the national level. 
For IPS to become real we need a vision and political commitment be-
yond a single election term. Then extant societal resources – technology, 
institutions and markets – can be effectively employed to work in the so-
cially preferred direction – that of sustainability. While the world at large 
will most likely continue to play roulette with natural systems, for small 
economies like Croatia’s, being passive and disoriented as it currently is, 
may result in bearing large (un)predictable consequences in the not so 
distant future. 
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The climate change threat
Climate change has become one of the most serious consequences of the 
global environmental crisis of the past few decades and one of the big-
gest threats to life as we know it. Whilst climate change affects and has its 
roots in processes occurring in nature, its hazards are caused by modern 
forms of social organisation: the economic, political, and cultural system 
that has spread from the West throughout the rest of the world. Since the 
1980s, there has been an increasing amount of evidence that mankind has 
an effect on the global environment – the global temperature is rising, and 
consequently, the global climate is changing. Global warming has had a cu-
mulative long-term effect over the entire history of modern society and its 
attitude towards nature, an effect which was ignored until the consequences 
became apparent. The greatest influence on anthropogenic aspects of cli-
mate change has been the burning of fossil fuels through basic industrial 
processes, followed by the use of cars over a period stretching over more 
than a hundred years, modern agricultural production, and deforestation. 
In 2013, the latest report from the International Panel for Climate Change 
(IPCC) reported with great confidence that human activities increase global 
warming. It also warned that the increase of temperature must be limited to 
below 2 °C, the margin that mankind will be able to withstand and adapt to1. 
However, emissions keep growing year after year, and an efficient interna-
tional agreement which would bind all countries in the world to reduce their 
emissions has not yet been achieved. Scientists have signalled warnings 
several times that if “business-as-usual” continues, the temperature will 
rise by 4 °C by year 2060 due to the reduced capacity of forests and oceans 
01 IPCC (2013), Cimate change 2013 – Physical Science basis, http://www.
climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-SPM_Approved-
27Sep2013.pdf
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to absorb the excess of CO2. Such catastrophic predictions were unheard of 
ten years ago. Today, as climate science improves, they have become a regular 
occurrence, a part of the mainstream. The concepts of a tipping point and 
positive feedback loops have become widespread in scientific discourse.
The need to understand global warming and climate change constitutes 
a high level complex problem for those whose duty it is to understand the 
phenomena. This complexity includes society and social relations, which 
means that the social sciences have to respond to the changes manifested in 
society, as well as to the changes in public, scientific, and political discourse.
It is such changes within science that have pushed climate change to the 
fore as a political problem. Climate science has become a springboard for 
topics that keep appearing on the political agenda, and which are a cause 
of political negotiations and conflicts.
Research into the geophysical processes of anthropogenic climate 
change is constantly improving and one can assume that contributions 
to understanding this phenomenon will further improve. However, the 
burning issue of social reactions relating to political, economic, and social 
structures; the relations between human action and beliefs, and between 
natural processes and social consequences remains. Climate change, there-
fore, is not an exclusively environmental problem but is also connected to 
a wide array of social and political issues, first and foremost to the question 
of the environmental sustainability of the current generation’s lifestyles, 
that is, towards questions regarding the planet, and humanity’s survival.
A Political answer to the climate change problem
Climate changes do not only mark the consequences of human influence 
on the global environment but also require an unprecedented political 
consensus necessary to stop the global average temperature rise (prefer-
ably through reducing and stopping the emission of greenhouse gases) and 
alleviating the consequences of climate change. The international political 
response to climate change is reflected in the Kyoto Protocol and attempts 
to establish a new agreement which should have followed it in 2013. Since 
the Kyoto Protocol and the international negotiations that followed did not 
yield the desired results, an increasing number of sociologists are consider-
ing the option of using alternative political and legal instruments which 
would serve as a model for creating a new, more efficient global climate 
change policy. Attempts to create a new agreement include analysis and 
reviews of market mechanisms, regulatory approaches, decentralisation 
and the democratisation of the decision-making process, ways of connect-
ing heterogenous opportunities, or a new universal policy to be conducted 
by international community elites. 
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Olmsted and Stavins (2012) believe that global climate policy has to contain 
three elements in order to be successful: a) a framework which will ensure 
the participation of developing countries; b) an emphasis on extended dead-
lines or emission reduction goals; and c) flexible, market-oriented mecha-
nisms that will enable a lower cost for emission reduction. Even though 
the authors claim that the Kyoto Protocol was oriented towards short-term 
emission reduction and included only developed countries, a proposal cur-
rently under their consideration may be equally inefficient. Unclear goals 
with delayed actions and without short-term mechanisms for implemen-
tation and monitoring have a much bigger chance of failure than modest 
short-term goals. The participation of developing countries is expected in 
the post-Kyoto period, with a particular emphasis on historical rights and 
common but differentiated responsibilities. The necessity of developing 
countries’ participation in international negotiations has not been ques-
tioned so far, but it is important to bear in mind aspects of climate justice and 
complex geopolitical and economic relations between the developed and the 
developing countries, in which the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities is used as an excuse for avoiding international obligations 
for emission reduction. In addition, the flexible mechanisms that rely on 
market regulation were included in the first period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
but even they have not ensured a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The 
elements of international climate policy to which Olmsted and Stavins refer 
actually make up declarations that stem from international negotiations 
concerning climate change since 2009. The analysts regard these as ineffi-
cient, non-binding, unclear in terms of goals, declarative, and in any case, a 
step away from an agreement that would ensure a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions as recommended by the scientists spearheaded by the IPCC.
Some authors believe that the key lies in connecting heterogeneous 
and decentralised policies, as experience shows that a universal and global 
agreement is almost impossible to accomplish (Metcalf and Weisbach 
2010; Hayward 2008).They claim that the global trend is a step further away 
from a universal policy for creating and implementing various local, na-
tional, and regional level policies. These policies include various implemen-
tation mechanisms, from the market-oriented to regulatory mechanisms 
in which the state has the key role. In order to avoid the recent errors of 
several regional policies, such as carbon leakage2, the authors find it neces-
02 Carbon leakage occurs when the price of carbon (either directly through 
the carbon trade system or indirectly through taxes) drives away the car-
bon-intensive industry into countries with cheap carbon. In the case of 
recent international climate change policy, these were the undeveloped 
countries that were not obliged to reduce greenhouse gas emission.
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sary to establish legal instruments for connecting heterogeneous policies 
instead of homogenising the existing policies. The linking mechanisms 
would allow each country to determine how to control its emissions for 
itself, but they would also establish a network that would prevent the 
shortcomings with which previous international climate policy was faced. 
The precondition for efficient regional or national policies is the establish-
ment of a unique price for carbon. In this case, the linking policy would en-
able an interaction between various regional emission reduction policies, 
which would reduce the cost of climate policies aimed at alleviating climate 
damage. Bearing this in mind, it is important that all countries making a 
large contribution to total emissions of greenhouse gases take part in the 
integrating of these heterogeneous policies.
However, what the advocates of such an approach are failing to see is a 
need for drastic short-term emission reduction in order for global warming 
to remain within the margins humanity will be able to bear. Regardless of 
whether this is achieved through a universal policy or a network of poli-
cies, it is necessary to extensively redirect the economic policies of both 
developed and developing countries. It is this, and not the lack of flexibility 
of existing instruments concerning the Kyoto Protocol that constitutes an 
obstacle to efficient international climate change policies.
Bearing this in mind, Vezirgiannidou (2009) emphasises the participation 
of all countries as a precondition for efficiency of (and the ability to imple-
ment) any international agreement. This has to be done in a way which 
ensures their participation. Even though maximising the participation of 
all countries is necessary for efficient international policy, it can lead to 
“weaker” agreements as a large number of various interests and potential 
conflicts lead to a solution using “the lowest common denominator”. Guided 
by the example of the Montreal Protocol3, the Vezirgiannidou suggests a 
plausible framework for generating climate policy. Universal participation 
does not have to be ensured immediately to keep track of climate justice 
and the (in)abilities of undeveloped countries, but this can be done within a 
certain time frame. Contrary to the practice of helping, the author suggests 
that, in order to increase participation, a combination of strict institution-
03 The Montreal Protocol is an agreement on stopping the production and 
usage of chemical substances that affect the depletion of the ozone layer. 
The agreement was signed in 1988 and was put to effect immediately with 
the aim of completely stopping the production of certain gases (halon, 
freon, and other chlorofluorocarbons) until 1996. Undeveloped countries 
were given the possibility of postponing the implementation of the Pro-
tocol guidelines and a certain amount of help was also agreed. The results 
of the agreement were visible immediately after it was put into effect – a 
decrease in the production of these gases was recorded and it is assumed 
that the ozone will be replenished by 2050. 
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alised mechanisms with determined sanctions and help for undeveloped 
countries would be useful in order to ensure participation and efficiency. In 
the context of climate change, an agreement between the countries emit-
ting the largest amount of greenhouse gases regarding detailed measures 
and policies for emission reduction in accordance with reduction goals, 
should include market instruments that would provide financial benefits 
to the participants and would disadvantage those that are not participating. 
Vezirgiannidou argues that a detailed elaboration of a political and legal 
framework which would ensure the participation and implementation of 
further agreements would prevent the shortcomings of the previous (Kyoto) 
protocol and ensure quality monitoring, implementation, and efficiency of 
the agreement, combining it with a demand for urgent action.
The increasing complexity of climate change policy, which in this case 
does not refer simply to particular industrial processes (as was the case with 
the Montreal Protocol) but all aspects of human activity, makes reaching an 
agreement which would serve as a new political framework for the interna-
tional community much more difficult. In addition, the success of reaching 
an international agreement ultimately depends on the political will of mem-
ber states to take part in such an agreement and to establish the need to reach 
a new agreement which has only been considered a delayed option until now. 
Croatia as a high emission society?
The social causes of climate change are a result of the social organisation of 
life. Increase in emissions is not a result of individual behaviour and choices 
but is caused by historically rooted modes – systems – in which certain 
types of social practice are established and maintained in interaction with 
nature’s carbon cycle4. This interaction enabled deeply rooted routines and 
04 In order to explain the complex relations between society and the environ-
ment, many authors use Marx’s term “metabolic rift” (Foster 2002a; york, 
Rosa and Dietz 2003; foster, Clark and York 2011; Urry 2011; etc.). Soci-
ety, in interaction with nature, takes part in its metabolism and through 
its metabolism it constantly recreates and transforms social forms. The 
energy and materials that society extracts from the environment cannot 
disappear; they can only be transformed so that the output of waste is 
equal to the input of resources (except in cases of “delay” through the 
accumulation of materials). Therefore, even though it seems that nature 
is separated from society, especially during increased industrialisation, 
there is always a material metabolism, and forcefully separating nature 
and society creates a metabolic rift. The circulation of goods through the 
systems for communication and transport based on the consumption of 
fossil fuels “upgrades” capitalist industrialisation and rescinds space by 
time. This becomes a necessity as production increasingly relies on the ex-
change of goods and the increasing rate of exchange between the mecha-
nised, fossil fuel-based mobility of goods and human beings. 
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lifestyles that constitute modern culture and technology and define desired 
forms of accepted behaviour in many contemporary societies. 
The standard of living in the wealthy North which has been marked 
by an increase in income, security, mobility, prosperity, and a longer life 
expectancy, has become standard in Eastern Europe from 1945 onward, 
and especially following the collapse of communism in 1989 (Urry 2011). 
The socialist countries of Central and South Eastern Europe experienced 
intense transitional changes (political systems, systems of ownership, cul-
ture, etc.). 
In terms of the organisation of production and overall social life, Croatia 
follows the example of developed countries, having moved to a capitalist 
mode of development. This means that the process of “carbonisation”5 is 
an inevitable process which accompanies the overall production process 
and the organisation of life. 
Urry (2011) detects five notable systems, each possessing a powerful “con-
servative moment”, pointing to “the path dependence” of large socio-tech-
nical systems:
•	 the development of systems of electric power generation and con-
sumption (especially fossil fuels), and national electric grids which 
ensure that all homes in the developed North are lit, heated, and sup-
plied with electricity-based consumer goods;
•	 the expansion of fossil fuel-based automobiles and roads, along with 
a widespread infrastructure connecting remote places of residence, 
work, and rest;
•	 the development and expansion of suburban settlements, located away 
from places of work to which one must travel by car, and furnishing 
homes with consumer goods, such as televisions and other electric 
appliances;
•	 the increasing ownership (especially in the private sector) of places of 
rest, supermarkets, theme parks, stadiums, and restaurants that are 
travelled to by car or plane, and which also involve the long-distance 
transportation of goods (Urry 2011, 51-52).
These are not only social patterns or individual preferences, but also high 
carbon systems. Each of these systems simultaneously include trade, trans-
portation, and consumption and each of them constitutes an important 
condition for the existence of other connected systems.
05 We define carbonization as the developmental process that is based on 
excesive use of fossil fuels for mantaining the basic needs of population, 
which in turn have a vast amount of greenhouse gas emissions as a conse-
quence. 
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When talking about net emissions of greenhouse gases, Croatia is in 
the middle between rich countries that are high emitters and poor coun-
tries that are low emitters6. If we take into consideration the emission 
per capita, Croatia moves a few spots higher7. In its history, Croatia has 
recorded two major drops in emissions8. The first occurred immediately 
after it became independent and was caused the by the breakdown of the 
economy due to war. During the UN meeting on climate in Morocco in 2001 
(COP79), Croatia asked for its greenhouse gases quotas10 to be increased for 
the base year, 1990, as this was the year in which Croatia was founded under 
the specific conditions of war. At the moment of its creation, Croatia took 
part in the construction and consumption of energy outside its borders on 
the territory of former Yugoslav countries. In fact, Croatia received 22 % of 
its energy from these power stations. Taking into account that the initial 
greenhouse gas quotas were higher (as energy consumption was higher), 
the reduction in emissions would ultimately be smaller for Croatia. Even 
though the quotas were permitted at the meeting of parties present at the 
Kyoto Protocol in Nairobi in 2006, in 2009 (just before the Copenhagen 
conference) the UN Executive Board for the Kyoto Protocol revoked Croa-
tia’s starting (higher) emission quotas which put Croatia in an unfavourable 
position. At the Copenhagen conference, Croatia reissued its request and 
06 In absolute figures, Croatia’s share of greenhouse gases is 0.08% (Interna-
tional Energy Statistics http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject ).
07 The carbon dioxide emission is measured through Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and the Forestry method (LULUCF) which primarily refers to di-
rect human/society’s use and conversion of land and forestry practices 
that decrease, that is, it represents a huge decrease in CO
2
eq net emis-
sion. Without the LULUCF segment, Croatia has to decrease the total in-
ventory of greenhouse gases that itemits. In the case of Croatia, LULUCF 
represents a bigger difference in the end-result of CO
2 
net emissions by a 
meagre 0.9% in the period of 1990-2008, while it reduced its emissions 
by 13.7% in the same period if we include the LULUCF segment, and a de-
crease in emissions is also recorded in the following years.
08 A detailed display of individual and group data on greenhouse gas emis-
sion in Croatia can be found on the UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int/di/
DetailedByParty/Event.do?event=go.
09 The abbreviation COP refers to Conference of the Parties, which gathers all 
members of the UN convention on climate change, held once a year. The 
Kyoto Protocol was voted on the third summit (COP3). The summit held in 
Morocco was the seventh summit which is why it is referred to as COP7.
10 Croatia asked for its starting quotas to be increased by 4.46 million tons 
of CO
2
eq, which would make a total of 35 million tons instead of 31 million 
tons of CO
2
eq (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/irr/hrv.pdf ).
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de facto requested a 6% increase in emission11, at a time when even unde-
veloped countries committed, at least declaratively, to reduce emission by 
twenty or more percent in the following ten years or until 2050.
The second major reduction in greenhouse gas emissions occurred par-
allel to the great economic crisis in 2008. A similar event took place in 
almost all developed countries, in which the crisis resulted in many indus-
trial complexes being closed down and a decrease in the consumption of 
energy. Therefore, the reduced emission of greenhouse gases (in Croatia 
and the rest of the world) was not a result of conscious efforts and creative 
policies, but a result of economic crisis. Another element that surely influ-
enced emission reduction in Croatia was population change: Croatia had 
a negative natural change, that is, a decrease in the number of inhabitants 
which to some degree implies reduced consumption and consequently, a 
decrease in emissions12 (Nejašmić and Mišetić 2004). 
If we go back a little earlier, the picture becomes much clearer. In the 
period before the economic crisis, from 1990 to 2007, emissions in Croatia 
had grown by 3.2 percent from the base year. An inadequate government 
engagement concerning climate change was confirmed by the Climate 
Change Performance Index (CCPI), an instrument which aims to show the 
efficiency of climate change policy in 57 countries that are responsible for 
over 90 % of global CO2 emissions. In fact, ever since the Kyoto Protocol was 
ratified, the efficiency of the greenhouse gases reduction policy has been 
marked as “poor” by the CCPI13. The biggest increase in CO2 emissions has 
been recorded in the energetics and industrial processes sectors. 
11 Croatia’s move did not go unnoticed in the world media even at the Co-
penhagen summit, and numerous criticisms soon followed. The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning, in charge of the imple-
mentation of the UN’s climate change convention framework argued that 
it was not true that Croatia asked for an increase in emissions but rather 
asked for a revision of the starting quotas. However, a simple calculation 
shows that such an increase in starting quotas would not “cost” Croatia 5% 
of emissions but would give it a margin of an additional 6% for emission. 
12 Demographers predict that by 2031, Croatia will have 756,710 fewer inhab-
itants, that is, 17% inhabitants less than in 2000. Many demographers mark 
the negative demographic trends in terms of natural growth and popula-
tion age structure as a “demographic extinction”, which will have many 
(negative) socio-economic repercussions (Nejašmić and Mišetić 2004).
13 The aim of the index is to increase the transparency of national and in-
ternational measures and policies for climate change. This tool illustrates 
who does what in order to prevent climate change. The criterion that the 
index uses for assessing particular countries includes objective indicators 
of the situation with greenhouse gas emission and emission trends (80 
%), and professional assessments of national and international measures 
(20%). See: http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ccpi.htm.
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Fossil fuel energy is one of the biggest sources of carbon dioxide in the 
world. Croatia gets the majority of the energy it produces from fossil fuels 
(for which the energetics sector contributes more than 74% of total green-
house gas emissions), which means that a large amount of greenhouse gases 
that Croatia emits relates to carbon dioxide, even more than 75%14. Supply 
problems concerning non-renewable energy sources (mostly oil), and cli-
mate change go hand in hand as energy-intensive systems and systems of 
centralised electrification are one of five major interdependent locked-in 
systems that make up the high emission society. Croatia has inherited the 
centralised, highly energy-intensive systems from the previous political 
system along with its political situation and attitude towards the environ-
ment. Following its dependence, it did not develop sustainable energetic 
strategies but continued down an old path that was not characterised by 
the ecological modernisation of energetics and development in the direc-
tion of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in this sector.
Another feature of modern systems, or high emission systems, is spatial 
mobility. This is reflected in Croatian society as well, as its certain patterns 
of increased consumption and high mobility resembles (and aspires to re-
semble) Western consumer societies. An interesting fact in this context is 
that, even in the crisis years when the total emissions from the energetics 
sector dropped due to decreased consumption, the emissions from the traf-
fic subsector increased by more than 50 % relative to the base year.
In terms of territory and population, Croatia is a small country and is not 
a major polluter on a global level. As a transitional society, Croatia has found 
itself within the context of market globalization, forced to adapt to social 
processes that are destructive in some aspects of development, especially 
in terms of its effect on the environment (Lay 2003). Anthropogenic global 
warming is an example of global pollution that transcends national bounda-
ries and Croatia will not be able to avoid further deterioration in the quality 
of life caused by climate change. We agree with the opinion that despite this, 
Croatia may still pursue a strategy that will nurture the “culture, measures, 
and practice for preserving nature and the environment (…) for long-term 
social gain” (Lay 2003, 322). In addition, in the context of systems science 
that focuses on the interrelatedness between systems, it is clear that meas-
ures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions directly correlate with overall 
sustainability, independence, and the quality of life. Even though there has 
been a trend towards decreased emissions from 2008 onward, analysis of 
the causes of such trends and of basic strategies regarding attitudes towards 
controlling the emission of greenhouse gases (energy strategies and sustain-
14 http://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/hrv_ghg_
profile.pdf.
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able development strategies) shows that the overall development trend 
is not in the direction of low emission societies. All sectors are in need of 
public and economic policies aimed towards the decarbonisation of society.
The state and the efficiency of measures for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in Croatia
Even though Croatia ratified the Kyoto protocol and implemented some 
measures to reduce emissions, Croatia did not achieve the desired results. 
Climate policy is complex and in order to be successful, it has to incorporate 
instruments and measures from all economic sectors. In addition, climate 
policy has to use positive instruments that would enable multi-level ben-
efits (Giddens 2009; Latin 2012). Giddens explains the comprehensiveness 
of climate change though the term “political convergence”. Latin explains 
the same idea with the term “strategy of pure replacement technology”. 
Both terms denote the extent to which political measures for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions overlap with other public policy measures so 
that they mutually support and strengthen each other and bring multiple 
benefits. It is also important that the overlap between these measures is 
positive and that the measures themselves are positive, that is, that they 
support not just economic prosperity, but overall social development and 
quality of life, in both the short and long term15.
In the following part of our work, we shall present the results of research 
concerning the situation and the efficiency of policies and measures in 
Croatia for reducing climate change. The research presented is a part of a 
wider study conducted in the scope of a doctoral dissertation16. In this work, 
we focussed on the aspects of our study that are used to analyse the state of 
climate policies in Croatia, as well as obstacles to implementing measures 
for reducing emission within the climate policy framework17.
15 Perhaps the best examples of such policies are the energetic development 
strategies based on using renewable sources of energy. Not only do they 
accomplish a significant reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases, the 
usage of renewable sources of energy can be a positive factor for invest-
ments and generating new jobs, it contributes to the country’s energetic 
security, saves its resources, and improves the quality of the local environ-
ment. It is also cost-effective in the long term and ensures the country’s 
energetic independence.
16 Puđak, J. (2013) Croatia and climate change: Sociological analysis of state 
and efficiency of policies for greenhouse gas emission reduction, doctoral 
dissertation, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
17 The final results of analysis for this study conducted in the scope of a doctoral 
dissertation were 156 codes, distributed into 22 topics, categorised into 6 di-
mensions. This work provides a review of 24 codes distributed into 3 topics.
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Methodology
In order to describe the situation and the efficiency of policies aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gas emission in Croatia, we have decided to conduct 
qualitative research18. Since there have not yet been any studies of this type 
on this topic in Croatia, our study has a guiding character. We have tried 
to give an overview of this field, without in-depth and detailed analysis of 
every specific topic that were found to be relevant for this work. The quali-
tative approach has allowed us to gain better insight into the area without 
any further knowledge (studies) which would permit us the a priori crea-
tion of categories. A qualitative approach also allows us to understand and 
explain the state and efficiency of climate policies in Croatia, from the 
perspective of crucial actors, directly or indirectly involved in processes 
of decision making and policy implementation.
The main goal of this research is to explore the views of the relevant 
practitoiners (i.e. actors from public administration, civil, science, political 
and business sectors) concerning the state and efficiency of climate change 
policy in Croatia, and also their views on (possible) implementation obsta-
cles to these policies. This should give us a better understanding of state and 
efficiency of the national climate policy. The main hypothesis put forward 
in our research is that the relevant actors from public administration and 
politics do not create a coherent and efficient climate politics19.
As concerns the survey questions in this study, we decided to gather 
data through semi-structured interviews20. This enabled us to gather a 
broad spectre of data and information, but also to keep track of particular 
topics of interest. We used open-ended questions to allow participants to 
give us their broad opinion on the different aspect of the matter under 
consideration.
Since the study involved actors from five social sectors, we used addi-
tional questions to adapt the interviews where necessary, according to the 
level of expertise of various actors in order to cover all basic topics that the 
author initially created21. In some cases, new questions were added as new 
information appeared in earlier interviews. The interview was divided 
18 The study was conducted from March to June 2012. 
19 In the original research there was one more specific goal and several more 
hypothesis concerning relations and (self)perceptions among diffrent re-
search groups, but those were left out in this overview bacause it is not 
directly conected to this part of research.
20 The interviews were conducted solely by the author of this paper. 
21 This is a common procedure when conducting semi-structured interviews 
using the Grounded Theory methodology and does not imply inconsist-
ency regarding the end results.
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into four basic areas: climate changes as a problem, global climate politics, 
domestic climate politics, context and implementation of measures for 
cutting GHG emissions in Croatia.22
The material we obtained was then analysed by using particular proce-
dures relevant to Grounded Theory. The choice of method of data analysis 
depends on the research questions and research questions depend on their 
context and everything available to the researcher in this given context. 
The author chose the Grounded Theory procedures to process the data in 
order to interpret them in the best possible way, considering the nature of 
the given information (interviews concerning the attitude of crucial ac-
tors) and research aims (understanding certain social phenomena – in this 
case, the state and the efficiency of climate policies). Grounded Theory is 
an iterative process through which the researcher becomes increasingly 
“grounded” in the data and has the ability to develop complex concepts 
and models that explain the phenomenon in question. Using the Grounded 
Theory method, the researcher wants to identify the categories and con-
cepts derived from the text and connect them with formal theories (Cor-
bin and Strauss, 1990). Since the author’s primary goal is not to develop a 
theory but to understand the social phenomenon, only certain procedures 
of Grounded Theory were used, such as multi-level coding and comparative 
analysis. 
Since this is a narrow and highly specialised topic, we opted for a deliber-
ate sample. The sample included relevant persons from the civil, business, 
and public sector, politics, and science. By doing things in this manner, we 
wanted to include key actors from all social sectors that are directly or in-
directly involved in climate change policies in Croatia. Due to the diversity 
of relevant actors, we decided to divide the sample into five narrow sec-
tors (groups), instead of a traditional distribution in democratic societies 
into three wider sectors (public, civil, and business). A total of 32 out of 40 
contacted participants agreed to an interview: seven scientists, four poli-
ticians, four public administrators, eight members of non-governmental 
organisations and nine businessmen23.
22 The interview scheme is attatched in the anex of this paper.
23 Fewer survey participants from public administration and politics sectors 
are not only due to less interest among contacted individuals, but also 
due to overall small number of people working on climate change policy 
in public sector (for instance, main government department dealing with 
climate change is under the authority of Ministry of environmental pro-
tection and spatial planning, and in the time of conducting a survey only 
three people were working on the department).
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Results
Following the first reading of the data for analysis, the relevant topics and 
codes became apparent and answers to our research questions were con-
structed around them. Through multilevel coding we came to the final net 
of twenty-four codes divided into three topics:
CODES TOPICS
Croatia has taken on too big a responsibility; 
Croatia has a comprehensive climate policy; Croa-
tia does not have a comprehensive climate policy; 
there is a lack of long-term climate policy plan-
ning in Croatia; the EU influence on climate policy.
Climate change 
policy in Croatia
Fund: realistic role incongruent with the idea; 
Croatia will not achieve its reduction goals; un-
regulated emission reduction in Croatia.
Emission reduc-
tion in Croatia – 
the situation
Absurdities concerning the emission reduction 
policy; bureaucracy as an obstacle to develop-
ment; existential questions have priority; mea-
sures are good but their implementation is not; 
inadequate basic strategies; lack of measures 
across sectors; no political will for climate policy; 
lack of understanding of climate policy; no co-
operation among the government; disorganised 
public sector, lack of transparency in the fund’s 
work; partial measures due to EU pressure; ob-
stacles within the system; a conflict of interests.
Obstacles to 
implementing 
emission reduc-
tion measures
The topic “Climate change policy (CP) in Croatia”
Croatia ratified the 2005 Kyoto Protocol and started implementing meas-
ures to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. The level of emission 
reduction attained does not necessarily reflect a comprehensive and well-
rounded climate policy. Due to the complexity of the problem itself and the 
legislative framework, particular measures from different sectors do not 
have to be compatible or even effective. The topic “Climate change policy 
in Croatia” includes four codes and fifty-eight quotes.
III Country case studies 308
Figure 1
The topic “Climate change (CC) policy in Croatia” and its respective codes
The question of whether Croatian climate policy is considered comprehen-
sible or not yielded mostly negative opinions.
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Lack of a comprehensive CC 
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A negative response was the most common answer amongst participants 
from all sectors. The reason why most participants think that Croatian 
climate policy is not comprehensive largely refers to the lack of interdis-
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ciplinarity, a lack of cooperation amongst the ministries, and the lack of a 
framework which would encompass all measures from each sector, accord-
ing to participants.
When explaining their attitude, the participants emphasise the lack 
of relatedness between particular measures, i.e. paradoxes across certain 
measures which disables implementation, thanks to contrasting measures 
from other departments. This is a result of a lack of cooperation between 
the ministries, a lack of coordination and interdisciplinary thinking in the 
creation of complex policies, such as climate policy. When asked “What 
are the reasons for ineffective climate policy in Croatia?” the participants 
responded:
Scientist2: “There were some examples in countries where 
they exist, where the bodies that cover all ministries decide 
together. If a question is really important, the connection be-
tween institutions shows you how important the people find 
it to be. It apparently is not an important issue here as eve-
ryone decides for themselves…Each ministry has its jurisdic-
tions and this policy is not entirely recognised in this aspect.”
The participants often stated that neither the wider environmental protec-
tion policy nor the climate change policy was set up systematically.
Politician4: “I think they have opened a way towards thinking 
about the necessity of a comprehensive system within Croa-
tia, but I think we are far from having a comprehensive nature 
protection policy and climate protection policy.“
Another recognised problem is the lack of staff in public administration 
dealing with this topic, which some participants perceive as a lack of po-
litical agility regarding climate policy. This reflects the lack of systematic 
implementation of particular measures for greenhouse gas emission re-
duction and a lack of long-term planning. Croatia has certain legislation 
and subordinate legislation that refer to emission reduction, but a certain 
number of participants think that these regulations are not implemented, 
which resulted in an increased emission of greenhouse gases. In addition, 
one gets the impression that political planning is done only within a sin-
gle term which prevents creating a comprehensive climate policy which 
should set goals for a much longer period (the following twenty to fifty 
years). According to participants the lack of political will is also reflected 
in the lack of institutional cooperation on the same problem. On this topic, 
the participants once again referred to examples from foreign countries in 
which government bodies coordinate climate policy and they recognized 
that as an important problem in political leadership. Therefore, a lack of 
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communication between institutions is an indicator of the government’s 
stance on climate change, which leads us to conclude that the Croatian 
government still has not recognized this problem as an important one. 
When asked “Does Croatia have a comprehensive climate policy?” a sci-
entist answered:
Scientist1: “No, we do not. If we start from the top, that is, 
the public administration, government, ministries – they are 
the ones creating and implementing the policy and monitor-
ing if their design is achieved. I don’t think these policies are 
connected there nor can you clearly say ‘This is the climate 
change policy and it consists of policies for energetics, indus-
try, transportation, finance…’”
When talking about the lack of long-term planning, a number of the par-
ticipants reflected on Croatia joining the climate policy discussion through 
the signing of the Kyoto agreement. They are dissatisfied with govern-
ments’ unpreparedness when entering negotiations on climate and the 
poor negotiation body which put all those obliged by this agreement into 
an unfavourable position. Comparative analysis allowed us to notice that 
such opinion was voiced by the participants who believed that the quotas 
assigned to Croatia through this protocol were unjust. The possibility of 
not fulfilling these goals was seen as a responsibility of the delegation who 
gained a poor starting position in the negotiations, and not as a problem of 
Croatia’s climate policy.
“Unpreparedness” is reflected in the later phase of climate policy prepa-
ration, that is, the harmonisation of chapters on the environment during 
Croatia’s accession to the European Union; a number of participants found 
that adopting the framework came down to copying EU regulations with-
out adapting these regulations to particular conditions and other public 
policies in Croatia. 
Apart from that, certain participants detected a lack of long-term plan-
ning in current Croatian government projects, mostly related to industry 
and energetics, which largely contribute to greenhouse gas emissions.
Only two participants think that Croatia has a comprehensive climate 
policy. They base their attitude on the claim that Croatia took on EU cli-
mate policy during its negotiations and that this policy is regarded as good 
and comprehensive.
Even without being prompted directly about it, a large number of partic-
ipants refered to the influence of the European Union on Croatia’s internal 
politics, which is reflected in climate policy as well. A number of partici-
pants with negative opinions concerning Croatian climate policy have the 
attitude that the European legal framework will bring the desired results 
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in the future. These participants believe that EU membership will compel 
actors in Croatia to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This mostly refers to 
public administration through enforcing European goals and implementa-
tion instruments, as well as industry through the emission trading scheme. 
The participants who share this view, much like the supporters of Euro-
pean climate policy, do not find the fact that Croatia joining the EU does 
not change the governing structure and implementation instruments to 
be relevant. By joining the ETS (Emission Trading Scheme)24, the industry 
will have to make certain adjustments, that is, purchase certain permits 
for emissions. These costs will eventually be shifted onto consumers, thus 
neutralising a part of their costs. Even though this does not guarantee a re-
duction of emissions in industry or energetics, or any other sector for that 
matter, the participants have the impression that our obligations towards 
the European Union will make us more responsible in managing emissions 
and related costs (in particular, the Environmental Protection and Energy 
Efficiency Fund). When asked “How do you view the influence of EU policy 
on climate policy in Croatia?” the participants provided two-sided answers:
Businessman1: “Unfortunately, this has to happen, I have al-
ways said that I am for Croatia joining the EU, as I believed this 
would have positive results, be a step forward, a framework 
in which you move and you get less room for manoeuvre…”
Some participants, when reflecting on the influence of the EU on domestic 
climate change policy, talk about the influence of the EU on withdrawing 
demand for the revision of quotas. In this respect, the influence of the EU 
is understood to be negative, especially in terms of participants’ attitude 
towards the justification of Croatia’s request. In addition, a number of the 
participants regard the EU’s influence on climate policy during the negotia-
tions as negative as they think that no attention was paid to the quality of 
adaptation of Croatian legislature to the European framework due to the 
rush to meet the EU deadlines, although we think that the European Union 
should not be held accountable for that. This is illustrated in the response 
from one of the participants from the business sector to this question:
Businessman8: “We are always caught up in some deadline to 
meet certain EU demands and what has always troubled me 
was ‘let it go now, let’s meet the EU demands, and we will take 
care of it as we go’ – so many things were done superficially.”
24 The emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is the market approach used for con-
trolling pollution, that is, the emission of greenhouse gases, which offers 
economic incentives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, or the emis-
sion of pollutants. 
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The topic “Emission reduction in Croatia – the situation”
Much like the state of the country’s climate policy, the participants re-
ported on the state of greenhouse gas emission reduction in Croatia and 
on future aims for reduction. When asked about their attitude concerning 
Croatia’s climate policy, participants often referred to the real state of re-
duction/increase of emission, and the role of the Environmental Protec-
tion and Energy Efficiency Fund (hereafter: the Fund). We think that con-
centrating on these two topics is not arbitrary. Perhaps unconsciously, the 
participants speak of the two most obvious indicators of how climate policy 
in Croatia works, as the functionality of the policy is reflected through 
(un)achieved results, and the Fund represents one of the most important 
instruments for investments in emission reduction in industry and ener-
getics (the largest emitters). The topic “Emission reduction in Croatia – the 
situation” includes four codes and twenty-six quotes.
Figure 2
The topic “Emission reduction in Croatia – the situation” and its respective codes
A number of participants wanted to express their doubts over achieving 
certain goals relating to emission reduction, such as increasing energetic 
efficiency through increasing the share of renewable energy sources. This 
almost completely refers to goals set by the European Union for 2020. The 
reasons for this current attitude lie in the lack of infrastructure and projects 
for renewable energy sources, and the current state of such power plants in 
Croatia. Aware that we are far from the goals that were set for 2010, the par-
ticipants find it impossible to achieve such a “leap” in order to fulfil the goal 
of 20 % of energy sources being renewable. The lack of market for quotas and 
political planning (converging policies) are also stated as reasons for think-
ing that Croatia will not fulfil these goals. When asked “Why do you think 
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Croatia will not achieve the set goals in emission reduction in the framework 
of EU climate policy?” the participants provided the following answers:
Scientist1 “… the problem is that there is no such market 
in Croatia. It exists in Europe, but here no company has to 
buy carbon and we have already lost the chance to make this 
switch in this short period, for someone in Croatia national 
electric company (HEP)25 or our cement industry to say ‘let’s 
go change something.’”
Scientist7: “We had partial goals for 2010 that we missed by 
a wide margin and I believe we will not achieve these goals 
either, but I think it’s more important that we at least try to 
achieve this, to make pre-conditions.”
However, a common attitude among the participants is that it is not so 
important to fulfil the goals as to move towards them.
Table 2  Emission reduction in Croatia – the situation
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 “The state has not done 
anything” 1 0 0 0 2 3
Fund: a realistic role 
incongruent with the idea 3 0 1 4 0 8
Croatia will not achieve its 
reduction goals 0 2 1 3 2 8
Uncontrolled emission 
reduction in Croatia 1 2 2 0 2 7
EMISSION REDUCTION IN 
CROATIA – THE SITUATION 5 4 4 7 6 26
With reference to the previous code, a number of participants finds that 
the “state has not done anything” to achieve these goals. Even though a 
large number of measures have been established, the participants did not 
25 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda (HEP) – Croatian national electricity company.
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find the results apparent. They have a feeling that it is another case of a 
“business-as-usual’’ scenario, despite the declarative dedication to green-
house gas emission reduction.
This brings us to the attitudes of participants towards the Fund’s actions. 
The participants from the civil and business sector believe that its realistic 
role is not congruent with its original idea. The basic purpose of the Fund is 
considered to be the reduction of emissions at their source by reinvesting 
the money charged to industry and citizens, in which the Fund eliminates 
its own purpose as it removes the focal points of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The Fund is perceived to be radically different: first of all, the participants 
think that it has not fulfilled its basic function of reinvestment into pro-
jects for reducing emissions, which leaves an impression of dysfunction-
ality concerning the state’s base instrument for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. When asked “Why do you find the realistic role of the Fund 
incongruent with the nominal role?” a participant from the civil sector 
gave the following answer:
Civil-society1: “…however, the Fund did completely the op-
posite. It cemented its survival, it dealt with things that were 
not their job, and it is funded by industry – I don’t know if any 
of these companies that paid for these emissions, that any of 
them got any money back, which I think is an error on behalf 
of the public sector as a whole.”
Some participants mention numerous specific examples from their own 
experience regarding an inability to fund projects for emission reduction of 
which the Fund is in charge. Members of the business sector feel the most 
struck by this situation as they are the ones to whom this money should 
have returned in order for them to be able to finance projects that would 
reduce their costs of entering the ETS system.
The accomplished greenhouse gas emission reduction in Croatia, accord-
ing to the participants, is not the result of a joint effort of public admin-
istration, entrepreneurs and citizens, but a result, or even a by-product of 
(economic) processes that marked the past several years in Croatia and Eu-
rope. The economic crisis that hit the global economic market in 2008, from 
which most countries have yet to recover, has resulted in decreased produc-
tion in some countries which in turn resulted in a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions. According to the participants, this was the case in Croatia 
where a combination of conditions resulted in a decrease in greenhouse 
gas emissions to the level specified by the Kyoto protocol. The reason for 
this, according to the better informed participants, are several years with 
hydrologically favourable conditions which resulted in a greater level of 
production from the hydroelectric power plants, a continuous decline in 
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the number of cattle in the country and significantly decreased production 
in high emission industries, such as the cement and lime industry. Such an 
attitude is shared by all participants and is confirmed by participants from 
the public administration while the participants from the business sector 
chose not to comment on this topic.
The topic “Obstacles to implementing emission reduction 
measures”
After discussing the situation concerning climate policy in Croatia and after 
having expressed the opinion that Croatia does not have a comprehensive 
systematic climate change policy, we asked participants to explain some of 
the measures for implementing emission reduction. The topic “Obstacles 
to implementing emission reduction measures” consists of sixteen codes 
and one hundred and two quotes.
Figure 3
The topic “Obstacles to implementing emission reduction measures” and its 
respective codes
The topic includes some codes that are not grounded, that is, those that 
appear only once or twice in the transcripts. These will not be given much 
attention, as they do not represent the predominant perception of the 
problem, but we wanted to present them in the figure and the table in order 
to depict the diversity of attitudes.
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Table 3  Obstacles to implementing emission reduction measures  
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Absurd emission reduction policy 3 0 0 1 0 4
Bureaucratisation as an obstacle 
to development
3 2 1 2 0 8
Existential questions have priority 0 3 2 0 0 5
Emission reduction measures: 
things are slowly going in the 
right direction
0 0 1 0 0 1
Measures are good but their 
implementation is not
8 0 2 6 5 21
Inadequate base strategies 
(ES and SD)
4 0 1 2 1 8
Lack of sector measures 1 0 0 0 2 3
Some individuals have more 
rights than others
0 0 1 0 0 1
No dialogue between the sectors 1 0 1 2 1 5
No political will for CC policy 7 0 0 2 3 12
No understanding of CC policy in 
Croatia
1 0 1 0 2 4
Unorganised public sector 2 0 0 4 0 6
Lack of transparency regarding 
the activities of the Fund 
7 1 0 3 2 13
Partial measures due to pressure 
from the EU 
2 0 1 1 1 5
Conflict of interest 0 0 0 0 4 4
Obstacles within the system 1 0 0 0 1 2
OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
OF EMISSION REDUCTION 
MEASURES
50 7 11 23 22 102
11. Are we ready for climate policy? 317
According to the claim most frequently heard in the interviews, certain 
measures for emission reduction are good but their implementation is 
not. This claim was present in many answers in which the participants elic-
ited specific problems of the system not functioning, such as corruption, 
a lack of finance, procedural dilemmas etc. For the researcher this creates 
an impression of chaos for the researcher as concerns the implementa-
tion of measures where a set of measures is not created to contribute to 
the common goal of reducing the emissions. In other words, it leaves the 
impression that there is a large number of individual, unrelated measures 
of emission reduction that are not necessarily poorly devised but are sim-
ply not implemented, their effects being lost in other procedures, and no 
monitoring that would ensure their consistent implementation and the 
removal of obstacles. When asked “What are the obstacles to implement-
ing emission reduction measures in Croatia?” the participants gave the 
following reasons:
Civil-society2: “…from subsidies that formally exist but are 
hard to obtain, to the corrupt Fund which spent or stole every 
penny26, to HEP’s monopoly that does not allow anyone else 
to connect to the grid, and if they do connect, it takes a long 
time before they start paying and you need some 40 permits 
– this is insane!”
Lack of trust in government institutions refers to both the inspectorates 
and the Ministry itself. The participants report a complete absence of con-
trol. Administrative obstacles to the implementation of emission reduc-
tion measures are also often cited, as well as inefficient distribution of 
jurisdiction among the bodies. It is often reported that the problem is not 
the legislature but its implementation, not just by those in positions of 
responsibility but also from the bodies that prescribe these laws, that is, 
those who write subordinate legislature which creates the conditions for 
their implementation in the relevant context. The lack of coordination 
between institutions in creating legislature, a lack of converging policies, 
a lack of adaptation to the newly introduced laws (since the EU accession 
process commenced) to specific situations in Croatia, a lack of expertise 
and poor communication with other social sectors – these are the main 
obstacles for the implementation of measures that the participants report.
The lack of control is reflected in the lack of monitoring which makes 
the process of proving the effects of reduction measures impossible. The 
26 This is not just a colloquial term and a case of the participant pointing out 
vague and unproven corruption in public institutions, but a concrete case 
that was proven in court.
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participants also express doubts regarding the information that public ad-
ministration institutions publish, as well as doubt regarding the number 
of parafiscal charges collected and invested, and the real situation as con-
cerns greenhouse gas emissions. When asked about the situations relating 
to the monitoring system for the implementation of measures in Croatia, 
participants from public administration replied:
Public-administrator4: “Well, the question is whether the data 
are correct. Because our policy and our general system are not 
bad. I think some should even look up to it, however, we have 
one thing on paper and another thing in practice, so the ques-
tion is whether the data reflect the real state of things and 
whether those charges paid are really so...”
Despite constant reiteration that the legislature is not the problem but its 
implementation, comparative analysis shows that the participants often 
provide conflicting answers and use examples to illustrate the problems 
that occur in the aftermath of poorly constructed regulations, and those 
that are a consequence of implementation. This reflects the total organisa-
tional form of the regulations, their level of detail and their compatibility 
with regulations from other departments.
Public-administrator1: “If the agency has its register of en-
vironmental pollution, you have the information that they 
[industry] will report into one base and you will report on 
them into another. This should not happen because you do 
not have a body that would control both databases. Then the 
law is sometimes vague, which means you are told that each 
county has to check the data on its own, and they do not have 
adequately trained staff…”
When talking about unorganised reduction measures, the participants 
put into question the issue of political priorities. By this logic, if emission 
reduction is one of the government’s priorities, actions from above should 
make sure this goal is achieved. This reflects the need for a strong state and 
its responsibility for reducing greenhouse gases.
One can conclude that despite taking over the EU regulation measures, 
climate policy in Croatia does not contain all the necessary elements and 
cannot be conducted. Such policy can ultimately have a strategy (in this 
case, for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) that is supported by 
various laws but cannot be implemented. 
We may find a good example in the code regarding the lack of trust in 
one of the main instruments for greenhouse gas emission reduction – the 
Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund. Just before this 
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study commenced, the Fund’s chairman was prosecuted and convicted 
for embezzlement and corruption, which only reaffirmed the opinion of 
the study participants regarding the responsibility of the public sector 
for unsuccessful climate policy in Croatia. The participants emphasise 
the disproportion between the money accumulated by the Fund and the 
projects it accomplished, expressing their doubts regarding the criteria 
that were used to decide on co-financing for various energetic efficiency 
or renewable energy projects. The participants think that the Fund de-
feats its purpose and creates an image of having a lack of transparency as 
the criteria used to distribute the money are unclear and not available to 
business subjects as interested parties. Some participants see this as delib-
erate creation of conditions that would allow money to be embezzled. In 
addition, the results of the Fund’s activities are unclear, and they are not 
visible in measures or efficiency studies, if they even exist. When asked 
to express their attitude concerning their (mis-)trust in the state system 
for emission reduction and the system for monitoring the efficiency of 
emission reduction measures, one participant from the civil society sec-
tor reported:
Civil-society1: “...in the situation we have been living in with 
Kyoto for the past six years, aware of the regulations and 
formulas used to show emissions, and which measures are 
permitted to decrease the emissions – comes a Fund chair-
man who starts yelling about how they reduced five hun-
dred thousand tons of CO2 using their own measures…Alright, 
where do you see it in our national plan? If you created some 
subsidies, then you should be able to see it in Croatia’s bal-
ance.”
We are drawn to the conclusion that there is a notable systematic error in 
the Fund’s creation when you take all information and attitudes into con-
sideration; much like with the implementation of climate policy, except 
this is a case of conflict of interest in the way that an institution acts. In 
this particular case, the Fund is the body which collects the money and 
decides on its distribution. Therefore, there is no triangle of organisa-
tions – one which creates the legislative framework (the ministry), one 
that determines the criteria for choice of projects (separate agency), and 
one that would distribute the financial assets according to the legislative 
framework and external decision (the Fund). Since the Fund collects the 
money and decides how the money is spent, this creates an opportunity 
for a lack of transparency concerning the handling of money, that is, 
embezzlement, which is the reason the chairman of the Fund ended up 
in jail.
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The lack of political will is also reflected in the lack of instruments and 
legislature for greenhouse gas emission reduction27, in the lack of interest 
from the governing structures to deal with climate change as they have not 
been recognised as a priority, and within the prevailing interests that are 
not in accordance with measures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
as some participants stated: 
Scientist2: To have efficient measures, you have to carefully 
plan them. And people making the plans have different inter-
ests, especially in energetics. This means the obstacles are that 
those who are supposed to change things or do things differ-
ently are not planning anything. That is the main obstacle, and 
they will continue planning.”
 Civil-society2: “Some people see the problem as being in cor-
rupted public administration. I think the inefficiency was not 
there on its own but was a result of scheming, either in the 
Fund or at the level of blocking certain investments at HEP 
or them maintaining their monopoly.”
The next most commonly mentioned codes refer to a gigantic bureaucratic 
system and the inadequacy of basic strategies that should support the cli-
mate policy of the state. The size of the bureaucracy affects the speed at 
which emission reduction projects are conducted and the motivation of 
private persons or potential investors. An inefficient bureaucratic system 
is shown to reflect the inefficiency and disorganisation of the public sector, 
essentially having reasons related to conflicted interests.
In addition to conflicting interests, many participants from the civil sec-
tor think that energy development strategies and sustainable development 
strategies lack vision. This lack of vision is reflected in their orientation 
towards minimal goals for emission reduction in energetics and an incom-
plete sustainable development strategy. Even though these strategies are 
a few years old, their results are still not visible to relevant actors. Another 
issue that is emphasized is the lack of connection between the strategies, 
as the sustainable development strategy should be the main document that 
is used to orient all the other development strategies. In addition, certain 
projections and projects in the energy development strategy are considered 
inadequate in the context of greenhouse gas emission reduction and are 
perceived as projects that will keep the economy tied down to fossils fuels 
for the next twenty years.
27 The laws relating to the emission reduction of greenhouse gases are cur-
rently available in the form of several articles, found in the Air Protection 
Act: http://www.zakon.hr/z/269/Zakon-o-za%C5%A1titi-zraka.
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The relevant actors also think that the strategies are not developed 
enough. This results in them being declarative strategies that are not im-
plemented as there are no short-term plans for action in certain sectors. 
When asked “How do you rate the Sustainable Development Strategy and 
the Energy Strategy with regard to the reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions?” a participant from the business sector answered:
Businessman4: “The strategy is not developed into a strategy 
which should be public, business, and academic. It doesn’t 
have that “drill down” effect (…) that is well known in these 
circles that deal with sustainable development, socially re-
sponsible business and so on; you just can’t monitor all sides 
– state, public, academic, and business at the same level and I 
think we don’t have much chance for success.”
This again emphasizes the dissatisfaction of participants with the com-
munication between certain sectors of society. The dialogue between the 
scientists, NGOs, entrepreneurs, and public administration is necessary 
in order to reach agreement and for the legislature to be implemented ef-
fectively. Dialogue and compromise are emphasised here. One can see that 
the participants think that each sector is “selfish” when lobbying for their 
own measures of greenhouse gas emission reduction and if some of them 
do not sacrifice their own interests, a compromise which would ensure 
implementation will not be possible to achieve. While some participants 
talk about connecting the sectors, others describe a “culture” of dialogues 
which would enable them to recognise a common goal for all sectors. When 
asked about their view on the role of other groups of actors included in this 
study with regard to participation in the creation of measures for emission 
reduction, the participant from the public administration expressed the 
following attitude:
Public-administrator3: “It is necessary for all sectors to have a 
dialogue as it can be used to reach a certain compromise which 
would be structured in such a way that it allows this frame-
work to be implemented…because if we don’t have that, then 
we have laws, which might be phenomenal, but are not being 
implemented.”
Some participants are still focussed on the lack of organisation of the pub-
lic sector in terms of the absence of a main agenda according to which all 
members of various departments should act, and then the lack of public ad-
ministration employees in the sector of climate change and in terms of the 
inefficient distribution of jobs and task prioritisation. Thus, some partici-
pants have the impression that the existing measures for greenhouse gas 
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emission reduction are partly a result of pressure by the European Union 
and that these measures were taken over as partial, unrelated, unadjusted 
and therefore inefficient. This leads to many absurdities in climate policy, 
such as conflicting regulations, counter-effective subsidies etc., and many 
participants from the civil and business sector express their concern over 
this.
The participants see the motive for such a formal approach to climate 
policy as lying in the fact that the government finds this problem relatively 
unimportant. Due to the economic recession, a large number of unem-
ployed people, poor industrial production, and a large number of people 
below the poverty line, some of our participants emphasise that existential 
issues take priority. That is, every segment of the public administration, 
or every ministry is trying to solve immediate social problems, thus con-
tributing to short-term economic progress, which is sometimes opposed 
to long-term climate policies. When asked “Do you think the emission 
reduction is a priority for the government?” a participant from the field 
of politics answered:
Politician4: “I am aware of what should be done and how the 
ministry of agriculture and regional development and the 
ministry of finance should join in, but I think, considering 
the situation in the country, that they do not think this as a 
priority…unfortunately.”
Conclusion
The participants were almost unanimous in their stance that the policy 
for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions created by the government 
and implemented by the public administration is neither comprehensive 
nor efficient. 
The participants see Croatia’s climate policy more as a set of unrelated 
and incomplete measures that aim to reduce the emission of greenhouse 
gases, than a systematic policy which has a clearly defined goal and straight-
forward instruments that are connected in all sectors and which include 
political convergence. The most commonly mentioned causes for the non-
existence of comprehensive policy are a lack of interest or knowledge from 
persons responsible for drafting climate policy. This is compounded by the 
lack of cooperation between ministries, lack of coordination between sec-
tor measures and the lack of long-term planning crucial for climate policy. 
However, some participants have a positive opinion concerning the de-
velopment of climate change policy in the near future, partly due to the 
European Union and partly due to a new Minister (who, in the meantime, 
has resigned from her position).
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Special attention was given to the causes of the inefficient implementa-
tion of measures for greenhouse gas emission reduction. The participants’ 
opinions regarding the obstacles for implementing the emission reduction 
measures are characterised by dissatisfaction with relevant actors involved 
in the implementation. By stating the whole array of reasons, that is, the 
obstacles to carrying out the emission reduction measures, the participants 
often contradict themselves but concrete problems illustrate the extent of 
problems and the grounds for their dissatisfaction with the implementa-
tion of measures. The total number of codes on this topic contributes to the 
impression of “chaos” among the measures for greenhouse gas emission 
reduction as they were not created so as to lead towards a common goal. 
Even though there are a large number of individual measures to reduce the 
emissions, their efficiency is lost in procedural vagueness and the lack of 
coordination with other measures, and there is no quality system of moni-
toring that would direct attention to specific problems.
An opinion often voiced is that Croatia joining the European Union 
should result in positive effects the adopted legal framework and through 
the international emission trading system. However, this does not take 
into account the fact that changing some settings as concerns the political 
context does not change the governing and administrative structure in the 
state, which will be reflected in the further (in)efficiency of climate policy. 
Special attention should be paid to the absence of international, legally 
binding agreements that would bind the countries to fulfil the goals by 
written sanctions. Taking this into consideration in the context of climate 
policy, the attitude towards the defining effect of the European Union on 
Croatian climate policy is in contrast with the opinion that the inefficient 
climate policy in Croatia is a result of a negative attitude of the government 
towards the problem of climate change. 
One can conclude from the opinions of the participants that some of the 
basic elements such a policy should have are lacking: a legal framework, 
instruments for implementation, monitoring and sanctions. Even though 
the country created the legal framework, it did not take care of the system 
of implementing the emission reduction measures – and this primarily 
refers to the lack of organisation, the incompatibility of certain measures 
from various departments, legal paradoxes, a gigantic bureaucracy, a lack 
of staff etc. – and it completely ignored the system for monitoring which 
resulted in an inability to assess what has been done and the inability to 
correct one’s mistakes.
The problems of climate policy such as the lack of relations between 
institutions, a lack of coordination of sector policies, and the general inef-
ficiency of climate policy are often perceived as the result of the govern-
ment’s attitude towards the problem of climate change. If we leave out the 
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conflicts of interest groups and lobbying and corruption, which appeared 
as one of the topics in the interviews, the poor state of climate policy is, 
according to everything stated above, an indicator of the inability to rec-
ognise and understand the importance of climate change, consequently 
located so low on the list of priorities. In the context of the overall quality 
of life in the country, we should also add that solving immediate existential 
issues such as the high unemployment rate and the large number of peo-
ple below the poverty line is more important and is a higher priority for 
this government. In all this, the development potential of comprehensive 
climate policy remains unrecognised and the primary problems are solved 
through projects which are, despite being economically justified in the 
short-term, in conflict with the long-term efforts of the greenhouse gas 
emission reduction policy.
Given all that is stated above, the answer to the question put forward 
in the title of this article is obvious. Croatia is not yet ready for a coherent 
climate policy, not only due to deficiencies in legislature, but also due to 
basic structure of interrelations amongst actors from different social sec-
tors, and due to reluctance of crucial actors in state structures for creating 
such a policy.
In this respect, the contribution of this research lies in the answers to 
basic questions regarding the relation of relevant actors to climate change 
policy in Croatia and in the creation of a new background for more detailed 
studies of all individual phenomena that have been shown to be relevant 
in this study. 
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Annex
Interview protocol
Climate change as a problem
1.  What is your attitude towards global warming and climate change as 
an ecological problem?
2. How well are you informed about causes and consequences of global 
warming and climate change in your opinion?/where do you get infor-
mation about causes and consequences of global warming and climate 
change?
3. In your opinion, what are the most threatening consequences of cli-
mate change?
4. Who are in your opinion relevant actors for dealing with / solving cli-
mate change threats in Croatia?
5. What actions they should be conducting? 
Global climate change politics
6. How well are you informed about global climate change politics in your 
opinion? / where do you get information about climate change politics?
7. How would you assess (un)efficiency of global CC politics (Kyoto pro-
tocol and the following negotiations)?
8. Do you consider implementation of ‘radical’ measures for reducing 
GHG emissions possible (zero carbon economy etc.)? / Do you know 
some examples of implementation of that kind of measures?
Domestic climate change politics 
9. In your opinion how well are you familiar with domestic laws and regu-
lations on cutting GHG emissions?
10. Do this regulations in your opinion constitute coherent and full cli-
mate change politics?
11. Do you consider justified Croatia’s repeated request on rising emission 
quotas for the base year of the Kyoto protocol?
Context and implementation of measures for reducing GHG emissions in 
Croatia
12. How effectively are regulation for emission cutting implemented in 
Croatia?
13. Are there any obstacles? If yes, which are they?
14. Your perception of your own role in dealing with / participate in im-
plementation of climate change policy in Croatia?
15. Your perception of role of other actors in society in dealing with / par-
ticipate in implementation of climate change policy in Croatia?
16. Do you see current economic crisis as obstacle or as opportunity for 
creating and development of efficient climate change policy in Croatia?

Environmental sustainability and 
education: The case of Croatia and 
Slovenia
Mladen Domazet / Branko Ančić
12
Never before have the stakes been so high for the role of [edu-
cation] in shaping how people interact with the environment. 
Human activities such as the generation of greenhouse gases, 
the accumulation of waste, the fragmentation or destruction 
of ecosystems, and the depletion of resources are having a 
substantial impact on the global environment. As a result, 
threats to the environment are prominently discussed in the 
media and citizens of every nation are increasingly faced with 
the need to understand complex environmental issues (OECD 
2009, 3). 
Calling for global change in society and education
Though we can safely say that ever since humanity developed an ability to 
record its fears and wishes we have been fascinated and tormented by the 
fate of the human race, contemporary science warns humanity that we are 
facing an unprecedented transitional period1. Humanity has indeed experi-
enced great transitions before, such as the beginning of the Stone Age, the 
Agricultural Age or the Industrial Revolution (Glasser 2007), but we have 
never before been in the position to causally link the fate of most of con-
temporary biosphere to ours (Beck 2010; Chakrabarty 2009). Faced with 
such a warning, numerous authors argue that this global problem cannot 
01 We would like to express our gratitude to Danijela Dolenec for a thorough 
reading and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this text. We are also 
grateful to the colleagues and participants in the ESD-Relevant Content 
in Transitional Countries’ Compulsory Education: a Comparative Perspective 
symposium at the European Conference on Educational Research 2012, in 
Cádiz, Spain for comments and suggestions on some of the preliminary 
findings. 
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be resolved using the current modes of environmental interaction within 
the current lifestyles (Milbrath 1996; Eckersely 1998; Doppelt 2003; Ehr-
lich and Ehrlich 2013; Cifrić, THIS VOLUME; Šimleša, THIS VOLUME). To 
achieve the desired material transformation of environmental impact we 
need a transformation of economic and political governance, knowledge 
and values such that “basic organising concepts of modernity have to be 
rethought” (Davidson 2004, 169). 
We need, they say, a shift away from the contemporary common sense 
conceptualisation of nature and its role in the socio-economic processes 
within and between societies. Even the reluctant (at best) advocates of 
the seriousness of the challenge and the need for change, such as Žižek 
(2008), state that the scientific warnings and the everyday worldview have 
come to a point of ‘reinforcing each other’s blindness’, and a possible action 
strategy requires a shift from the current common-sense interpretation of 
Nature and Environment. 
To put long term sustainable socio-economic patterns into practice we 
require wide-reaching formal and social learning, including fostering a 
broad understanding of the problems and consequences of the daily practic-
es of material production and their social impact, but also of the procedures 
and mechanisms available within a society for their eventual alteration in 
line with sustainability-oriented strategies. To gain the said understanding 
is not only to be horrified by the scale of the problems, but also to have a fa-
miliarity with the wholesome natural processes which the human survival 
and development materially depends on. We need educational content that 
can help individuals use their understanding of natural and social processes 
so as to go beyond the paralyzing fear of the impeding crash of civilisation 
and the material foundation on which contemporary societies are devel-
oped (Newell and Pitman 2010). However, understanding the root causes 
of the current predicament also needs to be agreed upon. 
This is not a standard task for educational transmission as on one hand 
there is the urgency to enable contemporary youth to respond to the rap-
idly changing environmental circumstances now, with no pan-culturally 
uniform and delineated body of knowledge and skills to be simply trans-
mitted and trained in. Tillbury (2007) explicates that a comprehensive ap-
proach to the problem in the education sector requires questioning the 
existing mental models and societally engineered expectations that have 
lead contemporary societies to unsustainability. Glasser (2007) warns that 
it is dangerous, given the urgent need for action, to miss an opportunity 
to act based on what we know – even though much remains unknown. So 
as to make the required change all-encompassing and avoid the rushed 
botched responses to externally enforced crises, it should be based on learn-
ing which is largely rooted in public education. The required learning has 
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to be all-encompassing and planned in that it has to be more than a push 
against the boundaries of ignorance and adoption of inert facts. That learn-
ing does indeed have an effect is confirmed by OECD (2009), according to 
which the school remains the main source of information on key environ-
mental issues. In the United Kingdom awareness of sustainable develop-
ment concept was greatest among fresh school-leavers (SDC 2001) out of 
the whole adult population. 
Of course, awareness of human-environment interaction and its con-
nection to some aspects of individual and societal wellbeing is not a revo-
lutionary new requirement for global educational systems (Sato 2006), or 
in the cases of Croatia and Slovenia. Even though it was introduced into 
educational theory over 40 years ago, initially environmental education 
(EE) did not present the environment-development interaction as one of 
interconnected feedbacks. It focused largely on conservation of nature, pri-
marily delivered through environmental science. Such an approach is still 
present today in the PISA2 2009 reports, as well as in much of environment-
related curricular content justification in Croatia and Slovenia (Bajkuša 
et al. 2011; Gobbo 2011). Management of natural resources appears to form 
the conceptual core in justifying the inclusion of environmental science 
factual content into compulsory education. 
A few decades later, development was brought into sharper focus bring-
ing a shift from EE to education for sustainable development (ESD) (Sato 
2006). The UN’s sustainable development agenda named explicit tasks for 
education through Agenda 21, stating that education is of critical impor-
tance in promoting sustainable development and improving the capacities 
of people to address both environment and development. By the end of the 
20th century, international education policy initiatives increasingly saw 
environmental protection issues as a global, rather than parochial path-de-
pendent problems, linking them ever more closely with the developmental 
sustainability narrative. Notwithstanding that, international educational 
initiatives can be decades away from implementation in national educa-
tional systems. Though some aspects, such as inclusion of global agenda 
scripts can be rapidly spread under ‘world culture’ pressures (Meyer et al. 
1997), according to Pizmony-Levi (2011) actual implementation can be slow 
and extensively modified under exigencies of ‘local culture’ (Anderson–
Levitt 2003). In other words, both a time-lag and significant contextuali-
02 PISA is an international student assessment programme run by the Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched 
in 1997. Through standardised testing it pertains to evaluate education 
systems wordlwide every three years by assessing 15-year-olds’ compe-
tencies in the domains of reading, matheamtics and science. Croatia and 
Slovenia have participated since 2006. 
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sation affect the translation of global educational initiatives into national 
compulsory education narratives. What is more, there is also a tendency to 
relegate tasks to education if they are to be postponed for the time being. 
Beck (2010) blames the present mismatch between scientific factual 
presentation of the global environmental problem and the lack of adequate 
societal response on the fallacious separation of the sociological aspects 
of development from natural sciences and the economies based on them. 
Some analyses show that this is precisely what has emerged from the good 
intentions of original EE in developed countries of the global North: it has 
turned from instilling conservation values to propagating technical knowl-
edge for managing the environment as a resource for sustained economic 
growth (Sauvé, Brunelle and Berryman 2005). The narratives of histori-
cal development of science developed after World War II have separated 
the interaction within ‘nature’ and within ‘society’, only to be forced to 
bring them back together today through the consequences of the actions 
resulting from science and technology on the global climate, and the conse-
quences of climate change on society. Beck takes climate change as a literal 
ridicule of the premise that society and ‘nature’/environment are separate 
and mutually exclusive (2010). 
Political ecology in education: teaching for transformative 
potential 
Given this advanced understanding of the relationship between environ-
ment and society, educational narratives are today expected to present 
global environmental change as a challenge that can be addressed through 
social struggles that form an integral component of human interaction 
with the natural environment. This emerging political ecology perspective 
advances both traditional environmental education and the curricular con-
tent of education for sustainability. The political ecology approach sees en-
vironmental education practices as not only scientific, but political, framed 
by different locally contextualised perspectives on specific trajectories of 
political-economic change through development. It provides the critique 
of traditional environmental education that warned of the dangers of envi-
ronmental pollution in industrialized societies (Peet and Watts 1996) and 
extends education for sustainable development into a concern for future 
generations’ potential to continue along modern developmental paths. 
This novel perspective exposes human struggles embedded in tradi-
tional environmental issues without reducing factual understanding of 
the biophysical processes and social agents and institutions involved in 
them. Educational presentation upon such views fuses the factual, mate-
rial, value-laden, discursive and change-efficacious readings of the nature-
society complex and its implications for publicly proclaimed outcomes 
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of compulsory education. Of course, in educational theory we often find 
well-argued calls for conceptually complex presentation of the material 
and social worlds (Martin 1993; Kohli 1995; Bennett 1995; Adler 2003), 
but it is much harder to find them operationalized into clear curricular in-
structions. In the case of political ecology framing this can also be seen as 
a reflection of the broader polarisation and its subsequent transcendence 
within the intellectual sphere following different readings of the Marxian 
modes of production as combining the material and the social (Wolf 1982; 
Paulson, Gezon and Watts 2003). It is thus far from easy to find guidelines 
on how to apply criticism of EE and ESD content exposition in political 
ecology to existing national curricula. We should aim, at first instance, to 
find in them factual content organised into a holistic construction of the 
nature-society complex, whilst the phenomenon of environmental change 
manifests processes of social conflict and domination. The guiding question 
here is how environmental issues reflect relationships within society, that 
is – those between individuals and broader socio-environmental systems 
(Prakash 1995; Robbins 2004).
As we elaborate here, in existing Croatian and Slovenian curricula we 
find only interpretational reflection of content that trains for the analy-
sis of “the nexus of production and consumption, in its modern capital-
ist guise, [as an] indispensable starting point for understanding the basic 
causes of the destruction of the global environment” (Peet, Robbins and 
Watts 2011, 15). These documents, originating from mid-2000s, were not 
constructed based on the requirements of the emerging field of political 
ecology in education. However, this does not mean that we should give 
up on seeking a comparative presentation altogether. Pursuing a political 
ecology perspective in education means to explore ways in which mean-
ings of the wider nature-system are culturally mediated and geopolitically 
situated. Given this approach, we can start by mapping environmental 
sustainability content in relevant subject-programmes in the search for 
transformative potential through appropriate presentation of the con-
tent, agents as meaning creators and different relations between them. 
In this way we open up the possibility for environmental challenges to 
be presented as a socio-political issue at least as much as an economic and 
technical challenge. 
In line with that, but aware that it by no means presents a complete 
political ecology critique of existing educational narratives in Croatia 
and Slovenia, we present a preliminary reading of the selected subjects’ 
curricular content in line with educational paradigm of Cross-boundary 
Transformative Sustainability Education (Schwarzin 2010), as given by 
Domazet (2012b). Though this is not the only educational strategy inspired 
by critical pedagogy (Freire 2000; 2007) and in line with political ecology, 
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this transformative paradigm is explicitly rooted in an attempt to respond 
to standardised sustainability projects perpetuating the exploitation and 
inequality whilst striving to protect the environment (Schwarzin 2010).
Croatia and Slovenia: shared history and contemporary differences 
Croatia and Slovenia share much of their developmental history over the 
last 200 years, as well as much of the educational tradition over that period. 
As members of the Central European empire of Austria-Hungary the two 
states shared a starting position for industrial modernization, despite re-
corded differences in political and strategic positions within larger empires 
and federations (Mirković 1958; Štih and Simoniti 2004; Budak 2007). This 
shared position was carried over into the Yugoslavian kingdoms and feder-
ated republics in the second half of the 20th century. Regarding educational 
history, both states inherited the overarching educational tradition from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Yugoslavian iterations, despite the fact 
that the federal republics were in charge of their own educational policy 
in socialist Yugoslavia. Unfortunately we are not aware of comparative 
analyses of the processes of curricular reforms in these two countries over 
the last 20 years, which would undoubtedly improve the interpretation of 
the comparison of existing respective curricular content, but exceeds the 
scope of this text. 
As other texts in this volume amply illustrate, the two states share simi-
lar levels of GDP and HDI (cf. domazet and marinović jerolimov, this 
volume; Domazet, Ančić and Brajdić-Vuković, THIS VOLUME; Dolenec, 
Domazet and Ančić, THIS VOLUME; UNDP 2013), but differ with respect to 
the ecological footprint (EF), inequality-adjusted human development index 
(IHDI) and inequality adjusted income index enough to occupy opposing 
positions among the 18 European countries analysed (cf. Domazet, Ančić 
and Brajdić-Vuković, THIS VOLUME). Whilst Croatia’s overall HDI places it 
in the same global development group of countries as Slovenia, its GDP per 
capita and inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) exhibit a stark difference from 
Slovenian averages. Given that inequality presents the most immediate ob-
stacle to Croatian population’s greater support for sustainability measures 
(Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012), it is not surprising that the difference 
in average inequality-adjusted income also shows up in the difference in 
mean values of indicators of willingness for material sacrifice (cf. Domazet, 
Ančić and Brajdić-Vuković, THIS VOLUME), suggesting that the Slovenian 
population is more committed to willing material sacrifice. On the other 
hand, as can be seen from Table 1, whilst enjoying the same level of biocapac-
ity potential per capita, the Slovenian Ecological Footprint (EF) of in-country 
production (EF production) and consumption (EF consumption), as well 
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as the overall 2008 average is greater than Croatia’s. That makes Slovenia’s 
population’s debt to environment and future generations much greater 
than Croatia’s, and in line with that of most developed European countries.
Table 1  Development, income and environmental cost indices 
  for Croatia and Slovenia 
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Croatia 61% 0.805 0.683 3.3 4.2 3.9 2.6
Slovenia 84% 0.892 0.840 3.8 5.2 5.2 2.6
Previous analyses also show that higher educational attainment is related 
to greater environmental concern (Haanpää 2006; Domazet, Dolenec and 
Ančić 2012; Kufrin, THIS VOLUME; Bieri and Stoilova, THIS VOLUME). Al-
though similar proportions of youngest generations in Croatia and Slovenia 
hold tertiary education qualifications, Croatia is lagging behind Slovenia 
in all other generation groups under 55 years of age, as is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2  Percentage of the population with tertiary education  
  qualifications in the population aged 24-64, by age  
  group, 2010 
Years Croatia Slovenia 
24-29 25.2 25.4
30-34 22.6 34.8
35-39 17.7 29.7
40-44 16.1 23.7
45-49 17.6 21.4
50-54 14.7 18.5
55-64 17.4 16.3
Source: EACEA 2012
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Although the two countries share the same starting point in 1990, over the 
20 year period the expected years of schooling have grown from 12 to 14 
years in Croatia, compared to almost 17 in Slovenia (UNDP 2013). According 
to OECD’s (2009) recent international assessment programme of 15-year 
olds which analysed knowledge of environmental science and geosciences, 
Croatian students’ results were generally close to the OECD average, whilst 
the Slovenian were generally above it. In both countries awareness of the 
basic environmental issues and a sense of responsibility are higher than 
the OECD average (2009). On the other hand, optimism regarding improve-
ment in the next 20 years is slightly lower than the OECD average in both 
countries. In the case of Croatia the results show a statistically significant 
relationship between higher optimism expressed and lower performance 
on the assessment, whilst among Slovenian 15-year olds no such link was 
established.
In the context of the data from the environmental module of the ISSP 
survey (2011), results from OECD (2009) show an interesting congruence 
between optimism related to cognitive performance in environmental 
science and geoscience among 15-year olds (OECD) and agreement with 
levels of techno-scientific optimism in the general populations of these 
two countries (ISSP), which is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1
ISSP: agreement with statement “Modern science will solve our environmental prob-
lems with little change to our way of life” in Croatia and Slovenia – general
population
As can be seen from Figure 1, a general belief in science as the solution to 
environmental problems is higher among Croatia’s population than among 
Slovenia’s. Taken together, these findings suggest that better educated 
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populations show less faith in technocratic solutions to environmental 
problems. Regarding the general level of concern for the environment and 
readiness to do something about its protection, there is a marked difference 
among Slovenia’s and Croatia’s populations (Domazet, Ančić and Brajdić 
Vuković, THIS VOLUME). Apart from that, no marked differences show up 
between the two populations on most other attitude indices and single in-
dicators charting modernisation, growth and economy-environment trade-
offs . However, for our analysis of educational content it seems significant 
that the two countries differ regarding the level of agreement on whether 
economic growth always harms the environment. While Croatia’s contains 
one of the largest proportions expressing agreement with such statements 
(slightly above United Kingdom, Sweden and Norway), Slovenia’s propor-
tion in agreement is much lower similar to populations of Switzerland, 
Finland, Austria and – interestingly – Bulgaria.
Methodological choices in analysing curricula
The social and behavioural changes required for an organised response to 
global environmental change require a universal education in competences 
for sustainability. In order to accomplish this universal character of edu-
cational curricula, it is necessary to develop governmental requirements 
for the public education sector (Di Giulio et al. 2011), such as the layout 
of educational standards, definition of general learning objectives, and 
national curricula for universal compulsory education. Whilst all forms 
of education should contain appropriate sustainability oriented content, 
compulsory education has the most universal reach prior to ability and 
interest differentiation of the student body. 
The precise choice and nature of presentation of topics is ideally based on 
the scientific models of how incremental competences develop, as well as 
on public dialogues about competences required to address the complexity 
of development issues in this century. Therefore, the compulsory school-
ing curriculum necessitates making choices and allocating preferences 
between different topics which are justifiably seen as related to sustain-
ability. Through the choice and representation of topics, as well as through 
their framing in curricular texts, national curricula influence classroom 
practices, as well as how teaching time is divided among different topics (Di 
Giulio et al. 2011). This is taken as an indication of the relative importance 
assigned to different topics, as well as skills and values development. Even 
where the teaching time for particular unit is not explicitly declared in 
the national framework curriculum (NFC), the relative representation of 
a particular topic within the overall topic selection indicates the relative 
importance assigned to it by the educational authorities. 
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The data presented here for Croatia and Slovenia are from a study cov-
ering nine countries, which mapped curricular topics, skills and values 
deemed relevant for education for sustainable development in national 
curricula, as well as in a selection of subjects and textbooks (Domazet et al. 
2012).3 Though the study did not analyse the relative representation of ESD-
relevant content within the overall curricular content, it enables a clear 
comparison regarding relative representation of different ESD-relevant 
topics, skills and values for Croatia and Slovenia. A detailed presentation of 
the methodology behind the research design can be found in Domazet et 
al. (2012). For our purposes here it is important to stress that the selection 
of topics, skills and values recorded in the NFCs4 draws on the UNESCO 
Decade of ESD mid-term report (Wals 2009). They were contextualised by 
the research team having in mind the specificities of the analysed national 
educational systems. Overall we recorded 26 cognitive content topics and 
21 skills or values whose representation in NFCs. The cognitive content 
eventually recorded consisted of topics covered in the factual knowledge 
content of the NFCs, while skills and values recorded were those explicitly 
mentioned as developed through implementation of different content 
units of the said curricula. The cognitive content was further divided into 
environmental, economic and socio-cultural topic lists. Individual cur-
ricula entries, meaningful wholes of sentences, bullet recommendations or 
entire paragraphs were marked as belonging to multiple topics if they for 
example combine content in both poverty and agriculture. For the purpose 
of analytical clarity, the list of skills and values was shortened into 5 skill 
03 The data used in the publication has been obtained within Network of 
Education Policy Centers (NEPC) project Education for sustainable develop-
ment partnership initiative. The content of this publication is the sole re-
sponsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views 
of NEPC. 
04 In Slovenia there is no equivalent document to a national framework cur-
riculum, but individual subjects’ syllabi chart the overall aims of the sub-
ject and its connections to other subjects in compulsory education in their 
introduction sections. These introductory sections were used in lieu of 
NFC in the case of Slovenia in Domazet et al. 2012. In Croatia, at the time of 
data collection there was a national framework curriculum for compulsory 
education providing an overview of educational goals and content coher-
ence for overall compulsory education, but detailed classroom instruction 
still followed individual subject syllabi from 2006 (collected in Milanović-
Litre and Vican 2006). Slovenian documents can be found online at http://
www.mizs.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/direktorat_za_predsolsko_vzgo-
jo_in_osnovno_solstvo/osnovno_solstvo/ucni_nacrti/posodobljeni_
ucni_nacrti_za_obvezne_predmete/#c17865; whilst Croatian document 
is available online in English translation at: http://public.mzos.hr/Default.
aspx?sec=2499. 
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or value groups, which were shown to be generally consistent with group-
ing of selected skills and values in different countries’ curricular content 
(Domazet et al. 2012). Finally, further shortening was made to enable visual 
representation in cloud graphics, which we use in the empirical analysis 
that follows. Detailed specification of the topics and their broader descrip-
tion is given in Annex 1 of Domazet et al. (2012). 
In the following analysis we firstly focus on the relative representation 
of the Economic, Environmental and Socio-cultural topic groups in the 
cognitive content of the Slovenian and Croatian NFCs, followed by the 
relative representation of environmental topics within each country’s 
NFC document. After that we discuss the importance of the relative rep-
resentation of different skills and value groups in each of the countries’ 
NFCs. We review differences in performance and related findings of in-
ternational assessment framing of curricular content that combines the 
most frequent skills and values groups with environmental topics. Before 
making concluding remarks regarding attitudes among Croatia’s and Slove-
nia’s populations, we discuss the framing of the curricular content which 
is required to adequately address global environmental change. The quali-
tative review of framing of educational content is drawn from Domazet 
(2012b), Gobbo (2011) and Bajkuša et al. (2011). In Domazet (2012b) we used 
the selection of content from Environment, Technology and Geography 
subject curricula in the two countries. Using the same coding matrix as in 
Domazet et al (2012), the content was selected and coded in accordance with 
Schwarzin’s 2010 transformative education model. We assess the selected 
subject content groups against Schwarzin descriptions of model’s require-
ments. We focus on subject curricula because they are more readily used 
in classroom practice, while the framing of content given in them is more 
readily transmitted through teaching than is the case with the national 
curriculum framework. The national curriculum framework on the other 
hand gives a more coherent picture of the overall compulsory educational 
content irrespective of academic disciplines behind it. 
Compulsory education curricular content – quantitative distributions 
and qualitative framings
 
In their national framework curricula Croatia and Slovenia do not show 
great differences in relative representation of environmental cognitive con-
tent (Figure 2). In Slovenia it is the most represented segment of cognitive 
content in the curriculum, whilst in Croatia it is the second most-represent-
ed by a narrow margin. In that respect, and at the level of national frame-
work curricula, we can expect that the instruction time and effort dedicated 
to these topics is roughly the same in both countries. In the methodology 
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used to record these findings there was no way of measuring the overall 
representation of the ESD-relevant content versus the content that is not 
relevant to ESD, as the latter was never recorded and numbered. However, 
given that the definition of content relevant to ESD was quite broad, there 
is no reason to suspect that the ESD-relevant content enjoys a miniscule or 
insignificant representation in the national framework curricula overall. 
Figure 2
Relative representation of different groups of Cognitive Content in the national 
framework curricula (NFC) Croatia and Slovenia. Reprinted from Domazet et al. 
2012, 73.
However, Figure 2 also shows a stark difference in the balance of the other 
two components of the ESD-relevant content. Croatia has a much greater 
representation of socio-cultural than economic content, whilst in Slovenia 
the situation is almost reversed. This suggests that the instructional time 
and effort dedicated to the two types of curricular content is substantially 
different between the two countries. Adherence to Croatian framework 
curriculum requires greater emphasis on the topics of peace, human rights 
and intercultural understanding, than to poverty, economic principles, sus-
tainable development principles and the presentation of the production-
consumption nexus. The situation in Slovenia is reversed. Overall however, 
there is a need for greater coverage of the social and economic aspects of 
sustainability in school curricula of both countries, especially the relation-
ship between economic growth and the environment (SDC 2011; Domazet 
et al. 2012). 
Adopting a political ecology critique of ESD, we expect a twofold impact 
of these differences. On the one hand, differences in the internal distribu-
9 
 
In the methodology used to record these findings there was no way of measuring the overall 
representation of the ESD-relevant content versus the content that is not relevant to ESD, as the 
latter was never recorded and numbered. However, given that the definition of content relevant to 
ESD was quite broad, there is no reason to suspect that the ESD-relevant content enjoys a miniscule 
or insignificant representation in the national framework curricula overall.  
 
Figure 2: Relative representation of different groups of Cognitive Content in the national framework curricula 
(NFC) Croatia and Slovenia. Reprinted from Domazet et al. 2012, 73.  
However, Figure 2 also shows a stark difference in the balance of the other two components of the 
ESD-relevant content. Croatia has a much greater representation of socio-cultural than economic 
content, whilst in Slovenia the situation is almost reversed. This suggests that the instructional ti e 
d effort dedicated to the two typ s of curricular content is substantially different between the two 
countries. Adherence to Croatian framework curriculum requires greater emphasis on the topics of 
peace, human rights and intercultural understanding, than to poverty, economic principles, 
sustainable development principles and the presentation of the production-consumption nexus. The 
situation in Slovenia is reversed. Overall however, there is a need for greater coverage of the social 
and economic aspects of sustainability in school curricula of both countries, especially the 
relationshi  between economic growth and the envir nment (SDC 2011; Domazet t l. 2012).   
Adopting a political ecology critique of ESD, we expect a twofold impact of these differences. On the 
one hand, differences in the internal distribution of topics within the environmental segment of the 
curricular content are related to instructional time and effort. On the other, the political nature of 
discussions should become more accentuated in topics within socio-cultural and economic 
segments. However, our analysis here cannot capture this level of detail, so we focus on the 
presentation environmental topics that are in line with the focus of the analysed texts. The analysis 
of framing of subject syllabi content in Croatia and Slovenia presented below provides some idea as 
to how the environment and its relation to humans is constructed in selected subject-syllabi of the 
compulsory educational systems of the two countries.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Slovenia
Croatia
Socio-cultural Environmental Economic
12. Environmental sustainability and education 339
tion of topics within the environmental segment of the curricular con-
tent are related to instructional time and effort. On the other, the political 
nature of discussions should become more accentuated in topics within 
socio-cultural and economic segments. However, our analysis here cannot 
capture this level of detail, so we focus on the presentation environmental 
topics that are in line with the focus of the analysed texts. The analysis of 
framing of subject syllabi content in Croatia and Slovenia presented below 
provides some idea as to how the environment and its relation to humans 
is constructed in selected subject-syllabi of the compulsory educational 
systems of the two countries.
Environmental content – quantitative curricular topic 
allocation
In the following analysis we employ cloud graphics as a visual tool that 
facilitates analysis of the relative importance given to topics within envi-
ronmental curricula in Croatia and Slovenia. Larger renderings of concepts 
represent more frequent appearance of the given concept in the national 
curricular texts. Figure 3 shows clouds of environmental topics in the na-
tional framework curricula of Slovenia and Croatia. 
Figure 35
Clouds of relative proportions of environmental elements in national framework 
curricula (NFC) in Croatia and Slovenia. The figure includes only those elements that 
are represented in the curricula in respective countries. Reprinted from Domazet et 
al. 2012, 75. 
Overall, Figure 3 suggests that there is a greater emphasis on resource-
driven construction of the environment in Croatia, compared to a more 
complexity-oriented construct in Slovenia. Whilst in both countries ‘bio-
05 Some graphic representations are shorter versions of coding matrix terms 
(“human beings” = “human beings (as living organisms)”).
Croatia
agriculture air biodiversity climate change energy human beings
natural disasters natural resources pollution soil waste water
Slovenia
agriculture air biodiversity climate change energy human beings
pollution rural development soil urbanisation waste water
Croatia
agriculture air biodiversity climate change energy human beings
natural disasters natural resources pollution soil waste water
Slovenia
agriculture air biodiversity climate change energy human beings
pollution rural development soil urbanisation waste water
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diversity’ and ‘natural resources’ are dominant topics of environmental 
ESD, different emphasis is placed on ‘energy’ and ‘human beings as living 
organisms’. Croatia places greater emphasis on ‘energy’ suggesting more 
time dedicated to the role of the environment in energy generation. Slove-
nia, on the other hand, places about as much emphasis on ‘human beings 
as living organisms’, parts of the overall complexity of global and regional 
ecological systems, as it does on the presentation of ‘natural resources’ 
to be extracted from the environment for human benefit. But Slovenia 
also includes topics of ‘rural development’ and ‘urbanisation’ which are 
altogether absent from Croatian framework curriculum. These topics, in 
turn, could be associated with more politicised aspects of learning about 
the environment, both from the perspective of utilisation of environment 
in economic development, and in presenting human incursions in other 
ecologies as intrusive and potentially destructive. 
An analysis of the relative representation of skills and values groups 
relevant to ESD in the two countries’ curricula confirm this line of assess-
ment, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 46
Clouds of relative proportions of skills and value groups of elements in national 
framework curricula (NFC) in Croatia and Slovenia. The figure includes only those 
groups that are represented in curricula in respective countries. Reprinted from 
Domazet et al. 2012, 102. 
In Croatia the accent is again on ‘respect and responsibility’ values, and 
less on ‘complexity understanding’. Such an arrangement suggests the 
representation of nature as a distant other, to be treated with respect, 
rather than a space of debate through which to implement changes and 
06 Some graphic representations are shorter version of names of groups of 
skills and values constructed from coding matrix terms (“complexity un-
derstanding” = “reflexivity and complexity understanding”; “managing 
change” = “managing change and uncertainty”; “respect and responsibil-
ity” = “values of respect and responsibility”).
Croatia
basic science skills community cooperation complexity understanding
managing change respect and responsibility
Slovenia
basic science skills community cooperation complexity understanding
managing change respect and responsibility
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‘improvements’. The situation in Slovenia is reversed, with ‘complexity un-
derstanding’ taking centre stage, whilst ‘respect and responsibility’ comes 
second. Combined with greater representation of ‘managing change’ skills 
and values, this suggests that Slovenian educational discourse takes a more 
active approach to management of global environmental change, perhaps 
one of direct involvement, whilst Croatian one prefers a more passive ap-
proach. In addition to that, a sizeable relative representation of ‘respect and 
responsibility’ values in Slovenia suggests that the approach to ESD skills 
and values is not entirely techno-managerial.
Qualitative framing of environment in subject syllabi from 
transformative perspective 
From an engaged political ecology perspective, it is important to equip 
students with critical tools required to understand root causes of contem-
porary global environmental challenges and their connection to human de-
velopment and wellbeing. Given this objective, a quantitative comparison 
of topic representation cannot tell us whether their framing leads to un-
derstanding rather than rote-learning, and to exploration of causes rather 
than appropriation of notional platitudes. Sauve, Brunelle and Berryman 
(2005) analysed environmental education texts since the 1970s in order 
to establish the influence of neoliberal globalization, and they concluded 
that environmental education was presented as a tool for material develop-
ment and economic growth. The environment was presented as resource 
characterised by technological problems of management and not a part of 
human experience with its own intrinsic value. Given that education is also 
a tool to express societies’ choices and aspirations, they concluded that a 
lack of critical inquiry into the root causes of contemporary environmental 
challenges is a sign of societies’ choice to prioritize neoliberal economic 
policies. This can be seen as locking future generations into existing prac-
tices that are clearly problematic from the perspective of environmental 
sustainability. Individual societies, even small and peripheral European 
ones like Croatia and Slovenia should resist such globalizing tendencies 
through educational documents that embody transformative notions of 
describing and integrating environmental content into national compul-
sory education.
In subject syllabi that cover the Environment, Geography and Technol-
ogy7 in Croatia’s compulsory education overall there is almost no overlap 
between conceptual domains of complex objective systems, human society 
07 As stated above, due to the process of educational reform this refers to a 
different document (Milanović-Litre and Vican 2006) predating the more 
comprehensive, but as yet very general national curriculum framework 
(NFC) whose quantitative relationships are reported on. 
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and individual agency (see example in the box below). In addition to that, a 
transdisciplinary perspective on the contemporary global environmental 
challenges is also missing. The presentation of content is such that it does 
not allow students to tackle root causes of environmental degradation and 
their connection to individual behaviour and wellbeing, as well as power 
relations in society. The environment and ecosystems contained therein 
are presented as a resource to be economically managed so that the nega-
tive side-effects are avoided (Domazet 2012b). Besides being valued as a 
resource, biosphere is only valued for aesthetic reasons. 
In Slovenia, there is a greater overlap between the conceptual domains of 
complex objective systems, human society and individual agency, though it 
is still far from making the permanent connection that Schwarzin’s (2010) 
transformative educational paradigm envisions. There are some explicit 
calls for transdisciplinary approach to factual content, but no great wealth 
of examples and inclusion of non-scientific forms of knowledge and envi-
ronmental world-views (Domazet 2012b). Two examples of framing are 
given in the box below. 
Slovenian selected subject syllabi present the students’s potential as hu-
man individuals, giving them a more prominent role in tackling environ-
mental challenges than is the case in Croatia. In addition to that, it places 
greater emphasis on the holistic humanity-environment-economy com-
plex. Though explicit exploration of root causes of global environmental 
change in its material and social aspects is still absent, in Slovenia there is 
“Students should develop an attitude towards life as a value, and fa-
miliarize themselves with capacities to conserve and protect nature. 
They should familiarize themselves with beauty of their surround-
ings and the importance of protection of natural beauty and resources 
for purposes of human health and wellbeing.” (Authors’ translation 
from 7th/8th grade Biology subject syllabus, Milanović Litre and Vi-
can 2006). 
“Students should, at science and technology lessons, experience na-
ture empirically, learn about it, change it through work and assess 
interference with it from different value-points. […]
Knowledge and experience about themselves, about nature and tech-
nology is used by pupils in order to engage with the environment and 
make informed and responsible change to it.” (Authors’ translation 
from 5th grade Nature and Technology subject, Vodopivec et al. 2011).
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a greater emphasis on critical thinking in different disciplinary domains 
related to sustainability and development. 
 
Concluding remarks: education for switch to sustainability or business 
as usual? 
Although scientific literary practice prefers a clear conclusion mandating 
unanimous action, the rethinking of basic organising concepts of moder-
nity, limited transformation potential of the semi-periphery, span of social 
and formal learning practice and only partial contribution of curricular con-
tent to eventual learning outcomes; we shy away in this instance from sug-
gesting simple curricular replacements of the existing content recorded. 
Nonetheless, the above analyses should have informed the reader of the 
curricular areas and structural connections where such alterations might 
be found in each of the two semi-peripheral European formal educational 
systems. Their historic rootedness in the processes of ‘europeisation’ of 
education in each country and possible ‘modernisation’ convergence re-
mains an issue for further explorations. Overall, the observed differences 
among qualitative framings in two countries align with our insights from 
quantitative comparisons in the preceding section. 
Our findings mostly confirm the rigid distinction between culture and 
nature which has been a central feature of modern Western traditions 
(Latour 1993), and which still shapes much of sustainability thinking in 
developed societies. A reorientation to sustainability requires the integra-
tion of technology, humanity and ecology into a whole, while all of these 
elements are subject to political negotiations of choices (Davidson 2004). 
In contrast to that, representations of humanity, ecology and technology as 
separate forms of reality still stand behind much of current sustainability 
thinking, which is reflected in our analysis of curricular content in Croatia 
and Slovenia. 
Compulsory education still insufficiently nurtures connections be-
tween techno-scientific developmental progress and processes that lead 
to it. A somewhat greater awareness of technology as not only a product 
of existing but a creator of new human-environment complexes (Latour 
2002) may be related to the observed greater disassociation from techno-
scientific optimism in Slovenia. This realisation of the limited scope of 
technology to address the problem demands a new kind of democratic 
citizen to be fostered through educational process. To avoid simply shifting 
the burden to the curricular content of “citizenship” or “civic education”, 
a wholesale change of educational framing of development model and 
ideology is needed, away from straightforward ideological reproduction 
of the status quo. 
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The social change invoked in texts of this volume places before edu-
cation a staunch task of quickly redefining the answer to the question 
‘How should we live?’ (Davidson 2000) – suggesting that something like a 
global citizen is called for. This would be an individual that is conceptually 
‘plugged’ into the interconnectedness of societies around the planet, as 
well as humans, the rest of biosphere and the planetary physical base. That 
individual must take much greater responsibility and show far reaching re-
spect for distant consequences of her actions (Davidson 2004). Essentially, 
this requires educational practices of governance and participation, as well 
as normative respect for the non-human biosphere and responsibility for 
the human disproportionate impact on the whole. 
Given the necessity of accentuating the environmental change in the 
public sphere of the European semi-periphery , we call for an education that 
discusses root causes of the dissatisfaction with the current predicament 
and encourages exploration of possible alternatives. In devising a global 
environmental reorientation, our societies must discuss the global direc-
tion of civilization, while our education systems should equip citizens with 
tools for such a discussion, abandoning reliance on simple practical fixes for 
existing socio-economic institutions. In some respects, Slovenia’s popula-
tion currently seems better prepared to embark on such a transformative 
path, not only because of greater individual income of its members, but 
also because of societal aspirations encoded in educational narratives that 
present the environment as a more integral component of individuals’ 
wellbeing. At the same time, a relatively high concern for environmental 
protection, coupled with respect for biodiversity and natural resources 
indicates that Croatia could embark on a transformative path as well, if it 
challenges its blank reliance on economic growth and better negotiates 
long-term human wellbeing within the confines of a geographically and 
climatically limited space. 
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To think through the potential of developmental sustainability, whilst 
bearing in mind the relationships between environment, economy and 
society is in itself in this day and age an important discipline. A group of 
authors here, whilst thinking through the concepts of ‘degrowth’ and 
‘prosperity without growth’, seek out solutions and point to possible 
ideational ‘sustainable pathways’ towards sustainability. In that sense 
this volume is a good, even exceptional, contribution to science of 
sustainability within the discourse of social sciences and humanities.
— Vladimir Lay • University of Zagreb
This volume is in many respects exceptional. The topics are judiciously 
covered, with detailed information about contemporary insights in 
individual research areas, the approaches are appropriately theoretically 
framed, the empirical standpoints are methodologically rigorously 
examined, and – a special quality of this volume – the hegemonic 
discourse of development is critically examined. On top of its analytical 
qualities, this volume is heartening for the critical thought contained 
herein, the thought which invigorates the hope for a possibility of a 
different development at a time when this is not generally encouraged. 
Especially in the countries of the (semi)periphery, where the evidence of 
the correctness of the existing development model is based, as so many 
times in history, on the destruction of the counter-evidence. 
— Vjeran Katunarić • University of Zadar
The transition countries of South-East Europe are a showcase of how 
the contradictions of intensified economic growth and sustainability 
shape reality. This remarkable volume devoted to an under-researched 
geographical area helps to understand the limits of going green in SEE,  
but also opens paths for a mutual understanding and for enhancing 
support for highly-needed green policies in the region.  
— Manuela Troschke • Institute for East and Southeast 
 European Studies, Regensburg
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